The Securitization of Muslim Migration and Islam in France
Bachelor’s Thesis

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Annotation

The objective of this thesis is to analyze the evolution of the perception of Muslim migration and Islam in France as a potential threat, with emphasis on time period of 1989-2014. The main theoretical framework used- the securitization theory- is being utilized in order to identify significant securitizing actors, referent objects as well as the key moments of the securitization. Whilst first part of the thesis focuses on the presentation of theoretic-methodological concepts and the Copenhagen school with migration-security nexus included, second represents the case study itself, with timeline analysis of important securitizing moves and their transformation into binding laws. This part also contains an overview of each speech act and topoi analysis in order to identify arguments being used. Last part aims to examine the reaction of audience, i.e. public opinion for each securitizing move, which securitization theory deems as essential.

Keywords: France Islam Migration Muslims Securitization Copenhagen School Speech act
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Anotace
Tato bakalářská práce si klade za cíl analyzovat vývoj vnímání Muslimské migrace a Islámu ve Francii jako potenciální hrozby, a to s důrazem na časovou osu 1989-2014. Hlavní použitý teoretický rámec- teorie sekuritizace- je uplatněný pro identifikaci významných aktérů sekuritizace, referenčních objektů i klíčových momentů sekuritizace samotné. Zatímco první část práce se soustředí na uvedení teoreticko-metodologických konceptů, Kodaňské školy a je zde zahrnutý i tzv. migration-security nexus, druhá je pak samotnou případovou studií s časovou analýzou jednotlivých významných sekuritizačních pohybů a jejich transformace do závazných zákonů. Tato část také obsahuje přehled řečových aktů a analýzu topoi pro účely nalezení hlavních argumentů, jež aktéři užívají. Poslední část pak zkoumá reakci publika, tzn. veřejný názor na jednotlivé sekuritizační pohyby, který je pro teorii sekuritizace klíčový.

Klíčová slova: Francie Islám Migrace Muslimové Sekuritizace Kodaňská škola
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I would like to thank my supervisor prof. JuDr. PhDr. Miroslav Mareš, Ph. D and my consultant Mgr. et Mgr. Michael Murad for their advice and support during writing my thesis.

I hereby declare that I have written the thesis “Securitization of Muslim migration and Islam in France” completely by myself, and have not used sources or means without declaration in the text. Any thoughts from others or literal quotations are clearly marked. This Bachelor’s Thesis was not used in the same or in a similar version to achieve an academic grading or is being published elsewhere.
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INTRODUCTION

After the end of the Cold war the world defined by the bipolar system and kept together by the ideologies of competing superpowers changed significantly. The old military threats and arms races were replaced by the new challenges stemming from the transformation of international order. These were mostly the creation of new states, growing trend of globalization bringing more economic interdependency, but also phenomenon such as growing disparities between rich and poor, transnational crime, increase of ethnic and religious conflicts and new forms of terrorism.

Though, the migration is not any new phenomenon- on the contrary it has been accompanying people´s daily lives during all its history. However, with the possibilities brought with the current globalization trends, the migration- defined as a process of moving, either across international borders or within the state (IOM 2004: 41) - and migrants became issue of concern and attention both in the sense of development and security. International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates that there are around one billion migrants worldwide, with 240 million counting for international migrants and around 740 million for internal1 (IOM 2011: 49).

France is certainly no exception. Although Bourbeau argues that France as “immigration country” is relatively new phenomenon, which has not been accentuated much in its rhetoric in the past, it cannot be denied that the migration to France started to be emphasized especially within the context of decolonization of North African countries sharing the geographical proximity- Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia specifically (2011: 13). In the last decades, the question of migrants was raised with even bigger intensity and from its economic problems and implications, which were accented throughout the whole Europe in the second half of the 20th century, the focus turned to the issues of identity, nationalism and religion.

In many cases, such increase of immigrants from different religious or ethnic backgrounds can then bring the perception of the threat for cultural, religious or political values of the majority society, which can be reflected in the rise of tensions, xenophobia or Islamophobia and can lead to different anti-immigration movements, specific measures or legislation to be accepted ( Fekete 2009: 1-11).

1 As these estimates date from 2011, it can be expected that the number of migrants, i.e. people migrating for economic reasons, displaced people, refugees etc., even increased. Only from Syria the number of registered refugees abroad is almost 3, 98 million people (UNHCR 2015).
The purpose and the main hypothesis of the thesis are therefore derived from this assumption. Through the optics of the securitization theory, as outlined by the Copenhagen school, which follows the process of issue being turned into the threat, we will analyze the timeline of French policies and public opinion in regards to the Muslim immigrants and Islam in France within the context of particular events and its presentation in the security discourse.

The first part of this thesis is structured in theoretical and methodological way. The Copenhagen School, its framework and the theory of securitization are introduced with the emphasis on the issue discussed further, and offer foundation for the following research. Also, this part presents basic data regarding the subject of the thesis, i.e. the figures for migrants and people of Islam belief to familiarize the reader with the veritable facts.

The second part focuses on the securitization of Muslim immigration and Islam *per se* in the context of the second half of 20th century in France with the accentuation of the last two decades mostly in regards to the legislature accepted. Critical for this analysis appear to be the speech acts, which are investigated in the third chapter.

The last part shows the necessary condition for successful securitization, which is public acceptance of special measures as proven by the public surveys concerning the immigrant population and Islam in the context of French society. Through its analysis throughout the years and following important events influencing the discourse we will be able to state whether the question of Muslim migrants and Islam is being politicized, securitized and if so, with which success.
THE METHODOLOGY AND OBJECTIVES OF THE WORK

This work is geographically limited to the French Republic, focusing solely on its European part and exempting the regions and territories overseas for its distinctive and different demographical, religious or social structures including the migration flows. The timeline of the research spans from the second half of the 20th century to the present and emphasizes the ongoing time period from 1989. We will omit the policies suggested and approved by the European Union—though France is a member and such legislature and policies have implications on it, the amount of data would exceed the scope of this thesis and cause the loss of the coherence and focus on French specificities in the text. Also it is important to remind that the focus on Front National in the text is very minor—although we understand that FN as a political party has tough stance towards both Islam and immigration in France, the analysis of the political parties discourse is not the subject matter of the thesis which is trying to target French executive power and government and its viable steps towards the securitization instead.

For the purpose of this study we have chosen the qualitative research method, which is useful for the analysis of data in text rather than numbers and takes in account specific characteristics of the researched object, and which serves for detailed analysis of the phenomenon in depth (Drulák a kol. 2008: 14). As time and geographical limits are precisely defined above, we can talk about this work as a case study using critical discursive analysis (CDA), which help to “map the emergence and evolution of patterns of representations which are constitutive of a threat image” (Balzacq 2010: 39). As Drulák explains, the discourse analysis is characterized by the role of language, which does not serve to describe objective phenomenon, but the language itself is the construct of the reality (2003: 93-95). CDA therefore sees usage of the language as “social practice”; discourse is not only shaped by different social situations and interactions, but influences them vice versa also (Wodak – Meyer 2008: 6). Hence, the critical discourse analysis offers us the possibility to investigate the discourse and the way it structures the social reality through different concepts such as interviews, newspaper articles or even pictures (Drulák a kol. 2008: 40-41).

As for the originality of the thesis, we can say that with the emergence of “triggers” such as 9/11 or attacks in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005, the literature regarding the migration-security nexus or the securitization of Islam has been gaining its momentum. However, many of such works pay attention only to the European context as whole or are
designed as comparative studies, e.g. Jocelyn Cesari and her essay on the securitization of Islam in Europe (2009), Phillipe Bourbeau’s study on the comparison of the securitization of migration in Canada and France (2011) or Kaya Ayhan’s focus on migration in the European context (2009). In the Czech academic sphere this particular topic has been elaborated on only once in the Bachelor’s Thesis, otherwise there is a lack of studies regarding migration-security-Islam nexus in France in our environment. This thesis will therefore use mostly foreign sources- primary (such as French legislation) as well as secondary (including the authors mentioned above) both in English and French language, when the methodological concept of the book is based on the book “Securitization: A New Framework for Analysis” (1995). The research can be characterized mostly as descriptive and in Czech context explanatory.

The hypothesis we are going to test is: “The Muslim migration and Islam in France are securitized.”

The research questions we are going to answer are:

“What are the main referent objects in regards to the potential securitization of the Muslim migration and Islam in France?”

“Who are the securitizing actors in the process?”

“Is Muslim migration and Islam successfully securitized, i.e. did the audience accept the extraordinary measures?”


THE COPENHAGEN SCHOOL

The Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, known as COPRI, was founded in Denmark in 1985 and ranks among the ones of the most prominent institutions within the European context (Guzzini – Jung 2004: 1-2). According to Waisová the Copenhagen school, represented in the field of security and securitization theory by the scientists such as Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, draws inspiration mostly from the fusion of realism (with the concept of state-centrism) and social constructivism (with the intersubjective perception of the security and the social construct of the threat) and their main theory of securitization derives also from the English school, realpolitik and sociology (2004: 81).

With the post-Cold war period, change of international order and emergence of the new threats, the COPRI argued for the complex widening of the security dimensions in two directions- first, by deepening the term of referent object, when the state-centric view is being challenged by Buzan himself in the statement of the “state less important in the new security agenda than in the old one” and other referent objects such as human being are also taken into consideration. Aside from deepening of the security, the COPRI introduced broadening the spectrum of the sectors beyond the military one (Özcan 2013: 60-61).

The Process of Securitization

Securitization, as one of the key concepts of the COPRI, was first introduced in the book “Security: New Framework for Analysis” (1998). The authors work on the presumption that any issue can be placed within the spectrum of three dimensions, ranging from nonpoliticized (issue is not a part of the state agenda), politicized (matter demands certain level of state and public policy involvement) to securitized. The securitization is hence described as an extreme form of politicization when the issue is designated as an existential threat thanks to which the acceptance of emergency and extraordinary measures beyond the normal political procedures is being justified and done (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). However, the movement of the issue within these three levels is not limited only to the direction nonpoliticized- securitized, but can happen vice versa also.

The securitization can be therefore seen as a process of the speech act, when a certain securitizing actor (e.g. government or any other authority with enough legitimacy or influence) declares the issue as an existential threat for the referent object. For Buzan and
Wæver the securitization depends „on the political choice and hence the security can never be objective” (1997: 246). The securitization is “the self-referential practice” (Buzan et al. 1998: 24), where the security is the subjective perception, i.e. the threat is presented as the menace without any need of its actual existence, and can be further investigated by the analysis of the discourse. Such act- being called securitizing move- itself however does not count for the whole process, as there is a need of agreement and approval by the audience through which the speech act and extraordinary measures acquire the legitimacy (Ibid. 25). The Copenhagen School does not define the character of the audience in precise terms and leaves the room for interpretation, so this thesis is going to work with the further formulation made by Balzacq who attempted to clarify the concept by dividing the audience into two groups labelled as “moral” and “formal support”. As for moral support, he defines the audience as the one having the direct causal connection with the matter discussed, while formal support stands for the audience platform possessing means for enabling the actor with the realization of the extraordinary measures accepted (2010: 8-9).

In our analysis, the acceptance of the audience will therefore focus on moral support represented by the French society as expressed in the public polls, and formal one demonstrated by the French decision-making institutions and actors.

The Units of Security Analysis

Referent Objects are things, groups or entities whose core existence is considered to be threatened by the securitizing actor. In the traditional interpretation the main referent object is the state and its survival and in indirect meaning the nation and its identity. Although the current widening of the security agenda generated new possibilities for the referent objects ranging in its size from individuals to system-level objects (e.g. humankind, environment), the collectivities remain the most frequent referent objects to which securitizing actors refer to (Buzan et al. 1998: 36-39).

Securitizing actors are those who proclaim certain object as existentially threatened and do so by the security speech act. Usually such actors are governments, politicians or bureaucratic apparatus, but also companies or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). As it can be problematic to identify the securitizing actors due to the possible disaggregation, the focus should be directed on the logic shaping the act, i.e. whether such actions are taken
arbitrarily or collectively in the name of the organization, rather than the actor *per se* (Ibid. 36-41).

**Functional actors** represent those who are neither referent objects nor securitizing actors, yet take part and affect the sector itself, i.e. influence the decision-making process by their inputs or lobby. In many cases, their interest may lie in the desecuritization of the topic (Ibid. 36). As for this thesis, the role of the functional actors, which are in the field of migration represented by the vast number of organizations focusing on e.g. xenophobia or racism (*SOS Racism* in France) will not be discussed any further in order to concentrate more on previous two units.

The Sectors of Analysis: Societal Sector

Buzan defines sectors as the “*views of the international system through a lens that highlights one particular aspect of the relationship and interaction among all of its constituent units*” (Buzan et al. 1998: 29). Such concept broadened the area beyond the traditional military aspect of security and according to different types of interactions within the sectors distinguishes five of them varying in the sort of existential threats and typical referent objects- military, political, economic, societal and environmental.

In our analysis, the main focus will be on the societal sector as it is closely linked to the migration and religious issues. According to Wæver, security threats here are addressed in the sphere of identity, such as threats to culture, community, nation and in some cases religion or gender (Wæver 2008: 581). Identity is considered the most important value for survival of the society, which intends to maintain its fundamental character under the changing conditions (Waisová 2004: 76).

Together with horizontal and vertical competition, migration is described here as one of typical threats in the sector, when “*X people overrun or diluted by flow of Y people; X will not be what they used to be, identity will be changed because of change in population*” (Buzan et al. 1998: 121).

Despite the distinction between the sectors, Buzan et al. warns against their complete separation as they all create one security complex. This reality is even more apparent within the societal sector, which is often merged with political one due to the shifting of the societal threat to the state agenda, e.g. in the form of legislation or intensification of the border controls (Ibid.: 122).
Though the topic of immigration echoed through some states already before 1990s, it was especially after the Cold war when the focus turned away from military issues to the concept of “human security” and shifted to the individual. Such approach then according to Ibrahim turned into the dilemma of “whose security we should protect” – whether migrants’, or domestic population’s, which eventually lead to the cases of immigrants being portrayed as a threat” (Ibrahim 2005: 168-169).

Hyusmans talks about two ways how the migration is being turned into the securitized issue. Firstly that is the migration being transformed into cases which are being presented as an existential threat to the independent identity or autonomy of the political unit; secondly, it is the potential of migrants to convert and assert the very existence of the community (2006: 51).

As Kaya argues, migration is often being connected to the topics of unemployment, crime, violence or drug and human smuggling (Kaya 2009: 8). He reminds of the fact that in the 1960s the immigration was not considered an obstacle or a threat, but by contrast welcomed; the reversal came with the rising unemployment rates, deindustrialization or the economy based on the neo-realistic principles, which all caused immigrants to change into “unwanted” (Kaya 2010: 47-48). The migration is securitized in terms of economic and job opportunities (migrants are seen as “stealing our jobs” or “abusing the welfare state”), which was even exacerbated by the economic crisis of 2008. However, 9/11 attacks by al-Qaeda brought new connection with the strong link of immigration and terrorism. Migrants and diasporas are securitized as suspected from the support of insurgencies or potential terrorist cells and with the potential for radicalization (Ibrahim 2005: 172-173).

Though Islam is not explicitly mentioned, its increased role within the nexus cannot be overlooked. Kaya reminds of the fact that Islam appearing in this context is a complex issue, ranging from so-called “clash of civilizations” by Samuel Huntington (2001), when Muslims are presented as potentially threatening to the civilization of the West– “us” (European, Christian) versus “them” (Middle-Eastern, Muslim), to the single events, e.g. the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 followed by the American hostage crisis or worsened situation between France and Algeria and the issue of the potential export of political Islam to Europe. Such cases then have negative effects on the image of Muslims abroad who are viewed as a part of community wanting to “‘stone women’, ‘cut throats’, ‘be suicide bombers’, ‘beat their wives’ and ‘commit honour crimes’” (Kaya 2009: 5). 9/11 even increased these sentiments,
when Islam was brought to the spotlight being connected to topics such as terrorism, hatred towards the West or Islamic versus Western values.

For many, the connection of security and migration (or indirectly Islam) presents a powerful political tool in the form of meta-politics, when politicians link the social, economic and security problems with the migration without any further data confirming their talk (Faist 2004: 9-10). For many politicians, turning immigrants into meta-issue can be a way how to create unity and sense of identity within the society- what Buzan calls “us” versus “them” dichotomy, when portrayal of immigrants as a threat can unite not always homogenous societies through spreading the fear and create common identity based not on its internal characteristics, but on the immigrants’ exclusion principle. Such fear also gives legitimacy to the politicians for further measures to be taken and can be used to justify either specific action (e.g. increased budget on border controls, expulsion, repatriation of immigrants) or serve as an excuse for the failure of their own promised policies (e.g. decrease of unemployment rate, criminality) (Hyusmans 2006: 47-52). During their speeches, the politicians therefore often engage in the usage of terminology such as “aliens” or “illegals” for immigrants and “flood”, “invasion”, “tide”, “stream” or “wave” for migration itself \(^2\) (Cunningham-Parmeter 2011), which is supposed to evoke the feelings of insecurity, destabilization or rapid uncontrolled and potentially destructive movement.

In general, the migration-security nexus is gaining more and more recognition with the growing numbers of immigrants as well as disasters such as Lampedusa tragedy and street riots and disturbances in Calais or in Paris banlieues. Thus, study of securitization of migration through the specific language metaphors and rhetoric shows as the solution for this pressing and up-to-date issue.

\(^2\) For migration, it has become increasingly common to address the issue either in terms of water (as above) or war (including coined term of the “clash of civilizations”, “Fortress Europe”).
CASE OF FRANCE

Islam in France

According to the Law 78-17 (“Loi informatique et Libértes”) from the 6th January 1978 addressing the question of information technologies and civil liberties, the clause number 8 explicitly forbids “to collect or process any personal data which either directly or not directly reveal the race or ethnic origins, the political, religious or philosophical beliefs, or affiliation with any labor union, or matters of health and sexual life” 3 (Legifrance 2015a). For this reason, there is no precise number of Muslim migrants or citizens in France available by the official sources and estimated numbers are often outdated, which can partly impede our research by the inability to assess the Muslims’ numbers exactly.

In France, the Islam is the second most practiced religion right after Christianity. The American think-tank Pew Research Center estimated the number of Muslims in France to 4.7 million in 2010, creating 7.5% of total population of France with the potential increase to 5.4 million in 2020 and 6.8 million, making 10.3%, in 2030 (Pew Research Center 2011; Pew Research Center 2015).

As for the role of the religion in France, the Republic is based on their own distinct concept of secularization- laïcité, which established the complete privatization of any religious practices, i.e. the religion is prohibited to become a matter of public sphere (Blandine 2010: 766) by the law of 1905 on the Separation of Church and the State (“Loi du 9 décembre 1905 concernant la séparation des Eglises et de l'Etat”). Though the concept of laïcité lacks one universal definition and is interpreted diversely, it is generally perceived as a non-religious and neutral nature of the state which does not subordinate or is not lead by any religion (Mazher Idriss 2006: 261-262). Yet as Patrick Weil reminds, the separation of Church and state should not be seen as the only cornerstone of the law, which also lies on the principle of freedom of conscience and equal respect to all religions (2009: 2704). The introduction of the laïcité concept was essential here for the ongoing debate over its meaning and its implementation in the society, which- as will be shown further- has been gaining momentum in recent years over the topic discussed in this thesis.

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3 Il est interdit de collecter ou de traiter des données à caractère personnel qui font apparaître, directement ou indirectement, les origines raciales ou ethniques, les opinions politiques, philosophiques ou religieuses ou l'appartenance syndicale des personnes, ou qui sont relatives à la santé ou à la vie sexuelle de celles-ci.
Immigration in France

According to the High Council for Integration (Haut Conseil à l’intégration) the immigrant population is defined as those who reside in France and are born abroad in foreign country; therefore the main criterions for the indication of immigrant are their nationality and place of birth. This distinguishes them from foreigners, whose characteristics lies in being a resident of France without French nationality and nationality is the only thing they are defined according to (Insee 2005).

In 2013 Insee assessed the number of immigrants to 5.8 million, representing 8,8% of total French population. From 2002 to 2012 around 90 000 immigrants entered France annually per average, while the number was increasing in the last years with around 1,6% per year (Insee 2014).

Most of the immigrants are coming from the countries of Africa- 42,5%, when Maghreb countries represent the biggest portion of it, Algeria standing for 13,4%, Morocco 12,2% and Tunisia 4,4% respectively (Insee 2012). The reason for this is not only geographical proximity of Maghreb to France, but mostly shared colonial history, when all countries used to be French colonies and the language barrier is almost non-existent due to French being one of the official languages in Morocco and in Tunisia and Algeria one of the most used ones. As all three countries are with 99% of its inhabitants Muslim, the predominant religion of Maghreb immigrants can be therefore considered Islam (CIA Factbook 2015). Talking about Pew Research Centre estimates for immigration and Islam in France, around 68,5% of total numbers of immigrants are believed to be Muslims (Pew Research 2011).

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4 Morocco and Tunisia gained independence in 1956 and Algeria in 1962.
THE SECURITIZATION OF MUSLIM IMMIGRATION AND ISLAM IN FRANCE

History of politicization and securitization of immigration and Islam in France from 1945 to 1989

As for the immigration in the second half of the 20th century, France followed the similar patterns as the rest of the Western Europe. Tapinos distinguishes between three time periods:

- 1646-1955- the period of change in the organized migration
- 1956-1965- the boom of the spontaneous immigration

For the better coherence, the last period- the controlled migration- would be set as ranging from 1968/1969, when the first discriminating connotations and politicization of the migration especially of the North African population got into discourse, as will be shown later. However, according to Togman year 1966 was chosen as the first recession in economy appeared (2002: 102).

After the World War II (WW2), France was in need of the immigrants to compensate for lacking human and working force. Though the post-WW2 period is often indicated as indiscriminative, Schain points out that even at this time, often considered as “unregulated” with immigrants coming on ad hoc principle, the French authorities preferred “immigrants of Latin and Christian origin”, who were supposed to outweigh the influx of those from the North Africa, Algeria especially (2012: 93). Therefore, in 1946 immigrants who prevailed in France were of Italian (25, 9%), Polish (24, 3%) and Spanish (17, 3%) origin, representing 67, 5% of the total number of foreigners in the country (Faidutti-Rudolph 1962: 152-154). Yet, almost 1,5 million of repatriates returned back to France after WW2 with Algerian inhabitants called pieds-noirs standing for two thirds of the whole number (Hein 2004: 73)- these movements were closely associated with the period of decolonization. In 1957, the immigrant population of permanent workers in France reached its peak (Faidutti-Rudolph 1962: 157).

We cannot talk about any political debate or legislation regarding the immigration till the end of 1960s; till then this issue had been tackled only by the ministry circular letters (circulaires) without any enforcing power (Schain 2012: 93). The period was characterized by
the migration boom, no controlling mechanisms or regulations, yet we can already see reserved attitude of the authorities towards the Muslim population from Maghreb, which exacerbated later.

Year of 1969 represents one of the first turning points in French immigration/Muslim discourse, when Correntin Calvez wrote the report regarding the problems of foreign workers (“Sur le problème de travailleurs étrangers”), which was also supposed to serve as the potential layout for the French systematic migration policies. In the report, the distinction between “wanted” European economic immigrants and “unwanted” non-European-Maghrebian specifically appears for the first time, when he considers them as “inassimilable island” whose presence in France should be limited to temporary working permits (Parsons – Smeeding 2008: 367). Nevertheless, the demand for labour force almost doubled the number of immigrant workers in 1970.

Marcellin-Fontanet Circulars in 1972 presented another politicization of the immigration with the goal to limit the influx of illegal migrants being regularized through job permits. Since then, the National Employment Agency (Agence National de l´emploi) analyzed individually the requests of employers for foreign workers and was obliged to try to find a French national able to replace the immigrant for such task. Marcellin-Fontanet Circulars were later partly lifted by what we can call lobby of the functional actors in this study, i.e. trade unions (Togman 2002: 104).

With the oil shocks of 1973, France accepted measures to curb the foreign immigration in 1974 by banning everyone aside from seasonal workers and foreigners from EEC. These precautions were explained in the terms of economic crisis and rising unemployment connected to the potential social problems, when other foreign workers would become “source of social tensions in the times of unemployment” (Ibid. 109).

1980 brought another attempt to tackle irregular (“illegal”) migration in France by the Bonnet Law (“Le loi Bonnet”), which aimed to restrict conditions for entry and residence and introduced the expulsion of those without the permission for stay or those overstaying. Illegal immigrants were considered a threat to the public order and preferred to be repatriated. Later was broadened by the first Pasqua Law from 1986, which reintroduced the forced removals of immigrants to their country of origin (Carvalho 2013: 46).

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5 European Economic Community as created by the Treaty of Rome in 1957
In 1981 first riots in the banlieues Les Minguettes near Lyon took place with “rodeos”, i.e. races organized by the local inhabitants with stolen cars or their burning, turning into a symbol of this social unrest. The delinquents were mostly youngsters of the first or second immigrant generation of Maghrebian origin, which influenced further rhetoric regarding immigration-criminality nexus (Cesari 2005).

First speech acts regarding the issue of immigration started to appear during this second period, such as Jacques Chirac’s speech in 1984, where he stated that there is “a growing insecurity in Paris...The increase of the insecurity is due to the uncontrolled migration.” (Causeur.fr 2014). The same can be said for the rhetoric of the right-wing party Front National (FN) which was created in 1972 and which often enhanced anti-immigration and anti-Islam sentiments by the linkage of the immigration and crime. In 1989 Michel Rocard, previous French Prime Minister, said in an interview for “7 sur 7” that “France has to stay a country of immigration...But not anymore. We cannot welcome all the misery of the world, but France has to take its equal share”. (Deltombe 2009). At the beginning of 1990, François Mitterand then described the current situation of immigration as the “threshold of tolerance” (“seuil de tolérance”), which became a coined term for the politicization and further securitization of the immigrant issue in France (Barats-Malbrel 1998: 73).

As for the securitization of Islam between 1946-1989, the issue itself (without its connection to the Maghreb, especially Algerian migrants) had been very subdued in the public debates compared to the question of immigration. The Muslim identity was highlightened during the era of decolonization and Algerian War between 1954 and 1962. Yet, the main characteristics which were singled out during the politicization of the immigration emphasized the feature of ethnicity or nationality (e.g. Maghrebian, Algerian) over the religious affiliation.

To sum up previous text, we can characterize the period of 1945-1989 by three categories:

- 1945-1966 (1968)- the golden age of economic boom (Trente Glorieuses) and immigration to France. The immigration was unregulated, on ad hoc basics, based
on *laissez-faire* policy. European migrant workers were preferred over the North African ones, but no limits were set.

- 1966 (1968)-1974- first attempts for the controlled migration, which were mostly unsuccessful due to the disunited attitude of French authorities. Calvez report, Marcellin-Fontanet Circulars and the creation of FN present a turn in immigration policies, when immigrants are increasingly considered as a reason for the unemployment with potential problems in economic and labour market, connected to the discourse of economic recession and oil shocks of 1973. We can therefore consider this period as immigration being politicized in the economic terms.

- 1974-1989- since 1974, Bourbeau considers immigration policy in France as “immigration zero” (2011: 15). This time period is characterized by the strong awareness of economic difficulties being made to collate with immigrants, which are being increasingly more turned to the question of the social unrest, insecurity in the streets and criminality. Bonnet and Pasqua laws are introduced and Bourbeau talks about 1974, when Front National (FN) won first local elections, as a breakthrough for future migration (Ibid. 13). Though we cannot talk about securitization yet, the third period presents shift from only economic concern towards the identarian and security one.

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6 *laissez-faire* policy, characterized by the noninterference of the state in the affairs of those from private sector, meant the freedom of employees to hire foreign workers according to the demand, when the immigrants would gain regular status in France after settling down (Carvalho 2013: 45).
Securitization of Muslim migration in France between 1989- 2014

The second period of our research dates between the transformation year of 1989 and nowadays. Bourbeau (2011) himself argues that such point is significant for the refugee crisis happening in the West, which caused further politicization and securitization of the issue, and Carvalho (2013) agrees with 1990s as a starting point for immigration and Islam being in the center of policy attention.

First attempt to crack down on immigration with its “immigration zero” policy can be seen in second Pasqua law of 1993, which not only continued with the restrictions regarding the entry and settlement of immigrants, but aside from that also introduced ban of one year for the family reunion and made the asylum claim inaccessible. Also, double peine, i.e. double punishment of imprisonment and deportation were passed for the irregular migrants. The extreme measures proposed are clearly shown by the veto of the law by the Constitutional Court which considered it as violating the Declaration; though, Pasqua second law eventually passed (Carvalho 2013: 46-47).

In 1997, Debré law was firstly introduced. Focusing on the immigration, the citizens became obliged to report whenever they hosted a non-European foreigner and state authorities were allowed to withdraw the passport of any irregular migrant in France. Former step was denounced by the European Parliament, which criticized the law as “Vichy-regime like” and for its contradiction with the Declaration issued a resolution opposing to such legislature. The law was approved despite the EU discontent, albeit the changes were made to the most controversial parts (Bourbeau 2011: 113).

Although 9/11 presents a turning point for the securitization of Islam and Muslim immigrants worldwide, who are being associated with extremism and terrorism, in France no such significant move exists. Bourbeau points out that there had been new restrictive measures, e.g. additional border officers, forced deportations, increased ID checks and need for fingerprints, but these securitizing moves were justified by Sarkozy in terms of domestic security, i.e. criminality, and not by any association with 9/11 attacks. Chirac himself then stated that the main threats for the Republic are still same and “did not change” (2011: 108). For that, we can assume that 9/11 had marginal effect on the securitization of Islam and Muslim immigration in France.

In 2003 the Regulation of 26 November 2003 on immigration and asylum (informally first Sarkozy law) is being proposed. It is regarded as the first step in overall
reform of immigration policies (Chou-Baygert 2007: 2). Sarkozy presented his intend to double the number of expelled immigrants illegally staying in France and to “combat migration” by weekly charter flights of those expelled back to the countries of their origin (Kaya 2009: 69)

Year of 2006 introduces the Immigration and Integration Law (second Sarkozy law) which was preceded by the banlieues riots in 2005\(^7\). The law endorsed chosen selective immigration (immigration choisi), i.e. when certain qualification or skills are needed and have to be demanded by France to accept the immigrant. The important exception is prohibiting of issuing of the “competence card” to the workers from regions as Maghreb or Sub-Saharan Africa, whose skills are indicated as critically needed and essential for their area. The law also prolongs the time for family reunification and introduces concept of “partnership”, which is intended to return of immigrants back to the country of their origin. Sarkozy justified this law as based on the “fight against frauds in immigration procedure” as well as the “way of integration” (Chou –Baygert 2007). Chou and Baygert partially trace the source of such policies to the context of presidential elections, when Sarkozy utilized the topic of immigration of his competing candidate Jean Marie Le Pen, e.g. modification of Le Pen’s quote “France- love it or leave it” and admitted his intention of turning extreme right-wing voters in his favor, which he believed could gain him together with the law the presidential seat.

Sarkozy justified the law in terms of reference to the urban crime and unrest, e.g. fight against “squats, ghettos and rioting”, but also pointed out that the introduction of the immigration choisi lowers xenophobia and racism in states with such policies. With this notion Sarkozy linked xenophobia to the unselective immigrants by making it natural and “understandable” phenomenon, which can be fought against only by the extreme measures taken (Kaya 2009: 67-70).

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\(^7\) Banlieues riots in 2005 was two months long period of street unrest and violence taking place in big French cities, e.g. Paris, Lyon or Dijon, lead mostly by the immigrants of North African and Arab origin, which were initiated after the death of two teenagers in the power plant who supposedly hid there from police (BBC News 2005).
Securitization of Islam in France between 1989-2014

In 1989, the first scarf affair (affaire du foulard) marked the increased politicization and the beginning of the securitization of Islam in French Republic. In October 1989, three girls of Maghrebian origin were prohibited from entering and later suspended from school in Creil, the town north of Paris, because of their Islamic headscarf (Kaya 2009: 79). Though the Minister of education Jospin overruled the decision, first affaire du foulard was excessively medialized and capitalized on especially by the Front National.

Bruno Mégret from the FN phrased the affaire in terms of the “invasion”, i.e. “A Muslim civilization has arrived in France. After its installation on French soil, it is now implanting itself symbolically by the wearing of the headscarf in schools” (Kaya 2009: 80). FN also exploited “us” vs. “them” principle, when they turned the situation in the choice of “should immigrants adapt to the French values” vs. “should France adapt to immigrants?” (Baubérot 1996: 10).

The institutionalization of Islam in France dates from 2002, when the French Council of the Muslim Faith was established with the objective of cooperation with the state on Islamic matters, e.g. halal food or chaplaincies. Such step was perceived by Sarkozy as a support of “liberal Islam”, which is opposed to the “Islam gone astray, garage Islam”, which he saw as threatening (BBC News 2002). By the foundation of such organization in a state with strong secularism we can note the importance subscribed to the role of Islam in France by the political elites.

Though not solely targeting Islam, Law n°2004-228 from 15th March 2004, which- as based on laïcité- prohibits students of public schools from wearing ostentatious religious symbols (Legifrance 2015b), caused one of the first visible securitization moves being taken in the context of Islam. Law, which forbids wearing of symbols such as hijab, yarmulke or Christian cross with the exception of the private lyceés and universities, was preceded by the Stasi report commissioned to investigate the role of religion in the Republic and concluded with their rising influence and need to protect the laïcité.

Jacques Chirac, the former president, pointed out that without such law France "...Would sacrifice its heritage. It would compromise its future. It would lose its soul." He also added that there is „no place for religious symbols at public schools“, which should remain secular as the laïcité constitutes one of basic pillars of the Republic (Sciolino 2003).

In his speech, we can directly see the topics of French identity and secularism („soul“), which are presented as the referent objects being threatened by „glorifying particular
identities“, e.g. Islam, in France (Broughton 2003). Both Chirac’s speech and the Stasi report showed immediate results, when after its publication the public opinion in favor of the ban raised from 55% to 69% (BBC 2003). Yet as the most controversial step appeared the Law n°2010-1192 prohibiting covering of face in the public spaces (“Loi interdisant la dissimulation du visage dans l’espace public“), which- exempting safety in the working environment, public traffic, health reasons and cultural or sports events and festivals- forbids any piece of garment covering the face precluding the recognition of the person. French penal code sets penalty of 30 000€ and imprisonment to those forcibly compelling others to such act, with 60 000€ fine in case of a minor, and fine and public courses for those wearing it voluntarily (Legifrance 2011). Despite the fact that the law should be universal and non-discriminatory regarding religious affiliation or gender, e.g. aside from burqa the apparels concerned were helmets, balaclavas and other face-guards, the speech acts by the politicians were in particular related to the burqa and Muslim female population.

According to Nicolas Sarkozy, burqa is not "a religious problem, it is a problem of liberty and dignity of woman. It is not a religious symbol, but a symbol of subjugation and humiliation. I want to say that it is not welcome on the territory of the Republic. In our country, we cannot accept women imprisoned behind the grille, cut off from any social life, deprived from their identity". Sarkozy’s speech was exceptional not only for the rhetoric chosen, but also for the fact that it was the first time the French president spoke in front of the parliament since the 19th century, which only raises the importance of such step (Gabizon 2009). After urging parliament to examine the situation also publically, he added that:“ We must not be ashamed of our values. We must not be afraid of defending them.“ (Ibid.)

If we analyze Sarkozy’s speech, we can see the potential shift from previous hijab ban at schools, when Sarkozy uses not only already embedded terms of identity, but most of all, addresses Muslim women in the sense of putting them into the position of referent objects, e.g. it is their identity and their dignity which France has to protect. Such step is original by making them “victims” of their own cultural tradition, yet, as he adds, it is still the values of France, i.e. secularism, liberty, which should be defended and which are pivotal.

Also Michèle Alliot-Marie, the minister of justice, pointed out burqa as questioning the integration model in France when the acceptance of French values is needed (Davies 2010).

However, the case was brought to the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) after an appeal of the French citizen with Pakistani origin, who claimed that such restriction is
against the European Convention on Human Rights, i.e. Article 9 about the Freedom of thought, conscience and religion. The court eventually upheld the law with France’s motive to “better integration” and “citizens living together” (Ibid.). Such action attests the modification of argument of France, altering from the “protection of Muslim women oppressed by burqa” to the “concern about integration and interaction of foreigners with burqa”, which changes the referent object back to the French values in the “community life with society in question”, as ECHR quoted. The law was justified also on the grounds of public security and its universalism, which as we saw before was not the initial argument of the securitizing actors (Willscher 2014).
Securitization Analysis

This section will follow and analyze the most important measures accepted in the context of securitization of Muslim migration and Islam between 1989 and 2014 with the data and charts based on the previous historical overview. Through the lens of the Copenhagen theory we will distinguish between the main securitizing actors and their positions within the French system as well as the objects they referred to as threatened. Also, their most notable speeches or used rhetoric are included to get an insight into the way they formed their speech acts and attempted to securitize certain topics. Aside from this, we will point out what can be viewed as the crucial moments which initiated the securitization process. This part also uses one of the techniques of the critical discourse analysis (CDA)- the topoi analysis where two major speeches of Nicolas Sarkozy, who was chosen as the securitizing actor relevant for both topics of immigration and Islam, are being broken down to the most occurring themes and connected to the list of topoi researched.

Scheme 1.1.: Securitization of Islam in France 1989-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures Accepted</th>
<th>Main Securitizing Actors</th>
<th>Referent Objects</th>
<th>Main points of speech act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Law no°2004-228 ("hijab ban") | Nicolas Sarkozy (Minister of the Interior) | • Laïcité  
• French heritage | • No place for religion at schools  
• Law against the sacrifice of French heritage and values |
| Law no°2010-1192 ("burqa ban") | Nicolas Sarkozy (President of France) *Upheld by the European Court of Human Rights | • French values  
• Women’s rights and dignity  
• Community life  
• French integration model | • Burqa as a symbol of oppression, obstacle for integration  
• Burqa as an opposite of French values |

Scheme 1.2.: Securitization of Muslim migration in France 1989-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Measures Accepted</th>
<th>Main Securitizing Actors</th>
<th>Referent Objects</th>
<th>Main points of speech act</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Pasqua Law 1993     | Charles Pasqua (Minister of the Interior) | • National cohesion  
• National community  
• French integration model | • Law as the last option for the French integration model  
• Against the loss of national identity and possible “explosive” immigration movements |
| Debré Law 1997      | Jean-Louis Debré (Minister of the Interior) | • National cohesion  
• Public order | • Irregular migrants as a risk for the society, |
As the charts show, between 1989-2014 the majority of laws concerning the topics of immigration and Islam have been proposed and approved after the speech acts made by the former Ministers of the Interior with some of the legislative measures even bearing their names. We can therefore presume the Interior Ministers as the ones who are the main securitizing actors in this period managing to succeed in obtaining the “formal support” of the audience, i.e. the legislation approval, for their securitizing moves. According to Bourbeau (2011: 76) the Ministers of the Interior made 60% of the securitizing moves in total with the chart pointing out that out of five the most significant laws accepted, four of them were preceded by the moves made by them with one being made by the former Minister and at that time French president Sarkozy.

Sarkozy can be seen also as one of the most eminent actors with regards to the securitization of Islam, which he particularly emphasized and had merit in two main laws passed.

As for the referent objects, they reflect mostly topics of the national identity and cohesion with French integration model being highlighted and considered endangered by both immigration flows and increased visibility of Islam in the society. Actors accentuated French culture and values as well as the laïcité mentioned. Public order as the referent object threatened by the criminality and delinquency played its role with regards to the securitization of immigration. Mentionable is also the appearance of the rhetoric which assumes that laws targeted to decrease the numbers of immigrants would curb xenophobic and racist attitudes of French public towards foreigners.

Scheme 1.3.: Other significant securitization moves regarding Muslim migration in France 1989-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Securitizing Actor</th>
<th>His position</th>
<th>Main speech act/theme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>Michel Rocard</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Connection of migration and terrorism “not welcoming misery of the world”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Phillipe Marchand</td>
<td>Minister of Interior</td>
<td>Uncontrolled migration as a threat for the security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Édouard Balladur</td>
<td>Prime Minister</td>
<td>Threatened French nation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>François Mitterrand</td>
<td>President of France</td>
<td>“threshold of tolerance”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source of data: Bourbeau 2011: 72-73
The overview clearly shows that since 1989 the politicians holding various offices have been already addressing immigration in the sense of securitization. Michel Rocard in 1989- that means prior to the terrorist attacks of 9/11- connected the topic of migration, i.e. opening of the borders, to the possibility of free movement of terrorists across the whole Europe (Bourbeau 2011: 65). Similar rhetoric was followed by Phillipe Marchand and with 1993 we can see that national identity and interests are being used as the referent objects.

Nicolas Sarkozy was not the only president engaged in the securitization discourse. In 1994, Mitterand put “erratic migratory movements” next to the international security issues such as terrorism or epidemic diseases and warned that neither border, nor nuclear bomb would serve as good protection against such phenomenon (Ibid.: 63). Jacques Chirac, though targeting immigration during his office in 1996, already made securitizing move regarding migration from Maghreb and Muslim countries in 1991 by the statement that “the problem is not immigrants, but their redundancy…It is sure that having immigrants from Spain, Poland or Portugal working here poses less problems than Muslims and blacks.” He also added the connection of abuse of the welfare system and made important step in the stigmatization of Muslims based on stereotyping them in the sense of unemployment or polygamy: “French worker...sees family with father, his three or four wives and dozen something kids getting 55,000 francs in welfare payments without working, naturally...And add the noise and smell.” (European Tribune 2005). By such statement it is clearly showed that the link between immigrants and labour did not stop after 1989 and though not as accentuated as in the previous era it still had its place within the discourse; by this step Chirac managed to make French welfare system the referent object of the securitization again.
**Scheme 1.4.: The most important driving factors, i.e. events of the securitization of Muslim migration and Islam in France 1989-2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1989</th>
<th>2005</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Affaire du foulard- scarf affair</td>
<td>Banlieues riots- riots in the outskirts</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Affaire du* foulard as started in 1989 and continuing for next years with different individual cases presented the first point of the securitizing moves with regards to the role of Islam in the French society. Hijab or burqa became symbols of Islamic faith in France till 2014. With words such as “invasion of Islam to France” the topics of headscarves was mentioned and influenced not only the main laws of 2004 (“hijab ban”) and 2010 (“burqa ban”), but induced already highlighted interest in 1990s, e.g. in *Circulaire n°1649* introduced by François Bayrou, who already in 1994 suggested a ban of ostentatious religious symbols at schools as later approved in 2004 during Sarkozy era (Assemblée Nationale 1994). We can therefore track the source of the securitization back to 1990s with first *affaires* serving as a fertile ground for the securitization process itself ten years later.

For the Muslim immigration discourse, the riots in French *banlieues* in 2005 present the event which aside from being used for the rhetoric concerning the *Immigration and Integration Law of 2006* induced many securitization moves made by Nicolas Sarkozy and worsened public opinion on immigrants of the Maghreb origin.

Sarkozy said that rioters “*are the bastards, the vermins, I insist on it and I sign myself under it*” (he used terms “racailles” and “voyous”) (Le Monde 2005). Less than a day after its outbreak he announced “*Operation Banlieues*” and pointed out that „between the world of violence and the values of the Republic, the moment of truth has come. The stakes are being set high as it is not the Republican order which rules in these outskirts, but the gangs or the extremists, which we do not want.” (Ministère de l’Intérieur 2005). Such securitizing move clearly puts generalization of Maghrebian/ mostly Muslim outskirts as the place of radicalization and extremism which is in strong opposition to the values of France and that gives potential for the further securitization of the topic.

**TOPOI ANALYSIS**

Topoi are observed as common-place statements with certain schema, which present generalized key ideas and serve as argumentative concepts (Žagar 2010: 1-5). Topoi are described as the connection between a certain argument and a conclusion. For the purpose of
this study, topoi are being understood as general ideas which are usually being underlined by the assumptions of the society concerned, and from which the statements are generated, e.g. specifically for the securitization theory the topoi can be seen as arguments being used for political purposes which can vary according to the targeted audience and geographical context (Žagar 2010: 5-6).

Nicolas Sarkozy speech regarding immigration and new immigration law (“second Sarkozy law”) from 11th December 2006 (Ministère de l'Intérieur 2006):

“European woman, per average, has 1, 5 children. African woman has 5, 2. That’s a considerable migratory potential!” – the topos 11- numbers, i.e. high fertility of African women leading to the possible increase of the numbers of immigrants in France.

“For decades, the one who dared to pronounce the word „immigration“ has been accused of extremism, populism, even racism”- the topos of injustice towards those speaking up (6) , i.e. positive discrimination of immigrants.

“But the truth is that many French see immigration as a threat to their security, their jobs, and their lifestyle, to the preservation of their values which they cling to, to the unity and national cohesion. It would be totally irresponsible to ignore this unease.”- the topos of threat, i.e. both security and economic (4, 9), the danger of different cultures and values, also topos of responsibility (7) when Sarkozy puts himself in the position of protector and advocate of the average French population disapproving immigration.

“The result...was the ghettoization of the immigrant population...the development of squats and insanitary dens, the delinquency, the violence, the revolt which was seen in October and

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8 In his research, Žagar analyses the list of topoi as presented by the critical discourse analysis expert, where he identifies mostly topoi regarding immigration and immigrants and topoi within the national context or European one by Krzyzanowski (2009), e.g. topos of national uniqueness, European values, joining the European Union at any cost etc. (2010: 7-10).
November 2005.” - the topoi of danger and threat - violence, hygienic conditions (4), history (2), i.e. the reminder of previous negative events connected to the immigrant society.

Though no topoi have been identified for the role of Islam/ religious diversity and potential conflicts regarding this topic, the topoi attached to the immigrants as “the Others” can be well used as well with many of them being found in cultural topoi as religious affiliation should have no place in French public sphere and is viewed mostly through the lenses of the culture.

Nicolas Sarkozy speech regarding the Law of 2010 (“the burqa ban”), 19th May 2010 (Vie Publique 2010)

“But we are an old nation gathered around one exact idea of the dignity of the person and especially of the woman’s dignity; around one exact idea of the life in the society...The full veil which covers face completely undermines our values, for us fundamental, if not essential in the republican sense.” - The topoi of culture, national history (14).

“In this affair the government deliberately chose strenuous, but fair path. “- The topoi of justice and law and right (6, 12), i.e. although the measures accepted may seem as too extreme for some, it is the only fair and just solution the government can offer.

“These last four years, I wanted to help the Muslims to fight with Islam in France which is not French Islam.” - The topoi of responsibility as well as their usefulness, also possible cultural one (1, 7, 14), i.e. Sarkozy arguing with the support and feelings of responsibility in “fight against wrong Islam”, when he perceives certain groups of Muslims as helpful and useful for his mission.
THE ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECURITIZING MOVES BY THE PUBLIC

As stated previously, the Copenhagen school considers the approval of the audience crucial for the successful securitization. Therefore there is a need for the analysis of the public opinion regarding the key topics mentioned, e.g. Muslim immigration, their integration into society or the context of the laws regarding Islam.

Already in 1990 in the poll commissioned by Rocard’s government, 76% of French society pointed out that there are too many Arab people on the French soil with 39% of them admitting disliking them (Bourbeau 2011: 119).

The criminality-immigration link in the previous analysis proved as especially strong in the rhetoric of 1974-1989 with regards to the banlieues riots of 1981 and later 2005. In the public opinion polls which asked about “the feeling of safety in the areas densely populated by immigrants”, in 1985 75% of French expressed they do not feel safe, with 69% in 1989 and 75% in 1993 and constant 8% of population without any particular attitude (Ibid.: 120). In 2006, 44% of those interviewed expressed an agreement with the thesis that immigrants are increasing the crime rates and 26% perceived that there is a higher probability of immigrants engaging in criminal activities (Ibid.: 121). We can therefore assume that irrespectively of the context, the perception of the insecurity has been constantly apprehended by the majority of French population and facilitated the acceptance of extreme measures as proposed by the authorities.

As for the subject of the French identity and integration, following graphs present the transformation in the public opinion. Though there is a slight decrement in the percentage of those perceiving immigrants as a threat for the identity, 68% of French constantly view the integration of immigrants as insufficient as opposed to 32% (IFOP 2012). Those interviewed who marked immigrants as poorly integrated indicated as the main reasons immigrants’ refusal to do so (61%) and their cultural incompatibility (40%), followed by “ghettoization” of quartiers where immigrants congregate (37%).
Graph 3.1.: “If the immigration is not curbed, France risks loss of the national identity.”

Source of data: Bourbeau 2011: 120; IFOP 2010. Chart by the author

Graph 3.2.: “Immigrants are well integrated in the French society.”

Sources: IFOP 2010. Chart by the author

The results of the survey by IFOP agency which were targeted to discover public opinion about the two symbols associated to Islam- mosques and hijabs - clearly show the increase of those opposed to the construction of new mosques in France and wearing of hijabs
publically at school. There is a sharp increase especially in the hijab question after 2003, which follows the introduction of the law prohibiting conspicuous religious symbols at public schools from March 2004, including hijab. For this, we can assume that the need for such legislation and the securitizing move has been approved by the public and the issue was indeed securitized.

**Graph 3.3.: Public opinion regarding building the mosques in France between 1989-2012**

![Graph showing public opinion]

Graph 3.4.: Public opinion regarding wearing of headscarf (*hijab*) in public spaces between 1989-2012

Source of data: IFOP 2012. Chart by the author

Graph 3.5.: Public opinion regarding wearing of headscarf (*hijab*) at schools between 1989-2012

Source of data: IFOP 2012. Chart by the author
As compared between 2010 and 2012, there is a slight growing trend in the number of those thinking that the Islam is becoming more visible and the religion itself more influential, which is generally exhibited by its increased importance. Talking about the acceptance of Islam in the French society, the majority- 69% - consider France as open towards Muslims in the comparison to 31% opposed (IFOP 2012). When asked about the characteristics they attributed to Islam, in 1994 the top association was fanaticism (37%), which was most often selected in 2001 with 22% as well. In 2010, 31% of respondents chose the refusal of the Western values (IFOP 2010).

Graph 3.6.: Public opinion on the importance, i.e. its visibility and influence, of Islam between 2010-2012

Source of data: IFOP 2012. Chart by the author
CONCLUSION

This section provides answers for the research questions as stated at the beginning of the thesis and gives general conclusion regarding the topic of securitization of Muslim migration and Islam in France.

“What are the main referent objects in regards to the potential securitization of the Muslim immigration and Islam in France?”

Referent objects as addressed between 1946-1989 show that the main areas of concern were connected to economy. In this period, referent objects were mostly employment of people of French origin and sustainability of welfare system, together with public order and safety in the streets especially in 1981 when the first riots started. At the end of this period and since 1989 the main objects referred to are French integration model and its protection against the collapse, public order threatened by criminality and street unrest, national cohesion and identity and French heritage and values, which are defined very vaguely and if so, then in the sense of Republican values. Referent object linked to Islam is often laïcité, which although again not specified in exact way is generally assumed to be another pillar of the French state and threatened by the increased role of religion in the public sphere.

“Who are the securitizing actors in the process?”

As for the pattern investigated, the Ministers of Interior accounted for the high level of the securitizing moves performed, 60% of total, and they managed to encourage four out of five laws regarding the restriction of immigration and Islam between 1989 and 2014 to be successfully passed. Aside from the Ministers of Interior, it is mostly Presidents and Prime Ministers who accentuate the potential threat of immigrants and Islam faith. The analysis shows that practically every government since 1989, with the exception of Lionel Jospin between 1997-2002 (Bourbeau 2011: 67), attempted to encourage extreme measures towards immigration and Islam through speech acts or laws proposed. As successful is deemed especially Nicolas Sarkozy, who managed to connect topics of migration, Islam or ethnicity and project them into the first laws regarding the religious status in France since the Law of 1905.

“Are Muslim migration and Islam successfully securitized, i.e. did the audience accept the extraordinary measures?”
Buzan et al. (1998 : 5) identifies three main components of successful securitization, which are: their presentation as existential threats to chosen referent objects, i.e. securitizing moves made by the securitizing actors; emergency and extreme measures being taken; acceptation of such moves by the audience, i.e. usually general public. Previous questions proved that the condition of securitizing move and measures taken was fulfilled. As for the acceptance of the audience, in the analysis we can identify that for the case of France numbers already in 1990 showed dissatisfaction of French majority with Arabs/ Maghrebians, i.e. those perceived as Muslims by majority, when more than three fourths of French agreed that their numbers are higher than tolerable. Around 44% also believed in the strong link between immigrants and criminality, which both represent environment inclined to the acceptance of securitizing moves already before their actual introduction. As for the results, right after the introduction of the “hijab ban” and “burqa ban” there was an increase in the public support for these laws, which can be perceived as an indication of successful securitization.

In this thesis, we tried to verify our main hypothesis, which was: “Muslim migration and Islam in France are securitized.” Our analysis, which briefly followed time period of 1945-1989 and focused mostly on years of 1989-2014, proves the presence of the strong politicization of the topic of Muslim migration from 1970s and its growing importance in the French context. For the conclusion, it is important to distinguish between politicization and securitization, when politicization brings topic to the agenda and public sphere, whereas the securitization stands for the issue being presented and accepted as an existential threat, i.e. the stronger version of politicization (Buzan et al. 1998: 23-24). The politicization of immigration is present in the French discourse with high occurrence since the 1970s and since 1989 it has become a regular part of the political discourse including its usage in the general elections. Yet it is crucial to note that the results of the securitization of immigration, i.e. laws, although often mentioned with terms of “integration”, “assimilation”, “opposing cultures” etc. and generally perceived as targeting especially Muslim population, do not point out to Muslims explicitly and if so, then through the notions of their country of origin or in general Maghreb. However, same cannot be said for the speech acts primarily from the beginning of 1990s such as Jacques Chirac´s speech focusing solely on the Muslim immigrants.

As for the question of Islam, its role did not bear much of the significance till 1989 with the exception of the Front National rhetoric and its indirect link to the question of ethnicity. After 1989 Islam is being addressed with increasing intensity and in the 21st century it is becoming politicized and securitized independently on the immigration.
Since 1989 we can observe that the laws passed—especially Pasqua law, Debré law and “burqa ban” law of 2010—indicate its extremity by the engagement of the institutions and international courts in the context of its compatibility with the basic human rights and French constitution as well as its condemnation by the European Union resolution. We can therefore assume that as an attribute of the issue being securitized, i.e. taken out of the regular context and influencing basic freedoms and rights of French citizens. For the conclusion, we can consider the securitization of Muslim migration and Islam in France being done successfully and fulfilling all three conditions mentioned above.
Primary sources


Secondary sources


