The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and
economic points of view.

J 2002

The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view.

KVIZDA, Martin and Jindřiška ŠEDOVÁ

Basic information

Original name

The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view.

Name in Czech

Postavení České národní banky z ekonomického a legislativního hlediska

Authors

KVIZDA, Martin (203 Czech Republic, guarantor) and Jindřiška ŠEDOVÁ (203 Czech Republic)

Edition

Acta oeconomica, Banská Bystrica, Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2002, 8080555923

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Článek v odborném periodiku

Field of Study

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Country of publisher

Slovakia

Confidentiality degree

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14330/02:00005496

Organization unit

Faculty of Informatics

Keywords in English

central banks independence; Act on the CNB; European integration; monetary policy

Abstract

ORIG CZ

V originále

It is not allowable for the economic policy to be uncoordinated that means to allow monetary and fiscal policies to aim at different targets or to aim at the given target in principally different and incompatible ways. Monetary policy should be determined with regard to fiscal policy objectives and on the other hand, fiscal policy should allow for the fact that a given measure will provoke a corresponding response of monetary policy. Uncoordinated implementation of each policy will probably make the situation worse. It will lead to overloading one policy and to replacing one imbalance by another. In better case the imbalance will be successfully eliminated, but with higher social costs than in case of a co-ordinated course of action. Problems of mutual co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies will depend on two basic facts: (i) on the legislatively enshrined relationship between the government and the central bank (i.e. the degree of central-bank independence) and (ii) on setting macroeconomic targets, i.e. understanding the concept of macroeconomic balance or, as the case may be, quantification of the imbalance, which is still acceptable. Economic policy will obtain the best results, if monetary and fiscal policy measures (i.e. governments and central bank activities) will be mutually co-ordinated not at random, but according to the set rule, i.e. contracted central banks independence. It is also related with public setting and quantification of macroeconomic targets, position of the central bank with respect to the government, i.e. the degree of its independence and efficient public control.

In Czech

Stať analyzuje postavení České národní banky, zejména aspekty její ekonomické a politické nezávislosti v kontextu hospodářské transformace a evropské integrace.

Links

GP402/01/P010, research and development project

Name: Vliv institucionálních změn na měnovou politiku v ČR během procesu začleňování do struktur EU

Investor: Czech Science Foundation, Institutional changes influence to the monetary policy in the CR during an incorporation into EU structures

Citovat

KVIZDA, Martin and Jindřiška ŠEDOVÁ. The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view. Acta oeconomica. Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2002, vol. 2002, No 7, p. 46-59. ISSN 8080555923.

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   author = {Kvizda, Martin and Šedová, Jindřiška},
   article_location = {Banská Bystrica},
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   keywords = {central banks independence; Act on the CNB; European integration; monetary policy},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {8080555923},
   journal = {Acta oeconomica},
   title = {The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view.},
   volume = {2002},
   year = {2002}
}

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TI  - The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view.
JF  - Acta oeconomica
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SN  - 8080555923
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KW  - European integration
KW  - monetary policy
N2  - It is not allowable for the economic policy to be uncoordinated that means to allow monetary and fiscal policies to aim at different targets or to aim at the given target in principally different and incompatible ways. Monetary policy should be determined with regard to fiscal policy objectives and on the other hand, fiscal policy should allow for the fact that a given measure will provoke a corresponding response of monetary policy. Uncoordinated implementation of each policy will probably make the situation worse. It will lead to overloading one policy and to replacing one imbalance by another. In better case the imbalance will be successfully eliminated, but with higher social costs than in case of a co-ordinated course of action. Problems of mutual co-ordination of monetary and fiscal policies will depend on two basic facts: (i) on the legislatively enshrined relationship between the government and the central bank (i.e. the degree of central-bank independence) and (ii) on setting macroeconomic targets, i.e. understanding the concept of macroeconomic balance or, as the case may be, quantification of the imbalance, which is still acceptable. Economic policy will obtain the best results, if monetary and fiscal policy measures (i.e. governments and central bank activities) will be mutually co-ordinated not at random, but according to the set rule, i.e. contracted central banks independence. It is also related with public setting and quantification of macroeconomic targets, position of the central bank with respect to the government, i.e. the degree of its independence and efficient public control.
ER  -

KVIZDA, Martin and Jindřiška ŠEDOVÁ. The Czech National Banks position from the both legislative and economic points of view. \textit{Acta oeconomica}. Banská Bystrica: Univerzita Mateja Bela, 2002, vol.~2002, No~7, p.~46-59. ISSN~8080555923.

Detailed Information on Publication Record