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In whose name? Construction of the EUropean agency in the European Union's institutional discourse on the war in Ukraine

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ABSTRACT

This article examines how European Union (EU) institutions discursively construct EUropean agency in their social media communication on the war in Ukraine, interrogating the legitimising strategies that constitute the Union's evolving role as a security actor. Grounded on poststructuralist understandings of discourse, legitimation and performativity, the study develops a novel model of EUropean agency attribution that accounts for its multi-actor fluid nature. This model is then applied to a large dataset of X posts published between 2022 and 2024 by the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the EU/European Council. The findings reveal profound institutional divergences: the European Commission deploys expansive and multilateral attributions of agency, performing a self-authorized role of a geopolitical orchestrator; the Parliament foregrounds itself and its members as the primary agents of response and the Council privileges abstract invocations of "the EU" as a unitary actor. Citizens and member states, by contrast, are largely absent as discursive agents, indicating a centralisation of symbolic authority at the institutional level. These patterns underscore the plural and contested nature of EUropean agency with broader implications for debates on EU legitimacy and symbolic authority in the security domain.

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Introduction

The paper scrutinises the ways in which the European Union (EU) institutions discursively construct EUropean¹ agency in their X communications on the war in Ukraine, that is "one of the most critical geopolitical developments in Europe's recent history and a major test for EU foreign and security policies" (Borgers and Giraudo 2022, p. 1). Specifically, it delves into the discursive self-legitimation strategies that these institutions employ, revealing the underlying mechanisms that shape and sustain the EUropean agency. It takes

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particular interest in the originators of agency in institutional discourse, which is crucial for understanding not only the representation of action and responsibility but also the construction of collective and institutional security identities within the EU. Particularly in the context of security, it is essential to understand how EU institutions construct and sustain their “selves” through discourse (McDonagh 2015).

Theoretically, the article draws on several foundations of poststructuralism and the concepts of legitimation, agency and performativity. Methodologically, it adopts qualitative content analysis, analysing a unique dataset of more than 9,300 X posts published between February 2022 and July 2024 by four key EU institutions: the European Parliament (EP), the European Commission (EC), the European Council and the Council of the European Union. Central to this inquiry is the introduction and subsequent application of a novel model designed to decode the EU’s agency attribution. By applying this model to the vivid case study of EU institutions’ communication on the war in Ukraine, the paper illuminates how the EU navigates and constructs its security identity within the broader discourse of European security.

Studying this performative positioning of European agency on the war in Ukraine, as exercised by EU institutions, is crucial for understanding the Union’s evolving role in European security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine put European security under immense pressure and marked a geopolitical awakening for Europe (Costa and Barbé 2023, David Maxine 2024, Håkansson 2024, Riddervold and Rieker 2024, Ünalldilar *et al.* 2025). It ushered in a new era and forced the EU to critically assess its foreign and security policies and advance its thinking about its geopolitical role. At the same time, it has sent “mixed signals” about the EU’s capacity to be a relevant actor in foreign and security policy (Costa and Barbé 2023). On the one hand, the steps taken by the EU have been widely seen as game-changers (Costa and Barbé 2023). The EU has responded to the war by strengthening its defence capabilities, a new security mission in Ukraine, a new industrial policy, sanctions on Russia and Belarus, and acceptance of Ukrainian refugees under temporary protection. At the same time, however, it has exposed the EU’s weaknesses and exacerbated its existing security-related problems, such as the overall low military capabilities, limited financial capacity, overly complex decision-making procedures and differences among EU member states (David Maxine 2024, Grevi 2024).

It is precisely within this tension that performative positioning becomes crucial. Together with Palm and Crum (2019, p. 515), the article considers “the EU’s security identity to be a function of its own articulation”. By communicating on the war in Ukraine, EU institutions actively construct and project a security identity that aligns with their strategic interests. Through this performative process, EU institutions may claim legitimacy and coherence even in the face of limited material capabilities.

Unravelling this process, the research question that this article seeks to answer is: How do the EU institutions attribute European agency in their X communication on the war in Ukraine? In doing so, it makes two original contributions. Theoretically, it advances debates on EU agency by conceptualising how institutions discursively “speak” European agency into being, while accounting for the multi-actorness and fluid overlap between the EU and the broader identitarian construct of Europe. Empirically, it provides the first systematic analysis of the EU institutional communication on the war in Ukraine, revealing not only who is positioned as acting but also how inter-institutional struggles over symbolic authority are performed through discourse.

The results reveal stark divergences in how EU institutions discursively construct European agency in their communicative responses to the war in Ukraine. The European Commission engages in expansive and multilateral attributions of agency, performing a self-authorised role as geopolitical orchestrator and effectively stretching the symbolic boundaries of European identity. In contrast, the European Parliament constructs itself as the core agent of response, while the Council privileges more abstract collective references to “the EU” as a unitary actor. This differentiated performance of agency suggests both strategic diversification and institutional dissonance, reflecting underlying asymmetries in symbolic authority. Notably, EU citizens and member states are largely marginalised as agents, indicating a discursive centralisation of legitimacy that prioritises institutional over participatory voices. As such, these findings bear significant policy implications for the EU’s legitimacy and communicative outreach by shaping who is constructed, and who is not, as a meaningful subject of European security.

The article unfolds as follows. It first situates the study within the existing scholarship and then turns to outlining its theoretical and conceptual grounding. Following this, it introduces a novel analytical model that operationalises the concept of European agency attribution. The subsequent section applies this model to the empirical case of the EU’s communications during the war in Ukraine. After providing the brief context of the EU institutions’ role and engagement in the war, the data and method are unpacked. This is followed by the presentation of the empirical results. The conclusion sums up the findings and discusses the policy implications.

Literature review and contribution to scholarship

This article makes theoretical, empirical and policy-relevant contributions to three inter-related strands of scholarship. By introducing and applying a novel model of European agency attribution to the case of institutional communication during the war in Ukraine, it engages with: (1) debates on the EU’s security identity, (2) nascent scholarship on the EU security discourse on social media and (3) research on the discursive construction of agency.

Efforts to embed a collective security policy within EU integration have long been analysed as part of the gradual emergence of the European security identity (Martin 2014, McDonagh 2015, Palm and Crum 2019, Riddervold and Rieker 2024). The Russian invasion of Ukraine is widely recognised as a critical juncture in this trajectory, accelerating the EU’s self-identification as a geopolitical and global strategic actor (Alcaro 2022, Costa and Barbé 2023, Freire 2024, Zarembo 2024, Pishchikova 2025). While recent constructivist and discursive accounts underscore the relational dynamics through which this identity is shaped (Bricart 2024, Pishchikova 2025, Tereskiewicz 2025), they do not ask who claims ownership of this evolving identity. Understanding this process requires turning to broader debates on agency.

Existing scholarship on EU agency underscores that agency is not given but performed, whether through practice (Bueger 2016, Palm and Crum 2019), as in “*doing Europe*” (McDonagh 2015, Bueger 2016), or through discourse, as in “*speaking Europe*” (Diez 1999), a mode further corroborated in linguistic and discursive studies (Ahearn 2001, Leipold and Winkel 2017). Yet the discursive construction of European agency – how the Union speaks itself into being across contexts – remains comparatively

underexplored. This gap is particularly acute in the case of the war in Ukraine, a turning point for the EU's security identity and actorness (Freire 2024, Tereszkievicz 2025). While Costa and Barbé (2023) and Lika and Riga (2024) show that the war has intensified material and strategic demands on EU actorness, the literature leaves unexamined the discursive performances through which institutions may bridge or obscure such constraints by projecting agency through language.

This question becomes particularly pertinent when examining the communicative practices through which EU institutions project their roles to the public. In this context, the article extends the literature on EU social media communication (Özdemir and Rauh 2022, Rocca *et al.* 2024, Özdemir *et al.* 2025) into the largely unexplored terrain of security discourse. Such discourse has long been shown to constitute the Union as a security actor and to securitise external threats (Christou 2014, Telford 2018, Tichý 2020), while broader work points to strategies of proximization and securitisation in this regard (Cap 2015, Köhler 2019, pp. 42–62). Social media adds a distinctive dimension to these dynamics, since it narrows the distance between the EU and its publics (Özdemir and Rauh 2022), becoming a key site for performative self-positioning and legitimacy-building (Schmidt 2022) that shapes public perception (Hu 2024).

What is more, although the existing work acknowledges the multi-actor nature of EU security policy (Rieker and Giske 2024, p. 15), it remains ill-equipped to capture the differentiated, multi-dimensional ways in which institutions discursively construct agency. This study addresses this lacuna by theorising and tracing institutional patterns of European agency attribution through a new model, designed to capture the fluid and institutionally dispersed nature of the Union.

Theoretical and conceptual background

Theoretically situated within the larger poststructuralist tradition, which explicitly conceives of discourse as constitutive, emphasising the performative force of language through its articulation (Buzan *et al.* 1998, Diez 1999, 2014, Braun *et al.* 2019), the article builds upon three core concepts: political legitimation, agency and performativity.

In terms of political legitimation, the paper adopts a Weberian perspective, viewing legitimation as a social activity that can be empirically observed and tested. Legitimacy is conceptualised as the beliefs held by audiences that an actor's authority is appropriately exercised (Bennett 2022, pp. 370–371). Consequently, legitimation is understood as strategic practices aimed at stabilising and enhancing such beliefs, with self-legitimation referring to an actor's own efforts to legitimise its actions and authority (Hall *et al.* 2022). This paper situates itself within the discursive strand of legitimation research, framing (self-)legitimation as inherently discursive (Bexell *et al.* 2022).

The concept of agency is broadly defined as the "capacity to act" (Braun *et al.* 2019, p. 788) and is seen as a "relational achievement" (Bueger 2016, p. 407). The sense of agency is a concept that "represents our ability to attribute actions to ourselves or other people" (Kaloczy 2018, p. 256). In the context of IR theory (and this paper), it refers to the ability of actors to make choices and exert influence within their specific contexts (Braun *et al.* 2019). From a poststructuralist perspective, however, agency is never given or static; rather, it is continuously performed and (re)constituted through discursive practices.

Central to this poststructuralist thought on agency is the concept of performativity (McKinlay 2010, Aradau *et al.* 2015, Braun *et al.* 2019, Makarychev 2024). Performativity, as initially developed by Austin (1979) and further elaborated by Derrida (1988) and Butler (2006), posits that discourses do not merely describe pre-existing realities but actively bring those realities, including forms of agency, into being through their articulation (McDonagh 2015, Braun *et al.* 2019). This notion is crucial for understanding how the actors' performative discourse serves not just as a reflection of their agency but as a constitutive practice aimed at establishing and legitimising their role as actors in the given domain.

This performative production of agency is tightly intertwined with the construction of role identities. Identity categories are not stable labels but socially constructed, relational formations (McDonagh 2015, Fisher-Onar 2023). In the EU context, security practices are performative in the sense that they are "implicated in the construction, reconstruction and legitimation of EU identity narratives, which in turn constrain and construct the security imaginary of the EU as a security actor" (McDonagh 2015, p. 627). Rather than reconstructing such narratives *per se* (cf. Roselle *et al.* 2014, p. 75), we examine attributions of agency as one component that can feed into broader identity narratives. These identity narratives simultaneously constitute the EU's agency and circumscribe the forms that agency may take, and are sometimes treated as a type of strategic narratives (Roselle *et al.* 2014, Miskimmon *et al.* 2018). Not all identity narratives are strategic, and motivations cannot be inferred from EU institutional communication. However, the performative, curated nature of social media makes it plausible that these agency attributions contribute to strategic narratives through which EU institutions "seek to establish themselves and their influence in world politics" (Miskimmon *et al.* 2018, p. 4).

Several key elements of performativity are particularly relevant for further analysis. Performativity fundamentally rejects essentialism, viewing the construction of role identities, and hence also the agency, as "constant discursive shifts and transformations along a broad spectrum of normative, ethical, moral and other options" (Makarychev 2024, p. 4). This perspective underscores the fluid and contingent nature of role identity formation, where identities are not fixed but continuously reconstituted through discourse (McDonagh 2015). Moreover, performativity highlights the intrinsic instability of agency performances (McDonagh 2015, Braun *et al.* 2019). The performative nature of discourse is coterminous with "the regular reiteration of norms as authoritative constructs" (McKinlay 2010), which, despite their appearance of stability, are in fact contextual and subject to change (McKinlay 2010, Makarychev 2024). This insight into the fluidity of performative acts is crucial for understanding how institutional and collective agency is constructed, maintained, and transformed over time.

Model of European agency attributions

European agency, as conceptualised in this article, refers to discursive attributions of action, initiative or decision-making that are linked either to actors embedded within the formal structures of the European Union or to broader, more diffuse representations of Europe as a geopolitical or civilisational space. These attributions are framed in ways that invoke, reproduce or align with European interests, norms and values, thereby distinguishing them from the agency of external actors such as the United States or

Canada. The analytical focus lies on the *discursive construction* of agency – specifically, agency attribution/nominal agency – understood as the explicit designation of actors as acting or being attributed with action. This approach enables a critical interrogation of how the EU’s security identity is performatively constituted through patterns of inclusion, exclusion and responsibility allocation, offering insights into the symbolic hierarchies and normative assumptions that underpin institutional self-legitimation in wartime.

To comprehend the discursive articulation of European agency in the context of the war in Ukraine, the article introduces a novel two-axis model, which captures the diversity and multiplicity of arenas in which European agency can manifest and which is visually represented in [Figure 1](#).

The model categorises European agency into four distinct quadrants along two primary axes. The first axis, *EU-specific vs. non-EU-specific agency*, distinguishes between agency attributions embedded within the normative and legal-political framework of the European Union, and those operating outside or beyond it (Bruter 2004, 2005). *EU-specific agency* is confined to entities whose authority derives from, or is tightly coupled to, the EU’s boundaries, which are “clearly delimited based on legal norms and agreement of its members” (Moreno Barreneche 2023, p. 685). This can include formal EU institutions or broader signifiers such as “EU citizens” or “EU member states”. By contrast, *non-EU-specific agency* encompasses actors who extend beyond these formal confines. These include civilisational or geographical referents such as “Europe”, “Europeans”, as well as institutions affiliated with states outside the EU but still within Europe, such as Moldova or the United Kingdom (cf. Moreno Barreneche 2023).




Figure 1. Model of European agency attributions.

The second axis, *institutional vs. non-institutional agency*, contrasts actions undertaken within formal institutions (such as the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council) with those that occur outside them, reflecting the understanding that agency can originate both within and beyond institutional settings (Rieker and Giske 2024, p. 33). We build on the classic distinction between formal and informal institutions (North 1990, p. 4, Hix 1999) but adopt a narrower definition of formal institutions, referring specifically to formally constituted decision-making bodies. This narrow definition is crucial because it excludes broader entities, including the “European Union” itself, from being considered “institutional” by this model.

As illustrated in Figure 1, from the intersection of these axes emerge four quadrants, each delineating a distinct category of discursive agency attribution (see the Codebook in Table 2 for full operationalisation and examples from the corpus). The quadrant of *EU-specific institutional agency* comprises references to EU institutions themselves, their internal components, their leadership and other EU institutions. *EU-specific non-institutional agency* encompasses attributions directed at more abstract or collective signifiers within the EU context, such as “the European Union”, “EU countries” or “EU citizens”. The quadrant of *non-EU-specific institutional agency* includes formal institutional actors situated outside the EU’s institutional framework. This includes national-level representatives of member states as well as institutions from third countries or international organisations. Finally, *non-EU-specific non-institutional agency* denotes the most diffuse and symbolically open category. It includes geographical abstractions such as “Europe”, identity-based references like “Europeans”, state references without the EU qualifier and individualised societal actors.

The very intersection of both axes is the pronoun “we” as a floating signifier (Laclau 2007). A floating signifier does not settle on a single referent. Its sense can differ based on context and on who interprets it, carrying multiple meanings at once for different audiences. This contrasts with an “empty signifier”, which operates as an intentionally indeterminate term that allows heterogeneous groups to rally around it by investing it with their own preferred meanings or agendas. In that sense, the empty signifier serves as a temporary point of attachment, while the floating signifier remains in motion and its sense is continuously refigured (Ostiguy *et al.* 2021). As such, it highlights the “we’s” role in constructing a flexible and inclusive discourse that can adapt to different audiences and objectives, with different “clouds of meaning” attached to it.

This model allows us to identify not only who is assigned the capacity to act, but also how inter-institutional divergences reveal underlying struggles over symbolic capital within the EU’s foreign and security policy apparatus.

Table 1. Corpus overview.

	European Commission	Council	European Parliament	Total
Total number of X posts	5,199	2,103	2,042	9,344
Number of X posts on the war in Ukraine	1,425	546	294	2,265
Number of X posts on the war in Ukraine as % to the total number of X posts by the institution	27.41%	25.96%	14.40%	24.24%

Application of the model

In what follows, we apply the model to the empirical case of EU institutions' communication on the war in Ukraine on X. Our focus is on key EU institutions: the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the Council/European Council (which share a joint X account). To provide the necessary contextual framework, we will first briefly delineate the roles and engagements of these institutions in the conflict.

Through its responses to the war, the EC, traditionally a secondary player in EU defence policy (Nugent and Rhinard 2016, Riddervold 2016), has sought to elevate its role in shaping the EU's security and defence policy (Fiott 2023, Håkansson 2024). It has seized the opportunities to assert its influence, particularly through the rapid implementation of unprecedented sanctions against Russia. Under the leadership of President Ursula von der Leyen, it has played a pivotal role in shaping EU policies, often leading the charge in areas traditionally dominated by member states. This shift not only underscores the Commission's growing geopolitical ambitions but also highlights its capacity to act (Håkansson 2024). The EC has employed a top-down, assertive approach in its policymaking, often positioning itself as the voice of the collective EU response (Håkansson 2024). The war in Ukraine thus marks "a watershed moment" for the EC, solidifying its position as a key player in European and global security dynamics (Fiott 2023, Håkansson 2024).

Despite its limited direct competencies in EU foreign and security policy, the European Parliament has also asserted a significant role in shaping the EU's response, through various legislative and symbolic actions. It has pushed for a robust and united stance against Russian aggression, for instance, through adopting resolutions condemning the aggression and advocating closer ties between the EU and Ukraine with large majorities, or hosting high-profile debates (Borgers and Giraudo 2022). President Roberta Metsola was also the first EU leader to visit Kyiv (Sheftalovich 2022). The war in Ukraine is widely perceived as a potential "catalyst for more parliamentary involvement in EU external action" (Borgers and Giraudo 2022, p. 1). This proactive engagement reflects the Parliament's broader ambition to influence EU external actions and position itself as a moral leader within the EU's institutional framework (Borgers and Giraudo 2022, Sheftalovich 2022, David and L.D 2024, Håkansson 2024).

The Council of the European Union and the European Council have played important roles in coordinating and shaping the EU's collective response to the war. While the European Council has been instrumental in setting the strategic direction for the EU's actions, the Council of the EU has been key in negotiating and adopting the specific measures. This has often been a challenge, particularly in the face of varying national interests and priorities (Costa and Barbé 2023). Their role has been characterised by the need for swift decision-making in a highly sensitive and rapidly evolving geopolitical environment. Their engagement has also highlighted the continued importance of member states in EU security policy, even as the European Commission has expanded its influence in this area (Håkansson 2024).

Data and method

The empirical data consist of a comprehensive corpus of X posts on the war in Ukraine disseminated via three official X accounts of four principal institutions of the European

Union (the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council/Council of the EU) from 24 February 2022, the day of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, to 15 July 2024, marking the end of the 9th European Parliament's mandate. This temporal scope provides an institutional boundary and ensures that we capture a representative snapshot of EU institutional discourse across different stages of the conflict and the EU's evolving responses – from initial condemnations and emergency resolutions, through sanctions and military assistance, to discourse addressing wider repercussions such as the energy crisis, refugee protection and Ukraine's accession prospects. These moments constitute key instances in which EU institutions discursively constructed and projected European agency.

The decision to focus on X is grounded in its status as a strategically significant platform for institutional digital diplomacy. As Özdemir *et al.* (2025, p. 256) observe, “social media offers opportunities for European Union executives to improve their precarious legitimacy. Their broad, unmediated, instant, and cheap reach allows EU executives to explain to citizens what they are doing in their own words”. In this sense, X furnishes EU institutions with a direct and unmediated communicative channel, without the mediating influence of traditional editorial gatekeepers. Its longevity, sustained high levels of user engagement, and entrenched adoption by EU policymakers during the period under scrutiny enhance its analytical relevance. Moreover, its architecture, explicitly optimised for real-time news diffusion and political signalling, positions it as a particularly salient site for tracing the performative articulation of European agency (Sguazzini and Mazziotti Di Celso 2025, Shyrokykh and Kragh 2025).

Operationally, all X posts were extracted from the institutions' official X accounts (@Europarl_EN, @EU_Commission, @EUCouncil), using NodeXL Pro software. As seen in Table 1, the number collected across all three institutions totalled 9,344 X posts. From the overall dataset, we chose only those posts in English that explicitly addressed the war in Ukraine, amounting to 2,256 X posts in total (24.24%). The intensity of X communication on the war in Ukraine varied markedly across institutions, with the European Commission (27.41%) and the Council (25.96%) devoting over a quarter of their total posts to the conflict, in contrast to the European Parliament, where the war featured in only 14.40% of posts.

Methodologically, the article adopted a qualitative content analysis, which allowed for a systematic assessment of the scope of various types of European agency. The strength of content analysis lies in its capacity to quantify the contents of a text using a method that is clear and replicable (Neuendorf 2017). We opted for manual coding over computer-assisted coding, which allowed for a more sensitive examination of the material (Krippendorff 2019).² Each instance of agency attribution in the X posts was meticulously coded in accordance with the detailed Codebook (Table 2). In line with our understanding of agency set out above, we coded as attributions of agency all cases in which an actor is presented as doing something – for example, proposing, deciding, agreeing, calling for, implementing, enabling or constraining – or as responsible for a course of action, in both cases related to the war in Ukraine. Mere mentions of actors, or cases where actors appear only as recipients or beneficiaries without being depicted as actively shaping events, were not coded as agentic. For instance, in the tweet “Austria, France and the Netherlands will receive an additional €119.9 million under REACT-EU” (@EU_Commission, 2.8.2022), the member states are not attributed agency because

Table 2. Codebook.

Quadrant	Subcategory	Operationalisation	Example from the corpus
EU-specific institutional agency	Self-referenced EU institution	Agency attributions by the institution to the institution itself (e.g. the EP attributing agency to the EP).	In the aftermath of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Parliament today, with an overwhelming majority, demanded tougher sanctions that will hurt the aggressor. Read a summary of what Parliament is calling for ↓. (@Europarl_EN, 1.03.2022).
	Self-referenced EU institutional members	Agency attributions by the institution to its members/components (e.g. the EC attributing agency to Commissioner @YlvaJohansson, the EP attributing agency to MEPs).	[...] Commissioner @YlvaJohansson provides advice on the risk of human trafficking for those fleeing the war on UA. #EUAgainstTHB (@EU_Commission, 23.03.2022).
	Self-referenced EU institutional leader	Agency attributions by the institution to its institutional head (e.g. the EC attributing agency to President @vonderleyen).	President @vonderleyen [...] will mobilise support and raise funds for Ukrainian refugees and those internally displaced (@EU_Commission, 08.04.2022).
	EU institutions and leaders (general)	Agency attributions to EU institutions/EU leaders in general.	Today the Council's Europa building and other EU institutions' headquarters light up in blue and yellow to mark Ukraine's Independence Day and to show our unwavering support for and solidarity with #Ukraine. (@EUCouncil, 24.08.2022).
	Other EU institutions and leaders (specific)	Agency attributions to other EU institutions (e.g. the EC attributing agency to the EP).	The atrocities committed in Ukraine must not go unpunished. We welcome @Europarl_EN's adoption of our proposal to reinforce the Eurojust's mandate. @Eurojust will now be equipped to serve as a central hub to preserve, store and analyse evidence of war crimes. #StandWithUkraine (@EU_Commission, 19.05.2022).
EU-specific non-institutional agency	EU	Agency attributions to the EU as a collective.	With Russia's war on Ukraine, the EU stays true to its values, defends the @UN Charter and continues to work as a force for peace. (@EUCouncil, 10.12.2022).
	EU member states	Agency attributions to EU member states collectively (e.g. EU countries, member states).	EU countries agreed to consider increasing support of ammunition to UA armed forces via the #EuropeanPeaceFacility [...]. (@EUCouncil, 20.03.2023).
	EU citizens	Agency attributions to EU citizens (e.g. EU citizens, the people of the EU).	[...] EU citizens continue to show their unwavering solidarity with Ukraine. [...]. (@EU_Commission, 23.02.2023).
Non-EU-specific non-institutional agency	Europe	Agency attributions to Europe.	Two years after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion, Europe continues to stand with Ukraine. [...] (@Europarl_EN, 24. 02. 2024).
	Europeans	Agency attributions to Europeans (e.g. Europeans, European people).	[...] From Stockholm to Alicante, Copenhagen and Prague, Europeans took to the streets with one message: Stop war. #StandWithUkraine (@EU_Commission, 01.03.2022).

(Continued)

Table 2. Continued.

Quadrant	Subcategory	Operationalisation	Example from the corpus
Non-EU-specific institutional agency	Individual EU member states (w/o EU qualifier)	Agency attributions to a specific EU member state without the EU qualifier (e.g. Poland, Germany).	Poland is playing an essential role in supporting refugees fleeing Ukraine. [...] (@EU_Commission, 30.03.2022).
	Individual non-EU European states	Agency attributions to non-EU European states (e.g. Moldova, the United Kingdom).	Moldova is strongly determined to stay part of the free world. We are part of Europe. [...] (@Europarl_EN, 21. 05. 2022).
	Other	Agency attributions to other non-EU-specific non-institutional informal actors, e.g. Other non-EU-specific non-institutional actors (e.g. Hungarian volunteers, Polish mothers, Alina and many other volunteers)	Refugees from UA Ukraine get off their wagons at Budapest Nyugati Railway Station. HU Hungarian volunteers are there to welcome them and offer free housing. [...] (@EU_Commission, 11.03.2022).
	EU member states institutions	Agency attributions to institutional actors from EU member states (e.g. Slovenian Prime Minister, the Czech President).	Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob stressed the power of European unity, cooperation and solidarity when facing challenges such as Russia's aggression against Ukraine and the energy crisis [...] (@Europarl_EN, 13.12.2022)
	Non-EU European states institutions	Agency attributions to institutional actors from non-EU states (e.g. Moldovan President Maia Sandu, Ukrainian parliament, Ukrainian president).	Moldovan President Maia Sandu will address MEPs on the war in Ukraine and its consequences this afternoon ↓ (@Europarl_EN, 18.5.2022).
	We		Agency attribution to an indeterminate collective "we".

they are only on the receiving end of an action. Importantly, a single X post could involve multiple agency attributions, a reflection of the complex and multifaceted nature of European agency and its representation. To ensure comprehensiveness, agency attributions falling outside the predefined categories of European agency were coded as non-European agency.

To assess whether agency attribution patterns remain broadly consistent over time, we split the corpus into two near-equal sub-periods (24 February 2022–5 May 2023; 6 May 2023–15 July 2024) and re-estimated the distributions by institution (see Online Appendix). Although this design cannot capture month-to-month volatility, it allows us to test whether the principal patterns persist across the earlier and later parts of the observation window.

Results

Table 3 depicts the overall patterns of agency attribution across the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Council. It distinguishes between non-European and European agency, with the latter further disaggregated into four quadrants. In what follows, the article looks into how exactly the European agency was discursively constructed.

Table 3. Comparative overview of the agency attribution patterns.

Agency	EC	Council	EP
Non-EUropean agency	11.58% (164)	6.59% (36)	3.00% (9)
EUropean agency	89.26% (1272)	95.42% (521)	89.67% (269)
EU-specific institutional agency	22.60% (322)	58.61% (320)	82.00% (246)
Self-referenced EU institution	0.98% (14)	17.77% (97)	37.67% (113)
Self-referenced EU institutional members	3.02% (43)	37.00% (202)	44.33% (133)
Self-referenced EU institutional leader	13.40% (191)	1.47% (8)	6.00% (18)
EU institutions and leaders (general)	1.68% (24)	15.02% (82)	2.33% (7)
Other EU institutions and leaders (specific)	9.47% (135)	0.92% (5)	4.33% (13)
EU-specific non-institutional agency	35.51% (506)	49.82% (272)	33.67% (101)
EU	32.84% (468)	46.34% (253)	31.33% (94)
EU member states	3.86% (55)	11.54% (63)	3.00% (9)
EU citizens	1.19% (17)	0.37% (2)	1.00% (3)
Non-EU-specific non-institutional agency	20.14% (287)	2.20% (12)	8.67% (26)
Europe	5.54% (79)	0.00% (0)	2.67% (8)
Europeans	1.82% (26)	0.18% (1)	2.33% (7)
Individual EU member states (w/o EU qualifier)	3.02% (43)	0.00% (0)	0.00% (0)
Individual non-EU European states	4.63% (66)	1.28% (7)	0.33% (1)
Other (Hungarian volunteers, Polish mothers)	6.74% (96)	0.92% (5)	3.33% (10)
Non-EU-specific institutional agency	4.63% (66)	6.04% (33)	13.00% (39)
EU member states institutions	2.11% (30)	0.00% (0)	4.67% (14)
Non-EU member states institutions	2.60% (37)	6.04% (33)	8.33% (25)
WE	66.04% (941)	4.21% (23)	5.67% (17)

Percentages indicate the share of war-related X posts by each institution; absolute counts are given in parentheses.

Several cross-cutting patterns stand out immediately, most notably the European Commission's markedly broader attribution of agency compared to both the Council and the European Parliament. The Commission exhibited the highest degree of centrality, mobilising the entire spectrum of actor categories, both within and beyond the EU's formal boundaries. As such, it attributed agency to a heterogeneous coalition of responders to the war in Ukraine. This expansive range of attributions signals a distinctly multilateral stance, through which the Commission performed its role as an integral node within a broader international coalition. As such, it actively reinforced its self-image as a geopolitical actor capable of mobilising diverse constituencies.

A closer look at the balance between European and non-European agency underscores how strongly all three institutions foregrounded the EU and the broader identitarian domain of Europe as the principal site of legitimate action. European agency overwhelmingly dominated: the Council attributes agency to European actors in the largest share of its posts (95.42%), followed by the European Parliament (89.67%) and the European Commission (89.26%).

Accordingly, the EC was by far the most open to attributing agency to non-European actors (11.6%, compared to 6.6% in the case of the Council, and 3.0% in the case of the European Parliament). This openness is evident in its frequent references to global partners, international institutions, and concrete third states, further reinforcing the European Commission's distinctive multilateral posture.

The few instances in which non-European actors were foregrounded directly point to strategic purposes. Most often, they served to reinforce credibility and unity by embedding the EU's stance within a wider coalition (as in, "We are united in our support of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. EUUS"[@EU_Commission, 22.03.2022]). In other situations, they showcased alignment through gestures of support or gratitude

(as in “We support the investigation by @IntlCrimCourt prosecutor [...]” [@EU_Commission, 14.03.2023]). In such cases, the attribution of non-EUropean agency reinforced the credibility of the EU’s response by presenting it as manageable through collective effort, demonstrating unity and supporting coalition-building. Only rarely did institutions adopt a more demanding posture, addressing non-European states with explicit calls to action, as in:

The war in Ukraine is a violation of common rules. China has a very special responsibility as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. At the EU–China Summit, President @vonderleyen and @eucopresident discussed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine with President Xi Jinping. [@EU_Commission, 01.04.2022]

Yet, this attribution of non-EUropean agency was almost never presented in isolation. Out of 164 instances where the Commission referenced non-EUropean actors, only nine involved stand-alone non-EUropean agency attribution unaccompanied by any parallel EUropean agency (as in “For the first time in history, the @IntlCrimCourt has issued an arrest warrant for a leader of a permanent member of the UN Security Council” [@EU_Commission, 14.04.2023]). For the Council, this occurred in just seven cases, and even these exclusively concerned references to the G7 or G20, groupings in which EU representatives are themselves participants. The European Parliament, by contrast, never attributed stand-alone agency to non-EUropean actors at all; when external actors appeared, they were typically cast as complementary collaborators rather than exclusive shapers of the response (as in, “The International Criminal Court has issued a warrant for Vladimir Putin. The Russian president is accused of forcefully deporting Ukrainian children from their homeland. Parliament wants tougher global measures against Russian leaders [...]” [@Europarl_EN, 23. 4. 2023]).

This suggests that the EU institutions’ approach, with the European Commission at the forefront, actively constructed a shared framework of legitimate action. Rather than granting agency to external actors, they discursively integrated them as aligned partners within a web of collective response, thereby reinforcing the EU’s role as the coordinator on the global stage.

EU-specific institutional agency

The most pronounced form of agency attribution was EU-specific institutional agency, yet here striking differences emerged: it dominated the European Parliament’s discourse (82.00%), remained significant in the Council (58.61%), but was markedly less salient in the European Commission (22.60%).

The EP emerged as the most discursively self-assertive and inward-looking institution in narrating the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine. It attributed agency primarily to MEPs or its constituent parts (44.33%) and to itself as a whole (37.67%), constructing itself as the principal agent of EU action. The Council followed, assigning agency to its formations in 37.00%, to itself as a whole in 17.77% and to its President in 1.47% of cases. In stark contrast, the European Commission was the least self-referential, with just 3.02% of attributions referencing its members, 0.98% the institution itself and 13.40% its President. The European Parliament’s self-referential agency was most often expressed through condemnations, endorsements or calls to action, rather than references to direct

implementation. Unlike the Commission, which frequently communicated enacted measures, the Parliament typically called for others to act – such as urging the adoption of sanctions – rather than reporting on their implementation (as in “In a debate on EU-Russia relations, European security and Russia’s military threat against Ukraine, MEPs called for a united response and voiced support for Ukraine” [@Europarl_EN, 16.2.2022]). This tendency may be partly explained by the Parliament’s limited competencies in crisis management and foreign policy (e.g. in sanctions or military action under the Common Foreign and Security Policy). Yet, by continually commenting on, endorsing, or urging responses to the war in Ukraine through self-legitimation, the EP discursively claimed a central role, projecting authority and institutional visibility even where its material capacity to act was constrained. The Council typically constructed its agency through references to deliberation and agenda-setting, as in: “#FAC | EU foreign affairs ministers will discuss Russian aggression against #Ukraine & the EU action plan on its geopolitical consequences [...] (@EUCouncil, 20.4.2023)”.

The Council most frequently attributed agency to EU institutions or EU leaders collectively (15.02%), a markedly higher proportion than in the EP (2.33%) and the Commission (1.68%), reflecting its emphasis on undifferentiated institutional unity. By contrast, the European Commission assigned agency primarily to other specific EU institutions (9.47%), compared to just 4.33% in the EP and 0.92% in the Council, which highlights its preference for a more targeted, actor-specific representation of EU agency.

EU-specific non-institutional agency

The second most prevalent agency attribution was EU-specific non-institutional agency, where the distribution was more balanced but still revealed distinct emphases: it was highest in the Council’s case (49.82%), followed by the European Commission (35.51%) and the Parliament (33.67%). Among the categories, the EU as such – an abstract collective signifier – featured prominently across all three institutions: it was invoked in 46.34% of cases by the Council, and with similar frequency by the European Commission (32.84%) and the European Parliament (31.33%). For the Council, the EU constituted the single most frequently invoked category, for the European Commission it ranked second (after the collective “we”) and for the European Parliament third (after MEPs and the EP as such). The Council stands out in most forcefully emphasising the EU’s consolidated capacity to act in response to the war in Ukraine. Yet, the broader pattern, wherein all three institutions invoked the EU as the collective actor, reveals a cross-institutional discursive tendency to foreground the Union itself as a central locus of agency in the performance of security actorness.

What is particularly striking, however, is the near-complete absence of EU citizens as agents, with only 1.19% in the case of the Commission, 1.00% in the Parliament and 0.37% in the Council. This marginalisation of EU citizens as agents is especially notable in the case of the EP, the EU’s only directly elected body, which often rhetorically commits to citizen engagement (for instance, Metsola 2021).

Similarly, agency attributions to EU member states remained sidelined, referenced in only 3.00% of the EP’s content, 3.86% of the Commission’s and 11.54% of the Council’s. This is especially notable given that they have been directly involved in shaping the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine (for instance, European Council/Council of the

European Union 2022). This minimal visibility suggests a deliberate strategy aimed at collectivising EU action, absorbing national agency into broader supranational constructs such as “the EU” or the collective “we”.

Non-EU-specific non-institutional agency

The third most visible quadrant was non-EU-specific non-institutional agency, where the Commission stood out as the clear frontrunner (20.14%), while the Parliament (8.67%) and the Council (2.20%) engaged this dimension far more sparingly.

The most widely invoked category within this quadrant was “Europe”, functioning as a civilisational and geopolitical signifier that expanded the semantic scope of agency attribution. It allowed institutions to frame the EU’s response to the war in Ukraine as part of a broader continental endeavour. This framing was used most by the European Commission (5.54%), less by the European Parliament (2.67%), but not at all by the Council. This aligns with existing literature that highlights the Commission’s “deliberate usage of Europe to respond to crises” (Håkansson 2024, p. 27).

In contrast, the category of “Europeans”, which nominally evokes collective identity and inclusivity, played only a marginal role in agency attributions. It appeared in just 2.33% of Parliament’s references, 1.82% of those by the EC and a mere 0.18% in those by the Council. While the Parliament’s slightly higher engagement reflects its symbolic claim to represent the people, the identitarian discourse of “Europeans” remained largely dormant. Another bottom-up construction of agency, through references to other non-EU-specific non-institutional actors (such as “Hungarian volunteers” or “Polish mothers”), emerged most clearly in the Commission’s discourse (6.74%). The Parliament also engaged with this logic to a lesser extent (3.33%), while the Council largely eschewed such framings (0.92%).

Agency attributions to specific EU member states (without the EU qualifier) appeared exclusively in the Commission’s discourse (3.02%) and were entirely absent from the EP’s and Council’s. Agency attributions to concrete European non-EU states (e.g. Ukraine, Moldova, or Georgia) followed a similar pattern. The Commission again led with 4.63%, while the Council and Parliament invoked these actors far more sparingly (1.28% and 0.33% respectively). This again signals the European Commission’s distinctive willingness to individualise agency in response to the War.

Non-EU-specific institutional agency

Finally, non-EU-specific institutional agency was the least frequent overall but not negligible: it appeared most in the Parliament (13.00%), followed by the Council (6.04%) and the Commission (4.63%). The Parliament’s comparatively higher engagement reflected agency attributions to institutions and representatives of non-EU member states (8.33%). This was echoed by the Council (6.04%) and, to a lesser extent, the Commission (2.60%). Additionally, the EP attributed agency to institutions and representatives of EU member states in 4.67% of cases – a category completely absent from the Council’s discourse and marginal in the Commission’s (2.11%).

Moreover, the overall low attribution of agency to European non-EU states (non-EU-specific non-institutional agency) and their institutions (non-EU-specific institutional

agency) suggests that EU institutions cast actors such as Georgia and Moldova, but particularly Ukraine, primarily as recipients of support rather than as autonomous agents of their own defence, despite repeated appeals by Ukrainian leaders to be recognised as such (Zelensky 2022). In doing so, EU institutions downplayed the distinct agencies of these actors, framing the response within a broader narrative of “our” action through the use of “we” (see below) and other EU-specific forms of agency.

Floating signifier of we

Among all forms of agency attribution, the most striking divergence concerned the collective pronoun “we”. The European Commission employed “we” in a remarkable 66.04% of its agency attributions, by far the highest single category across any quadrant or institution. By contrast, the European Parliament (5.67%) and the Council (4.21%) engaged this form of attribution much less often.

As already suggested above, this inherently polysemic and versatile signifier possesses exceptional inclusionary functionality and transcends specific boundaries. Functioning as a powerful discursive tool of inclusive authorship, it allowed the Commission to present its actions as part of a broader collective, often ambiguously encompassing the EU institutions, member states, or citizens. Its use blurred institutional boundaries and co-constructed the Commission’s role as a unifying voice of EU crisis response.

This vast discrepancy reveals the Commission’s strategic reliance on “we” as a vehicle for constructing leadership and fostering a sense of shared responsibility, albeit on terms it discursively controlled.

Temporal stability of agency attributions

Comparing the distribution of agency attributions across the two sub-periods (24 February 2022–5 May 2023; 6 May 2023–15 July 2024), we find that the patterns are highly stable over time (for detailed results, see Online Appendix). For all three institutions, European agency accounts for the overwhelming majority of attributions in both periods, while non-European agency remains marginal. For each institution, the rank ordering of the four quadrants and the “we” category was identical across the first sub-period, the second sub-period, and the full period. Across the sub-categories,³ the median absolute change in their shares between the two periods was around 1.7%. This temporal stability suggests that each institution drew on relatively consistent repertoires of European agency that were reiterated rather than fundamentally reworked as the conflict evolved, potentially reflecting routinised institutional communication practices.

Discussion and conclusion

The article has provided critical insights into the security positionalities and discursive strategies employed by EU institutions in response to the war in Ukraine. The analysis has demonstrated that the proposed model effectively captures the modalities through which European agency is articulated, offering conceptual yardsticks to anchor a discussion thereupon. The findings reveal the multifaceted, plural nature of European agency

and show how the construction of agency was closely intertwined with the positionality of each institution within the War. These results add nuance to debates linking the invasion of Ukraine to the EU's self-identification as a geopolitical actor (Freire 2024, Håkansson 2024, Pishchikova 2025, Tereszkievicz 2025) by demonstrating how the institutions, particularly the Commission, interpret and discursively perform aspects of this shift through constructions of agency. Indeed, EU institutions discursively constructed European agency in markedly different ways, and these patterns appeared broadly consistent over the period examined.

The Commission stands out through its expansive attribution of agency to a wide array of actors, including non-European partners, and its heavy reliance on the polysemic “we”. By positioning itself as a central orchestrator of cooperation and engaging in what can be seen as a form of discursive colonisation (cf. Krzyżanowski 2018) – speaking in the name of a broader community that transcends its formal authority and thereby enhancing legitimacy in domains where its competences remain limited – the Commission performs the very strategic role that underpins von der Leyen's ambition of a “geopolitical Commission” (Freire 2024). Coupled with the cross-institutional discursive tendency to foreground the EU as an important locus of agency, such collective framings may mask internal dissent, marginalise divergent national voices, and project unity even where fragmentation persists (Baracani 2023, Grevi 2024). While this strategy strengthens the EU's profile as a cohesive geopolitical actor and reinforces the sense of “Europe with a new unity and purpose” (Genschel 2025), it is also a double-edged sword: by diffusing responsibility across a collective, institutions risk obscuring accountability and, as Özdemir *et al.* (2025) warn, potentially undermining legitimacy. By contrast, the Parliament and the Council constructed agency in narrower, more internally focused ways. The Parliament foregrounded itself and its members as principal agents, while the Council leaned towards collective invocations of the “EU” as a unified actor or references to its member formations.

On the one hand, such discursive differentiation may be read as a strength. By addressing varied audiences and performing distinct roles, institutions broaden the EU's communicative reach and diversify its claims to legitimacy. On the other hand, the lack of convergence risks projecting dissonance.

From a policy perspective, these findings carry three main implications. First, the discursive exclusion of citizens by attributing agency primarily to elites represents a missed opportunity. Explicitly constructing citizens as actors could serve a dual purpose: signalling input legitimacy (Schmidt 2022) by demonstrating participatory inclusion at the institutional level, while also fostering citizens' own sense of agency in real-life crisis situations (Todd 2014), whether through solidarity practices or compliance with measures.

Second, the sidelining of EU member states as discursive agents is also notable. While perhaps not entirely surprising (given that these are institutional self-narratives and EU institutions have historically tended to foreground their own roles), it nonetheless signals discursive institutional assertiveness in shaping the Union's response to the war. Such foregrounding of supranational voices may strengthen claims to unity but warrants caution in interpretation: the EU acting as a unitary actor does not necessarily translate into greater effectiveness in crisis governance. In foreign and security policy, especially, unanimity has often been achieved “at the expense of effectiveness” (Missiroli 2001).

The third implication concerns how institutional discourse shapes symbolic boundaries of belonging. The Commission's use of the inclusive signifier "we" and the invocation of "Europe" stretches the scope of EUropean agency beyond institutional confines, encompassing a broader cultural and political space. Such discursive elasticity is politically consequential: by blurring who is included in the "we", institutional discourse opens possibilities for re-imagining the boundaries of the Union (cf. Pishchikova 2025).

Given the relative stability of agency attribution patterns over the period examined, future research could test their robustness by applying the model to other security and policy areas and to a longer time span. This would show whether similar patterns of agency attribution and inter-institutional cleavages recur, or whether different contexts elicit alternative configurations of EUropean agency. Another promising avenue concerns the reception side of agency attributions. While the war has been shown to foster unity among European publics (Genschel 2025), we still know little about how citizens interpret institutional claims to agency, whether such discourse reinforces or undermines the EU's legitimacy as a crisis manager, and how it influences their perceptions of the Union's boundaries.

Notes

1. We use the term EUropean agency – a deliberate blend of EU and European – to conceptually capture the fluid, overlapping space between the institutional and normative domains of the European Union and the broader civilisational, geopolitical, and identitarian construct of Europe. This enables a more nuanced and inclusive analysis of how agency is being discursively attributed within and beyond the EU's formal boundaries.
2. While the study concentrates on textual content, it acknowledges the potential for future research to explore the impact of multimedia content, such as links, images, and videos.
3. Including the floating signifier "we", as it has no sub-categories.

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Data availability statement

The data supporting the findings of this study are available via Figshare at <https://doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.30395716>.

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Online Appendix: temporal stability of agency attributions

The table reports the number and share of agency attributions by category for each sub-period. "First half" refers to 24 February 2022–5 May 2023; "second half" refers to 6 May 2023–15 July 2024. Shares are calculated relative to the total number of war-related X posts by each institution in the respective sub-period. Categories correspond to the coding scheme presented in Table 2.

Institution	EP				Council				EC			
	First half – count	First half share (%)	Second half – count	Second half share (%)	First half – count	First half share (%)	Second half – count	Second half share (%)	First half – count	First half share (%)	Second half – count	Second half share (%)
Non-European Agency	7	2	3,06%	3,08%	22	14	5,93%	8,00%	129	36	12,42%	9,33%
European Agency	208	61	90,83%	93,85%	354	167	95,42%	95,43%	949	324	91,34%	83,94%
EU-specific institutional agency	198	48	86,46%	73,85%	199	121	53,64%	69,14%	241	81	23,20%	20,98%
Self-referenced EU institution	87	26	37,99%	40,00%	55	42	14,82%	24,00%	11	3	1,06%	0,78%
Self-referenced EU institutional members	108	25	47,16%	38,46%	131	71	35,31%	40,57%	37	6	3,56%	1,55%
Self-referenced EU institutional leader	16	2	6,99%	3,08%	5	3	1,35%	1,71%	144	47	13,86%	12,18%
EU institutions and leaders (general)	7	0	3,06%	0,00%	49	33	13,21%	18,86%	16	8	1,54%	2,07%
Other EU institutions and leaders (specific)	12	1	5,24%	1,54%	4	1	1,08%	0,57%	95	40	9,14%	10,36%
EU-specific non-institutional agency	72	29	31,44%	44,62%	190	82	51,21%	46,86%	388	119	37,34%	30,83%
EU member states	66	28	28,82%	43,08%	174	79	46,90%	45,14%	359	110	34,55%	28,50%
EU citizens	7	2	3,06%	3,08%	49	14	13,21%	8,00%	44	11	4,23%	2,85%
Non-EU-specific non-institutional agency	1	2	0,44%	3,08%	2	0	0,54%	0,00%	15	2	1,44%	0,52%
Non-EU-specific non-institutional agency	19	7	8,30%	10,77%	9	3	2,43%	1,71%	210	77	20,21%	19,95%
Europe	4	4	1,75%	6,15%	0	0	0,00%	0,00%	67	12	6,45%	3,11%
Europeans	5	2	2,18%	3,08%	1	0	0,27%	0,00%	19	7	1,83%	1,81%
	0	0	0,00%	0,00%	0	0	0,00%	0,00%	34	9	3,27%	2,33%

(Continued)

Continued.

Institution	EP		Council			EC						
Individual EU member states (w/o EU qualifier)	1	0	0,44%	0,00%	5	2	1,35%	1,14%	32	34	3,08%	8,81%
Individual non-EU European states	9	1	3,93%	1,54%	4	1	1,08%	0,57%	76	20	7,31%	5,18%
Other (Hungarian volunteers, Polish mothers)	29	10	12,66%	15,38%	22	11	5,93%	6,29%	55	11	5,29%	2,85%
Non-EU-specific institutional agency	8	6	3,49%	9,23%	0	0	0,00%	0,00%	27	3	2,60%	0,78%
EU member states institutions	21	4	9,17%	6,15%	22	11	5,93%	6,29%	29	8	2,79%	2,07%
Non-EU member states institutions	13	4	5,68%	6,15%	18	5	4,85%	2,86%	692	250	66,60%	64,77%