Detailed Information on Publication Record
2003
Nezaměstnanost a pracovní pobídky
SIROVÁTKA, Tomáš and Martin ŽIŽLAVSKÝBasic information
Original name
Nezaměstnanost a pracovní pobídky
Name (in English)
Unemployment and Work Incentives
Authors
SIROVÁTKA, Tomáš (203 Czech Republic) and Martin ŽIŽLAVSKÝ (203 Czech Republic, guarantor)
Edition
Politická ekonomie, Praha, Vysoká škola ekonomická, 2003, 0032-3233
Other information
Language
Czech
Type of outcome
Článek v odborném periodiku
Field of Study
50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher
Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
References:
Impact factor
Impact factor: 0.235
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14230/03:00008140
Organization unit
Faculty of Social Studies
UT WoS
000183508700007
Keywords in English
replacement rate; reservation wage; work incentives
Změněno: 27/8/2003 09:51, Mgr. Martin Žižlavský, Ph.D.
V originále
In this paper we explore how unemployment benefits and other social benefits affect work incentives in the Czech Republic. We test the link between replacement rates and reservation wages taking duration of unemployment into account and we specify validity of the outlined model using replacement rates and reservation wages recognised in the sample of the unemployed. We conclude that replacement rates are high only in case of specific family types (incomplete families and families with children where women have lost the job), low skilled categories of the unemployed. Reservation wages are linked mainly to the economic and social status of the unemployed and seem to be raised by replacement rates of benefits only with the category of the unskilled. Besides low efficiency of job search, insecurity of job tenure and of insecurity future benefits entitlements raise the price of the "status of the unemployed" and push reservation wages up.
In English
In this paper we explore how unemployment benefits and other social benefits affect work incentives in the Czech Republic. We test the link between replacement rates and reservation wages taking duration of unemployment into account and we specify validity of the outlined model using replacement rates and reservation wages recognised in the sample of the unemployed. We conclude that replacement rates are high only in case of specific family types (incomplete families and families with children where women have lost the job), low skilled categories of the unemployed. Reservation wages are linked mainly to the economic and social status of the unemployed and seem to be raised by replacement rates of benefits only with the category of the unskilled. Besides low efficiency of job search, insecurity of job tenure and of insecurity future benefits entitlements raise the price of the "status of the unemployed" and push reservation wages up.
Links
| GA403/00/0420, research and development project |
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