Detailed Information on Publication Record
2012
Encryption with weakly random keys using quantum ciphertext
BOUDA, Jan, Matej PIVOLUSKA and Martin PLESCHBasic information
Original name
Encryption with weakly random keys using quantum ciphertext
Authors
BOUDA, Jan (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Matej PIVOLUSKA (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution) and Martin PLESCH (703 Slovakia, belonging to the institution)
Edition
Quantum Information and Computing, Princeton, USA, Rinton, 2012, 1533-7146
Other information
Language
English
Type of outcome
Článek v odborném periodiku
Field of Study
10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Country of publisher
United States of America
Confidentiality degree
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Impact factor
Impact factor: 1.646
RIV identification code
RIV/00216224:14330/12:00057319
Organization unit
Faculty of Informatics
UT WoS
000304380700002
Keywords in English
quantum cryptography weak randomness encryption
Tags
Tags
International impact, Reviewed
Změněno: 23/4/2013 15:46, RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D.
Abstract
V originále
The lack of perfect randomness can cause significant problems in securing communication between two parties. McInnes and Pinkas proved that unconditionally secure encryption is impossible when the key is sampled from a weak random source. The adversary can always gain some information about the plaintext, regardless of the cryptosystem design. Most notably, the adversary can obtain full information about the plaintext if he has access to just two bits of information about the source (irrespective on length of the key). In this paper we show that for every weak random source there is a cryptosystem with a classical plaintext, a classical key, and a quantum ciphertext that bounds the adversary's probability $p$ to guess correctly the plaintext strictly under the McInnes-Pinkas bound, except for a single case, where it coincides with the bound. In addition, regardless of the source of randomness, the adversary's probability $p$ is strictly smaller than $1$ as long as there is some uncertainty in the key (Shannon/min-entropy is non-zero). These results are another demonstration that quantum information processing can solve cryptographic tasks with strictly higher security than classical information processing.
Links
| GAP202/12/1142, research and development project |
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| GBP202/12/G061, research and development project |
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| MUNI/A/0914/2009, interní kód MU |
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