Challenges of Central European Security
Critical Insights

Jan Daniel
Richard Turcsányi
Diána Potjomkina
Tamás Csiki
Lubomír Lupták
Václav Walach
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Jan Daniel
Richard Q. Turcsányi
Diāna Potjomkina
Tamás Csiki
Ľubomír Lupták
Václav Walach

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AUTHORS

Tamás Csiki is a PhD Candidate at the Doctoral School of Military Sciences, National University of Public Service (Budapest, Hungary), and a graduate of the Nationalism Studies Program, Central European University (Budapest). Currently he works at the Center for Strategic and Defense Studies as a defense policy analyst, focusing his research on European defense policy trends and transatlantic relations. His academic interests are right-wing extremism, Roma in Central Europe, and analytical approaches to securitization. Contact: csiki.tamas@uni-nke.hu.

Jan Daniel is a Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Prague, and a PhD Candidate at the Institute of Political Studies at the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University in Prague. He received his M.A. degree in International Relations from the Faculty of Social Studies at Masaryk University in Brno. In his work, he mainly focuses on contemporary critical and sociological security theory, international political sociology, practices of security governance, and Middle East politics. Contact: daniel@iir.cz.

Ľubomír Lupták works as a Senior Lecturer at the Department of Politics and International Relations and as a researcher at the Studio of Visual Ethnography, Department of Anthropology at the University of West Bohemia in Pilsen. A former security bureaucrat who has fled the world of security professionals in order to make sense of it, his research focuses on two interconnected issues – first, security discourses and everyday, as well as ceremonial practices of Central European security professionals under post-socialism; and second, urban marginality and the relationships of marginalization, ethno-racial stigmatization and class reproduction to the spread of frames of insecurity and practices of surveillance, repression, and punishment in Central Europe. Contact: lubomir.luptak@gmail.com.

Diāna Potjomkina is a Research Fellow at the Latvian Institute of International Affairs. She has also worked as a project manager and counsellor for European Movement – Latvia; an expert for three opinions of the European Economic and Social Committee; and a lecturer for a Rīga Stradiņš University course. Diāna holds a Master’s degree in International Relations (with distinction) and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Sciences (International Relations – European Studies, with distinction), both from Rīga Stradiņš University. Her main research interests include Latvia’s foreign policy and Europeanization processes; Latvia’s relations with the USA and CIS/Eastern Partnership states; and external relations of the EU and the USA, as well as civic participation in decision-making. Contact: diana.potjomkina@liia.lv
Richard Q. Turcsányi is a PhD Candidate at the Department of International Relations and European Studies, Masaryk University. In addition, he is the Editor in Chief of Global Politics and an Associate of the European Institute for Asian Studies in Brussels, among others. He has been involved in organizing and teaching various university courses, such as courses on theories of international relations, international security in the European perspective, and the history of Central Europe. His further research interests are the East Asian regional system, Chinese foreign policy, and more generally power and interest in international relations. Contact: turcsanyi@mail.muni.cz

Václav Walach is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, Faculty of Social Studies, Masaryk University, Czech Republic. He focuses on security theory and practice, crime and violence, ideological critique, emancipation, narrative research, and interpretative methodology in general. As a researcher, he participated in the projects “O Leperiben: The Memory of Romani Workers” and “Sociological Monitoring of Educational Inputs and Outputs of Children and Pupils, Including Children and Pupils with Special Educational Needs in the Czech Republic.” He also did internships at European Grassroots Antiracist Movement in Paris and Transparency International in Prague. Contact: 219253@mail.muni.cz.
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Jan Daniel and Richard Turcsányi
This book employs various theories of contemporary security studies to explore some of the most important and most common security issues in Central Europe at this time. Individual chapters of the book adhere mainly to European branches of critical and constructivist security studies, through which they look at some of the salient topics of Central European security politics.

The distinction between internal and external security issues is employed throughout the book for analytical purposes. Under this framework, alliance building, security guarantees, “special relationships,” the relational politics of identity, and relations with major powers – documented in the book on the case of Latvia’s relations with United States – are examples of external security issues. Various pressing domestic security challenges, illustrated on the case of Hungarian far-right movements and their activities towards the Roma minority, are examples of internal security issues. At the same time, the book does not attempt to draw a line between internal and external security issues and each case also discusses overlaps between the two and defies simple distinctions.

Finally, the book calls into attention broader theoretical and methodological questions of the study of contemporary security issues in the region. Examples of a specific marginalized community and the security bureaucracy of Slovakia demonstrate how primarily local issues point to broader societal dynamics and are in a way illustrative of developments in other places of the region. These examples also demonstrate the transcending character of contemporary security issues in contrast to a simple internal-versus-external dichotomy.
CONTENTS

1 Central European Security Challenges: Internal and External Threats to the Region through the Lenses of Contemporary Security Theories ............... 1
   Jan Daniel and Richard Q. Turcsányi

2 Fully Appreciated with Time? The Role of the United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse ......................................................... 15
   Diāna Potjomkina

3 Securitizing the Roma of Hungary ......................................................... 32
   Tamás Csiki

4 Security! How Do You Study It? An Introduction into Critical Methodologies and Research Methods ......................................................... 52
   Lubomír Lupták and Václav Walach

REFERENCE ........................................................................................................ 73

INDEX ................................................................................................................ 100
1 Central European Security Challenges: Internal and External Threats to the Region through the Lenses of Contemporary Security Theories

Jan Daniel and Richard Q. Turcsányi

It would be awkward to observe an emotional discussion between Greeks and Spaniards on the meaning of “Southern Europe” or between Dutch and French on the borders of “Western Europe.” Yet the borders and meaning of “Central Europe” have been extremely attractive topics for many intellectuals – and not just from the region itself (see e.g. Sinnhuber 1954; Ash 2001; Drulák – Šabič 2012). Conceptual uncertainties are present on an even larger scale with the second crucial concept of this book – security – which is widely described as essentially “contested” and has brought endless discussions in the fields of security studies, international relations, and political science (see among many others Baldwin 1997; Huysmans 1998; Wolfers 1952).

Obviously, it is beyond the scope of this book to provide an exhaustive elaboration of both the state of contemporary security research and a comprehensive discussion on the concept of Central Europe. Our aim is more limited, and aspires to use various theories of contemporary critical and constructivist security studies to explore some of the contemporary Central European security issues that can be seen as important and in some ways typical for the region. For better illustration, we find it valuable to employ a distinction between internal and external security issues, although we acknowledge that this duality has been disappearing lately in many cases, and especially in Europe (see Bigo 2001).

Under this framework of ours, alliance building, security guarantees, “special relationships,” relational politics of identity, and relations with major powers – documented in the chapter by Diāna Potjomkina on the case of Latvia’s relations with United States – are examples of external security issues. Various pressing internal security challenges are consequently illustrated on the case of Hungarian far-right movements and their attempts to blame the Roma minority for the bad state of public security and order in the country. In this regard, the issues of radical nationalism, minority rights, and the struggle to maintain public order among the marginalized communities are shared by most of the states in the region.

However, at the same time, we are not trying to draw a strict line between internal and external security issues, and, indeed, one of the very same chapters of this book defies this simple distinction. Diāna Potjomkina in her contribution shows how the external security alliance is interpreted in the national arena, and how it is partly opposed when the USA proposes a liberal governance agenda that interferes with domestic perspectives of politics and sovereignty. In the last,
largely theoretical and methodological, chapter by Václav Walach and Lubomír Lupták, both authors use their own research projects as examples of ways that research can in some way transcend the internal/external dichotomy. Walach’s research of a specific marginalized community in his hometown is strictly local, but points out broader societal dynamics and is in a way illustrative of developments in other places of the region. Lupták’s contribution, on the other hand, focuses on Slovak security bureaucracies, positioned between the internal and external dimensions of (national) security politics and with a substantive role in both of them.

Going back to our initial remarks about the contested natures of both security and Central Europe, our understanding of the two must be clarified before moving any further. Therefore in the scope of this chapter, serving as an introduction, we will firstly address various theoretical conceptions of security in contemporary constructivist and critical security studies. Afterwards, we will move towards the concept of Central Europe and consequently we will present a general framework of the linkage between the two.

**WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET: THE BROADENING AND WIDENING OF SECURITY RESEARCH**

Over the past 20 to 25 years, approaches to security studies, especially from the critical and constructivist perspectives, have developed substantially, and a short review of this is warranted. Through this brief overview, we would like to point out how different conceptions of security and approaches to its study have enabled researchers to see relevant issues in a different way. The question of methodology, the political relevance of methods chosen, and related research problems in security studies is also dealt with in the concluding chapter of this publication by Lubomír Lupták and Václav Walach entitled “Security! How Do You Study It?”, where the authors discuss novel ways of approaching the study of security issues in the Central European region.

We do not want to subscribe here to a single specific definition of security; hence we rather opt for a plurality of possible research programs, some of which have been rather neglected in Central European security studies research so far. “Traditional” security studies as they developed throughout the Cold War were mainly concerned with security defined as military defense against external and to a certain degree also internal threats. As Stephen Walt noted in his famous 1991 article, the main focus of security studies since 1950s was clearly military power and war in general (Walt 1991: 212). Researchers thus concentrated on issues such as national defense, deterrence, arms races, or nuclear strategy (Buzan – Hansen 2009: 66–100). In terms of International Relations theory, these “traditional” military-focused approaches were connected not only with realism (and its neo-offshoots) but also with (neoliberalism and various branches of peace studies (Peoples – Vaughan-Williams 2010: 4–6). As far as Central Europe is concerned,
these “traditional” approaches with their emphasis on the military, state power, and geopolitics can be seen as fairly well established and do not need further introduction. The study of ongoing discursive struggles between “narrower” and “wider” approaches to security can be well noted in the chapter by Diāna Potjomkina on the example of Latvia.

Even though Walt (1991: 213) explicitly rejected the “widening” of security studies research to include new potential threats, at the time his article was published, this development was already taking place and transforming the field in a significant way. Twenty years later, this made Tarek Barkawi (2011) paradoxically wonder where war had disappeared to from security studies theoretical research.

In the 1990s, security studies were separated from the narrow focus on war and military power and, partly as the result of impact of feminist, constructivist, post-colonial, and post-structuralist critiques, “widened” and “deepened” (for a general overview see for example Buzan – Hansen 2009). The focus on national security has been deepened by an emphasis on other security objects beyond state – including, for instance, the environment, society, or gender; narrow concentration on military security has been widened by researching security in the context of, for example, the economy, politics (“regime”), or society and its identity (see among others Burgess (ed.) 2010; Buzan et al. 1998; Hansen 2000).

In our book, we adhere mainly to the European branch of critical and constructivist security studies, through which we look at some of the salient topics of Central European (security) politics. The chapters in this book have been influenced mainly by post-structuralism and constructivism, and particularly by the three “schools” of critical security studies, nicknamed by the places of their origin – Copenhagen, Paris, and Aberystwyth (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006; Waever 2004).

The post-structuralist critique in International Relations and security studies had already emerged in the late 1980s with important contributions by authors such as R. B. J. Walker (1993) and Richard Ashley (1988), who attacked the “constructedness” of the (neo)realist view on international politics. Informed by authors such as Michel Foucault and his concepts of power and discourse, and the deconstruction of Jacques Derrida, these authors focused their criticism on the seemingly unchangeable nature of international system composed by competing states that rely on a set of discourses creating exclusive binaries of inside and outside (or internal and external), self and other, or hierarchy and anarchy. Realist theory was seen as treating these binaries as given and in the same time further reproduced them.

In security studies, post-structuralist theories were advanced in David Campbell’s (1992) seminal study of US foreign policy, danger, and production of iden-

2 On the other hand, peace studies have never significantly developed in this region.

3 It should, however, be noted that war is still very much present in what is known as “strategic studies,” which could be thought as a specific subfield of security studies.
tity. In relation to Central Europe, these ideas were used by Iver Neumann (1998) in his treatise about uses of “the other” in production of “the self.” Specifically, Central Europe was interpreted as a discourse that was used by certain post-communist states to distance from the (“barbaric and culturally inferior”) Russia and to get closer to the rest of (Western) Europe. Therefore, to analyze security from the post-structuralist point of view is to see it as a productive discourse that forms identities, communities, selves and otherness. As security always brings a vision of a threat, it also carries the vision of the desired “secured” state and the desirable nature of a political community (Aradau – Van Munster 2010).

In the Central European case, post-structuralist research could take, for example, the form of an analysis of main threat discourses in various settings, their deconstruction, and their relationship to particular deep-seated parts of self-identities. While Russia is an obvious example, there could be many “softer” threats, such as immigration, crime, specific minorities (Roma, Hungarians, Russians, and others), “old Europe,” or the European Union as such, in certain moments and discourses.

Constructivism is in International Relations and security studies often labelled as a “softer” version of the post-structuralist approach. Certainly, there are many similarities and overlaps between these two. However, even though many researchers (especially from more critically-oriented strands of constructivism) use some post-structuralist theories and vice versa, a few important differences exist. Generally, apart from ontological and epistemological issues, constructivists share the interest in studying identities, but treat them as norm-producing ideas that are pursued by states (or other political communities) and to which states adjust their behaviour. On the other hand, post-structuralists treat identities as inseparable from the actors’ actions, being in the same time starting point for the action and its results, and from the relations of power in the world politics (for a detailed elaboration, see Buzan and Hansen 2009).

Various branches of constructivism thus stressed the importance of commonly held norms for international politics, or the importance of ideas in foreign and security policymaking (among many others, see Adler – Barnett 1998; Fierke 1996; Hansen 2006; Katzenstein 2003; Weldes 1996). However, for most constructivists, security as a concept is not a crucial object of research. Scholars working within this theoretical approach rather study how security issues (like the national interest, or certain security-related events) are discursively constituted and interpreted (Buzan – Hansen 2009: 198). In the Central European region, this could, for example, mean research on the discursive constitution of Polish energy security policies (Best 2006), socialization of Central European states in the liberal-democratic security norms of transatlantic organizations (Gheciu 2008), or among many others, the contradictory discursive interpretation of United States as the key security ally of most of the Central European countries in domestic discourses, as Diàna Potjomkina nicely shows in this volume.

Most of our studies use concepts deriving specifically from the constructivist (and post-structuralist) research associated with Copenhagen School. In addition
to its later work on a discursive theory of foreign policy (see Hansen 2006; Hansen and Wæver 2003, and Potjomkina’s chapter), the Copenhagen School’s main contribution in terms of security studies could be thought as structured along three core issues – sectors, regional security complexes, and securitization (Wæver 2004). The former two come mainly from work of Barry Buzan (for example, see Buzan 1983) and highlight specific types of security-related interactions in areas beyond state and military security (the economy, the environment, and other sectors) and regional interconnectedness of security concerns in these issues. Regional security complexes could be then described as a set of units (not only states) whose security processes and dynamics are interlinked to the extent that they cannot be analyzed separately from one another (see Buzan – Wæver 2003).

Whether this concept could also be applied to the subregion of Central Europe (for this conceptualization, see Cottey 2000) with its fuzzy borders, unclear identity (see below), and high level of integration with the rest of European Union is a question we have left unanswered here, but are a bit skeptical about. On the other hand, we believe and try to show in this book that there are some security issues that characterize Central Europe rather well.

Nevertheless, it was the concept of securitization that has both integrated the former two concepts in the coherent constructivist theoretical framework and has generated the biggest discussion among IR and security studies scholars (Peoples – Vaughan-Williams 2010: 75). “Securitization” refers to a process of shifting of a given issue from the area of “normal politics” to an emergency area “above politics” by presenting it as an existential threat for a given referent object. In other words, security is understood as a successful speech act performed by a relevant authority and accepted by its audience (Buzan et al. 1998). In studying securitization, scholars are thus not interested in security as a sign referring to something “more real” (a threat, an event etc.), but in the securitizing act itself – in the construction of security.

The focus in the context of Central European security could be, for example, on the question of how certain topics have started to be seen as a security issues during the process of accession to EU (Lavenex 2004), how the gas supply from Russia has emerged as a security issue and by whom it was addressed as such, or identity securitization moves by various nationalist politicians. Focusing on the under-researched issue of securitization by non-state extremist groups, Tamás Csiki uses his chapter to focus on how Hungarian far-right parties have practiced a securitization strategy of the Roma issue for their particular goals.

Since the mid-1990s, the study of securitization as the specific ways of constructing security has developed – especially in Europe – into a broad research program. Various scholars have tried to address the questions related to the nature of audience and context needed for successful securitization to take place (Balzacq 2011; Stritzel 2011), securitizing moves that are produced by various visual representations rather than by spoken proclamations (Hansen 2011; Williams 2003), the nature of securitizing moves and their theoretical grounding (Balzacq 2010; Hansen 2000; Huysmans 2011; Leonard 2010), the process of desecuritization
(Aradau 2004; Huysmans 1998; Roe 2004; Salter 2008), or the authority of people and groups who are able to make securitizing moves (Berling 2011). It should be noted that Tamás Csiki’s chapter in this book also tackles some of these problems, providing a rare analysis of securitization by a non-state actor as well as a nuanced analysis of the permissive context in which this could occur.

The focus on people responsible for creating “security agendas” and their practices is however much more connected with the research program of the Paris School as developed by Didier Bigo (1996; 2008; 2013a) and others, and later reformulated in a broader, more sociological approach to study of security – so-called “International Political Sociology” (IPS) (Balzacq et al. 2010; Peoples - Vaughan-Williams 2010: 69). While the Paris School accepts the Copenhagen School’s assertion that what counts as security and insecurity is socially constructed (especially in more recent works), the scholars of the Paris School stress the need to analyze not only speech and discourses, but the broader security practices and context in which security practitioners exist and operate.

In terms of social theory, Bigo and other IPS authors draw heavily on Pierre Bourdieu, making use of his concepts of field (briefly, the complex web of social relations between actors, structured along unequally distributed resources) and habitus (very briefly, actor’s framework of orientation and perception). By using these “thinking tools” in tandem with inspirations from other critical theorists (such as Michel Foucault), scholars working within this approach show the emergence of a transnational European (and increasingly globalized) field of security professionals; a blurring of the borders between internal and external security; the empowerment of specific types of security professionals; and the emergence of illiberal practices that have come with this new security environment (Bigo 2013; Bigo – Tsoukala (eds.) 2008; Jabri 2006; Salter ed. 2010; for the Central European case see Tóth 2008).

Security for some and at the same time insecurity for others (for example, immigrants from non-EU countries in EU immigration security practices) is in the view of sociologically-oriented security researchers mainly the result of the developments in the field of security professionals. While analyzing security and insecurity, it is therefore crucial to study who is making an (in)securitization move, under what conditions, towards whom, and with what consequences (Bigo 2008: 124). This means studying not only state agencies, but increasingly also private security companies and resulting public-private partnerships (Abrahamsen and Williams 2011; for a Central European case study, see Bureš 2014). To study Central European security issues through the lenses provided by this approach means, for example, concentrating on the practices of local security bureaucrats and their interaction with European or global fields, as seen in the last chapter of this book by Žubomír Lupták and Václav Walach, who studied the case of Slovakian security bureaucracy. Other examples could be an analysis of the positioning of various actors within the security field and emergence of new actors equipped with a specific type of knowledge (cybersecurity could be seen as a typical example in this case), or security practices in places of (per-
ceived) insecurity – such as political protests, marginalized communities, or borders with the “dangerous East.”

More than the other two “schools,” the Aberystwyth (or Welsh) School’s approach to security studies draws more on Critical Theory as developed by the Frankfurt School and neo-Marxism in general. As such, it takes an arguably more normative stance towards security, and sees it as a tool for human emancipation (Booth 2007: 110; see also the last chapter of this book for a discussion about security and emancipation). Security in this approach means an objective absence of threats. Emancipation is viewed as the freedom of people (as individuals and groups) from physical and social constraints which stop them from carrying out what they would freely choose to do. War and physical insecurity is viewed as only one of those constraints, the others being poverty, poor education, political oppression, and many others. For writers associated with the Aberystwyth School, getting rid of these constraints produces what they call true security (Booth 1991: 319). However, this means that security cannot be thought exclusively as a national security, but should be understood primarily as a security of human beings (Wyn Jones 1999: 23). The scope of security studies therefore should be scaled down to the level of individuals and in the same time also up to global and international level to include all the insecurities relevant in each case.

To study security critically in the tradition of the Aberystwyth School means to uncover the main sources of insecurities, and actively try to change them as active and practically-oriented intellectuals. Regarding the example of application in Central Europe, Sybill Bidwell and Krzysztof Wójtowicz (2004) analyzed the non-military insecurities faced by people in this region since the end of the Cold War and identified ethnic, cultural, and religious intolerance among the main sources of insecurity. For emancipation it is thus necessary to ensure respect for group identity, and guarantees of human rights and economic stability. Studies using this approach could, however, also be conducted on a much smaller scale, such as in the specific location of a small Roma ghetto in the Czech Republic, as the chapter by Lubomír Lupták and Václav Walach very suitably demonstrates.

**Locating and Characterizing a Region: Building the Case of Central Europe**

Having clarified our theoretical approaches, we still have to clearly define what will be meant in this book by “Central Europe” and why. As has already been hinted at, this is not an easy task. As early as 1954, Karl A. Sinnhuber noted his confusion after he found that in various historical sources the only lands that could always be found in “Central Europe” were present-day Austria and the Czech Republic, while only territory in continental Europe not being included in any was the Iberian Peninsula (Sinnhuber 1954: 20).

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4 This section to some extent uses material from previous research of the author: Turcsányi, Richard, Runya Qiaoan, and Zděněk Kfíř (2014): “Coming from Nowhere: Chinese Perception of the Concept of Central Europe.”
Perhaps part of the explanation of this high level of confusion may be the simple fact that as being in the middle of Europe, Central Europe naturally borders all the other European regions, such as those of Western, Eastern, Northern, and Southern Europe. While all these regions may face difficulties with determining some of their borders, the Central European region is unique in that all of its borders are shared with other European regions – there is no finite geographical limitation, such as oceans or impassable mountain ranges. In fact, taking a stance on determining “Central Europe” actually means defining the borders of most of the other European regions.

Paul Robert Magocsi (2005) in his very systematic text on the demarcation of Central Europe asserts that, geographically speaking, as many as 16 contemporary states would be at least partly found in Central Europe, understood as one of the nine pieces into which Europe would be divided from North to South and East to West – Poland, western Belarus, western Ukraine, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, Moldova, Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Macedonia, and Bulgaria. Magocsi further divides this region into three geographical units – the northern zone, the Alpine-Carpathian zone, and the Balkan zone, and discusses its manifold religious, linguistic, and national characteristics. What is relevant for the purposes of this book is the great complexity the region demonstrates along all these spectra and their interconnected nature. One example Magocsi discusses is a process when a recognized language apparently gives rise to a recognized nationality, or, vice versa, the process of when a language gets “de-recognized” due to changed political realities, such as in the case of the Serbo-Croatian language after the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

What makes the region such a complex mixture is its historical experience. Norman Davies (1996) discusses in his vast book some of the historical dividing lines of Europe. The first is a geographical line between north and south; the second, the area between Roman-conquered territory and the outside; the third between the denominations of Catholicism and Orthodoxy; the fourth, between the lands occupied by the Ottomans; the fifth, regions which underwent the first wave of industrialization in the Nineteenth Century; and the sixth, the one between east and the west, in the sense of the Cold War division. Without going into depth of any of these, the historical fluidity of the Central European region and its complex historical legacy is obvious when observing that each of these fault lines runs through this region. Indeed, the resulting region is bound to be fragmented due to the ambiguous historical legacies that are transferred onto often contradictory characteristics. Ironically, this internal heterogeneity may be even considered an important characteristic of the region, always lying “in the middle” (see Iordachi 2012).

However, while geography obviously plays a role, and so do the history, culture, ethnicities, religions and other aspects, it has been argued that regions are to a significant extent created as political projects (see Neumann 2001; Hettne 2005). Here, the concept of Central Europe has a no less turbulent history, and one’s point of view effectively determines its perception of the region. Hence
for some, Central Europe would be the lands under Habsburg rule; for others, it may also include the rest of the German-speaking world and seen as a heir to *Mitteleuropa*, which nevertheless was rather discredited due to the historical legacies of the two world wars. For Hungarians, Central Europe may be primarily the extension of Hungarian monarchy in the Carpathian Basin, while for Polish the legacy of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would be the most important historical “ancestral” unit.

It is argued here that the view which has attracted the most followers is the one corresponding with how Otakar Halecki\(^5\) (1980) explained it back in the 1960s – countries or lands in between the great powers, referring especially to Germany and Russia, but also (in different eras) the Ottoman or Byzantine Empires. As an apparent consequence of this understanding of the region, these countries have never played a significant role outside of the regional space, nor have they attempted to do so and have found themselves on the receiving end of many international conflicts. This understanding of the region is consistent with the ideas of thinkers such as Palacký, Masaryk, Piłsudski, Szűcs, and others and, in fact, is also in line with how Milan Kundera (1984) approached it in his famous essay *The Tragedy of Central Europe*, which marked the beginning of the new era of the concept. Kundera describes Central Europe as the region being geographically in the middle of Europe, historically and culturally part of (Western) Europe, yet after the World War II being “kidnapped” and (at the time of his writing) being politically part of the East.\(^6\)

It was this understanding of the region which became the predominant political project in the post-Cold War for many of the formerly “Eastern European” countries. The “othering” of Russia and the communist past of the region could be seen as one of the few things that constituted post-Cold War Central Europe and are common to most of its states. Moreover, it was not just the former Soviet Union and the newly-created Russian Federation, but also less-developed and more “problematic” countries – such as in the Balkans – from which the proponents of Central Europe wanted to differentiate themselves from. On the other hand, a claim to being part of Central Europe seemed to be a path toward the more developed West. In this book, we fully acknowledge this constructed nature of Central Europe and take it as a reference point for our own demarcation.

To sum up our understanding of Central Europe, we would like to point out that while there are those who understand the region as including Austria and Germany and hence redefine the old *Mitteleuropa* on mostly historical bases, most others have seemingly preferred the definition coming from Palacký, Kundera,

\(^5\) It should be however noted, that Halecki divides Europe in four regions – Western, West Central, East Central, and Eastern, out of which East Central Europe is what we label here “Central Europe.” This approach is in fact present in some other authors’ works as well, although some of them use more of the terms at the same time (see e.g. Magocsi 2005).

\(^6\) Interestingly, most of Kundera’s original criticism of the West as morally corrupt, opposed to the “pure” Central Europe discourse, has been largely lost from the subsequent debate about the region.
and others, and exclude (former) Western-bloc countries from the concept (see also Šabič – Drulák 2012). Furthermore, as all of the authors of this book are themselves coming from post-communist states, we align ourselves with this (still broad) approach; the first criterion we selected to define countries as “Central Europe” was former rule by a communist party. Secondly, while explicitly disqualifying Russia, we leave the door open to other countries to be included in the region, assuming that Central Europe is formed of countries sharing (and acting under) certain regional identity and historical experience, although it is not resolved what exactly this identity is or should be. As the result of this, we willingly reject attempts to draw an “objective” line based solely on historical, cultural, religious, ethnic and/or other factors, provided that a shared regional identity includes all of these already. This approach leaves the possibility to also include the Baltic countries and, to a certain degree, the Balkan countries as well, and perhaps even Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova – although this is extremely rare and would be likely disqualified on the basis of regional identity.  

Staking out the frontiers of the region as such enables us to utilize two case studies and two subsequent methodological research reports to demonstrate the Central European security issues salient at this time. Even covered jointly in the final chapter if the “geopolitical” situations of, for example, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Estonia might be different, the topics described by our studies are shared to a certain degree by all of the states in the region. In the next section, we describe the logic of our case selection and theoretical groundings.

**Approaching Central Europe’s Security Concerns**

The basic understanding of the region and its characteristics will be stepping stones for the constituted case studies of this book. Each chapter applies a security studies’ theory to a specific security issue of a country in the region. We believe that an understanding of the region will help readers to make connections between the particular studied issues, their broader regional impact, and maybe, for our Central European readers, also of their own experience in their countries. This allows us in the following chapters to point out some features that are illustrative for the security of the region: things such as integration processes, relations with great powers, nationalism and minority rights, and security issues at the local level. While this choice is the result of the security issues linked to the certain characteristic of the region, it also puts together security issues at various levels, moving from external issues to internal ones.

First of all and most traditionally, the conceptualization of the region points clearly at the geopolitical space between the two major powers – Russia to the

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7 It remains to be seen whether current developments in Ukraine will not result in attempts of the pro-Western politicians to apply the label to themselves in an attempt to legitimize their stance. A similar process may well also take place in Moldova, which shares historical legacies with Romania and has its own separatist fears in its eastern and southern regions.
east and Germany to the west, and the external dimension of national security. Both of these forces imposed great destruction and suffering on the territories “in between” in the past with the most obvious example being the period around the World War II (see e.g. Snyder 2010). However, due to circumstances of the post-1989 era and the legacies of communism, it has been Russia that has been taken as the major geopolitical threat almost unanimously around the region. Figuring out how to prevent Russia from interfering in the domestic affairs of the countries in the region after their regaining of functional (or de jure) sovereignty became a major national security question immediately after 1989 and it seems that this perception is not going to be altered any time soon. Most countries, again, followed the path of expelling stationed Russian military and, after brief consideration about remaining neutral, moved decisively towards the “West” (i.e. mainly NATO and the USA in regard to security), calling for explicit security guarantees.

Representative of the reflection on the role of Western allies for Central Europeans, the following chapter by Diāna Potjomkina, “Fully Appreciated with Time? The Role of the United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse” presents more specific insight into the role and the perception of the US in a single country of the region – Latvia – since its independence in the early 1990s. The author demonstrates on a number of cases how in different times the perception of the US evolved in the domestic discourse, from being an unquestioned security guarantor in less certain times towards a more pragmatic relationship in the time after joining NATO, when Latvia considered itself to be generally safe. Thereafter, Diāna Potjomkina’s chapter shows the uneasiness on the part of local elites when it came to external interference in topics that were traditionally understood as internal affairs. Consequently, after joining the “West,” symbolized by the entrance to the EU and NATO, the general perception of the “Eastern” threat among countries in the region significantly decreased, at least for the time being. The recent situation in eastern Ukraine and the reaction of some Central European countries shows that the image of the Russian threat is still very much present, at least among part of the domestic elites, and may be invoked at any moment.

With the Obama Administration in the US, it may be questioned how this “special relationship” of Central European countries with the US has developed since the President visibly moved his major attention elsewhere, and has not shown particular interest in forging the relationship with the region (Rhodes 2012). Also, since the integration into the western organizations was achieved, some Central European countries seem to have lost a broader foreign and security policy vision and have fallen into a sort of ontological insecurity about their place in the world and in Europe. This was followed in some cases by foreign political passivity, reactionarism, nationalism, and populism, and/or by the state being captured by economic elites (Handl – Hynek eds. 2013; Innes 2014). Yet, obviously, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine seems to have contributed a major input into this consideration of regional countries and has affected the approach of Western Europe and the US toward this region, symbolized at the most visible level by the introduction of sanctions and a stepping-up of the military presence.
Another factor which has been identified above as an important regional characteristic is the diverse ethnic structure. While during the previous century, ethnic diversity of the region decreased significantly especially during and immediately after World War II, issues regarding national minorities and their treatment remained present in almost every part of the region. One example of historical legacy is Hungary and its relations with neighbours related to the huge territorial losses after the World War I, which left millions of Hungarians in bordering countries. Similar problems can be found in relations between Russian populations living in newly independent countries, especially in the Baltics. Ethnicity and revived nationalism were also at the core of the still largest recent bloodshed in the region, which took place in the area of former Yugoslavia and has not been resolved entirely even today.

Closely connected to both the ethnic structure and the processes of integration throughout the region are issues regarding the Roma people, who have been living scattered around the region for centuries. In different time periods Roma lived in different conditions, yet what may be the constant is their out-class status on the margins of societies. This position has become particularly visible after 1989, and in many instances has spiralled into open hostility and even violence, resulting in labels of “shame” on the continent and particularly Central Europe (The Guardian 2010; Popov 2011). This is the second issue we would like to cover here in greater detail, given its importance for the region. Tamás Csiki in his contribution to this book named “Securitizing the Roma of Hungary” presents one study of how a Roma issue was securitized during the period leading up to the 2010 parliamentary elections in Hungary by various extreme right-wing political parties and movements and how, consequently, the government intervened and thus possibly prevented further outbreak of the violence. However, Csiki also shows how this securitization move was enabled by the popular underlying prejudices against Roma communities. What connects these ethnically-based issues is their re-appearance after the falls of communist regimes. Lonnie Johnson (2002) put this more straightforward than anyone else when he claimed that these problems are not results of communism. Being frozen and unsolved during the communist decades (which may in some aspects add to their difficulties), their roots go into more distant past and neither post-1989 or communist eras should be solely blamed for it.

As it was already noted, this book is not trying to present a comprehensive account of all the present-day security threats in the Central Europe, which is not possible given its limited scope. Although it is necessary to start every analysis of a security situation with the objective data on the ground, we believe it is at least equally important – if not more – to be conscious about the theoretical and methodological background with which security issues are approached. This is also the point of our concluding chapter, where Václav Walach and Lubomír Lupták sketch a framework for future critically-oriented security research in Central Europe. Giving the examples of their own research, they call for more theoretically and methodologically sound scholarship oriented towards relevant
local, national and regional issues, which has been relatively scarce in the region up to this point. It is worth mentioning that their research projects are themselves very much grounded in Central European experiences. Walach investigates the everyday insecurities of a specific marginalized Roma community and how the meaning of security is constructed among its members. In this sense, his research fruitfully complements Csiki’s study of securitization and shows a different approach to this issue. Lupták in the same chapter reflects on his previous career in the Slovak security apparatus and autoethnographically explores the production of meaning within the security bureaucracy. While this research does not seem at first sight to be specific for Central Europe as such, Lupták shows how the professionals of (in)security, who mediate the transfer of security meaning between external and internal realms, are deeply embedded in the context of post-communist transformation and adaptation to the Western security discourses and practices.

The aim of this publication is therefore to shed more light on specifically chosen (and in some ways representative) security issues which would demonstrate some of the internal and external security issues of Central European countries as grasped by some contemporary approaches to security studies and international relations research. In this light, this chapter presents a very brief introduction of the security challenges the region of Central Europe faces, especially in those aspects which may be regarded as “characteristic” for this region.

**Looking ahead: Central Europe, Ukraine, and New Pathways of Research**

At the time of preparing this book for publication, the crisis in Ukraine started and grew up to the level of being the biggest security crisis in Europe since the end of the Cold War, leading some to announce the ending of the “post-Cold War era” (see Friedman 2014; Al Jazeera 2014); others even began to draw parallels with World War II – interestingly, both Russian President Putin (BBC 2014) and NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen (Traynor 2014). In fact, even though critical security studies notoriously have a “blind spot” with regards to large-scale armed conflicts (see Barkawi 2011), the developments in Ukraine could be also interpreted by many of the concepts presented in this introduction and which are under deeper scrutiny throughout the book.

Ukraine has been long divided between its eastern and western regions, which have struggled to be aligned with either Russia or the rest of the Europe. This internal division is very much in line with ethnic, linguistic, religious, or otherwise identity-related issues, with some important economic factors resulting from the post-Soviet transformation playing roles. We believe that an analysis of developments in eastern Ukraine should be done not only from the crude geopolitical and materialist point of view, but also from more nuanced theoretical and methodological positions. There is much to be yet written about strategies of discursive construction of space, enemies and friends on both sides, or about the lived insecurities on the ground.
Apart from being able to understand the current situation in Ukraine using the concepts and knowledge of Central Europe, it is clear that this development does and will influence the general security environment in the region. As the most texts of this book had been written before the crisis in Ukraine escalated, it is not addressed explicitly in most of the texts besides this introduction.

Nonetheless, we believe that a sincere understanding of some of the contemporary region’s security issues and their in-depth analyses using the current theoretical and methodological approaches may be of significant use when trying to put (not only) the Ukrainian development into the context. It is thus our foremost hope that readers will find this book both as a useful probe into this vibrant region (which, unfortunately, has been present at the beginning and often the focus of many of the world’s bloodiest endeavours) as well as a guidebook to ways to study it. This book should thus also serve as an invitation to more “reflexive,” critical, and constructivist theorizing on Central European politics and security issues. As we try to show on the next pages, approached by these theories and methods, the region could still be a rich source of fresh ideas and perspectives, perhaps not the “pure” European one that Kundera once argued for in his famous essay, but certainly not less interesting.
What has been the role of the United States of America in Latvia’s security discourse? According to the official, and academic, interpretation, it is first and foremost a “strategic partnership,” a highly trustworthy guarantee of Latvia’s national independence. However, a more in-depth analysis allows us to deconstruct this concept of partnership and to elucidate alternatives, showing the broad spectrum of discourses and sub-discourses which underlie Latvian-American relations. This article shows how the narrow, “traditionally” military-strategic concept of security relations with the US has been defended and contested by different official and non-official actors in Latvia, and what changes (if any) have appeared over the years.

The article is structured as follows. First, it begins with outlining the theoretical approach – research is grounded in consistent constructivism, synthesizing it with moderate poststructuralism insofar as the epistemological and ontological preferences of different theorists prove compatible. Security is treated as a socially constructed phenomenon, the extreme form of identity, with a potentially limitless scope of meanings – it can refer to state sovereignty, culture, political independence, economic well-being etc., so virtually anything can be securitized. Second, main trends in Latvia’s foreign and security policy are briefly outlined and conceptualized, in order to provide the reader with a theoretically informed background for further discussion. Latvia’s policy has been analysed quite widely, including from the constructivist perspective. However, in many cases it has been simplified, focusing either on confrontation with Russia and the “return to Europe”, or, alternatively, on “postmodern” changes and new security priorities (see e.g. Berg 2008, Holtom 2005, Lejins 1999, Mäksoo 2010, Möller 2002, and Paulauskas 2006). These reports actually do highlight two, coexisting discursive streams in Latvian foreign policy, which we will look at more closely.

The main part of this paper consists of three case studies, each characteristic of a certain period in Latvia’s foreign and security policy and of Latvian-US relations in particular. They correspond to, respectively, the period before Latvia’s membership in the EU and NATO, and independence itself, was assured (during the period of the US-Baltic Charter, 1998); the “transition period” just before joining both organizations (around the time of the Iraq War, 2003); and the time after accession, when the security situation of the country had been (objectively)

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1 This chapter draws on the Master’s thesis developed by the author at Rīga Stradiņš University: „The Role of the United States of America in Latvia’s Security Discourse“, 2012.
improved\textsuperscript{2} (using a speech by the US Ambassador to Latvia against corruption in 2007 as a touchstone). The methodology used in this research corresponds to Lene Hansen’s second model of discourse analysis, encompassing not only the immediate decision-makers but also the political opposition and opinion leaders from among the broader society (Hansen 2006). The case studies cannot of course be deemed fully representative, but they do allow us to discern some more general patterns in the development of Latvian policies – and these patterns may be applicable beyond Latvia’s borders as well.

**Consistent Constructivism and Security Discourse(s)**

The theoretical basis for this research has been primarily based on works of consistent constructivists, especially Nicholas Greenwood Onuf and Jeffrey T. Checkel (e.g. Checkel 2007, Onuf 1989), synthesized with moderate poststructuralists, such as Lene Hansen. The main criteria here have been common ontological and epistemological grounds / complementarity, not the official self-identification of the authors. What emerges out of this synthesis is a broad and flexible theoretical paradigm.

Consistent constructivism belongs to the broader theoretical approach of social constructivism, which appeared at the end of the Cold War and soon gained popularity thanks to its capacity to explain not only continuity but also changes in world politics. Among the many streams within social constructivism, the consistent strand is marked by its consistent focus on the supreme role of ideational factors over material ones, and on the key role of language (norms, discourse) which allows actors to comprehend the world and act towards it. This does not mean that material factors are disregarded; indeed they are often reflected in the discourse, and the discourse also relies upon material factors in order to implement rules in practice (Onuf 1998 and 2002). Actors can also attempt to strengthen their own material positions, but ideational factors remain more important. Thus, changes in material circumstances (like, in this case, Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO) can only have importance through discourse.

Consistent constructivism also pays attention to both components of the agent-structure dilemma. Language is the link which connects the structure and the agent, and in principle, their relations are mutually constitutive, and in any case where norms are involved, we can speak about relations of power and rule. Agents can be influenced by the broader ideational structure, or by other agents’ views, and this can occur to different extents. Sometimes, external norms change agents’ identities (fundamental views), but sometimes they have only a superficial influence on their behaviour and can be discarded when the pressure

\textsuperscript{2} This reference does not go against the principles of consistent constructivism, as this approach does not deny a certain role of “material” factors – only stressing that in the absolute majority of cases, it is not these factors \textit{per se} that are important, but actors’ interpretations of them (as Onuf (2002) asserts, a speech act is an action in itself).
diminishes. Jeffrey T. Checkel therefore distinguishes among actors guided by a “logic of appropriateness” and those led by a “logic of consequences” (Checkel 2007). In some, albeit rather uncommon, cases, the structure can be so solidified that it fully determines the views held by the actors, meaning that no independent agency exists. But in most cases, agents actively reproduce the structure, and they can, and do, bring changes to it. Various ideational structures can co-exist and interact (Hansen 2006, Onuf 1989).

What does this imply for security discourse analysis? Security is a socially construed notion, not a given, and actors can securitize very different aspects of life, such as military security, economics, environment, language, culture, etc. The exact understanding must be determined empirically in each case. Importantly, security is normally defined against some “Other,” and, by defining who is the “Other,” the agent at the same time defines his/her own identity. Thus, from the policymakers’ point of view, a conflict situation may provide a raison d’être not only for the state, but also for themselves as its lawful representatives. They can use their own needs/understanding of security and extrapolate these as needs of the country as a whole. Security rationales, in politics, can be used as justification for mobilizing all available public resources, sometimes for the agents’ own purposes; simultaneously, decision-makers also tend to de-politicize the issue, avoiding any questions (Hansen 2006). Thus, we can see security as the supreme justification for rule of some norms, and subjects, over others.

Methodologically, recognizing this pluralism and the different degrees to which norms can be internalized warrants close research, both of discourses for their own sake, as well as their contextual framework, in which process-tracing can be employed. In this article, both methods have been applied. As mentioned above, discourses from various governmental and non-governmental players were analyzed, taking into account external discursive influence(s) as well. This corresponds to the second analytical model identified by Lene Hansen – researching not only official speeches and documents, but also discourses of the political opposition, interest groups, mass media, and other stakeholders, all of whom have or potentially can have an influence on policies (Hansen 2006). Available official materials, press articles, and other publications relevant to the case studies (about a year-long period in each case) have been used. The focus of the research therefore is on the interaction among different discourses and possible changes caused by it.

**Latvia-U.S. relations: an Overview and the Discursive Context**

Latvia’s discourses regarding the United States are of course part of broader discursive streams which exist in the country’s foreign policy. These, along with key events in relations between Latvia and the US, are briefly identified here in order to provide a background for research on the three particular cases.

Latvia’s foreign and security policy has been analyzed rather frequently, but, as mentioned, many of these research works seem to exhibit one common fault:
oversimplification. Analysts tend to simplify not only Latvia’s external policies, but also the processes in the Latvian political space, asserting that a certain political stance is supported by the entire elite, or even “the state” as a whole. This author invites scholars to adopt a more complex view of the situation, recognizing that in Latvia, two broad discursive streams (each containing various discourses and subdiscourses) exist simultaneously. For the sake of simplicity, here they are termed, respectively, the “modern” and the “postmodern/postmodernized” – focusing on their respective approach to security. These terms draw on the classical understanding of modernism and postmodernism in International Relations, as described by, for example, Robert Cooper (2003) and Maria Mälksoo (2010). Here, the “modern world” is exemplified by the balance of power and a state-centric international system, and the state is considered the main security object; this is contrasted with the “postmodern” one, seen in supranational processes such as European integration, the transcending of state sovereignty, and instead bringing the individual to the forefront. The specification and application of these concepts to Latvia is the author’s initiative, based on several years of researching Latvian foreign policy (e.g. Potjomkina 2010).

The first discursive stream tends to exhibit a very categorical, Manichean understanding of security, which takes the state as the primary object of security and focuses on its confrontation with other states (therefore, “modern”). In practice, this stream has highlighted actual (not potential), omnipresent threats to the state and the nation, and has had marked existential elements. Drawing parallels with classical theories of International Relations, it could be rather precisely identified as “realist;” even if sometimes it refers to liberal democratic values, this is mainly done in line with the “clash of civilizations” thesis, trying to justify Latvia’s belonging to the West and alien nature of the dangerous East.

One fundamental impact on the “modern” discourse was left by the Cold War and Soviet occupation, which strengthened the already existing mistrust and fear of Russia. Importantly, during the occupation period, the Latvian diaspora in the West (including in the US) adopted, to a great extent, the predominant anti-Soviet discourse and later, coming back after the restoration of Latvia’s independence, influenced its foreign politics in this direction. Thus, the “modern” discourse has been markedly “pro-Western,” trying to detach Latvia from the USSR temporally and from Russia spatially and to secure national sovereignty through the means of Euro-Atlantic integration, especially NATO. These aims were officially pursued with a great rigor that even led some authors to speak about “militarization of the mind” (Möller 2002). Admittedly, NATO, the EU, and other external partnerships were seen, to a large degree, in an instrumental way. No deeply internalized collective identity with the Allies existed in the 1990s, although this was to some extent obscured by the pro-integration rhetoric. The situation did not change fundamentally after Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO in 2004 – the focus still was on guaranteeing Latvia’s security and a good standing within the Alliance. Sometimes, this was done with “doublespeak” – voicing more “postmodern,” liberal democratic arguments in discussions with
Western partners but maintaining the more nationally-oriented and securitized discourse domestically.

In this discursive stream, the USA emerged as one of the primary, or the primary guarantor of Latvia’s security and independence – with a great emphasis on the “principled” American support throughout the years. In 1940, Sumner Welles, US Secretary of State at the time, was the first representative of the international community to condemn Soviet aggression. The US was instrumental in preserving the independent diplomatic representation of Latvia which existed throughout the Cold War (and supported the missions in other states), and maintained a strict non-recognition policy towards “Soviet Latvia.” It also provided valuable assistance in the restoration of Latvia’s independence, the subsequent withdrawal of the Russian army, and Latvia’s accession to NATO, among others – even if in practice, sometimes the US policy was less altruistic than many Latvian decision-makers would like to believe. In particular, the foreign policy of the George W. Bush Administration resonated very well with “modern” Latvian beliefs thanks to its strong geopolitical dimension covered by liberal democratic values. Also, relations with the US, being bilateral by definition, must have been somewhat easier to comprehend, and develop, than the complex policies of multilateral integration. At the same time, issues such as economic cooperation, education, democracy, civil society development, and the fight against corruption, which had already been on the bilateral agenda in the 1990s (e.g. Meyer 2000–2001), did not receive the focused attention of these players. They also tended to sideline postmodern security initiatives promoted by the US, e.g. the Northern Europe Initiative, which was launched by the US in 1997 and was remarkably transnational in its outlook. Political and military issues remained virtually the alpha and omega of Latvia’s priorities in relations with the US.

In contrast, the “postmodern(-ized)” discursive stream first and foremost pays attention to internal and transnational (non-traditional) threats, such as organized crime, environmental hazards, and – distinctively – socioeconomic problems. The focus on national sovereignty as the supreme value is less pronounced, with a more open perception of national borders and greater focus on security problems of a socioeconomic nature. The intensity of securitization is normally somewhat lower than in the case of the “modern” view, and the focus often is on potential future gains. However, in contrast to the usual understanding of “postmodernism,” many representatives of this approach are still not willing to “lose” sovereignty to supra-national institutions and continue to prioritize the state as a whole (hence, “postmodernized” to reflect the fact that the postmodern dimension has been taken on partially, somewhat artificially). Moreover, liberal democratic values are generally not used as the guideline in foreign policy; most often, readiness to cooperate with all states and regimes is proclaimed, especially if it brings economic benefits (Cooper 2003). If the first discursive stream is closer to realism, then this one hews towards liberalism.

In Latvian politics, the “postmodern(-ized)” stream appeared by the early 1990s and has remained ever since. Even if the major political forces did not
openly doubt Latvia’s membership in the EU and NATO as the prime foreign policy goal, they still had different opinions on the preferred form and results of this integration. Priority was put on economic issues, and these players worked to construct Latvia’s place as that of a bridge “The Amber Gate” between the West and the East. To some extent, was possibly was caused by purely ideational reasons, but the “pragmatic” desire to maintain links with Russia and CIS countries also must have played a role. At the same time, external influences on Latvia and its society were, in many cases, viewed skeptically, maintaining a strong focus on sovereignty (and probably unwillingness on the part of national elites to dilute their own influence). After 2004, this discursive stream became more prominent. Latvia’s security concerns were alleviated to a great extent, and accession to the EU and NATO already had taken place, so “principles” could give way to purely economic considerations. However, for these players, the USA still has not become a high-profile priority, apparently because the American economic and social presence in Latvia is not as significant compared to other European states.

These two discursive streams were not the only perspectives, however. Another important tendency, which had appeared even at that time, was passivity both in political circles (the process of Euro-Atlantic integration was virtually monopolized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Lejiņš and Ozoliņa 1998)) and in the broader society. It created an enabling environment for a closed, non-transparent process of making decisions on these fundamental choices of Latvia’s foreign policy, and the often-quoted societal “consensus” on EU and NATO accession was rather a consequence of depolitization (Heinemann-Grüder 2002, Ozolina 1996, Ozolina 1998, Urbelis 2003). Against this complex background, we can turn to the three case studies which give us a clue to whether, how, and for what reasons the predominant, “modern” Latvian view of the US changed over the years.


“A Charter of Partnership among the United States of America and the Republic of Estonia, Republic of Latvia, and Republic of Lithuania,” signed on January 16, 1998, came at a difficult time for Latvia. By then, the European Commission had announced that Latvia was not ready to start accession talks with the EU, nor was it included in the first NATO enlargement round; overall, the stance of many Western allies on these matters was rather hesitant. In contrast, in the autumn of 1997, Russia offered its security guarantees to the Baltic States, which were quickly turned down by Latvia. In this context, the Charter was an important manifestation of continued support by the United States as it declared, “[t]he United States of America has a real, profound, and enduring interest that in the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, and security of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,” and “welcomes the aspirations and supports the efforts of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to join NATO” (Charter, 1998). It also asserted
that no third country (i.e., Russia) will have influence over integration efforts of the Baltic States. Admittedly, an entire section of the Charter was dedicated to economic cooperation (supporting, inter alia, the Baltics’ accession to the WTO, to the OECD, and an increase in American investments), but, as will be seen further, this fact remained largely unnoticed.

The process of preparing the Charter was, however, a rather closed one. The first news on the document appeared in the Latvian press in early 1997, but only in June was more precise information released. The Charter was classified until its signing by the presidents, and in Latvia, it was not even subject to a discussion in the Saeima (Parliament) – six days before it was signed, the Foreign Affairs Committee complained about not having seen the text (Kuzmina 1998). The main role in the talks was undertaken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs together with the President, Guntis Ulmanis. Under such conditions, the broader society, quite predictably, was not involved. The only attempt at dialogue between state institutions and society was an article by the Foreign Minister in one of the leading daily newspapers (Birkavs 1998), and it simply aimed to unilaterally explain the importance of the document. The monopolization of the process by the executive branch severely limited the discursive field. Moreover, as seen from the Latvian mass media, the official US discourse was adopted in Latvia rather uncritically.

From the very beginning of discussions, the Charter was seen from the “traditional” security perspective as a proof of the much-needed American interest in the Baltics. Some criticism appeared on the part of officials in the spring of 1997, but it was aimed not against the conceptual basics of the Charter, but instead against their perceived weakness. As statements from Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs indicate, he fully supported the Charter, and at the same time stressed it must become more substantial, possibly even legally binding (Tihonovs 1997). (In the end, the Charter was adopted as a political declaration.) A few other players, outside of the formal circle of decision-makers, were even more critical about the alleged hesitance of the US to offer stable guarantees to Latvia. Still, also these belonged to the “traditional” discourse and doubted the actual role of the US in relation to Latvia, rather than what was desired. Questions posed by journalists in the period before signing the Charter also related to the particulars – who will sign the Charter and when; how strong the guarantees provided will be, etc. Almost no questions were asked about the need for the document as such, or about other fields in which Latvian-US relations should be developed. It seems the mass media themselves did not even try to look for alternative opinions. Rare mentions of the need for promoting economic relations between the countries and American investments were also generally related to the wish for a greater American presence.

As the talks on the Charter progressed, the predominant pattern of discourse – reflecting the fundamentally positive attitude of the executive branch and the official American rhetoric – remained the same. Moreover, the document began to be seen as the proof that Latvia was being heard and its concerns were being taken into account, exemplifying the “new quality” of the Latvian-US relations
(Latvijas Vēstnesis 1997, Zeikate 1997). The Russian factor, predictably, was often referred to, positioning the Charter as a guarantee against Russia’s attempts to hamper Latvia’s accession to NATO. In fact, it was directly counterpoised to Russia’s aforementioned offer of security guarantees (Tikhonov 1997). Thus, the Charter, to a certain extent, was interpreted by Latvians to be tougher than it actually was, since at that point, the US actually took care not to isolate Russia. The US also emerged as the main, almost the sole, guarantor of Latvia’s security and independence, and as the example for other, more reluctant Western states and as the true beacon of the Western values. It was ascribed the role of NATO leader, hoping that other NATO member states would follow the US lead. As Foreign Minister Birkavs said, “sometimes it seems that the US better remembers our place in Europe than the European Union member states” (Birkavs in Apinis and Lejins, 1997: 10–1). At the same time, the importance of the US-backed Northern Europe Initiative (which also appeared at that time) was relegated to the background. The main priority was to escape “regionalization” of Latvian security, meaning that neither cooperation with other states of the Baltic Sea Region, nor the Charter itself, could be seen as a replacement for the EU and NATO membership (Birkavs 1998). Additionally, a symbolic dimension also appeared in the debate, showing how the US never accepted Latvia’s occupation.

Thus, until the Charter was signed, the dominating positive discourse remained practically unchallenged and unchanged. There were only a few articles which dared to doubt the importance of the document or the overall strategic role of the USA in Latvia’s security – but again, in principle, these players supported Latvia’s pro-Western orientation. Research for this article uncovered only one article in the Latvian language which explicitly questioned Latvia’s goal becoming a NATO member (Tarvids, 1997) (more criticism was voiced by the Russian-language media which was clearly drawing on arguments employed in Russia.) The criticism is quoted here to show that no overwhelming unity existed in Latvia, but in fact it was barely notable in the overall debate.

The signing of the Charter become a major discursive event, attracting high media attention – it was even translated live on Latvian state TV. The full text was published immediately by several media outlets. Still, the predominant discourse did not change. Somewhat greater attention was paid to the economic aspects of the document, and some insignificant criticism still appeared, but generally, the final document was interpreted both by decision-makers and by the media as a major achievement. The role of the Charter as a guarantee of Latvia’s (traditional) security was not doubted. The main political forces, who now had the chance to get acquainted with the text, also voiced their support (although it was impossible to pinpoint the opinion of one of them, the National Harmony Party, which was mainly oriented towards the Russian-speaking minority). However, interestingly, the opinions from representatives of the broader society – which, at that time, were also featured in the media – had a larger proportion of critical views (Funts 1998a, 1998b, Lauku Avize 1998, Luta 1998, Diena 1998).
Against this overall rather homogeneous and pro-American discursive background, one last example should be mentioned in relation to this case study. In February 1998, vigorous discussions took place, both in the Parliament and in the press, on possible Latvian support to the US operation on disarming Iraq. The question, in this case, was whether to allow Latvian soldiers to participate in an international peacekeeping mission. The president, the ministers of defense and of foreign affairs and other policymakers were in favor of such a decision, citing both moral and international security arguments and also taking the issue as a practical embodiment of the commitments undertaken in the Charter (Saeima 1998). Still, the criticism in this case was much more noticeable – possibly because the decision would have a very immediate impact. It came both from some Members of the Parliament (most of them – from the “postmodern” parties) and from some media. This particular instance already offers a certain bridge to the next case study.

**Latvia’s Involvement in the Iraq War, 2002–2003**

The second case study is rather characteristic of the first change in Latvian discourses regarding foreign policy and security, which came with the accession to the EU and NATO. Latvia, with its heated internal debates, was very similar to other countries in Europe and around the world, in that the opposition and the broader society did not hesitate to counter the official pro-Bush, pro-war orientation. However, the Iraq case came at a time when many players in Latvia were still insecure about the country’s future. Full Euro-Atlantic integration came closer to being a reality, but Latvia’s accession was not yet ratified. Taking into account the hesitance in admitting Latvia to these organizations, which had been previously shown by many Western partners, certain doubts were understandable. Russia, meanwhile, became more and more assertive internationally. As a result, many Latvian policymakers, in line with the “modern” worldview, clearly continued to rely on the USA as the main guarantor of Latvia’s security and independence, and considered it their duty to counter any criticism against this strategic ally.

Before the war erupted, the United States and its allies were trying to legitimize the invasion through a UN resolution. At the same time, they put forth the view that the UN’s inability to make a decision should not obstruct the disarmament, and when it became clear that a new resolution would not be adopted, the coalition declared that those resolutions which were already in place justified the use of force. Ziemele (2003, 2005) provides a well-argued opinion that the Iraq operation was against international law, and it was actually the first case when Latvia openly confronted the United Nations. However, as will be seen later, international law concerns played a far less important role for Latvian executives than the position of the US did. Latvia, according to Donald Rumsfeld’s famous classification, could now feel itself as a part of the strong and principled “new” Europe, and it could consider the US to be not only its protector
but also its partner. The “modern” forces readily embraced the changes in the US discourse which came with the George W. Bush Administration, which allowed them to voice their own “modern” discourse even more actively than before. A neoconservative mixture of liberal democratic values and geopolitics was the argumentation employed by the US officials to justify the global role of America, and it was also the reasoning which the Latvian officials used to explain their own desire to establish partnership with the US and accede to NATO. At the same time, the US consistently maintained its support for Latvia’s NATO membership.

The first time Latvia officially voiced support for the US on the Iraq issue was at the UN General Assembly in September 2002. It was done by the president, Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, who was notable for her active engagement in foreign policy and her hawkish, “modernist” views (Diena 2002, Latvijas Valsts prezidents 2002). In January-February 2003, Latvia acceded to two Conclusions of the European Council which supported the US role in resolution of the conflict. At the same time, it went further than the official EU position, co-authoring the so-called Vilnius Letter (published on February 5) by ten former Eastern European countries, many of them aspiring EU and NATO members. Latvia, along with other signatories, expressed its readiness to join the international coalition on disarming Iraq. The letter clearly marked a divide in Europe, since at that time, many other countries advocated continuation of inspections.

The actual decision to support the US was made in great haste. On March 18, 2013, the Cabinet of Ministers decided, by an urgent procedure, to convene a session of the Parliament the next day and submitted to it the draft decision “On the participation of Latvia in the international operation for the disarmament of Iraq.” After long and lively debate on March 19 – in fact, in the first hours of March 20 – the Parliament adopted the decision “On Latvia’s support to execution of the UN resolution No. 1441,” thus allowing Latvian military forces to take part in the international peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The war started in the early morning of the same day.

This case, however, was different from the previous one, in that discursive pluralism was much more pronounced, and the official policies were subjected to harsh criticism, coming both from the political opposition and from the broader society. In contrast with the Charter case, when the main agents were decision-makers, this time, a wide range of independent opinions was expressed by policy experts, civil society organizations, journalists, and other representatives of the society (inter alia through media polls). Representatives of the mass media themselves (including the official Latvijas Vēstnesis) reflected diverse viewpoints on the issue, including different opinions from elsewhere in the world and not only the official US discourse. Interaction among discourses was also more pronounced, although here we can rather speak about changes in rhetoric/way of argumentation, not in substance.

The debate on the possible war actually started “from below”, before any possible Latvian participation in it was even discussed. From the beginning, discontent with the US policies was notable – criticizing the US for aggressiveness,
a selfish desire to acquire Iraqi oil, the possible negative impact on oil prices and
the world economy at large, the disregard of public opinion and UN norms, etc.
The relative importance of each discursive stream is difficult to measure; how-
ever, it seems that at the beginning of the debate, “postmodern(-ized)” arguments
actually were prevalent.

This position, however, did not find support in official circles. The position
taken by the executive was, in stark contrast, strongly supportive of the Bush
Administration’s policies, and of securitizing Latvia’s own situation. A threefold
justification was normally offered: 1) the threat which the Saddam Hussein’s re-
gime posed to the world’s, and thus also to Latvia’s, security; 2) the transgressions
which the Iraqi leader committed against human rights and international norms;
and 3) in fact, the key one – Latvia’s duty to support its allies, first and foremost
the US, if it wanted to keep external guarantees to its security. Although official-
s sometimes referred, more generally, to “allies” or to NATO, the US clearly
emerged as Latvia’s main protector, overshadowing any international organiza-
tions (Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003, Saeima 2003). “The US is the main player in this
game, and we must show our stance” (see Heinacka 2003). As in the previous
case, this debate often quoted historical facts (in a rather selective interpretation),
focusing on the US’s continued support for Latvia. Russia continued to feature
as the major threat to Latvia’s independence, sometimes equating opposition to
the war to supporting Moscow’s influence (see Saeima 2003). Notably, the official
discourse found some supporters in the public space, among them political sci-
entists, representatives of the mass media, and members of civil society. It was
also supported by some reports of the US position. Still, in this case, the official
discourse was not the dominant one, but one of many.

First, while continuing to discuss the “modern” discursive stream, it is impor-
tant to note that not all of its representatives supported the war. Some of them ac-
tually considered the US policies to be threatening to Latvia’s interests and called
for more careful maneuvering among the US and its allies, on the one hand, and
the European countries critical of the policy on the other. According to this alter-
native view, the Bush Administration was actually weakening the NATO with its
confrontational stance. In the February 19 debates, more moderate MPs advocated
providing a non-military contribution to the Iraq operation, in order not to esca-
late the relations with influential European powers (see Saeima 2003). For these
players, then, the US lost its primary and uncontested role in Latvia’s security,
and security itself was defined somewhat differently. American policies would be
evaluated positively only on the condition that Latvia’s relations with other allies
would not suffer.

Moreover, various “postmodern/postmodernized” discourses continued to
play a key role throughout this period. The majority of actors belonging to this
stream considered the US policies to be threatening Latvia’s, and the world’s,
interests, by setting a negative precedent in their unauthorized use of force, and
possibly involving other Muslim nations in the conflict. In contrast to the official
“modernist” worldview, these forces considered the UN, the EU and various
European countries to be the main guarantors of Latvia’s security, putting a premium on international law and on Latvia’s Europeanness. Here, one could also quote the much-used arguments on the need to solve domestic problems first. Economic considerations were also important. Admittedly, some players expressed hope that Latvian businesses will be able to take part in Iraq’s reconstruction or that support for the US could bring additional American investments to Latvia (Elferts 2003, Kilevica 2003, Kuzmina et al. 2003, Latvijas Vēstnesis 2003b, Linuža 2003). Still, the majority of the opinions were negative, referring to the rise in oil prices, the possible negative impact on European economies, etc. The economic issues were clearly securitized, thus, in fact, making the US appear as an economic threat. And in the Latvian public sphere, there were also other, albeit smaller, discourses, which could be described as “postmodern” in the traditional sense of the term – meaning a strong focus on needs of the Iraqi society, on international norms, and also on the threat to individual Latvian citizens taking part in the operation. While many players in Latvia used these normative arguments instrumentally (to a lesser or greater extent), others demonstrated a clear “values” judgment.

The discursive environment in Latvia, in the context of the war in Iraq, was clearly much more diverse and saturated than in the previous case. Still, political apathy remained widespread. More radical representatives of both discourses actually advocated neutrality in the conflict, as a way to escape unnecessary involvement in great powers’ games. And public protests in Latvia, although noticeable, were insignificant compared to other countries. To some extent, this process must have facilitated the official, top-down style of decision-making.

As can already be understood from the above, Latvian decision-makers, despite widespread political and public opposition, did not change their discourse throughout this case. In fact, they openly rejected any need to listen to the public opinion, even though polls showed that between 74% and 81% of the inhabitants were against the use of military force in Iraq (LETA 2003). The President, Viķe-Freiberga, went so far as to “regret” the polarization of opinions, also stating that the state officials are authorized, by their initial public mandate, to make any decision they consider necessary (Viķe-Freiberga 2003a, 2003b). To some extent, the official discourse tried to provide counterarguments to its critics (e.g. stating that Saddam Hussein indeed possessed chemical weapons or that Latvia would not be involved in active combat), but this should be seen as a tactical adaptation, not as a change in underlying norms. If anything, Latvia’s foreign policy in the run-up to March 20 developed in the direction of the more radical, pro-Bush and anti-UN modernism. Thus, although the two situations are to a certain extent different, the Iraq case shows important continuity with the policy which Latvian “modernist” leadership pursued in regard to the US-Baltic Charter.
THE ANTI-CORRUPTION SPEECH BY CATHERINE TODD-BAILEY (US AMBASSADOR TO LATVIA), 2007

On October 16, 2007, at the University of Latvia, the Ambassador of the US to Latvia, Catherine Todd Bailey, presented her famous speech against corruption, “Preserving our Common Values.” This case was one of the few instances after Latvia’s accession to the EU and NATO when Latvian-American relations came into the spotlight. Despite being, in principle, different from the previous two, it also demonstrated some interesting trends in Latvia’s policy towards the United States.

If the previous two cases – the US-Baltic Charter and the Iraq War – were related first and foremost to external affairs, then Todd Bailey’s speech had a direct domestic importance. Its main thrust was to criticize corruption and the non-transparent influence of some key figures on national politics, asking Latvians to stand for democracy and the rule of law (Todd Bailey 2007). The Ambassador also indicated that these developments were incompatible with the “common values” held by Latvia and the US. As shown above, these “common values” were actually raised in the Latvian-American dialogue already back in the 1990s, when the US provided support and assistance for, inter alia, combating corruption. However, back then they did not raise public controversy, and any criticism, if it appeared at all, remained marginal. In turn, the Todd-Bailey’s speech provoked heated discussions on what, if any, would be the desirable influence of the US over Latvia. It was also very directly used in political struggles among the parties, since the state of democracy and rule of law at that moment was a highly prominent issue on the political agenda.

To provide a background for this case, one can go back to beginnings of 2007, when the US’s “interference in the internal affairs of Latvia” started to meet increasing criticism in certain media outlets. In fact, the structural openness, which appeared in the mass media during the run-up to the Iraq conflict, was partially reversed. This time, the Independent Morning Newspaper (with rather unclear political affiliations) emerged as the main critic of the US’s activities in the field of democracy and anti-corruption efforts. Its discourse could be best characterized as “modern”; notably, it did not contest the positive role of the US in guaranteeing Latvia’s external security, but securitized its role in domestic politics. The US, and certain groups in Latvia which were seemingly affiliated with the United States, were represented as the threat to national sovereignty “from within.” The newspaper referred to alleged pressure by the US Embassy in order to guarantee that key posts in the state governance were taken by loyal candidates (e.g. Barisa 2007, Rozenbergs and Dreiblats 2007a). Notably, at that period the critics of the US were most vocal, while supporters were not so noticeable.

Coming back to the Ambassador’s speech, it must be noted that the ruling elite had also changed in the period since 2003. One of the political forces which was already present during the period covered by the second case study, the Latvian First Party – Latvian Way, strengthened its positions and was able to voice more
openly “postmodern(-ized)” views. Meanwhile, the most vocal “modernist” force, the New Era (which was generally pro-American), in 2007 went into opposition. The position of the ruling elite was also affected by growing domestic criticism, on the other hand (the government actually collapsed soon after this case). In this complicated domestic situation, it is all the more interesting to observe the debate on the relations with the United States.

In this case, the governing elite at first tried to minimize the importance of the event (again – depolitization), by continuing to attempt to preserve good relations with the US but also not giving way to domestic political opponents. The only comment coming from the government before the event was that by the Foreign Minister, Artis Pabriks, saying that the speech is merely academic and implies no consequences for the Latvian-American partnership (see Sloga and Egle, 2007). Similarly, the president, Valdis Zatlers, asserted that the speech was academic, and also that Latvian domestic political problems should be solved by Latvians themselves (Ūdris 2007). After the speech, no visible changes took place. The Prime Minister continued to diminish the importance of the event, at the same time refuting some criticisms of the Ambassador and stating that the US remained Latvia’s “strategic partner” (Latvijas Avīze 2007). Both the President and the Foreign Minister also referred to the “strategic partnership” and to the “shared values” (Apollo/LETA 2007, Latvian MFA 2007, Zatlers 2007, Zagorovskaya 2007). Some disapproval of US behavior was manifested, but rather cautiously. (It was much more pronounced on the part of those coalition politicians who did not hold high political posts (Margēviča 2007, Rozenbergs and Dreiblats 2007b).) Still, a certain dualization of the official discourse appeared in this case, whereby the US was considered as, clearly, the guarantor of Latvia’s external security, but as a potential threat to its internal sovereignty. Pressure on the part of pro-American postmodern(-ized) and modern forces evidently contributed to the recognition of the first, external role.

So what happened in the broader political debate and in the society? Some players, notably from the then-opposition “modernist” New Era party, supported the “common values” which were put forward in the speech (thus admitting that the US was, to some extent, guaranteeing Latvia’s internal security defined as its political integrity), while also referring to the US as the guarantor of Latvia’s security in the international arena. Other actors explicitly referred to the Russian threat, stating, in this context, that Latvia should do everything to preserve the trust of its main ally (e. g. Ozoliņš 2007). Thus, the “hard security” arguments, which seemed not to have had direct relevance to the particular case, were put to the forefront. At the same time, the Independent Morning Newspaper and some other media continued to uphold their critical stance. Some representatives of the “postmodern(-ized)” wing – even those who would not traditionally be considered pro-American – this time securitized the negative developments in Latvia and expressed full support to the US position. One of them explicitly noted that Todd-Bailey’s speech was a friendly gesture, in contrast to the US policy with regard to Iraq (Delfi 2007, Ves.lv 2007). Yet others continued to advocate full neutrality,
arguing that Latvia should solve all of its problems – both domestic and external ones – on its own. So, while being very complicated, this case shows how the basic arguments regarding the US were preserved since the 1990s and were employed, in principle, regardless of the situation. This case also shows how the official elite evaded a broader discussion on the role of the US in Latvian security. The well-known “strategic partner” argument has, in this and in other cases, served to cover the wider and more complicated reality and also more painful issues in the Latvian-US relations. Depolitization, along with securitization of Latvia’s international situation, has been a marked tendency.

Conclusions

Latvian-American relations indeed offer an interesting empirical ground for researching discursive plurality and interactions among different norms. Even if, on the surface, the link between the two countries is an unproblematic “strategic partnership,” more complex dynamics have actually been in place. This article also shows the importance of civic engagement/policy debates and the negative consequences which can be left if structural limitations are in place.

The first case study – discussions on the US-Baltic Charter in 1997–1998 – shows the predominance of the “modern” discourse in Latvia’s policy towards the US, which at that period remained virtually uncontested. However, contrary to the usual interpretations, the argument this article puts forward is that the lack of contestation was caused not only, and probably not so much, by domestic consensus so much as by the unwillingness of decision-makers to engage in discussions with other actors. The decisions were made by the executive, without even consulting the national Parliament, and definitely without consulting with society as a whole. This lack of openness was reinforced by structural obstacles, such as the overall atmosphere of secrecy (inhibiting independent media coverage) and a lack of proactive interest from the broader society. As a result, in the predominant discourse throughout this period, the US appeared as the main supporter of Latvia’s “traditional” security, independence, and Western orientation. At the same time, such “postmodern” concerns as economic cooperation – being also part of the Charter – attracted almost no attention, despite being potentially important. Admittedly, the Charter became a target of somewhat stronger criticism in 1998, when Latvian policymakers discussed possible cooperation with the US in Iraq. To some extent, this marked the course of the heated discussions in later years. The Latvian political elites dominated the discursive space; their discourse was fairly congruent with that of the United States, but even more focused on Latvian sovereignty and “national interests” – meaning they have, at least partly, exercised their independent actorness.

The next case study shows the increased readiness, and interest, of the broader Latvian society to engage in discussions and to debate on the desired role of the US in Latvia’s foreign policy. This enthusiasm, however, found no
support on the decision-makers’ side. In 2002, when Latvia was expecting an invitation to join the EU and NATO, the elite still harbored strong feelings of insecurity and a strong “modernist” view of international affairs (either by intent, inertia, external pressure, or combination of these). In the broader Latvian society, a wide proliferation of alternative discourses was observable, for which no single source could be identified. Sometimes these were evidently related to broader discourses coming from outside Latvia’s borders and sometimes were of local origin, either historically determined (discursive structure is primary) or instrumentally created (actorness is primary). The role of the US in Latvia’s security was variously defined and hotly contested, sometimes interpreting it as a threat, sometimes as a protector, and taking into account very different spheres of life (including the economics and interests of individual Latvian citizens). Some of the arguments were even unrelated to Latvia, prioritizing human rights and international norms as the general values of the international community. At the same time, the decision-makers wholeheartedly adhered to the “with us or against us” logic of the American administration. The Latvian National Security Council, the Bush Administration and, importantly, the President declared their support for military intervention even before the decision of the UN. If anything, Latvia’s official support for the US policy only grew stronger with time, despite increasing protests from the broader society. The importance of public opinion was even derided by the president. The basic explanation was the need to be “with” the strategic partner, the US (and not the “postmodern” terrorist threat on which the US seemingly focused). The still-acute feelings of insecurity, together with the wish to strengthen their own positions within society, precluded elites from taking into account opposing domestic and international views.

The final case study is somewhat different from the previous two, in that it refers to a different sphere on the agenda of Latvian-American relations, and also because of the different domestic situation at that moment. The elite itself had changed, and “postmodernized” forces were in power. Nevertheless, its reaction was actually very much based on the classical “modern” arguments, in that the US was still officially positioned as, first of all, the guarantor of Latvia’s military security. At that moment, the government was about to fall, while the “modern” opposition and some representatives of the broader society strongly supported the Ambassador’s message. It was evidently easier to relegate cooperation with the US into the “traditional” security domain, which had been already institutionalized during the previous years to a great intent, and not to explore the potential of relations in all spheres, including the economy, civil society, and transatlantic relations. At the same time, the US in this particular case was also pictured as a “postmodern” threat to Latvia’s political values and political independence. The criticism of corruption was actually interpreted as intervention into the internal affairs of the state. This rhetoric showed greater self-assurance of the “postmodern” elite after joining the EU and NATO, in that it dared to publicly disapprove of the speech. So, in this case, the elites’ discourse was to a great extent instrumental
(actor-determined), with the aim of ensuring their own political survival. During the period of the case study, it partly changed (becoming milder and more deferential to the US’s positive role in Latvia’s security) through interaction with alternative streams. Still, although public opinion was not altogether ignored in this case, the general trend of the elite not being ready to engage in true dialogue on security issues was observable. The third case showed that, as the Latvian-American partnership extended deeper into those fields where domestic interests were stronger, it could find new supporters but also new opponents. Personalities, international trends, and other external factors evidently played a role in all cases, but the broader discursive trends, along with the tendency towards depolitization, have persisted.

Recent developments seem to confirm that the trends exhibited here have, to an extent, persisted to this day. The agenda of Latvian-American relations has become broader over the years, but Latvian policymakers are still reluctant to address situations which threaten “national interests” as defined by them – or perhaps their own narrow interests. Discursive interactions have already brought positive changes, by making the agenda of the political relations more comprehensive. In particular, the “strategic partnership” is being slowly expanded into the economic realm. However, broader involvement of the public is necessary – it would most likely even propel broader cooperation with the US and also legitimate it.

By way of epilogue – a full-fledged analysis of occurrences in other Central and Eastern European states of course lies beyond the scope of this article, but there are indications that parallels could be found also in other cases. For instance, Maria Mälksoo finds significant discursive similarities among the Baltic States and Poland (Mälksoo 2010, also Mälksoo in Berg and Ehin 2009). As known, the Iraq issue has been hotly contested across the region, while the elites chose a similar, supportive course (e.g. Fakiolas and Fakiolas, 2006). Additionally, later, while some Central and East European leaders expressed a deeply securitized outlook, lamenting Obama’s withdrawal from Europe and the “reset” policy in the face of Russian aggressiveness (Adamkus et al. 2009), others continued to develop very pragmatic, low-key cooperation. The general tendency to disregard the role of civic participation and discussions with opponents, to prioritize narrow “national interests” over international partners’ opinions and requests, and to use the same “national interests” as the universal explanation of any policies is likely to be a part of the Soviet legacy – and one can presume that leaders holding on to their power still prefer this political culture. In any case, it is surely not characteristic of Latvia alone. To sum up, the underlying substances of the region states’ “strategic partnerships” with the US are worthy of exploring.
INTRODUCTION

The intensifying right-wing extremism – through popular movements, political parties, and paramilitary organizations – seen in Central Europe has been subject to a great deal of increased scrutiny in recent years (Abbas et al. 2011, Langenbacher and Schellenberg 2011, Schiedel 2011, Goodwin et al. 2012, Mammone et al. 2012, Mareš 2012, Melzer and Serafin 2013). Within this wider framework of analysis, which also includes the examination of nationalist, populist, anti-Semitic, and anti-immigration elements, extremist anti-Roma tendencies and practices in Central Europe have also become more and more studied. However, comparative studies in a systematic manner that could locate and identify such practices, and also explain the logic of similar events and tendencies in Central European countries, are still sorely missing. Some analyses have already highlighted repeated cases of violence¹ and examples of attempts at securitizing the relations of Roma (minority) and non-Roma (majority) communities (Political Capital 2010: 56–61, ERRC 2012a, Bodnárová and Vicenová 2013).

A similar escalation of tensions as seen in Hungary in 2008–2010 is possible in other countries of the region, where significant numbers of Roma live as a marginalized, poorly integrated minority of society. Just to give one example, the demonstration in Šarišské Michaľany, Slovakia, in August 2009 was one of the biggest meetings of extreme right-wing Slovak associations in recent years. It was triggered by the perception of critically strained relations between the majority population and the Roma minority, framed as such by Slovak Brotherhood (Slovenská Pospolitost, SP), an association whose leaders announced the creation of a new far-right party, called The People’s Party – Our Slovakia (Ludová strana – Naše Slovensko, LSNS) shortly thereafter. As Bodnárová and Vicenová point out, “Šarišské Michaľany thus became the first stop in a series of pre-election demonstrations directed against the Roma minority, which SP together with LSNS organized since the summer 2009 all the way up to the parliamentary elections in 2010” (Bodnárová and Vicenová 2013: 24). It is clear that these actions were part of the quest for political support behind the new extremist political actors, exploiting perceived and newly constructed societal tensions.

Such parallel dynamics of ethnic entrepreneurship and conscious attempts to draw on a security discourse and appear as securitizing actors may be identifiable

¹ Since 2008, the European Roma Rights Center has registered at least 48 violent attacks against Roma in Hungary, 40 attacks in the Czech Republic, and 13 attacks in Slovakia resulting in a combined total of at least 11 fatalities. Between September 2011 and July 2012, 14 attacks against Roma and their property had been registered in Bulgaria (ERRC 2012b).
in other countries as well. In such countries, an “enabling environment” would also be discernible, as societal tensions among Roma and non-Roma are perceived and articulated in a radically othering manner. Therefore, conducting further national and comparative research is necessary and would assist scholars in identifying the ways securitizing actors pursue their agenda. This in turn would make it easier to prevent the successful securitization of issues related to the Roma population of Central Europe.

The constructivist theory of securitization is a long-established one and it has been applied to explaining the success of Western European anti-immigration movements in the 1990s (Huysmans 1995), as well as the dynamics of securitization of ethnic relations in Transylvania in 1990 (Roe 2002, Roe 2004). As a pioneer attempt, the current paper will apply this approach to securitization attempts by radical and extreme right-wing actors targeting the Roma in Hungary between 2006 and 2010.

The Analytical Framework

Broadly speaking, the paper builds on the well-known concept of securitization that emerged from constructivist thought in international relations throughout the 1990s (Waever 1993, 1995). Accordingly, securitization is understood as an extreme version of politicization that “upgrades” an issue from the level of social and political discourse to the level of security discourse. This means identifying an existential threat that demands urgent and immediate attention, as well as the use of extraordinary measures to counter this threat (Buzan et al 1998: 24–25; Waever 1995: 51). As non-conventional, non-military threats – such as threats to societal security – are more difficult to quantify and justify as truly existential, more explanation is needed regarding how extremist actors can abuse securitizing discourse for such argumentation.

Specifically speaking about the methodology of the paper, securitization, as a process-oriented conception of security, examines how a certain issue is transformed into a matter of security. As an inter-subjective and socially constructed process it aims to understand “who securitizes, on what issues (threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under

The most fundamental need of any society is security – whether it is defined as an ability to prevent, deter or avert threats and protect against them, or as a set of favorable circumstances that implies no perceivable threats at all. Usually it is the most powerful actor – the state (central government) – that initiates securitization regarding a potential threat to national security (national sovereignty, territory, citizens etc.). In classical cases, clearly definable, quantifiable (usually military) threats are identified as threats against which the state needs to act. But beyond the objective criteria of security – such as the number of armed forces – it is the subjective perception of security (lack or presence of fear or insecurity) that determines the level of security that characterizes a society and the focus on new challenges to security, for example, how international terrorism became a top priority in the security policies of most European countries after 2001. Originally, this dualism was pointed out by Arnold Wolfers, who defined “security” by noting that “in any objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquire values; in a subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked” (Wolfers 1962: 150).
what conditions” (Buzan et al 1998: 32). When examining the political practices of domestic extremism, Manuel Mireanu makes the following argument: “Extremist groups use a mechanism of security to gain legitimacy for their actions. Leading members of political extremist groups articulate speech acts that speak on behalf of the society, attempt to securitize threats taken from the social imaginary and then propose urgent measures to tackle these threats” (Mireanu 2012: 43). Therefore, in the following subchapters I will use process tracing to map how Hungarian radical and extremist right-wing actors carried out a securitization attempt of Hungarian Roma population in the years 2006–2010. The peak of the process was – just like in case of the previously mentioned Slovak case – in the run-up period to the 2009 European and 2010 national parliamentary elections, escalating into a series of threat marches (2007–2010) and acts of physical violence against Roma residents (2008–2010).

The conceptual framework of the paper will go beyond the traditional interpretation and use of the Copenhagen model of securitization in several aspects. First, in accordance with the critical remarks of Thierry Balzacq related to securitization, I argue that a speech act view of security does not provide adequate grounding upon which to examine security practices in “real situations” (Balzacq 2005:171). Throughout the paper I view and examine securitization as a pragmatic process, including the context and the features of the audience, as well as the relations of the parties concerned (Balzacq 2011: 52–53). Therefore in a novel approach, process tracing will be applied and two new conceptual elements will be introduced: trigger events and securitization moves, which brought the process forward and elevated discourse to increasingly securitized levels. Within this broader framework, the securitizing discourse (speech act) will be only one of the factors that I examine (See Figure 2). Second, securitization as a discursive practice will be explained by using the concept of “radical othering” as put forward by Lene Hansen in order to highlight the logic of right-wing extremists who constructed a “negative pole”, an image of an adversary (Roma) to the majority population (Hungarians) (Hansen, 1997:370). This goes beyond traditional speech act analysis, because the underlying sentiments and prejudices, and the negative image of Roma strongly present in Hungarian societal thought, also need to be studied. Third, securitization as a political practice and tool of the radical right will be studied in order to understand the motives of securitization – thus the question of political entrepreneurship will be briefly addressed in order to give a realistic explanation of events.

As I mentioned, when analyzing the securitization process, three trigger events (at the locations of Olaszliszka, Veszprém, and Sajóbágy) and three securitization moves (the discourse on “Roma criminality,” threat marches by the Magyar Gárda, and a series of physical attacks against Roma) are identified. I argue that through this process, the normally politicized issues of public safety and crime, occasionally accompanied with active scapegoating and blaming in education and social welfare controversies, were used in a securitizing discourse. This also means an atypical approach to securitization where I do not point to one
single event or one specific speech act that identifies (constructs) the securitized threat. What follows is a process-oriented explanation that gives a great deal of space to examining the context in which securitization took place, what methods and means the securitizing actor applied, and why the audience was receptive to the securitization attempt.

In a 2008 article, Matt McDonald also criticized the traditional securitization framework for being problematically narrow in three senses. First, the form of act that constructs security is defined (too) narrowly, with the focus on the speech of dominant actors. Second, the context of the act is defined (too) narrowly, with the focus only on the moment of intervention. Finally, the framework of securitization is narrow in the sense that the nature of the act is defined solely in terms of the designation of threats (McDonald 2008: 563). Therefore I will be identifying trigger events that escalated the process to a higher level and securitization moves that kept moving the process forward (Figure 1).

Figure 1: The theoretical schematic of process tracing for the securitization of Roma in Hungary leading up to the successful securitizing speech act (2006–2009)

This methodological approach offers an answer to previous critiques to the practical application of securitization theory by building on the sociological approach of Thierry Balzacq. As a corrective, he put forward three basic assumptions: (i) that effective securitization is audience-centered; (ii) that securitization is context-dependent; and (iii) that an effective securitization is power-laden (Balzacq 2011: 31–53). The issue of audience will be addressed in the following subchapter, when the negative attitudes and prevalent strong anti-Roma sentiments attributed to majority Hungarian society will be described. The context of securitization will be mapped through process tracing in the period 2006–2010 shown by Figure 1. Additionally, the “effective securitization move” hereby defined as a “successful securitizing speech act” – identified not only as the result of the process described but as a distinctive element, indeed as a speech act of justification – also needs further explanation.

The Copenhagen School stipulated that a securitizing move in itself does not constitute a successful securitization attempt. For the securitizing move to be successful, it must be accepted by the audience, which is demonstrated by the demand for state (government) action. The paper identifies a statement by the former Mayor of Miskolc, Sándor Káli (a member of the Socialist Party, which also
was the main party of government at the national level) on November 16, 2009 as the speech act that proved the successful securitization of “the Roma issue.” At that time, he commented on a violent clash between Roma and non-Roma residents in Sajóbábony a day earlier as “Wake up Hungary! It is high time to realize that if things go on like this, we will be preparing for more severe clashes and circumstances of civil war, not for elections” (Origo 2009). I identify this step as a “successful securitizing speech act” as the head of the local government authority who was inherently tasked to avoid securitization and to prevent societal conflict, openly admitted that tensions were to surpass a level where state action would become necessary to avoid the escalation of violence.

This specific case is identified as the “successful securitizing speech act” within the wider framework of the securitization process, as the commentary came from the political left, evaluating it as an element of the ongoing highly charged political discourse and thus justifying the existence of a securitized discourse. Taken as such, it also satisfies the criteria that Wæver identified for a successful speech act: it was delivered by an authentic, authorized representative of the then governing Socialist Party, the occasion was significant as the violent clash on the previous day, Káli’s statement received heightened attention in Hungary and it was repeatedly cited in national media. Moreover, Káli’s statement generated significant response on behalf of the society and the political elite as well (Figure 2).

![Figure 2: The elements of the process that led to a successful securitization of Roma in Hungary (2006–2010)](image)

From the analytical perspective, there is one more element of the process that needs to be carefully described: this is the pattern of “radical othering.” This creates the connective tissue among societal phenomena (public resentment, negative public perceptions, and attitudes towards Roma) and political action (upgrading political discourse on public safety and economic concerns, and linking these to Roma through scapegoating, blaming, and othering) by radical- and extreme-right securitizing actors. As Lene Hansen defines it, “radical othering” is the discursive process of identification through which the image

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3 The “speech act,” as defined by Wæver (1989), is the specific element of discourse which clearly identifies a threat to society. The success of any such speech act depends on many factors, for example on who (an authentic, authorized actor), among what circumstances (on a significant occasion), at what level (national media) it is delivered, and what response it generates in society and among political elites.
of a negative pole is constructed against one’s self-identification (Hansen, 1997: 370). Thus, an image of an “enemy” that bears negative characteristics and poses a clearly defined threat to “us” is constructed. In relation to the Hungarian case, it is the constructed image of “the Roma” that had been framed by radical and extreme right-wing actors. This image depicts Roma people within an ethnicizing groupist discourse through blaming and hate speech as “parasites, a burden to society, criminals” etc. Such construction of the “threat” identified by the radical and extreme right would “justify a need to act to discipline the Roma,” as some of them argued. The constructed, racist nature of this discourse clearly builds on the public perceptions of “Roma otherness” and prevailing negative attitudes towards “the Roma” documented in recent years’ empirical research, as will be explained later on (Csepeli et al 1998, Tárki 2006, Publicus Research 2009, Bernát 2010, Bernáth and Messing 2011, Bernát et al 2012).

The most significant limitation to the process tracing analytical framework introduced above is the extensive media and political discourse analysis that is needed to precisely underpin these claims and argumentation. Given the relatively long time period (four years), the high number of incidents (ranging from education and social controversies that had been ethnicized to threat marches and physical violence targeting Roma people) requires either the analysis of thousands of media records or selectivity within this potential pool of discourse elements. The varying focus of these events under scrutiny oscillates between local significance and national visibility, thus suggesting the need for judicious selectivity. In addition, the radical nationalist Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom party and extremist groups have less access to mainstream media; therefore, they have developed their own (mainly online) media channels (such as the openly racist kuruc.info and barikad.hu), in addition to using political statements. Access to archived information on these sites is limited.

4 In a 1997 article – later widely applied in analytical case studies – Lene Hansen studied the ways and methods of how security identity is developed and how threats are defined by the state according to poststructuralist schools of security studies (like the Copenhagen School). She builds on the dyadic approach of differentiating between Self and Other, presenting three levels of the Other: the ontological level (the perception of the Other’s being in relation to the Self along the Self/Other dichotomy); the axiological level (a valuation of the Other in terms of moral status and “affection” as being inferior, equal, or superior to Us); and the praxeological level (the practical policy towards the Other: modifying the Other (assimilation, enslavement, extermination), modifying oneself to the Other (active neutrality, deliberate indifference) or submission to the Other (self-assimilation). Based on this concept, Hansen defines the “radical Other” as one attributed a high degree of difference from Self, as associated with securitized or highly politicized attributes, as an existential threat, and as a threat to security. This concept serves as one of the theoretical centerpieces of the article, identifying how “the Roma” have been identified as such a “radical Other” by radical and extreme right-wing actors in Hungary (Hansen 1997: 369–397).

5 As political and social science research focusing on Roma is not only academically complex but also politically sensitive, we need to keep in mind that there are a number of controversial conceptual and ideational issues also playing important roles in the current analysis, such as the use of terminology like the “Roma issue” and “Roma crime” when bringing up political, media, or public discourse. Being aware of the fact that the act of naming the elements of discourse itself pre-determines many things, it is important to note here that these expressions are used in a solely analytical manner, referring to elements of discourse, and the author does not subscribe to using these in any other context or wishes to provide legitimacy for these expressions.
Last but not least, it is important to emphasize that identifying and analyzing the securitization process is not the end of the story, but in this specific case, the central government’s response and desecuritization attempts also need to be briefly summarized. These, beginning in 2009, prevented further escalation and a fully successful securitization attempt. However, we need to keep in mind that given the prevailing tension in Hungarian society, the desecuritization process is (will be) a complex one and its in-depth analysis would go beyond the current analysis.

**The Securitization Attempt Targeting the Roma in Hungary, 2006–2010**

Acts of violence targeting Roma individuals in 2008–2010 raised public sympathy to an ethnicizing/racist political discourse for the benefit of radical right-wing politicians and extreme right-wing actors in Hungary who attempted to construct a “Roma issue” through political discourse and presenting it as a threat to society-wide security. This occurred during a period of transformation of the radical and extremist political right that had begun around 2002 and became apparent in 2006, gradually consolidating the position of the radical nationalist political party Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (hereafter “Jobbik”) in national politics. Gaining momentum from the violent events that were associated with the anti-government demonstrations of October 2006, right-wing individuals and groups used the window of opportunity opened up by widespread societal resentment to enhance their political capital before the 2009 European and the 2010 national parliamentary elections.

Radical and extremist right-wing actors successfully exploited the prevalent strong anti-Roma attitudes of Hungarian society and the negative public perceptions of the Roma to generate political capital, building on concerns about crime, public safety, and economic stagnation. These were presented through increased scapegoating and radical othering, characterizing “Roma otherness” – used here as an analytical term – as a key motif of radical right discourse. In this discourse, a parallel was drawn between high crime rates, the public’s strong desire to enhance public safety, and the settlement patterns of Roma people, calling for the government to take “necessary measures to protect the Hungarian people,” primarily in underdeveloped rural regions. Terms such as “Gypsy crime” and “Roma criminality” that had already been brought up before reappeared as a key feature of the “Roma issue.”

Societal discourse went even beyond that, as a significant proportion of Hungarian society has long had an abstract image of “the Roma” in mind that is “poor, uneducated, unemployed, disproportionately relying on social benefits, [and] more likely to commit criminal

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6 Unlike anti-Semitism, anti-Roma attitudes are openly declared, majoritarian characteristics of Hungarian society that are not restricted to the (radical and extreme) right-wing and are primarily strong in rural areas (Political Capital 2008: 22).

7 Despite the fact that terms like “Gypsy crime” and “Roma criminality” have been duly discredited in academia for reasons of discriminatory ethnic profiling, these have remained parts of public and political discourse.
offenses and as being both a burden and a threat to society (Bernát 2010, Társadalmi Konfliktusok Kutatóközpont 2011).

Recalling the argument of Manuel Mireanu, extremist groups use the mechanism of security to gain legitimacy for their actions. Speaking on behalf of the society, they articulate a constructed divide between certain groups within society that are vulnerable and threatened by other groups, and volunteer to take actions against these threats. This not only means that through radical othering, society becomes divided between “us” and “them” along lines of extremist ideologies, but also means that these groups challenge the monopoly of violence of the state (Mireanu 2012: 43–44).

Political extremism can thus be seen as providing security to a community that feels threatened and that demands security; extremist actions are the exceptional part of an existential discourse based on social fears. These groups are there to “rescue” society from a common enemy, against which the state is either helpless, or in complicity with (Mireanu 2012: 45).

Existing and perceived problems brought up by Jobbik were to set the scene for securitizing the Roma population of Hungary “from whom majority society should be protected.” As a result, between 2007 and 2010 – escalating in 2009 before the 2010 national elections and showing a rapidly declining trend afterwards – threat marches and intimidation from extreme right-wing organizations and individuals targeted rural neighborhoods. These neighborhoods were populated predominantly by poor, segregated people, identified by the local population as Roma.

When analyzing the process of securitization, three trigger events (at Olaszliszka, Veszprém, and Sajóbánya) and three securitization moves (the discourse on “Roma criminality”, threat marches by the Magyar Gárda, and a series of physical attacks against Roma) have been identified. Trigger events escalated the process to a higher level, while securitization moves kept pushing the process forward (Figure 3).

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8 An earlier study specified “welfare chauvinism” as the link between the perception of poor Roma households as recipients of social benefits and the inclination to discriminate them by other social groups competing for financial resources. When economic conditions deteriorate, such competition becomes harsher – such as since 2008, when economic and financial crisis hit Hungary. (See Székelyi et al. 2001: 19-46.)
The events of October 15, 2006 in Olaszliszka (Northeastern Hungary) marked a decisive point in consolidating anti-Roma discourse. A local teacher, Lajos Szögi, accidentally slightly hit a young Roma girl by car in a road accident and when he stopped his car and got out to check upon her, he was beaten to death by a group of Roma individuals (relatives and fellow residents) taking revenge on the scene. The violent incident was presented by radical right-wing actors as an evidence of “an inherent, ethnicized conflict between Hungarians and Roma/Gypsies” that “exemplifies the threat that people can expect to face anytime, anywhere” (Kuruc. info 2006a, 2006b). The brutal nature of the incident and the way it was presented in national mass media was consciously used by Jobbik and related organizations in the coming months to present themselves as supporters of society’s claim that further measures had to be taken to ensure security and to maintain public safety and order – far beyond the measures taken by public authorities and the police (Kuruc.info 2006c).

On this occasion “Roma criminality/Gypsy crime” became an everyday motif of radical and extreme right-wing media discourse (Kuruc.info 2006d). Though the term itself had appeared in Hungarian media before, previously it was rejected as being discredited for racial bias, reflecting the established European practice that no information on the physical, ethnic etc. characteristics of perpetrators can be recorded by police authorities. However, practice is not so simple if we take one – exceptional – example. In an interview on January 30, 2009, the Chief of Police of Miskolc, Albert Pásztor, spoke about local crime patterns and when speaking about robbery cases he included that “such petty crime as robbery in the street has recently been carried out here only by gypsies; a Hungarian would try to rob a financial institution or gas station, but street robberies are only committed by gypsies” (Index 2009a). He was talking about local crime along ethnic terms, adding that “it is time to speak out frankly and openly so that we can find a solution to this problem,” generating vigorous debate among local and central authorities, the police, Roma authorities, NGOs, and the general population. Both in an official statement in February 2009 and in a personal interview in August 2012 Mr. Pásztor emphasized that he had no racist intentions and he was looking for solutions, rather than generating new problems (HVG 2009). The overwhelming support behind him (uniting left and right wing, Roma and non-Roma representatives in this respect) demonstrated that it was indeed media (both mainstream and extreme right) that used this occasion to boost discourse on “Roma criminality” making it the second securitization move in the process tracing.

Jobbik’s discourse began focusing on public order and “Roma criminality” from 2006 on, building on the public’s ever stronger desire for order and stability – especially after the October 2006 government crisis and widespread protests. In doing so, the party and its related associations were rather successful in creating their own alternative media (see Political Capital 2008: 67–71, Political Capital 2009: 67–69, Bíró Nagy 2012: 10–12.). The hesitant attitude of Hungarian parliamentary parties from addressing issues of societal and economic concern created a window of opportunity for Jobbik to identify and openly speak out for an agenda that resonated with the majority society. It is important to see that this constructed discourse reduced rural public safety concerns to a criminological problem involving Roma, and acts of crime being often referred to as “Roma criminality.” This resulted in an oversimplifying discourse full of false assumptions discursively equaling “Roma” and “criminal” (Political Capital 2009: 67).
Only a few days later (February 8), the murder of handball player Marian Cozma of the Hungarian club MKB Veszprém with whom two other players had also been seriously injured became the next trigger event to greatly influence anti-Roma public discourse. The three players got involved in a club fight in Veszprém and had been attacked then stabbed by local perpetrators ( Index 2009b). The violent attack was highlighted in many national media from the beginning in ethnicized terms, often identifying the suspects as “Roma criminals.” They were indeed of Roma background and when safety camera footage was released popular anti-Roma resentment flared up.

Public safety has been people’s top concern for years, and extreme right-wing actors were ready to address this concern (Radványi, 2009). Studies have pointed out that the establishment of local Jobbik party organizations and Magyar Gárda organizations, as well as the launching of a series of threat marches in neighborhoods perceived as predominantly inhabited by Roma were well-coordinated, serving the purpose of raising public awareness and gaining political support, especially in rural regions (Political Capital 2008: 79, Political Capital 2009: 69–70). The undemocratic anti-Roma elements of the discourse promoted by Jobbik and related associations calling for an “alternative solution”(particularly in light of the inability of governing parties at the time to address the “problem”) was reinforced by the establishment of the paramilitary Magyar Gárda. (Recalling Mireanu’s argument, such groups offer “protection” to a community that feels threatened and that demands security by challenging the monopoly of violence of the state (Mireanu: 2012 44–45). The foundation of the Magyar Gárda expressed the willingness and readiness of radical and extreme right-wing actors to intervene where they perceived that the state was not adequately providing for public safety. By conducting demonstrative marches in crime-stricken rural neighborhoods – that also happened to be Roma neighborhoods – since 2007, these groups staged a tangible alternative solution that Jobbik offered for the problems that society perceived. This element of Jobbik’s discourse framed Roma – non-Roma relations along an offensive-defensive dimension in which Jobbik and the Magyar Gárda were depicted as protectors of the population from an aggressive, dangerous, threatening “other” (“the Roma”) due to the inadequate presence and inactivity of public authorities. Some analysts have even called the Magyar Gárda “the symbol of anti-Roma sentiments” (Political Capital 2008: 60).

The series of demonstrative (threat) marches that had been organized by the Magyar Gárda and associated organizations (sometimes independently, other times related to political demonstrations of Jobbik) represent the second broad securitization move in the series of events. Major demonstrations were conducted in Szentes (November 8, 2007), Tatárszentgyörgy (December 9, 2007), Nyírkáta (April 12, 2008), Vásárosnamény (April 27, 2008), Pátka (June 13, 2008), Sarkad (March 1, 2009), etc. The demonstrative aim of these was “to present an alternative to the inadequate police presence in rural areas” and “to prevent criminal offenses.” The marches either directly targeted neighborhoods where Roma families lived, or communicated anti-Roma messages identifying “Roma criminality” as the reason for organizing these marches.
Demonstrative (threat, intimidation) marches had a very significant consequence: they gave the tensions physical reality, bringing them to the streets in several rural settlements and escalated them further along a Roma – non-Roma dimension. During 2008–2009, the activities of radical and extreme right-wing organizations, including paramilitary groups, also became more coordinated. Meanwhile, beginning in 2008, a series of physical attacks targeted Roma individuals, thus the threat perception of the population – including both Roma and non-Roma – became more sensitive and alarmist. Between June 2008 and July 2010, twenty-one armed attacks directly targeted Roma individuals, families or property (Table 1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Physical attack</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pátka</td>
<td>June 3, 2008</td>
<td>Three Roma houses attacked by firebombs (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Galgagyőrk*</td>
<td>July 21, 2008</td>
<td>Shots fired at Roma houses (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pirsice*</td>
<td>August 8, 2008</td>
<td>Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs, a woman shot in the leg while trying to escape</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nagycsécs*</td>
<td>November 3, 2008</td>
<td>Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs, two men trying to escape shot dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyitraudony*-Tamásipuszta*</td>
<td>September 5, 2008</td>
<td>Shots fired at a Roma house (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siófok</td>
<td>September 17, 2008</td>
<td>A hand grenade thrown into the yard of a Roma house (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tarnabod*</td>
<td>September 29, 2008</td>
<td>Four Roma houses attacked by firebombs and gunshots (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debrecen</td>
<td>November 4, 2008</td>
<td>A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pusztadobos</td>
<td>November 20, 2008</td>
<td>A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alsózsolca*</td>
<td>December 15, 2008</td>
<td>A Roma man shot and seriously wounded, another slightly injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatárszentgyörgy*</td>
<td>February 23, 2009</td>
<td>A Roma house attacked by a firebomb, a man and his son shot dead while trying to escape; two other children wounded</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatárszentgyörgy</td>
<td>April 7, 2009</td>
<td>A Roma house attacked by a firebomb (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olt</td>
<td>April 15, 2009</td>
<td>Shots fired at the house of a Roma family</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fadd</td>
<td>April 13, 2009</td>
<td>Two Roma houses attacked by firebombs (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiszalók*</td>
<td>April 22, 2009</td>
<td>A Roma man shot dead</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Táska</td>
<td>May 5, 2009</td>
<td>Shots fired at the house of a Roma family (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kisféta*</td>
<td>August 3, 2009</td>
<td>One Roma woman shot dead, her daughter seriously injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sajóbáfony</td>
<td>November 14-15, 2009</td>
<td>Physical violence between small groups of local Roma individuals and members of Magyar Gárda carrying out “demonstrative patrols” in town</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Siófok</td>
<td>March 18, 2010</td>
<td>Three Roma houses damaged by firebombs (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hatvan</td>
<td>May 22, 2010</td>
<td>A Roma house damaged by firebombs (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Olaszliszka</td>
<td>July 4, 2010</td>
<td>Shots fired at a Roma House (no injuries)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*: Attacks committed by the “Gang of Four” – István Kiss, Árpád Kiss, István Csontos, Zsolt Pető

Table 1: Physical attacks involving the use of fire bombs or firearms targeting Roma individuals in Hungary, January 2008 – July 2011 (ERRC 2011)

10 These developments in radical-extreme-right activities came in a period when Hungarian society reported unprecedented levels of societal tension. Data from Eurobarometer 2009 show that Hungarian society suffered from the highest levels of societal tension among all 27 EU member...
Among these attacks, nine proved to be serial attacks and killings, altogether ending in the murder of six people and seven more with firearms-related injuries; all of the victims were Roma. Based on the criminal trial involving the so-called “Gang of Four,” the attacks were motivated by anti-Roma sentiment and racist hatred (Magyar Nemzet Online 2013a, 2013b). These hate crimes (even though this legal qualification is not applied in Hungarian law) also received expansive media attention and the anti-Roma characteristic of the attacks was obvious, creating an atmosphere of mutual distrust, fear, and conflict in rural settlements where Roma and non-Roma people lived together. Therefore, the escalating physical violence represented the third securitization move within the process under investigation.

The escalation of tensions peaked at the end of 2009 with frequent demonstrations of radical and extremist groups in small and middle-sized rural settlements. Sometimes these also provoked furious reactions from local Roma residents. Even though only the extreme right-wing discourse had adopted a vision of “civil war” previously, the violent clash between local Roma residents and members of the Magyar Gárdy marching in Sajóbábony on November 15, 2009 signaled a new level, making it the third trigger event identified in this analysis (Index, 2009c).

The Sajóbábony incident by itself demonstrated an unprecedented level of apparent, open, and physically violent conflict on a local level. The reason why its importance went beyond this was that the incident led to the comment by the Mayor of Miskolc at the time, Sándor Káli, that “there was a need to prepare for circumstances of civil war” (Origo 2009). In a personal interview conducted with Mr. Káli in August 2012 he emphasized that his intention was to point out the momentary loss of control over the tense situation that enabled local actors to turn to violent means. He wanted to focus the attention of both the authorities and the local population to the need to avoid such incidents from happening again in order to prevent mutual confrontation and escalation.

This specific case is identified as the “successful securitizing speech act” within the wider framework of the securitization process. The fact that someone representing both “public authority” and (then-governing) “left-wing” side of the political spectrum subscribes to the securitizing discourse, as the Mayor of Miskolc11 (a region in which Roma – non-Roma tensions have been constantly high) did, clearly expresses that the securitizing discourse had taken roots not only in radical right-wing politics that time, but had received a response among the governing elite as well.12 Despite Káli’s intention, the national media took over countries along all four dimensions surveyed: between the majority and an ethnic minority (close to 70% of respondents), among older and younger generations, and among the rich and the poor, as well as among employers and employees (Bernát 2010: 319–321).

11 The mayor was also at the same time a member of the National Assembly.

12 This claim might be disputed, but from the discourse analytical point of view, Káli was representing both, and his commentary cannot be assessed independent of the context as if it were his private opinion. Carrying a heavy symbolic charge by polarizing the context to such extremes as talking about civil war, which was nationally broadcast and carried by media, it had the potential to be identified as a “successful securitizing speech act” in accordance with securitization theory.
this new element of the securitization discourse (see for example Népszabadság 2009). However, there were some who were eager to voice that neither the terminology, nor – more importantly – the situation reflected the imminent threat of extensive societal conflict (Tálas 2009). These expert warnings can also be seen as the first steps towards a desecuritization process in which both central and local authorities would have to do their part.

It was only after the 2010 national elections and the implementation of various measures by the government measures that tensions began to ease. These included strengthening the police presence on the streets, with a strong emphasis on rural neighborhoods, as well as further efforts to tackle crime (including petty crimes) through initiating the Public Order and Safety Program (Rendőrség és Biztonság Program) in 2009–2010 (Jogi Fórum 2009). The last major incident involving firearms took place in Olaszliszka on July 4, 2010, when shots were fired at a Roma house (causing no injuries), and in the coming months a gradual “de-escalation” – desecuritization – followed.

**The Key to Securitization: Successful “Radical Othering”**

Balzacq argued that effective securitization is audience-centered (Balzacq 2005:171) and practice has shown that in the securitization process described above, the connection between the securitizing actor and the audience was constructed through “radical othering.” In other words, societal phenomena (public resentment, negative public perceptions and attitudes) was directly linked to the presence of Roma and transformed into political action (securitizing the discourse on public safety, economic concerns) through scapegoating, blaming, and othering. This section will give an explanation of why Hungarian society proved to be a very receptive audience to the securitization moves of the radical and extreme right through discourse.

As mentioned before, Lene Hansen defines “radical othering” as the discursive process of identification through which the image of a negative pole is constructed against one’s self-identification. Thus, an image of an “enemy” that bears negative characteristics and poses a clearly defined threat to “us” is constructed (Hansen, 1997: 370). In relation to the Hungarian case it is the constructed image of “the Roma” that is significant for our purposes. This image depicts Roma people within an ethnicizing, groupist discourse through blaming and hate speech as “parasites, a burden to society, criminals,” etc. Such a construction of the “threat” builds on the public perceptions of “Roma otherness” and prevailing negative attitudes towards “the Roma” documented in recent years’ empirical research.13

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13 The notion of “Roma” itself has prompted heated debate in academia recalling arguments from analytical fallacies of groupism to the politics of identification. As Rogers Brubaker argued against the use of essentializing conceptions during any analysis that refers to a community of people: “we should not uncritically adopt categories of ethnopolitical practice as our categories of social analysis” (Brubaker 2002: 166). This fallacy would lead to what Brubaker framed as “groupism: the tendency to take discrete, sharply differentiated, internally homogeneous and externally bounded groups as
Thus the key to understanding radical-extreme-right securitization attempts targeting “the Roma” in recent years in Hungary is to explain what serves as the medium for anti-Roma sentiment that can be escalated or “upgraded” through radical othering. This medium is the long-existent negative public perception of “the Roma” in Hungary that is a prevailing image drawn through ethno-historical stereotypes of Roma in Hungarian society that has repeatedly been studied. It is also important to note that studies as early as in the 1980s (and repeatedly during the 1990s) highlighted that Hungarian society in general is very much characterized by ethnocentrism, xenophobia, and welfare chauvinism, which all strengthen the disinclination towards the Roma population of Hungary (Fábián 1999, Székelyi et al. 2001, Csepeli 2002).

Despite the fact that systematic, comparable empirical research results have been fragmentary in the past two decades, those which are available have revealed the presence of strong anti-Roma sentiments, coupled with negative and also discriminatory attitudes towards the Roma population of Hungary specifically (Csepeli et al 1998, Tárki 2006, Publicus Research 2009, Bernát 2010, Bernáth and Messing 2011, Bernát et al. 2012). Furthermore, these negative attitudes have remained strong or further strengthened in most aspects if we compare the 1990s and the 2000s (Table 2).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>More social benefits should be given to the gypsies than to non-gypsies.</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All gypsy children have the right to attend the same class as non-gypsies.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Negative items</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The problems of gypsies would be solved if they finally started working.</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies.</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is right that there are still pubs, clubs and discos where gypsies are not let in.</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>988</td>
<td>3,857</td>
<td>1,521</td>
<td>1,022</td>
<td>4,040</td>
<td>3,040</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Attitudes towards the Roma in the 1990s and 2000s in Hungary (Bernát et al. 2012: 4)

Research results show that during the past two decades, the positive attitudes of Hungarian society towards Roma have somewhat weakened, while negative attitudes have remained high. Regarding social benefits provided to Roma people (referring to the traditional name “gypsies” in the quoted research terminology), only 11% of respondents supported extra sums provided to them, while still more than four-fifths of respondents agreed that their problems would be solved “if they finally started working.” Furthermore, still 60% of respondents agreed in 2011 that “the inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies,” showing why “Roma criminality” can be used so effectively in discourse. Regarding attitudes to segregation, we can see a slightly pro-segregation trend in the past decade both in schools and in other public places.

If we also add the results of public opinion polls that have focused on public attitudes, we find similar results: people think of “the Roma” as having an inclination to criminality and an antagonistic attitude, and are characterized by unemployment, societal differentiation, and self-segregation (Csepeli et al. 1998: 458–489, Székely et al. 2001: 19–46, Enyedi et al. 2004: pp. 383–386, Tárki 2006, Publicus Research 2009) (Table 3).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Statement</th>
<th>Rather disagree</th>
<th>Rather agree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>There are certain criminal acts that are more often committed by Roma perpetrators, therefore respective legal measures should be applied for the Roma.</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>46%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>It is better if the Roma do not mix with non-Roma.</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma are not more inclined to commit violent crimes than the non-Roma.</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma are inherently unable to coexist with non-Roma.</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>52%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The increasing number of Roma people within society is a threat to societal security.</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>62%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Roma should be given more support than non-Roma people.</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A certain number of students of Roma origin should be admitted to institutions of higher education irrespective of whether they fulfilled application requirements.</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Public sentiment expressed towards “the Roma” along certain dimensions of cooperation and conflict. (Publicus Research 2009)

This assumption is also supported by the empirical data that reflects attitudes towards Roma people by political party preferences (Table 4), highlighting that people encountering more negative attitudes are significantly more inclined towards Jobbik. As the Political Risk index of 2010 summarizes, 68% of Jobbik voters, 55% of Fidesz voters and 54% of MSZP voters openly declared anti-Roma sentiments during a 2009 study (Magyarország politikai kockázati indexe 2010: 60). It is also important to note that according to these results, the majority of Hungarian people perceive the Roma population as a threat to societal security (38% fully agree, 25% rather agree – altogether 63%). Moreover, this is true across the spectrum of party preferences measured (Jobbik: 85%, Fidesz: 64%; MSZP: 56% fully or rather agree). The situation is similar with respect to crime: almost half of the respondents think that “the inclination to criminality is in the blood of gypsies,” allowing an easy path to discourse on “Roma criminality” (47% of the total population; 66% of Jobbik, 48% of both Fidesz and MSZP voters).
Table 4: Attitudes towards the Roma in 2009 according to party preference
(Magyarország politikai kockázati indexe 2010: 61)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A growing Roma population in Hungary means a threat to societal security.</th>
<th>5: fully agree</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>1: fully disagree</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total population</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>FIDESZ</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5: fully agree</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1: fully disagree</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Attitudes towards the Roma in 2009 according to party preference
(Magyarország politikai kockázati indexe 2010: 61)

In sum, the long-standing traditions of negative public perceptions of “Roma otherness” and negative attitudes towards “the Roma” in Hungary have prevailed and in certain aspects have become more confrontational in recent years. This has created an “enabling environment” as the Athena Institute describes it. This indicates a social environment in which people who have radical views or groups of such people subscribe to extremist ideas (Athena Institute 2013). This pattern coincided with the need perceived by a significant ratio of Hungarian population to deal with problems of societal and economic security, strongly connected in popular discourse to the Roma. When radical right-wing Jobbik appeared on the political scene in 2003, the new party adopted the topic as one of its flagship projects.\(^\text{15}\) (Political Capital 2008: 29, Krekó et al. 2011, Magyar Progresszív Intézet 2012: 3). Shortly thereafter, and especially after 2006, Jobbik was able to dominate the way issues related to the Roma population of Hungary were thematized, as other political parties tried to avoid these issues, or (when they got involved), their activities brought only limited results.

**Desecuritization Measures Undertaken by the Central Government in 2009–2010**

Beyond a theoretical analysis of the securitization moves by radical and extreme right-wing actors in Hungary, the practical conclusions of how such an attempt can be redirected to normal politics – desecuritized – by the state should also

\(^{15}\) Since the former major extreme right-wing political party, MIÉP (Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja – the Hungarian Justice and Life Party) could not make it into the parliament in the 2002 elections, there was a window of opportunity for a new radical/extreme right-wing actor to appear on the political scene. By addressing previously neglected issues, such as societal and economic problems that were related to wide strata of Hungarian society, including some identified as Roma-related as well, Jobbik could fill a “missing role” and become the broker of anti-Roma sentiment, even channeling it to the Parliament after the 2010 national elections (Bíró Nagy et al. 2012: 3–4).
be drawn. Experience shows that despite the prevailing discourse on “Roma criminality,” in 2014 there have been fewer (threat) marches organized, while physical violence has declined and mainstream media discourse has been less concentrated on these issues. As the most capable and legitimate authority, the central government (the state) is entitled to act among such circumstances, but still there might be several alternative explanations why the desecuritization process was seemingly successful in 2010 and afterwards.

At least four such alternative explanations may be framed: 1) The problems highlighted in the discourse could have been solved; 2) Radical and extreme right-wing actors could have given up on their securitization agenda; 3) The means that enabled radical and extreme right-wing actors to carry on with securitization have been removed or made inaccessible; or 4) Public attention could have been diverted, changing perceptions of these problems.

Experience has shown that the first and second options have not been realized. Social problems have prevailed (HVG 2013a, Policy Solutions 2013, TÁRKI 2013, VG 2013) and crime is still an issue (Origo 2012, HVG 2013b); moreover, radical and extreme right-wing discourse has kept its anti-Roma characteristics (Népszabadság 2013, Jobbik 2013). However, the third and fourth explanations – not being mutually exclusive – seem to have played a role in the desecuritization process, beginning as early as 2009. In both respects, the central government possessed the means to exert effective action.

Measures undertaken by a government (narrowly focusing on curbing and revising securitization itself, rather than broadly or comprehensively managing i.e. crime or unemployment) can range from normal legal action against undemocratic (i.e. paramilitary) organizations through altering public policies to the allocation of extra resources for ensuring public safety (i.e. through increasing police presence in settlements). The general feature of any measure is to ensure state control over the legitimate use of violence, to prevent the illegitimate use of violence, and to protect all citizens from physical violence irrespective of any social, cultural or other background.

Legal measures are designed to support the above-mentioned aims in order to execute these tasks in compliance with democratic standards and the rule of law, and to sanction non-conforming actors, whether they be individuals or organized associations. In the case at hand, such legal action included the dissolution of Magyar Gárda Hagyományőrző és Kulturális Egyesület and Magyar Gárda Mozgalom by the court on July 2, 2009. These measures targeted extremist paramilitary associations first, in an effort to limit their scope of action as soon as possible. A parallel investigation began focusing on extremists in order to uncover the serial killers (the so called “Gang of Four”) who attacked Roma families and property in 2008–2009, murdering six Roma people and injuring another seven with firearms.

Both the Bajnai (2009–2010) and Orbán governments (2010-present) could most appropriately address the atmosphere of fear and insecurity through increased police action. The goal was to maintain public order and safety by visible police
presence on the streets (with a strong emphasis on rural neighborhoods), efficient efforts to tackle crime (including petty crimes), and maintaining adequate criminal court cases that would bring results within reasonable timeframes (in order to strengthen the population’s trust in public institutions).

One such measure was the Public Order and Safety Program (Rend és Biztonság Program) initiated by the Bajnai government in 2009, then re-launched in March 2010 during the campaign for national elections (Jogi Fórum 2009). This meant an enhanced police presence in the streets, complemented by the establishment or facilitation of civilian guards and neighborhood watch groups under the control of local public authorities in order to prevent the “privatization of violence” by avoiding the establishment of such “vigilance committees” like the Magyar Gárda, in which citizens tried to take the law into their own hands.

In order to divert public support from Jobbik, governing parties (MSZP during the run-up to the national elections, and Fidesz as part of its election platform, followed by its government program) also began to prioritize public order, safety and crime concerns. Both parties reacted to the societal discourse on social benefits in a way that tried to remove the ethnicizing undertone of Jobbik.

To some extent these measures were effective; beginning in 2010, public discourse mostly returned to normalized political standards and physical violence disappeared from the streets. Despite this general impression, the changing patterns of media and societal discourse in the 2010–2014 period need to be explored and investigated in detail, which is not the subject of the current study.

Conclusions

Along the chronological line drawn between 2006 and 2010, this article argued that a process of securitization took place targeting Roma in Hungary. In the period under review, the securitization attempt by radical nationalist party Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom and related extremist proxies, such as the Magyar Gárda, was escalated to a level where it was widely – though not unanimously and unquestionably – affirmed by the public, provoked direct political reactions, and elicited direct action on behalf of the central government. These reactions, however, were only efficient to the extent of preventing further escalation and open violence, without addressing the underlying problems that enabled securitization.

When a window of opportunity in the political arena appeared for a new radical right party after the 2002 national elections, Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom realized that putting sensitive and polarizing societal problems on its agenda might provide the basis for increasing its political capital. However, we cannot speak of simply adopting previously unaddressed issues such as public safety and crime to their agenda, but of going far beyond. They did this by constructing a political and media discourse that directly linked these problems to Roma through radical othering and blaming, providing the means of securitization.
This could thrive in an enabling environment, namely the dominantly negative attitudes and sentiments expressed towards a constructed societal image of “the Roma” throughout the majority of Hungarian society. Xenophobic attitudes and anti-Roma sentiments and prejudice have long been present in Hungarian social thought, and have not receded in the past twenty years. This very negative image of Roma could serve as the basis of successful securitization between 2006 and 2010. When economic and political crises triggered increased societal tension in Hungary from 2006 on, and people demanded strong responses and called for order, Jobbik was ready to offer its “radical solution.” In doing so, the party could effectively build on anti-establishment, anti-elite, anti-capitalist, and anti-Roma sentiments as well.

Driven by trigger events and supported by securitization moves, the securitization attempt escalated in 2009 and 2010 campaigns for European and national parliamentary elections, revealing a conscious political agenda behind the strategy.\footnote{In the 2009 European Parliament elections, Jobbik successfully competed for votes, gaining 14.77\%. In the following year’s national elections, the party won 12.18\% of the vote, gaining 47 seats out of 386 in Parliament. Of course, Jobbik’s electoral success is not solely the consequence of framing anti-Roma discourse; one should study a wider set of “enablers,” including failures of government policies, the negative effects of economic recession, which caused a transformation of social redistribution systems, long term crime trends, etc. The dynamics of internal politics and national elections, however, cannot be included in detail in the current article. For more details, see Political Capital (2009), or Rudas (2010).} This also led to a response both among the broader Hungarian society and the political elite on a national level concerning a series of violent events in 2009 and 2010 (Olaszliszka, Tatárszentgyörgy, Veszprém, Sajóbábony, serial murder cases in Eastern Hungary targeting Roma families). The heightened tensions among Roma and non-Roma members of local communities brought about a series of threat marches, including cases of physical violence.

It is important to note that keeping the constructed “Roma issue” in the media and on the political agenda was a cause for Jobbik’s increase in power and not an effect. This is evidenced by the fact that the party appeared in the media from 2006 on and was boosted up by 2009 – and was not brought to the forefront of discourse only after 2009–2010 – after all, Jobbik was already a capable actor in the political arena by this time. What Jobbik added to the problem of crime and public safety concerns was the discursive practice that tied Roma to crime and conflict, depicting Roma as “slackers”, “criminals”, and “dangerous antagonistic people,” thus constructing a “Roma issue” through radical othering. The practical means for sustaining media attention and catalyzing the securitization attempt were extremist organizations such as the Magyar Gárda that continuously provided occasions for appearing in national media because of the intimidation and threat marches, conducted in rural areas identified as Roma neighborhoods.

Intimidation peaked by the end of 2009 and this negative trend only eased to some extent in 2010, when focused government action attempted to desecuritize the hotly debated issues of societal security. In doing so, the most successful measure of the government proved to be the removal of some of those means that enabled radical and extreme right-wing actors to carry on with securitization:
restricting paramilitary organizations like the Magyar Gárda and diverting public discourse from envisaging conflict between Roma and non-Roma. However, it has been pointed out that in general, “government responses had been weak,” (FXB Center, 2014: 36) and “the Government had remained tolerant towards Jobbik’s intimidation practices.” (Dettke, 2014: 15) Thus, the basic elements of Jobbik’s communication (“Roma criminality”) and political agenda (“creating order”) have not vanished, and practices of intimidation have prevailed beyond 2010 as well. Following the logic of events between 2006 and 2010, the chance of a renascent securitization attempt was still present in the run-up to the 2014 national elections.

The original contribution of this research is the operationalization of the constructivist securitization theory in the case study of Roma in Hungary. As this is a rather atypical securitization attempt – the state not being the securitizing actor – and as it encompasses a longer time period, the research framework is built on process tracing. Process tracing enables us to identify those means and patterns that bring securitization forward (securitization moves) as well as those events that escalate these processes (trigger events). The methodology proposed herein also incorporates and builds upon the criticism towards the speech act-centered approach to securitization and allows for a much more elaborated examination of the context. Demonstrated by the results of the research that is built on this methodology, this approach can be recommended for further examination of other case studies as well.

Summing up my research results, I came to the conclusion that the securitization attempts of radical right-wing actors were successful in 2009–2010, with Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom and associated extremist associations such as the Magyar Gárda being the securitizing actors. Jobbik developed its securitizing discourse through constructing a connection and correlation between Roma and poverty – poverty and crime – crime and Roma, thus introducing and spreading the term “Roma criminality” in political, media and societal discourse through effective radical othering. In this process, radicals could build on prevalent strong anti-Roma sentiments within Hungarian society, a definite call for more order and increased public safety, strengthening welfare chauvinism at the time of financial crisis and deep political and moral crisis in Hungary. As the underlying reasons for the success of securitization – at once financial, political, and social crises – have been difficult to overcome (if it was ever possible at all), the Bajnai and Orbán governments had limited opportunities to restrain the means of securitization. Therefore – keeping in mind certain limitations of my research regarding its timeframe – we cannot speak of successful desecuritization but only of limiting and diverting the securitization dynamics.

At the end of the day the question still remains open: was the government of Hungary successful in removing the “Roma issue” from the security agenda? The appearance or lack of radical- or extreme-right discourse and actions before the national elections in 2014 could possibly provide an answer to this if confrontational practices were to be brought back again (or not). Despite this, alternative explanations still remain to be studied in both cases.
Security! How Do You Study It? An Introduction into Critical Methodologies and Research Methods

Ľubomír Lupták and Václav Walach

It has been over fifteen years since Jef Huysmans (1998) posed the question essential for every student of security: “Security! What do you mean?” Several theoretical orientations have crystallized in response, confirming Huysmans’s observation that the “exploration of the meaning of security is the security studies agenda itself” (1998: 223). There were few analyses dividing critical security studies into schools of thought (Wæver 2004; Taureck 2006) as well as a synthesis attempting to “go beyond the artificial boundaries in order to combine a variety of critical approaches under a common framework without, nonetheless, reducing one approach to another” (C.A.S.E. Collective 2006: 451). And no matter how many new security issues are identified (Burgess 2010), the meaning of security remains contested, as distinctive and mutually exclusive logics of security are theorized.

In the critical literature, two main logics of security are confronted. The first one relates security to exclusion, violence, fear, and anti-democratic politics. Against this bleak vision, the concept of emancipation is erected to conceive security in terms of human freedoms and rights. As such, the conflict over the meaning of security has been related to a normative problem: is it possible to make security in a positive way, or is the point to distance oneself and resist its oppressive logic to achieve emancipation? (Browning and McDonald 2013; Nunes 2012; Van Munster 2007). The adherents of the latter approach have suggested different politics out of security (Aradau 2008; Bigo 2010; Neocleous 2008; Peoples 2011). However, their opponents have countered with the argument that there is no intrinsic, timeless, and abstract logic of security; there are merely dominant representations and practices of security that can be and, in fact, should be dissected and challenged.

It is far from banal to assume that security indeed does different things at different times and in different places, as this has important implications for methodology (Ciuta 2009). Since research on security “comes from somewhere, is produced by someone, and has potentially significant impacts on others” (Jarvis 2013: 236), the idea of neutrality or pure objectivity is untenable and the question of context and interpretation gains in importance. Hence, not only “theory is always for someone and for some purpose” (Cox 1981: 128), but also the ways through which we study (in)security empirically inevitably contain certain political decisions and dilemmas leading to highlighting some and obscuring other elements of the social reality. The reflexivity, as in all social sciences, is thus the crucial aspect of solid research process.

1 This text was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic as part of the project No. 14-10641P ‘Critical political sociology of (in)security: dramaturgical analysis of public events in the field of (in)security experts’.
In this chapter, we will discuss the recent development of interest in methodology and research methods in critical security studies as a sort of conclusion to this book. The words “methodology” and “methods” have been treated as a source of confusion and anxiety especially on the side of students. Without textbooks or manuals on the use of formalized methods specifically in the field of security studies, students of security were often wrestling with hardships and doubts about the practical aspects of research and its relationship to the endless supply of theoretical frameworks and concepts. Dealing with the question of what it means to study security critically both in terms of theoretical approaches and discussions, and actual research practice, we aim to provide a basic introduction which might help to think about as well as to conduct an inquiry into the world of (in)security. To advance this intention, we focus on our long-term research projects, which happen to focus on two rather different fields: first, the practical world of security professionals; and second, the socially excluded locality – with both of the research projects embedded deeply in the context of post-socialist Central Europe (Slovakia and the Czech Republic). As these projects were conceived from the very beginning as critical enterprises, this trait is particularly scrutinized.

First, we describe the recent shift of attention from theory to methodology in critical security studies. As there are no methodological questions which do not engage theory, a very short introduction to the contemporary theorization of security is included, as well as a discussion of the specific problems of ethics in security research. The second section focuses closely on the “methodological turn” in critical security studies. In particular, the topics of research design, the methodological genres titled “methodological turns” by Salter and Multu (2013), and the critical re-conceptualization of methods debunking their performative and political nature (Aradau and Huysmans 2013) will be presented.

The paper concludes with two practical security research examples and their discussion. Once a security bureaucrat himself, Lubomír Lupták introduces his (auto)ethnographic study of the people who do security (i.e. the security professionals operating in the bureaucratic, academic, media, and NGO spheres in Slovakia and in the Czech Republic), trying to grasp the cultural and political significance of everyday practices, interactions, communal rituals, and symbolic production of this strange tribe of experts. Václav Walach turns attention to the experience of people who are often talked about in the context of security – the Roma, who in the Czech Republic are often relegated to marginalized neighborhoods (see also the third chapter of this book), attempting to make sense of their everyday (in)securities through his ethnographic inquiry.

FROM CRITICAL THEORY TO CRITICAL METHODOLOGY

After the “return to theory” in security studies (Wæver and Buzan 2013), one may speak about entering the age of methodology. Ontological and epistemological issues were for a long time at the heart of critical debates, whereas the “ideas
that inform the methods and techniques that we use” (Shepherd 2013: 1) were rather put aside (Aradau – Huysmans 2013). That is not to say, of course, that the methodological question of “how we do what we do” (Salter 2013a: 1–2) had not been discussed before, nor that researchers did not think critically about their inquiries.\(^2\) We can nonetheless see recent years as a time of change in critical security studies, as a number of publications, research projects, seminars, workshops, courses, and public lectures have been devoted exclusively to methodology and research methods.

On the other hand, this explosion of methodology may also be viewed as an expression of rather problematic transformations occurring in the social sciences in the recent decades. Methodological fetishism, a bias toward quantitative research, and ritualistic proceduralism have been criticized by a whole range of authors as devastating to the actual ability of the social sciences of providing original insights into social processes and phenomena.

More than half a century ago, Charles Wright Mills attacked the abstracted empiricism and bureaucratic ethos taking over the various departments and institutions of social science (Mills 1959: 50–119). Pierre Bourdieu and Loïc Wacquant have condemned the “methodologism” and “theoreticism” as two forms of “involution … separating reflection on methods from their actual use in scientific work,” leading to the cultivation of “method for its own sake” (Bourdieu – Wacquant 1992: 26–27). Most recently, Jock Young’s lament about criminology points out how “reality has been lost in a sea of statistical symbols and dubious analysis” (Young 2011: viii), where the focus seems to be more on innovation of statistical techniques and mathematical equations than on understanding and explanation of phenomena (ibid.: 47).\(^3\) Even in predominantly interpretative disciplines like anthropology, scholars have noticed the pressure of “scientific” research standards, often derived from the deductive logic of research, impeding their work (Okely 2012: 1–25).

Looking back at the changes in academic writing in the last few decades, we can observe a significant increase in formalism and proceduralism, turning the ever-increasing and sophisticated methodology sections into spaces of academic intimidation rituals, the function of which is far from making one’s road to his or her results more transparent. Attempts to reclaim methodology (see e.g. Hansen 2006: 16) and to delve into worlds of ritualistic ptydepe\(^4\) thus may seem unfortunate – submitting to the new “rules of the game” instead of accepting (and resisting)

\(^2\) There are various remarkable contributions to the subject that we highly recommend reading, see, e.g., Ackerly et al. 2006; Alker 1996; Friedrichs and Kratochwil 2009; Hansen 2006; Jackson 2011; Klotz and Lynch 2007; Klotz and Prakash 2008; Krause 1998; Milliken 1999; Pouliot 2007; Sylvester 1994; Vrasti 2008, etc.

\(^3\) For a critical defense of quantitative methods, see Sjoberg and Horowitz (2013).

\(^4\) In Václav Havel’s play “The Memorandum,” ptydepe is an artificial language boasting the ability to overcome the ambiguity of all other languages by adherence to strictly scientific principles – in the end, however, the language is an absurd and incomprehensible mess. Here the word is used as a metaphor of the various technical/bureaucratic jargon which often seem much better in obscuring meaninglessness than in conveying meanings.
the fact that the “game is rigged” (Broadus 2006). The explosion of new forms of academic writing patterns concentrated around formalized methods and the increasing mathematization of the social sciences may well be interpreted as a result of the triumph of bureaucratic formalism over sociological imagination, with the academic craft and methodological procedures trumping research questions. Descriptions of methods used in our research might be helpful for the reader, but they should not serve to cover the fact that there is not much to say, and neither should they be used as tokens of “scientific-ness,” substituting for the actual results of one’s research. Defying this formalism with a return to the literary style of writing of classical authors of social theory (and for the simple fact that in order to write something we must have something to say) might be a better way of resistance of the bureaucratization of social science than devising and engaging in our own methodological newspeak.

In this paper, however, we depart from such a gloomy assessment of recent developments. Instead of “killing method” in favor of insight and creativity (Ferrell 2009), we hold the view that the “tyranny of method” can be overturned. If we reframe methodology as an “overarching epistemological and meta-theoretical reflection,” it helps us to not only understand all the stakes implicit in an empirical investigation, but also to strengthen our inquiry this way (Aradau and Huysmans 2013: 2). As it is not possible to meaningfully answer methodological (or any other kind of) questions without epistemology or theory, it is necessary to begin with a very short introduction to the theory of critical security studies.5

According to Columba Peoples and Nick Vaughan-Williams (2010), there are several ways to characterize critical security studies. One of the first definitions conceived critical security studies more as an “orientation toward the discipline than a precise theoretical label” that would make the “question and problem of security” opened to change in terms of conceptualization and policy (Krause and Williams 1997: xii). The apparent broadness and permissibility mirrored the plurality of approaches influenced by multiple philosophies, ranging from critical theory and feminism to post-structuralism and post-colonialism. Since they sometimes found themselves in conflict, their opposition to traditional Realist/Liberal security studies has functioned as the lowest denominator of them (see also Buzan and Hansen 2009).

To understand the nature of the critical challenge, we can recall a now classic distinction between problem-solving and critical theory. Critical security studies are meant to be critical precisely in the sense that they, unlike traditional security studies, do not “take institutions and social and power relations for granted but [call] them into question by concerning [themselves] with their origins [i.e., of these social relations] and how and whether they might be in the process of changing” (Cox 1981: 129). Later on, Fierke (2007: 27), among others, reaffirmed the “shift to an understanding of security as a social and political construction,” calling for a further politicization of security. It is the question what security does politically,

5 For a more extensive summary of the theoretical development in security studies, see the first chapter of this volume.
that is, how “representations and discourses of security encourage sets of practices, legitimize particular actors or indeed constitute political communities and their limits in particular ways” (Browning – McDonald 2013: 239), which is supposed to be answered.

Given this, João Nunes (2012) came up with a reading of security as the narrative of politicization in order to, first, organize the increasing production of critical security studies and, second, point to some of its limitations. In particular, he spoke about the demise of critique within the project, as scholars have largely resorted to the “negative” conception of security (see also Hynek and Chandler 2013). Some scholars have concentrated on how security proclamations produce an exceptionalist curtailment of democratic procedures; others have highlighted routine practices that make certain social categories insecure as a result of the inner workings of the field of security professionals (e.g. Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Buzan et al. 2005; Lupták 2011). Either way, security may be conceptualized as a mode of exercising power based on drawing a line between normality and deviance, or, more precisely, as a “principle of formation” which fosters violence and insecurity, establishing limits, divisions, and hierarchies between and within different social groups (Aradau and Van Munster 2010: 74). As security denotes, after all, “practices of survival” aimed at “postponing death by countering enemies” (Huysmans 1998: 234, 236), the most radical understanding of security in this sense identifies its final horizon with the extermination of dangerous deviants, for which Neocleous (2009) reserves the notion of the “fascist moment.”

The more security has been identified with the negative logic, the more the orientation of moving away from security and its potential emancipatory effects came to be seen as politically and ethically sound. The rise of the security state along with the repressive logic of surveillance after the events of 9/11 made this approach comprehensible (Agamben 2005; Aradau and Van Munster 2007; Bauman and Lyon 2013; Bigo et al. 2010; Bigo and Tsoukala 2008; Jabri 2006; Neal 2010). To Nunes (2012: 350), nevertheless, the “extraordinary progress in problematizing predominant security ideas and practices” was paid for by the “depoliticization of the meaning of security itself,” which has resulted in the diminished analytical capacity of critical security studies, the decreasing possibility of alternative notions of security, the inability to operate as a political resource, and in being constantly at risk of being politically counter-productive. If security indeed is a “framework for organizing contemporary social life” in a post-9/11 world (Goldstein 2010: 488), the price for not inventing more inclusive and democratic security practices might be too high (see also de Lint and Virta 2004).

Security as emancipation represents a positive outlook. For its advocates, “critique of security can be both deconstructive (denaturalizing and problematizing) and reconstructive (engaged in political struggles for transformation)” (Bosu and Nunes 2013: 75). The workings of security described previously can be transformed “not only by social struggles, but also by ideas that shape these struggles” in order to create “spaces in people’s lives in which they can make decisions and act beyond the basic necessities of survival” (Nunes 2012: 351, 357). To put it in
Marxian terms, all that is solid eventually melts into the air, and the seemingly unshakable security representations and practices are no exception (Linklater 1996). This prospect is founded on the idea that security equates to “freeing people from the life-determining conditions of insecurity” (Booth 2007: 115). In other words, security and emancipation are “two sides of the same coin” which one uses to buy himself or herself out of the insecure circumstances limiting his free action (Booth 1991: 319). More security means therefore more freedom for everyone. Practices of survival might be carried out “not against others, but with them” (Booth 2007: 115).

Perhaps the best way to resolve this dispute might be to see “negative” and “positive” security as two poles of a continuum of security politics. Actually existing security representations and practices can be studied precisely in relation to the position which they occupy in the continuum. That is, if they are more pernicious to human freedom, they go closer to the “negative” pole and vice versa. This approach is fully compatible with Browning and McDonald’s suggestion to engage with the “nuanced, reflexive and context-specific analyses of the politics and ethics of security” (2013: 248) as a way to overcome the abstract security dichotomy through an understanding of how security is performed and experienced in reality. Empirically grounded inquiry that prefers the concrete over the abstract and the particular over the universal appears to us as a site of potential transformation, regardless if it is framed by the notion of security or not. Contextualized empirical research is never devoid of abstract theorization. Explicitly or implicitly, the way we grasp our object of research structures the research process itself, from our initial questions to our final interpretation and conclusions. As “there is... no such thing as description... that does not engage a theory” (Wacquant 2002: 1523–1524), researchers should reflect upon the theoretical assumptions that underpin their inquiry; otherwise, they will submit to lay interpretations and common-sense explanations.

This is true of all research, but the importance of theoretical reflection especially arises in the case of fieldwork. Here, although we strongly encourage researchers to employ a “methodology of conducting fieldwork that allows individuals to speak in their own voice” (Croft 2008: 504), they should not do it “unarmed.” This means, to paraphrase Wacquant (2011: 87–88), that they should carry out their inquiry equipped with all available theoretical and methodological tools, with the full supply of problems inherited from their discipline, with their capacity for reflexivity and analysis, and guided by a constant effort to objectivize the experience acquired in research and construct the object, instead of allowing themselves to be naïvely embraced and constructed by it.

Theories have impact on research designs, for they structure the understanding of research object as well as research ethics. The titles of the two security logics might be perplexing; however emancipation lies at the heart of critical security studies overall (Wyn Jones 2005). As Jarvis (2013: 242–243) argued, the researcher as critic not only wants “to know the world better or differently, but also to challenge and critique existing sources, agents, and consequences of insecurity.”
Whether we intend to attain it through security or against security, there is always an idea of progress underneath. Even postmodern or post-structuralist approaches to security, deemed notorious for their reluctance to articulate any notion of progress whatsoever, share this preoccupation. For instance, Aradau and Van Munster (2010: 80) claim that the challenge to ongoing security practices is oriented towards emancipation as an “unconditional principle” which refers to a de jure universality – freedom and equality.

Burke (2013: 80, 87) also insists on preserving the “hope that [critical security studies] could constitute a form of scientific and ethical progress,” whilst recognizing “two major contributions to a postmodern ethics of security”: an “ethics of resistance and critique” and an “ethics of relation,” The first has been introduced on a basic level; it coincides with the critique of dominant security representations and practices that must be resisted and unmade. Nonetheless, since security practices are frequently tied up with and enable the “larger ontologies (the systems and signification of identity, otherness, and being),” it is identity itself – the self and its relations with others – that must be rethought to bring about a progressive change (see also Neumann 2010). The ethics of relation accentuates diversity and interdependence of human beings. It is based on the recognition of others through giving up the conception of “self-contained and self-referring ego, one that seeks mastery over its environment, nature, and other human beings” (Burke 2013: 87; see also Burke 2007).

One of the routes to this end might be in Habermasian politics, in open dialogue, creating the symbolic and material possibilities of such a dialogue, and broadening the relationship between deliberation and its outcomes (Browning and McDonald 2013; Wyn Jones 1999). On the other hand, we should be wary of overlooking contextual specifics. When we research, for instance, how the field of security professionals contributes to the production and reproduction of social realities through (in)security discourses and practices, should we still talk about emancipation, or is emancipatory research of security reserved for research projects focusing on “experience of those men and women and communities for whom the present world order is a cause of insecurity rather than security” (Wyn Jones 1995: 309) after the fashion of immanent critique (Fierke 2007: 167–185)?

Obviously, these perspectives are seldom incompatible. Security representations and practices are part of the insecurity picture; they themselves produce insecurities which tend to target certain social categories more than others. Such an (in)security asymmetry might be the starting point in identifying emancipatory possibilities within the field of security professionals, out of which the current security representations and practices can be rendered more inclusive and democratic. At the same time, researching such representations and practices should be complemented by understanding what effects they have for

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6 Emancipation through security is obviously affiliated with Ken Booth (2007) and the “positive” strand of security thought. The approach against security is most eloquently articulated by Claudia Aradau (2008) and Mark Neocleous for whom Booth is “as mistaken as one can possibly be about security,” as, instead of security and emancipation, “security and oppression are the two sides of the same coin” (2008: 5, italics in the original).
those targeted by them. In Naderian terms (1972), both the studying up and down suit emancipatory purposes in security studies agenda. To identify how security politics operates in certain environments requires plunging into messy empirical worlds (Squire 2013).

In the next section, we present five methodologies relating the methods of ethnography, field analysis, discourse analysis, corporeal analysis, and analysis of material culture to other components of research procedure such as the object of research, techniques of data construction, the nature of data, etc. (Salter and Mutlu 2013). Afterwards, we elaborate on the re-conceptualization of methods as performative and political instruments to demonstrate the possibilities and limitations that their application in an empirical inquiry creates.

THE METHODOLOGICAL TURN(S) OF CRITICAL SECURITY STUDIES

With “more than twenty years of solid work in critical security studies” (Salter 2013a: 11), the issues of methodology and research methods have risen to prominence. The questions of how we do our research and how such projects can inspire other researchers are of particular importance, because the production of theoretical knowledge can hardly be imagined without a “serious engagement with the empirical” (Salter 2013b: 15). An immersion into the empirical requires reflexivity in methodology as well as in theory. In more specific terms, it means “to include method as an explicit pillar of research that supports the argument as much as theory” (Salter 2013a: 13).

Openness toward the research object and reflexivity regarding the research process are crucial features of critical methodology. In this respect, Salter (2013a: 2–3) speaks of “four postures of critical inquiry.” The first one considers social and political life to be complex and messy, making it impossible to identify any single unifying principle in social reality – context-specific understanding matters. Second, agency is presumed to be everywhere: in individuals, groups, states, ideational structures, and non-human agents too, and if we want to understand it, we need to deal with all of these subjects as well as the conditions they have produced and shaped them. The next posture bears on the nature of the relationship between these conditions and particular outcomes. Relying on the work of William E. Connolly, causality is supposed to be emergent. That is to say, there is no single or complex source to be set out by the analysis; there are only conditions of possibility allowing sets of politics, identities, or policies to occur. Discourses, institutions, structures, and agents render some paths possible, but not necessary; certain outcomes have been produced in certain ways, but their emergence out of these conditions is however never automatic or self-evident.

We already said that the issue of ethics is vital for critical security studies. Accordingly, the fourth critical posture corresponds with the recognition that research, writing, and public engagement are inherently political. Critical scholarship entails an active engagement with the world which has profound
implications for the role that a researcher plays in “both the activity of investigation and the narration of results” (Salter 2013b: 20–23). “Research never takes place in a vacuum” (Jarvis 2013: 236); it is situated in various social, political, institutional, and intellectual contexts, and this enables and constrains the choices available to researchers. Personal characteristics of the researcher always influence the research process, as his or her position in ethno-racial, class, gender, or spatial hierarchies usually differs from the position of those under study and makes it much harder to see the world through their eyes.

How can we handle a research project under these circumstances? Constant reflexivity is the first part of an interpretivist answer, clarity in research design and appropriateness of method for the object of study the second (Salter 2013b). As we in interpretivism are concerned with “legibility and not replicability” (ibid.: 15), a clearly specified research methodology is of utmost importance. Although not without reservations, the metaphor of “turn” has often been applied to methodological issues in critical security studies. We play on it here, too, as this style of explication is beneficial in presenting the research process as a coherent complex distinguished by its specific genre of analysis. On the other hand, the idea of genre should not lead to bounded, “inside-the-box” thinking that prioritizes methodological purity over the goal of inquiry. Researchers are encouraged to leave off formalized procedures and opt for *bricolage* whenever they feel it can benefit their aims. It is, first of all, the purpose of understanding the world of (in)security that should guide our conduct. Salter and Mutlu (2013) recognize five methodological approaches coined as the ethnographic, practice, discursive, corporeal, and material “turns”:

*The ethnographic turn:* The term “ethnography” is used to describe a range of qualitative data generation techniques that are *naturalistic*, meaning that they involve studying people or phenomena in their ‘natural’ setting or context, and produce accounts of research that are *experience-near*, meaning that they are based on people’s experiences of events, actions and phenomena in the setting or context (Wilkinson 2013: 129, italics in the original).

To put it another way, an ethnographer strives for an “empathetic analysis of culture” (Salter 2013c: 51) that generates “thick description” (Geertz 1973: 5) based on participant observation, interviewing, and document analysis. As such, it is well-suited to the study of the self-understanding of human collectivities, their identities, norms, rules, and way of being, as well as the dynamics of encountering the other. Traditionally associated with anthropology, ethnography is not a total stranger to security studies, although its usage has been rather intuitive and non-reflexive (Vrasti 2008). Ethnography’s significance nonetheless has increased, as the practical worlds of justice, power, and domination occupy a central place within the agenda of critical security studies. Especially, but not exclusively, “in cases where government statistics are suspect, media outlets are controlled by political interests, and poverty, lack of infrastructure, illiteracy, or political...
violence impede survey research, ethnographic approaches are often the most reliable and practical means of collecting data” on how the meaning of security is constructed in a certain context (Bayard de Volo and Schatz 2004: 269).

The practice turn: This approach is notably indebted to Bourdieu and his “thinking tools,” that is, field, capital, and habitus (Grenfell 2012; Růžička – Vašát 2011). If ethnography searches for meaning, field analysis lays stress on the logic of practice, the meaning of which must be unearthed in relation to the social and cultural context that makes its production possible (Bourdieu 1990). That is, when a researcher aspires to understand what people say and do, she must account for the internal functioning of fields in which they operate, applying the techniques of participant observation, interviewing, document analysis, and also statistics. Field is a relatively autonomous social space in which actors compete, struggle, cooperate, and interact for various types of capital (economic, cultural, social, symbolic) according to particular rules of the game (Salter 2013a). Viewed as an effect of a field, the practical materialization of habitus is seen in the form of mental schemata of perception, appreciation, and action that drive the operation of field (Salter 2013d). “To make visible the habitus and particular relations of struggle, competition, and dominance, analysts point to informal knowledge, social positions, and networks” of the agents engaged in the field (Salter 2013a: 3). The goal is to map the dominant objective structure of the field and the subjective understanding of the rules of the game, as they together produce certain effects.

The discursive turn: Basically, there is a bit of discourse analysis in every methodological approach. To be inspired by discourse analysis and to use it as a primary method are nevertheless two different things. As defined by Mutlu and Salter (2013: 113), discourse analysis is the “rigorous study of writing, speech, and other communicative events in order to understand these political, social, and cultural dynamics.” It is a “method to analyze these spoken, sign-based, or any other significant semiotic markers that provide meaning to the social world surrounding us” (ibid.). Discourse as such is a “linguistic practice that puts into play sets of rules and procedures for the formation of objects, speakers and themes” (Åhäll and Borg 2013: 197). A key aspect of this definition is the assumption that discourse does not merely describe objects or communicate certain meaning, discourse in fact does something. As it produces a more or less fixed representations of reality, discourse is constitutive of what we understand as “reality” (see also Neumann 2008). In security studies, the method has been applied, especially demonstrating the “impact of language on discourses and practices of security; not only highlighting the linguistic origins of insecurities but also demonstrating the impact of competing narratives in shaping them” (Mutlu and Salter 2013: 118; see also the second and third chapters of this book). There are a variety of ways to do discourse analysis. Bakhtin’s intertextuality, Foucault’s genealogy, and Derrida’s “anti-method” of deconstruction (Griffin 2013) are all
among their cornerstone tools. Among the modes of discourse analysis, there is, however, a gap to be filled with the visual (Moore and Farrands 2013). Though the ethnographers routinely collect visual data, the visual representations of the worlds of security (both the world of experts, security practices, and narratives, as well as of the subjects of security) still remain rather unexplored, though it is hard to contest their pervasiveness or significance. The possibilities offered by visual fieldwork methods (cf. Pink et al. 2004: 11–99), iconography (Leeuwen 2008: 92–118, cf. also Collier 2008: 35–60) or interpretation through ethnographic film (Baena et al. 2004: 120–134) all seem to provide promising avenues for exploration.

The corporeal turn: Covering affect, emotions, and the somatic is an “emergent research agenda within critical security studies” (Mutlu 2013a: 139). This methodology comes from feminist approaches to critical security studies where the body is seen as a “political site” and a “site of resistance” (Salter 2013a: 7). It is characterized more by its research object than a distinctive method, and the specification of the object becomes even more vital for research design. There is a substantial difference among the attributes of the corporeal which manifests itself in the choice of fitting method. When we study affect (or the absence of it), we are interested in bodily reactions such as smiling, crying, increase or decrease of blood pressure, or head movement, and auto-ethnography, interviews, and participant observation seem to fit this aim best. On the other hand, when we are concerned with verbal or written expressions of those affective reactions, i.e., emotions like happiness, sadness, anger, pain, fear, lightheartedness, shame, etc., then we should go for discourse analysis. In both cases, a focus on corporeal practices is chiefly favorable, as bodies are increasingly subjected to security control exerted by state and private apparatuses. The somatic refers primarily to the subjugation of gendered bodies to the social. To understand how bodies are shaped by power relations and security practices in particular, we can apply discourse analysis, interviewing, participant observation, or archival research (Mutlu 2013a).

The material turn: Whereas security scholars have paid attention to the role of meaning, practice, discourse, and the corporeal, material objects were largely missing in the agenda. The material turn can be seen as a critique of all previous approaches, since they fail to make sense of how objects mediate human agency. It is this methodology, resting on the “radical reorganization of our social hierarchies, one that recognizes both human and non-human actants as agents of impacting our social world” (Mutlu 2013b: 179), that redresses it. Full body scanners, CCTV, biometric identification systems, databases, and non-lethal weapons are all objects that have become part of everyday governance. The essential idea behind this approach is that such “objects have a social base that expands beyond their material existence,” and, as such, they are central to the performance of our identities and practices (ibid.: 173). Ultimately, human agency is understood to be indistinguishable from its surroundings. To the followers of Actor Network Theory, agency is a network consisting of human and non-human elements who act (see also Soreanu and Simionca 2013; Latour 2005). In this methodology, researchers use a “combination of discourse analysis, mapping
[social network analysis], and participant observations to trace the genealogy and quotidian uses of security objects” (Mutlu 2013b: 175) and examine an object’s effects on its surroundings.

These tools are relatively new to security studies and have their merits as well as limitations. To conform to standards of rigor, “frank discussion of research design limits, processes, and failures” is advisable (Salter 2013a: 9). In Guillaume’s words, “critical research design should open up inquiry, privileging the questioning rather than the answering, the doubt rather than the certainty that comes with an entrenchment in disciplinary practices” (2013: 31). In the rest of this section, we take seriously the claim that the “world is given through our methods of studying it” (ibid.: 3) and address the criticality of research methods.

By and large, methods are considered to be neutral techniques of gathering and processing data which guarantee the scientific natures of research. Because of the seeming separation of politics and methods, and the disciplining and constraining function of methodological requirements, methodological inquiry has been seen as “inherently suspect for a critical approach” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013: 5).

Aradau and Huysmans (2013: 3) oppose this reading and propose to make method and methodological reflection a “key site of revisiting critique and politics.” At the heart of this endeavor is the re-conceptualization of methods as performative and political instruments. Far from being “no more than ways of acquiring data” (Della Porta and Keating 2008: 28), methods not only serve to analyze the world, but also to construct or deconstruct it in different ways.

That is to say, methods are conceived as both performative and political; they present an “enactment of and rupture into the worlds of knowledge and politics” (Aradau and Huysmans 2013: 18). Methods, just like theories, are performative in that they “make and remake worlds, identities, and things in a fragile, continuously changing way” (ibid.: 9). All methods, be they surveys, data-mining techniques or in-depth interviews, drag along certain visions of social realities which are substantive in their effects. As devices, they inscribe themselves into the worlds they are supposed to study. Methods are also political rather than value neutral: “They are instruments not for creating common ground, but for power struggles, competing enactments of worlds and/or creating disruptive positions in the worlds of international politics” (ibid.: 3). To illustrate this by the authors’ own example, the “world of terrorism is different when accounted for by mapping global inequalities rather than by mapping terrorist networks” (ibid.: 9). Conceptualizing methods as acts, Aradau and Huysmans draw attention to the fact that methods can also have disruptive effects, entailing ruptures in the representations of the world enacted by different methods. In this sense, the use of ethnography in a power-laden, exclusive, and secretive context not used to this kind of research practice, or any kind of research scrutiny for that matter, is in itself such a disruption, an act of sabotage consciously willing to strike both the world of academic (mainstream) security studies, as well as the world of the security bureaucrat.
The twofold reconceptualization of methods answers a demand for critical orientation in security studies. Reclaiming methods themselves as areas that critical approaches can examine, the authors shed light on the high stakes of knowledge production. The ways we study the world have their specific political effects. Methods make certain worldviews as well as unmake them. Therefore, the basic methodological questions are how and what worlds we produce by means of research and, furthermore, what consequences result from this activity.

**Reflections on Critical Inquiry in Central Europe**

In this section, we analyze our research with respect to what has been said so far. The first body of research we would like to introduce may be considered traditional – to the extent that it is an exercise in critical political sociology as a discipline focusing on the relations between governance and social structure, with a special focus on the factors of bureaucracy, oligarchy, and ideology (cf. Bendix and Lipset 1966). Security is viewed simply as an overarching emic category motivating, legitimizing, and giving meaning to various forms of behavior of predominantly bureaucratic actors (i.e. actors occupying more or less significant positions in institutions of power or providing various services for these institutions). Security thus does not belong to the set of conceptual tools used in this research; on the contrary, these tools have been constructed with the exact aim to dissect and overcome the category of security as a major obstacle to understanding specific spheres and forms of practice connected with power and governance in contemporary societies.

The less traditional aspect of this research (besides, perhaps, the above-mentioned attempt to rob security of its relevance, gravity, and drama) lies in the specific position of the researcher as an insider in the practical struggles and discourse arenas marked by the category of security, a former security professional turned (auto)ethnographer, shifting from participant to participant observer/observed. Obviously, the position of a rogue insider conditions the critical attitude toward the master categories structuring his or her former activities to a large extent, and the utilization of ethnographic and auto-ethnographic tools brings very specific tensions to the processes connected with entering and leaving the research field, as well as to the relations with former colleagues turned informants. This should make clear that the results of such research will not and probably cannot resonate very well with what security experts themselves would term security research.8

The primary research goal was simply to grasp and understand the researcher’s previous and rather strange and disconcerting experience as an actor in the field of security professionals in a small post-socialist country – research seemed to be a perfectly logical way to order, extend, and interpret it. There were a great

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8 For an illustrative emic (security professional) account of what is important for security research, see e.g. Ušiak and Lasicová (2007).
many things to be explained: How come the actors in this segment of social space constantly engage in meaningless and futile routine activities, knowing they are meaningless and futile, but constantly performing with the gravitas connected with the vocation of a security expert “protecting” the society? How come huge amounts of bureaucratic/security texts, many of them classified, are created without any specialized training, in a manner that evokes high school papers rather than the peak of official expertise? How come most of the bureaucratic texts, regardless of their position in the official hierarchy of strategic documents, do not really have anything to do with the ways in which the huge amounts of resources are spent? How come the structure and language of the texts produced by security experts is so ritualistic and metaphysical, and at the same time so technically sounding, claiming unique access to specific knowledge of a “scientific” kind? How does one actually become a “security expert” and what is his or her function in the complex system of governance? Why have the numbers of security experts and their texts multiplied so much in recent decades?

There seemed to be no way to provide a meaningful answer to these and countless other questions within the social world under scrutiny; emic concepts seemed too blunt and blind for grasping these problems. The research, therefore, had to be conducted with a set of theoretical tools alien to the research field, allowing the researcher to “exoticize the domestic, through a break with [the] initial relation of intimacy with modes of life and thought which remain opaque... because they are too familiar” (Bourdieu 1988: xi). At the same time, the practicality of the research questions as well as the nature of previous experience allowed for no other but a long-term direct empirical (ethnographic) investigation with as many complementary modes of data construction as possible, focusing on the world of everyday practices of security experts, as well as on their texts, and, last but not least, on a reflexive exploration of one of our own career trajectories as a security expert.

The core of our theoretical toolbox was constituted by the first critical security theory we encountered – the Copenhagen school’s theory of securitization (see especially Wæver 1995; Buzan et al. 2005). Its limits in grasping and interpreting the everyday routine activities of the security experts, the language of security, and the goings-on of some segments of their world called for several pragmatically

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9 Such as writing a huge number of dossiers no one outside the closed world of a few security bureaucrats would (reluctantly) read, sometimes even engaging in prolonged and exhausting but largely pointless battles over words with other bureaucrats; formulating banal official positions with regard to this or that bureaucratic text that no one really cares about; preparing plans and strategies no one would follow (at times even pushing them through the government or Parliament, with no impact on their non-binding character); reading “top secret” documents consisting wholly of content copied from publicly accessible websites; engaging in endless rants against this or that “incompetent” or “useless” person or department (and knowing that the trope of “uselessness” may rightfully be used against you); or constantly complaining about lack of time (and being able to spend several hours of each workday doing so). The latter two examples are among the most pervasive routines serving important social functions in the worlds of petty bureaucratic politics, as well as providing a (modest) cover for the meaninglessness of one’s own activities.

10 See Lupták (2011).
oriented updates of the theory, which were thankfully provided by numerous crucial discussions and mutations of securitization theory within the field of critical security studies and international political sociology.

The most important, however, was an update provided by Didier Bigo (2002, 2008), connecting the critical analysis of discourses and practices connected with the label of security with Bourdieu’s rich theoretical apparatus. To be able to overcome the static and rather succinct character of the original securitization theory in the analysis of the linguistic and normative aspects of security, Lupták decided to draw from Holger Stritzel’s recent addition in the form of security as translation (Stritzel 2010, 2011). The final (at least at this time) addition to the conceptual toolbox was intertwined with the attempts to explore a particular part of the research field, that is, the communal celebrations of security experts (workshops, conferences, symposia, anniversary meetings etc.). Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical and frame analyses (see especially Goffman 1956, 1971, 1986; also Krčál 2013, Salter 2008) seemed to reconcile very well with the basic theoretical assumptions of other theories Lupták exploited, and provided a unique opportunity to delve deeper into the ceremonies and rituals of the strange tribe of security experts. Viewing these ceremonies as among the most important sites where the particular, localized regimes of security-truth are performed and negotiated (cf. Salter 2008: 322) allowed us to grasp better the relations between the banal, everyday practical world, textual practices, and the ceremonial behavior of the security expert.

As mentioned above, the core approach to data construction was ethnography as the most powerful tool for exploration of an insular face-to-face community (cf. Hejnal 2012), with a semi-covert approach to participant observation oscillating pragmatically between active and peripheral membership (Adler and Adler 1987: 36–66). Access to the field was fairly easy – due to Lupták’s position as a former actor in the field and prolonged contact with former colleagues, some of them turned to core informants, while others helped in snowballing. The semi-covert research strategy employed to access the field was in hindsight very useful, and though it is connected with considerable ethical dilemmas, these are by no means unsolvable. On the other hand, if Lupták chose to walk the path of gaining formal validation of his access to the field, disclosing his research to the persons and bureaucratic hierarchies under scrutiny, he would most probably have closed the entryways guarded by the more jealous and secretive gatekeepers, and caused unwanted reactivity among the potential informants.

The main complementary techniques of participant observation included informal (field) and unstructured narrative interviewing driven mostly by the informants and focusing on their everyday problems, their career trajectories, ambitions, self-perceptions and perceptions of others, and other things they themselves considered relevant (cf. Gillham 2005: 37–53). Adopting the “collector and walking archive” role (Okely 1994: 20), and stumbling upon huge amounts

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11 A more detailed explanation of the motives and rationales of this approach may be found in Hejnal and Lupták (2013a).
of security texts, Lupták also had to find a set of techniques allowing both the organizing of this data and the ability to delve deeper into the discursive techniques of security, grasping the structures of relevance and the basic assumptions governing the texts as well as the various modes of meaning construction and meaning exclusion utilized by security experts. To deal with the overwhelming number of texts, Lupták decided to use tools of computer-assisted qualitative and quantitative data analysis (see Hejnal and Lupták 2013b), combining structural (inductive) and formal (theory-driven) content analysis. The CAQDAS tool used (MAXQDA 10, later MAXQDAPlus 11) also served very well as a digital hub, storing all of the data constructed in the field (field notes, text materials, and interviews, as well as visual and audiovisual data) and allowed the consistent coding of a wide array of data types.

The preliminary conclusions of this research (for more details, see Lupták 2011 or 2012) revealed a specific kind of symbiosis between various types of actors participating in security practices and discourses in a post-socialist context, and pointed to the fact that it may be useful to view the local post-socialist world of security in three basic positions. First, as a pool of symbols and rhetorical and practical strategies used by political actors to localize the (neoliberal) transformation of governance: a specific segment of culture. Second, as a world of practice, with the overproduction of security texts and expansion of security-related techniques as a multilayered survival strategy utilized by bureaucratic, academic, police, military, and other cadres in the context of the global expansion of security discourses on the one hand, and post-socialist (neoliberal) transformation on the other. Third, as a source of economic and symbolic profit for actors attempting to capitalize on the cultural functions of security discourses, either by funneling large parts of security-related public budgets to private hands through selling goods and services to state and private institutions, or by utilizing the symbolic force inherent in securitizing discourses for mobilization of political support or for re-channeling of public attention toward an external enemy, turning it away from the local political elite. From the point of view of critical social research, of course, the third position seems to be most important; however, it cannot really be explored any deeper without tackling the first two.

The second of our research projects also started with personal discontent. The initial dissatisfaction with the grotesque securitization of Roma minority practiced by security experts, the prevailing tendency in the Czech Republic to see the areas with a higher concentration of marginalized Roma foremost as a “security risk for the majority” (GAC 2008: 25), and numerous violent rallies against “Roma criminality” (see also Tamás Csiki’s chapter in this volume) was eventually transformed into a longstanding academic interest out of which an ethnographic research in a marginalized neighborhood originated. The inquiry aimed to make sense of how its inhabitants perceive the condition of security within the place where they live. Rejecting the a priori allocation of the roles of the menacing and the menaced, the research pursued a critical orientation, as it was anchored in the “corporeal, material existence and experiences of [those]
human beings” (Wyn Jones 1999: 115) who were predominantly seen as the source of danger rather than the subject of security.

Embedded clearly in the context of security-as-emancipation approach, security was conceptualized as an equivalent of human freedoms and rights that contributes to a specific meaning in a certain environment. To have a better grasp of the process surrounding the construction of the meaning of security, the research object was further specified. As a standard dictionary definition of security is the “absence of threats” (Booth 1991: 319), the notion of security itself can be understood as a set of three definitional components: the threat, the threatened, and the desire to escape harmful possibilities. Each of those “core elements of security” (Booth 2007: 100) was used to formulate specific research questions to (re)construct the meaning of security from the point of view of those who are imminently involved: What threats do the marginalized identify? What identities are expressed in this sense? What strategies do they adopt to prevent undesirable consequences?

The ethnographic standard – participant observation, interviewing, and document analysis – seemed from the very beginning as the most suitable tools to address these questions. However, when the author was designing the project, ethnographic methodology appeared to him as insufficiently elaborated in the discipline. To enhance competence in this genre, cultural criminology was highly instrumental. As it itself draws on a rich tradition of “getting-the-seat-of-your-pants-dirty” inquiry (cf. Robert E. Park quoted in McKinney 1966: 71), it was chiefly helpful in thinking about methodological questions. Security was thus read in the research as a “creative construct” (Hayward and Young 2004: 259), a result of “expressive human activity” (Ferrell et al. 2008: 2) that constitutes the “webs of significance” in which all people are suspended (Geertz 1973: 5). The symbolic reality of (in)security is intended to be enacted temporarily and through participation of a variety of actors. Not only the marginalized, but also social agents, politicians, journalists, the public, researchers, and others produce different interpretations in the circumstances of unequal power relations which make some of them dominant and others subordinate.

Owing to the researcher’s previous experiences with grounded theory method, data gathering and analysis were informed by some of its procedures. In particular, the idea of theoretical sampling that denotes a technique to create data through a constant comparison of observed processes of human action provided basic guidance in achieving the stated goal of inquiry. Avowing the broad-ranging critique of grounded theory (see e.g. Thomas and James 2006), the method was thus employed as a “flexible and versatile data analysis technique” (Timmermans and Tavory 2007: 495) rather than as a systematic methodological approach as conceived by its founders (Glaser and Strauss 1967). The main part of analysis took advantage of ATLAS.ti software which not only facilitated the process but also ensured better orientation in data (for more detailed account of analysis see Walach 2013a).

Unlike Lupták, Walach needed to determine a field for the study more specifically. In 2006, a map with more than 300 “Romani socially excluded
localities” in the Czech Republic was published (GAC 2006). Firstly, Walach considered a locality in the city where his university is located in order to reduce travel expenditures and to keep himself more in touch with research participants. This place, however, seemed too overcrowded by researchers, so Walach eventually decided on a locale in his hometown. Not only had it been largely neglected by academic researchers, but it was moreover publicly recognized as problematic in terms of security, as street crime as well as hate crime had been registered here. Finally, it was also possible to capitalize on his personal connections, including a Roma activist who promised to arrange the contact with marginalized residents. Entering the field was therefore significantly easier. The reason of his presence was no secret. Of course, not everyone Walach met during participant observation knew about it, but generally he did not conceal the research identity, since he considered it to be the best way to ensure the ethical side of inquiry.

Doing research on security among the marginalized is stacked with ethical challenges (Jacoby 2006; Stern 2006). To mention one, in Walach’s inquiry there were many situations when he was captured in a swirl of responsibility towards conscience and the well-being of people under study, ranging from registering the small everyday cases of law-breaking to asking the big questions concerning appropriate ways of presenting the research arguments. Most importantly, Walach was confused by the narratives of many research participants, as they were almost indistinguishable from the dominant discourse on the “Gypsy menace” (Stewart 2012). His own experiences from the field, however, did not support the dismal picture portrayed by respondents. He does not argue that there were no cases of the frequently-mentioned social ills such as aggression, robbery, or theft. What he doubts was their quantity and intensity, which supposedly made the locality different from other parts of town. The uneasiness related to the risk of making the condition of the marginalized even worse ultimately prompted him to rethink the research project in a way of “stepping back” from the ethnography in favor of discourse analysis accounting more extensively for the symbolic construction of marginalized Roma neighborhoods as dangerous places (Walach 2013e).

Instead of outlining some conclusions of this still-ongoing inquiry (for this see Walach and Cisař 2013; Walach 2013b, 2013c, 2013d), Walach ends this presentation with emphasizing and favoring the messy, shaky, and ambiguous character of research process in line with “wondering as a research attitude” (Lobo-Guerrero 2013). As wandering back and forth, from side to side, and all the way around happens to be much more fitting to the actual conduction of inquiry, the linearity of research should be approached critically. To speak metaphorically, Walach started to ask people in their living rooms about what they fear in the neighborhood, went ahead through gambling at slot machines in dilapidated casinos, traveling cross-country to Roma parties, providing local rappers with inspiration for their lyrics and finished with visiting the city council meetings and anti-racist rallies, but never ceased to ask himself how all of it relates to the given research goal and if the goal itself is formulated correctly after all. Walach asserts this sort of research “disorganization” is a good way to allow for the “singularities of a practice or
a discourse to stand out and for the researcher to make them explicit” (ibid.: 25). It was frequently due to surprises, those “unexpected disruptions in the order of knowing about phenomena” (ibid.: 27), that certain wider rationalities of thought were discovered and gave rise to fertile courses of inquiry.

CONCLUSION

Critical research on security is an idea whose time has come. If critical security studies are about to succeed (in Central Europe as well as elsewhere), its exponents must definitely devote themselves to political issues beyond the boundaries of theoretical problem-solving (cf. Booth 2013). At the heart of the project, there is a “commitment to researching the lived experience of those affected by (in) securities” (Croft 2008: 506). There is the maxim to study security in ways that “seek to help to lift the strains of life-determining insecurity from the bodies and minds of people in real villages and cities, regions and states” (Booth 2005: 276), whether it is done by focusing on those who produce (in)security, be they disgruntled security bureaucrats or beat cops, or those who are on its receiving end. To deal effectively with (in)securities of “real people in real places” (Wyn Jones 1996: 214) requires the realization of Wyn Jones’s thesis according to which “only political practice can bring about the development of a peaceful, secure, and just world order” (1995: 315). Conducting critical inquiry comes under this rubric; as “barbarism is still a strong possibility” (ibid.: 314), it aims not only to interpret the world in various ways, but also to change it.

In this chapter, we attempted to elucidate what is encompassed in researching security in a critical manner. Since there is no methodology without theoretical and epistemological reflection, we started with a short introduction to the current state of affairs of theorizing security. Borrowing the language of security logics, we endorsed the overcoming of the abstract dichotomy of “negative” and “positive” security conceptualizations in favor of an understanding of what security does and what ethical stakes are implied in specific contexts. Such a re-orientation of critical security studies undoubtedly puts the issues of methodology and research methods to the forefront. Openness and reflexivity are typical features of critical inquiry, whether it is conducted through ethnography, field analysis, discourse analysis, corporeal analysis, or the analysis of material culture. All of these methodological genres utilize manifold techniques of data processing, ranging from participant observation and interviewing to statistical methods. To recognize that different methods enact and disrupt certain representations of the world is part of a critical reading of methodology as an overarching epistemological and meta-theoretical reflection.

This was followed by the presentation of two research projects conducted in post-socialist Central Europe which, due to its specifics of capitalist triumphalism, expanding securitization discourses and security practices, the spread of anti-Roma discourses, and rising social inequalities, appears to be truly well-suited
for critical and engaged research. By analyzing the everyday representations and practices of security professionals, Lupták challenged the political gravity and analytic value of security as a concept and instead focused on how it was used in the transformation and performance of governance in contemporary societies. With help of its native set of categories (threat, enemy, risk etc.), the discourse of security served to divert or channel public attention, depoliticize and technicize certain measures, stage symbolic performances of power relations, and ultimately served as a vital cog in the machinery of stratifying and classifying its members. His inquiry can therefore be classified as conforming to the “negative” logic of security. On the contrary, the “positive” motivation of Walach’s inquiry was embodied in the will to give voice to those who were securitized as the originators of insecurity rather than the recipients of insecurity. The authors applied a variety of different theoretical tools to make sense of their research objects, from (in) securitization theory to cultural criminology. While both of them used the techniques of direct observation and interviewing, their inquiries, however, differ in methodological genres. With his interest in the internal logic of operation of security professionals’ field, Lupták is closer to Bourdieusian field analysis. The way through which Walach examined how the inhabitants of a socially-excluded locality constructed the meaning of security in their surroundings corresponds to more traditional ethnography, though it was further enriched by the analytics of grounded theory method. The issues such as the construction of field, ethical challenges, and more practical problems were also discussed.

The other two studies in this book have employed more distant methods of studying security, such as discourse analysis, and could be thus described as belonging to the previously introduced discursive turn. Both of them were also somewhat closer to the “negative” approach to security conceptualization. However, similarly as Lupták’s and Walach’s research projects, both Potjomkina’s and Csiki’s studies investigated the construction of security and security threats in specific Central European contexts. Showing that traditionally perceived external security issues have important domestic underpinnings, Potjomkina’s contribution investigated how the meanings of security, identity, and sovereignty are contested and negotiated within distinct national discourses that create differing interpretations of relations with a “key” foreign ally. This issue is very much shared by other states positioned between Russia and Western Europe as well. Focusing on another pressing topic for many of the Central European states – relations between the majority and minorities – Csiki’s chapter looked on the traditionally national (“internal”) topic and analyzed the intentional process of the construction of a security threat by extreme-right movements. Even though both these studies used different concepts, theories, and levels of analysis, both of them (again, similar to Lupták and Walach) pointed to close connections between security, politics, and identity in their analyses, and the problematization of these three concepts lies at the heart of the tasks of critical security research.

As a newcomer to Central European academia, critical security studies represent a very promising orientation. They can provide researchers with a strong
rationale as well as a colorful theoretico-methodological framework for the study of contemporary politics. Security is a “powerful political word” (Booth 2007: 108), and the political significance of many issues endowed with “security” firmly calls for a serious engagement. The hitherto taken-for-granted assumptions must be put under scrutiny, the representations and practices of security problematized, and an emancipatory perspective stressed in order to understand the condition of those who speak and do – as well as experience – (in)security. In light of the fact that most of the conceptual development in security studies occurs in North America and Western Europe, scholars should take the advantage of the specific political and social situation of post-socialist countries, as this unique context might be the fertile ground out of which new perspectives on security theory and practice will blossom (Drulák 2009).

To conclude, let us thus again highlight the importance of context-specific knowledge, which was demonstrated by all the studies presented in this book. Whether it is the construction of security threats by militant extreme right-wing parties, or by (in)security professionals, it is precisely the understanding of security in time and space that allows us to acquire the relevant insights into what security means, how it works, and how it might be potentially changed. The students of security have nothing to lose but their theoretical chains and “common sense” prejudices. They have a world to win.
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## Index

(In)security, 13, 52, 53, 58, 60, 68, 70, 72

**A**
- Aberystwyth School, 3, 17
- Aradau, Claudia, 4, 6, 52–56, 58, 63
- Ash, Timothy G., 1
- audience (securitization theory), 5, 34–35, 44
- Austria, 7, 9

**B**
- Baldwin, David A., 1
- Balkan countries, 8–10
- Baltic countries, 10, 12, 20–21, 31
- Balzacq, Thierry, 5, 6, 34–35, 44
- Bauman, Zygmunt, 56
- Bigo, Didier, 6, 52, 56, 66
- Booth, Ken, 7, 57–58, 68, 70
- Borders, 1, 5–8, 19, 30
- Bourdieu, Pierre, 6, 54, 61, 65–66, 70–71
- Bureaucracy, 2, 6, 13, 53, 64
- Bush, George, 19, 23–26, 30
- Buzan, Barry, 2–5, 33–34, 53, 55–56, 65, 71

**C**
- constructivism, 1–5, 14–16, 33, 51
- Copenhagen School, 3–6, 34–35, 65
- corruption, 16, 19, 27, 30
- critical
- critical approach, 52, 63–64
- critical enquiry, 59, 64, 70
- critical methodology
- critical research, 12, 63, 70
- critical security studies, 2–3, 13, 52–60, 62, 65–66, 70
- critical theory, 7, 53, 55
- Czech Republic, 7, 8, 10, 32, 52–53, 67–70

**D**
- discourse, 13, 15–17, 22, 33, 58, 67
- discourse analysis, 16, 17, 37, 59, 61–62, 69–71
- Drulák, Petr, 1, 10, 72

**E**
- Eastern Europe, 8–11, 13, 24, 31
- emancipation, 7, 52, 56–58, 68
- epistemology, 4, 15, 16, 53, 55, 70
- ethnography, 59, 60–61, 63, 66, 69, 70–71
- European Roma Rights Centre, 32, 42
- European Union, 4–5, 22, 26
- Europeanness, 12, 32, 34, 39–45, 48–51, 71–72

**F**
- feminism, 3, 52, 56
- Fierke, Karin, 4, 55, 58
- Foucault, Michel, 3, 6, 61

**G**
- gender, 3, 60, 62
- geopolitics, 3, 10–11, 13, 19, 24
- Germany, 9–11
- Goffman, Erving, 66

**H**
- Halecki, Oskar, 9
- Hansen, Lene, 2–5, 16–17, 34, 36–37, 44, 54–55, 71
- human rights, 7, 25, 30
- Hungary, 9–10, 12, 32–51

**I**
- identity, 1, 3, 5, 7, 13, 15, 17–18, 58, 71
- regional identity, 10
- Iraq, 15, 23–29, 31

**J**
- Jobbik, 37–31, 46–51

**K**
- Katzenstein, Peter J., 42
- Klotz, Audie, 54
- Krause, Keith, 54–55
- Kundera, Milan, 9, 14

**L**
- Leeuwen, Theo van, 62
- linguistic, 8, 13, 61,
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>M</strong></th>
<th>methodology, 2, 16, 33, 51, 52–55, 57, 59–60, 62, 68, 70</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>methodological turn, 53, 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mitteleuropa, 9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miskolc, 35, 39–40, 43</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>N</strong></td>
<td>nationalism, 1, 10–12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATO, 11, 13, 15–16, 18–20, 22–25, 27, 30, 38, 45, 55, 71,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neocleous, Mark, 52, 56, 58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neumann, Iver B., 4, 8, 58, 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Northern Europe, 8, 19, 22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>O</strong></td>
<td>Obama, Barack, 11, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>oligarchy, 64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Onuf, Nicholas, 16–17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>othering, 9, 33, 34, 36, 38–39, 44–45, 49–51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>P</strong></td>
<td>Poland, 4, 8–9, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-communism, 4, 10, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>post-structuralism, 3, 15, 55,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public opinion, 25–26, 30–31, 46,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>public protest, 26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Putin, Vladimir, 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>R</strong></td>
<td>reflexivity, 52, 57, 59–60, 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roe, Paul, 6, 33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roma (people), 1, 4–5, 7, 12–13, 32–51, 53, 67–70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Russia, 4–5, 9–13, 15, 18–23, 25, 28, 31, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>S</strong></td>
<td>Salter, Mark B., 6, 53–54, 59–63, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>securitization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>securitization move, 5–6, 12, 34–36, 39–41, 43–44, 47, 50–51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>securitizing actor, 32–33, 35–36, 44, 51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>desecuritization, 5, 38, 44, 47–48, 51,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>insecurity, 6–7, 11, 30, 33, 48, 56–58, 70–71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>practice, 6, 34, 56, 58, 62, 67, 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>professional, 6, 53, 56, 58, 64, 71–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Slovakia, 13, 32, 34, 53, 64–67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Southern Europe, 1, 8, 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>sovereignty, 1, 11, 15, 18–21, 27–29, 71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Soviet 9, 13, 18, 19, 31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>special relationship, 1, 11,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>speech act, 5, 16, 34–36, 39, 43, 51,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stritzel, Holger, 5, 66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>T</strong></td>
<td>Tálas, Péter, 44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>U</strong></td>
<td>Ukraine, 8, 10–14,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>US-Baltic Charter, 15, 26–27, 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>violence, 12, 32, 34, 36–39, 41–43, 48–49, 50, 52, 56, 61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>W</strong></td>
<td>Wacquant, Loïc, 54, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Waever, Ole, 3, 5, 33, 36, 52–53, 65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>war, 2, 3, 7, 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Cold War, 2, 9, 13, 16, 18–19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Western Europe, 1, 8–11, 13, 18–20, 22–23, 29, 33, 71–72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Wolfers, Arnold, 1, 33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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