Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory

SVAČINOVÁ, Petra and Roman CHYTILEK. Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory. World Political Science Review. Berkeley: Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011, vol. 7, No 1, p. 1-30. ISSN 1935-6226.

Basic information

• Original name: Office Allocation in the Czech Government and Chamber of Deputies in Light of Coalition Theory
• Name in Czech: Alokace portoflií v české vládě a PSP ČR optikou teorie koalic
• Authors: SVAČINOVÁ, Petra (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Roman CHYTILEK (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: World Political Science Review, Berkeley, Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011, 1935-6226.

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Article in a journal
• Field of Study: 50601 Political science
• Country of publisher: United States of America
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• WWW: URL
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14230/11:00051917
• Organization unit: Faculty of Social Studies
• Keywords (in Czech): teorie koalic, formatér, ČR, office seeking přístup
• Keywords in English: coalition theory; Czech Republic; Formateur; office-seeking; proportionality; voting

Abstract

The article presented is theoretically grounded in the office-seeking approach to the study of coalitions. It takes the most influential theories of portfolio distribution in the executive and legislature (voting weights, proportionality, formateur) and tests it on the data pertaining to coalition negotiations in the Czech Republic between 1992 and 2010. We follow the distribution of portfolios in the government, in the presidium of the Chamber of Deputies, as well as in the presidiums of permanent parliamentary committees. The approach based on voting weights seems best for studying portfolio distribution in the Czech Republic, although it is not entirely satisfactory. In the theoretical discussion of the results, we also point out that the voting weights approach is somewhat less rigorous than others. At the same time, we show that even ostensibly exact approaches to the study of coalitions can lead to arbitrariness on the part of the researcher, as theoretical assumptions about portfolio distribution operate with decimal numbers, whereas in reality one operates with natural numbers.

Abstract (in Czech)

Článek představuje nejvlivnější teorie rozdělení portfolií při koaličním vyjednávání a aplikuje je na proces vyjednávání o rozdělení postů v české vládě a PSP ČR v období 1992-2010. Závěry práce nejsou jen substantivní, ale i metodologické a konstatují nevyhnutelnou arbitrárnost při využití představených přístupů.