Introduction
The vast and barren Arctic region has enchanted humankind for
centuries. Hundreds of people died searching for the unexplored land of the Far
North trying to push the frontiers of known areas further and searching for new
territories that could be recorded into the maps, reconnoitered and if possible
used for commercial purposes. The quests for the North Pole and for the Arctic
Northwest Passage were of major importance. For many the Arctic is only a
region ­ a place far away, for some it is a symbol of adventure and part of the
never-ending "human against nature" story and some see the Arctic as one of
the last unspoiled and virgin territories. There are also other, less romantic and
more pragmatic, approaches to this issue ­ climatologists see the Arctic as an
undiscussable evidence of the global warming impact on the nature, for
governments of the countries involved in the disputes (see Chapter 3) the Arctic
is a topic of foreign policy, part of the national sovereignty and last but not least
a potential source of immense wealth.
It is the very wealth and the overall potential of the Arctic region that has
put it again in the focus of international interests in the 1960s, and it is
particularly the Arctic Northwest Passage that plays the key role in the issue of
international disputes. Pierre Berton, an author of a book on the history of quest
for the Passage, has entitled the Passage "the Arctic Grail" which is
undoubtedly an appropriate and apt nickname. For centuries, were European
explorers obsessed with the quest for a northern shorter route to the Orient and
later also a shorter route connecting east and west coast of North America
which would highly improved trading and traveling. Even in the late fifteenth
century, when the first English men were sent to explore the Arctic, people
1
realized the strategic and commercial value of the region. But it was a long time
before the first people were able to go through the Passage at the beginning of
the twentieth century. Not even after the route was successfully navigated
through, it could not be exploited commercially because of the long and harsh
Arctic winters. People at the beginning of the twentieth century were not able to
deal with the rigorous climate and highly challenging conditions of the Arctic,
therefore there could not be taken advantage of the region in any considerable
extent. The icebergs and ice floes moving erratically, shallow sea, low
temperatures and very short summer season were among the major perils
which threatened the early explorers. But these problems have slowly begun to
become of less importance as the technology has been progressing. With
modern precise navigation and communication technologies, high-performance
icebreakers and highly functional clothing most of the problems have with a little
overstatement definitely fallen away by the mid-twentieth century. The short
summer season distinctive for the Arctic region may then represent the major
challenge. But even this problem might soon become past.
There is a mountain of scientific research providing evidence of climatic
changes in the Arctic which entails the increase of the average temperatures in
the region. Among the consequences of the changes then are the melting of ice
and opening of the waters that would have stayed closed even during high
summer only decades ago. Global warming could change it all, making the
Passage a key shipping route of high strategic importance. But as this happens,
the controversial question of sovereignty becomes increasingly important. Does
the Northwest Passage belong to Canada or the world?
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This is a tricky question which still has no unambiguous answer. There
are only different attitudes and claims declared by the involved countries.
Particularly the dispute between Canada and the United States is of the high
significance. The dispute has been there since the early explorations because
some states have never recognized the Canadian sovereignty at the Northwest
Passage region but it had not became a particularly topical issue until the
second half of the twentieth century.
This thesis deals with the Arctic Northwest Passage question as a whole
because it is a highly complex matter where various seemingly unrelated
factors, as for instance climate and politics, result in a closely related and highly
tangled issue. Geographical location and steady harsh climate determined the
Arctic region for ages ­ protecting it also from any considerable human
presence and making it impossible for people to exploit the region commercially.
The impossibility of actual use of the Arctic region ironically meant the stability
in the matter of the dispute. To put it simply, it was more or less only formal
dispute ­ there was no need to argue about the region which none of the
countries could use anyway. Since the climate and subsequently the conditions
in the region has been changing due to the global warming during the twentieth
century, also the dispute has became a particular topical problem.
It is not aim of this thesis to provide an answer to the question mentioned
above. The intention is rather to present possible approaches to the topic and to
show the complexity and importance of the Arctic Northwest Passage issue. An
introduction into historic and geopolitical context will be presented in the first
chapter. Only significant events will be mentioned with special attention given to
those expeditions of which major aim was the Passage itself even though the
3
exploration of the Passage is closely related to the quest for the North Pole.
Then I aim to analyze the impact of the climate change on the Northwest
Passage region not only from the ecological point of view but also from the
perspective of its consequences in the political stage with focus on the
American and Canadian dispute over the Passage. Subsequently the strategic
value of the region will be explained. The role of other countries involved and
other related disputes, will be also mentioned but only in short, providing the
basic information since I realize that to analyze this would be a matter of
another thesis. I believe it is necessary at least to mention it for a complex
understanding of the Northwest Passage issue. The last chapter should provide
a summary of the present situation and the most current events. Also the
possible future development of this issue based on scientific prognosis will be
outlined.
The thesis focuses on the Arctic Northwest Passage issue from the geopolitical
rather then sociological point of view. Almost no space in the thesis is
therefore devoted to the people of the Arctic. It does not mean that their role
and situation is not worth of mentioning but like the Passage issue, the question
of people living in the Arctic is highly complex.
There live almost four million people in the Arctic today including
"indigenous people and recent arrivals, hunters and herders living on the land,
and city dwellers" (Hassol 6). Like the Arctic region is created by many
distinctive sub-regions, also the group of people of the Arctic includes many
various and distinct sub-groups and communities. There are eight countries
(Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Canada, Russia, and the United
States) of which boundaries reach the Arctic. Eight nations therefore meets in
4
the Arctic region as well as the Arctic is homeland of "dozens of indigenous
groups" (Hassol 6). The miscellaneous group of people of the Arctic have to
coexist in the region and also deal with various challenges that are brought
about by nature (e.g. climate change, melting of the ice, shift in vegetation
zones) and also by the "rest of the world" (e.g increasing traffic and tourism,
industry development in the region). For the purposes of this thesis it is not
desirable or even possible to go into details and complexities of the issue but I
felt it important at least to mention that there are people in the Arctic and explain
why their role is not discussed in this thesis.
1 The Arctic Northwest Passage Issue in Context
The main task of this chapter is to put the discussed issue into context.
The thesis that follows gives greater attention to the Northwest Passage taken
as an issue of various policies and international disputes; but it is necessary to
know certain general information to understand the complexity of the disputes
and to see the significance and the overall impact of the climatic changes in the
region. Therefore the question like what and where the Arctic Northwest
Passage is, what conditions (climate and weather) are there and what the
historical background is need to be answered.
1.1 Geography
1.1.1 Terminology
Talking about the geography of the Northwest Passage, two terms are
going to be used ­ " the Arctic" and " the North". The problem with these terms
is that there is no official definition of what exactly they refer to; " the North" nor
5
"the Arctic" have strict geographical boundaries. To avoid ambiguity it is
necessary to set up the terminology used in this thesis.
As for the term "the North", the definition used by Bone in his book on the
geography of the Canadian North may be used, "geographically, the North is not
an easy defined entity. Its southern boundary is marked by the places where the
Subarctic gives way to other natural environments such as the grasslands of the
Prairies" (Bone 3).
A satisfactory definition of "the Arctic" is provided by Encyclopedia
Britannica which defines it as the "northernmost region of the Earth, centered
on the North Pole and characterized by distinctively polar conditions of climate,
plant and animal life, and other physical features" (Encyclopedia Britannica).
The Arctic region includes the Arctic Ocean, the northern parts of Canada,
Alaska, Russia, Norway, and the Atlantic Ocean, also Svalbard and most of
Iceland, Greenland and the Bering Sea, albeit in case of this thesis the term will
not only refer to the arctic region in general but it will often refer to " the Arctic"
in terms of the arctic parts of North America, Arctic Ocean and Greenland.
Another, more general but very helpful, description of " the Arctic" brings about
Susan Hassol in the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment saying,
One line often used to define the region is the Arctic Circle, drawn at the
latitude north of which the sun does not rise above the horizon at winter
solstice and does not set below it at summer solstice ­ "the land of the
midnight sun". Other boundaries used to define the Arctic include
treeline, climatic boundaries, and permafrost extent on land and sea-ice
extent on the ocean. (Hassol 4)
6
The Picture 1.11 shows the possible definitions and boundaries of the Arctic.
1.1.2 Localization of the Northwest Passage
The Northwest Passage (or North West Passage) is sometimes called
also the Northwestern Passage and these terms might be also seen in plural
(Northwest/-ern Passages) which is correct as well because there is actually
more then only one possible route. The paper on Canadian sovereignty
prepared for parliamentary information states that, "the Northwest Passage is
usually defined as the body of Arctic water existing between the Davis Strait and
7
1 the map was created by the author according to the map provided by the United Nations
Environmental Programme
High Arctic
Low Arctic
Subarctic
10°C July Isotherm
Arctic Circle
Transition zone from subarctic area to High Arctic
EUROPE
FINLAND
SWEDEN
NORWAY
DENMARK
ICELAND
R U S S I A
GREENLAND
CANADA
JAPAN
AMERICA
NORTH
ASIA
ALASKA
(USA)
(DENMARK)
USA
A T L A N T I C O C E A N
ARCTIC OCEAN
Beaufort Sea
Hudson
Gulf of Alaska
Baffin
Bay
Norwegian
Greenland
Sea
North
Sea
Baltic
Sea
Black Sea
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Barents
Kara
Sea
Leptev Sea
Caspian Sea
Sea
Sea
Bay
NORTH POLE
Picture 1.1
Baffin Bay in the east and the Bering Strait in the west. There are considered to
be five basic routes through this passage, consisting of essentially two
accessible routes" (Carnaghan, Goody 3). Another definition is provided by the
International Hydrographic Organization which defines the Passage as "a sea
route through the Arctic Ocean, along the northern coast of North America via
the waterways amidst the Canadian Arctic Archipelago, connecting the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans" (International Hydrographic Organization).
The map below (Picture 1.2)2 shows the possible routes leading through
the straits and channels between the islands of Canadian Arctic Archipelago.
8
2 the map was created by the author according to the map provided by the Athropolis.com
Routes of the Northwest Passage
EUROPE
FINLAND
SWEDEN
NORWAY
DENMARK
ICELAND
R U S S I A
GREENLAND
CANADA
JAPAN
AMERICA
NORTH
ASIA
ALASKA
(USA)
(DENMARK)
USA
A T L A N T I C O C E A N
ARCTIC OCEAN
Beaufort Sea
Hudson
Gulf of Alaska
Baffin
Bay
Norwegian
Greenland
Sea
North
Sea
Baltic
Sea
Black Sea
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Barents
Kara
Sea
Leptev Sea
Caspian Sea
Sea
Sea
Bay
NORTH POLE
Picture 1.2
1.1.3 Conditions and Climate
The conditions and climate of the Arctic region are among the harshest
and the most challenging in the world. The common misconception of the North
is that it is all formed of one piece and that there is only a lifeless land with a
bleak expanse of frozen sea and a dreary wilderness of frozen plain. The truth
is that the Arctic is as much varied as any other area on the Earth. Glacierencrusted
mountains, undulating hills and huge masses of ice and snow
covering land and sea are to be found there. Great variety is also among the
islands of the Arctic Archipelago which with some 900,000 square miles of land
constituting the largest island group in the world. Some of the islands are
mountainous, others are only bald stone and gravel deserts and others are
covered with low grass (Mowat 25).
Also the conception of lifeless land is incorrect. The Arctic region is
determined by the presence of cold environment which results in slow growth of
biological life, making the North among the least productive but also the most
fragile biological areas in the world. There has developed a small, but unique
and ecologically specialized community of organisms well-adapted for Arctic life
which is only slow to recover from any natural or anthropogenic damage (Bone
17). The major arctic vegetation zones include the polar deserts, tundra, and
the northern part of the boreal forest. The northern-most zone that covers most
of the high arctic is the polar desert, characterized by open patches of bare
ground and an absence of even the smallest woody shrubs (Hassol 46).
Vegetation in the Arctic is therefore limited to mosses, lichen and some
flowering plants flourishing only during the short spring and summer seasons
when there is a brief period of milder climate. Arctic animals have physically and
9
behaviorally adapted to the particular conditions of life in the most northerly
region of the Earth. Most of them are year-round inhabitants of the Arctic
migrating to the southern margins as winter approaches. There are about
twenty-six species of land and marine animals in the Arctic. The land animals
include for instance Spermophilus parryii (arctic ground squirrel), Canis lupus
arctos (arctic wolf), Rangifer tarandus (reindeer or caribou), and Ursus
maritimus (polar bear). Among the marine mammals are the Odobenus
rosmarus (walrus), Pagophilus groenlandicus (harp seal), and Balaena
mysticetus (bow-head whale) (Bone 18).
The arctic climate, classified as polar, is characterized by long, cold
winters and short, cool summers. It is defined by a low amount or absence of
sunlight in winter and long days during summer, with significant spatial and
temporal variation. The climate in all arctic areas is affected by the extreme
solar radiation conditions characterized by great seasonal variations that range
from twenty-four hours of constant daylight or darkness at the Arctic Circle to six
months of constant daylight or darkness at the North Pole (McBean 22). The
prominent feature of the Arctic is the cryosphere that is presented by the snow,
ice sheets, glaciers, sea ice, and permafrost - "perennially frozen ground, a
naturally occurring material with a temperature colder than 0° C (32° F)
continuously for two or more years" (Encyclopedia Britannica). Among the
physical properties of snow and ice are the high reflectivity and low thermal
conductivity which keeps the absorption of solar energy low even though the
Arctic receives a large amount of solar energy in summer. Another feature
determining the Arctic climate is the very low amount of precipitation falling
there, albeit persistent winds whip up fallen snow creating the illusion of
10
constant snowfall. Precipitation is almost entirely in the form of snow, the low
amount is caused mainly by the inability of cold air to absorb moisture (Bone
22). The regions abutting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, where the climate is
moderated by oceanic influences, have generally warmer temperatures and
heavier snowfalls than the colder and drier interior areas.
1.2 Historical Background ­ Discovery of the Northwest Passage
The first Europeans who reached the areas of the Far North were most
probably the Vikings coming from Scandinavia who established settlements on
Greenland and traded with Inuit groups. As there are no considerable written
records of these voyages, they are still partly matter of theoretical assumptions
and not much information is known about them. Any further European seafaring
into the Northwest Passage ceased until the late fifteenth century and it was not
till the nineteenth century the first significant achievements were accomplished.
For four centuries hundreds of men of various social rank, nationality and
fortune put their lives at risk setting out for the unknown and mysterious regions
of the Far North. There were two major reasons why they did so, each of which
predominated in various eras of the exploration, albeit they were often mingled.
In the time of the earliest exploration (fifteenth century to the early eighteenth
century) there was crucial the "vision of a commercial viable and strategically
advantageous seaway that runs west and north from Europe to the Far East
and back" (Griffiths 3). The second reason outweighed during the late
eighteenth and nineteenth century when the travels north became symbol of
romantic adventure and most importantly the matter of national as well as
personal prestige and fame, even thought they were usually introduced as
11
expeditions with scientific ambitions. Fergus Fleming in his Ninety Degrees
North even says, "scientific discovery, however, was a fig-leaf so tattered from
the number of times it had been snatched aside [..] As everyone really knew,
and as the press had no hesitation in saying, Arctic exploration was a matter of
naked ambition" (Fleming 57). By the mid-nineteenth century the Passage also
became of less importance and the quest for the North Pole was the major
argument for travels north. This shift of concerns was related to the shift of the
leading countries interested in the Arctic explorations. Whereas the Northwest
Passage had been the exclusive preserve of Britain till the mid-nineteenth
century and "by 1853 there had scarcely been one year in the last thirty-five in
which the area had not been visited by one exploration or another" (Fleming 8),
the explorations in the second half of the nineteenth century and the beginning
of the twentieth century were lead mostly by the Americans. In 1888, a
Norwegian neuroscientist Nansen brought Norway into the world of Arctic
exploration by making the first crossing of Greenland and manifesting that
Norway has also something to say to the Arctic explorations.
1.2.1 Early Voyages
The first recorded attempt to discover the Northwestern Passage, a
direct route to the Far East, was the voyage of John Cabot who was sent there
in 1497 by Henry VII. Then, during the sixteenth century and the early
seventeenth century, several other British expeditions followed and the first
areas of today Canadian Arctic were explored; attempts to chart the region or
make contact with the natives were sometimes carried out.
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Between 1576 and 1578 Sir Martin Forbisher made three voyages to the
North in order to find the Northwest Passage. The only thing brought from the
first voyage was "a very heavy black stone" (Abbott 41) which was examined
and said to contain gold. This false statement was successfully used to lobby
for funds for next voyages. Except for the tons of the supposed gold ore, which
was "nothing but a quantity of useless rock of no value whatever" (Abbott
45-46), Frobisher did not brought much information about the new land.
However, he had aroused interest in the Arctic region which is of the highest
importance. He discovered Frobisher Bay, which is named after him, and made
an unsuccessful attempt to establish a settlement in the North and make
contact with the natives.
Other expeditions followed. Ten years after Frobisher, between 1585 and
1587, an explorer John Davis explored the area discovering several sounds and
islands. In 1616, William Baffin entered Baffin Bay, through which the passage
was finally found, "traveling three hundred miles further north than he [Davis]
had ­ a record that stood for more than two centuries" (Berton 17).
After Baffin's voyage the interest in the Passage and arctic exploration
dwindled and moreover "the British [...] had forgotten the whereabouts of
Frobisher's discoveries and [...] had disputed whether there really was a Baffin
Bay" (Berton 18).
1.2.2 Nineteenth Century Exploration ­ Sir John Franklin's Expedition
At the beginning of the nineteenth century "except for Hudson Bay and
part of Baffin Island, the Arctic region was a blank on the map" (Berton 18). The
idea of a renewed search for the Northwest Passage had first appeared by
13
1817. Leading spirit of the new attempts was John Barrow, an Admiralty
bureaucrat, who came up with the idea that the Passage belongs to England
and that it would be humiliating for England if the Passage was reached by
another nation. There was also another reason ­ ninety percent of all naval
officers were unemployed after the end of the Napoleonic Wars and it was
needful to send them somewhere. Even though they were mostly inexperienced
and their equipment including ships was unsuitable for arctic waters (Berton
18-19). It was the very inexperience and poor equipment in combination with
chaotic organization and excessive assuredness of the British that caused that
the most of the nineteenth century voyages were great tragedies among which
the tragic disappearance of the John Franklin's expedition is still the most
mysterious one.
"Sir John Franklin set out in 1845 in command of the best-found
expedition ever sent to arctic waters to find the Northwest Passage" (Mowat
35). He was equipped with two of the Royal Navy most powerful ships, food for
seven years and about one hundred and thirty officers and men were aboard
(numbers from one hundred and twenty-four to one hundred and thirty-six are to
be found in various resources, e.g. Berton 19, Mowat 35). In July 1845 he
entered the Arctic and he nor anyone of the crew were ever heard of again.
What happened to them is still a great mystery. The significance of the
Franklin's expedition is not in the expedition itself because Franklin and his men
discovered literally nothing. The event is therefore important mainly because of
what it brought about and what followed after it. It definitely "put the Arctic firmly
in the map" (Fleming 5). After Franklin's disappearance the greatest search in
arctic history began when more then forty expeditions were sent in the region
14
(Mowat 35). Only bones of several men were discovered and until nowadays
there are remnants of the equipment and even remains of the members of the
crew to be found on several islands of the Arctic Archipelago (Canadian
Broadcasting Corporation).
Among the expeditions trying to find Franklin's crew was also the one
lead by John McClure who proved the actual existence of the Northwest
Passage. In the years 1850 and 1854 he and his crew traversed on sledges the
Passage from west to east. Their ship was trapped in the moving ice pack for
three winters and they would have died of starvation if had not been found by
chance by another expedition (Berton 210-232).
1.2.3 Amundsen's Triumph
What Franklin did not manage with huge ships, provision for seven years
and over one hundred men, Amundsen achieved in a thirty-one-year-old herring
boat, with food for five years and crew of only six men. It was probably his
biggest advantage that he did not over combined the expedition and made it as
most simple as possible. On June 16, 1903 his ship named Gja set out from
Christiania (today's Oslo) with the major attempt to sail through the Northwest
Passage. They spend two years living among the local natives from whom they
learned many arctic survival skills and also they set an observatory in a place
called Gja Haven. On August 17, 1905 their historic triumph came ­ their ship
"slipped between ice floes in Victoria Strait and anchored at last in Cambridge
Bay". On that day "Roald Amundsen and his crew managed to bring their ship
through the hitherto unnavigated link in the North West Passage" (Berton 543).
It was a historic achievement but it had also showed that there was no practical
15
passage for large ships that could be used commercially in any way (Berton
531-548).
Amundsen's travel has partly removed the mystery from the Northwest
Passage as well as it demonstrated the impracticality of the route. Subsequently
the interest in the Arctic region was on the decline ­ for explorers there was not
much to explore and for traders the Passage as a new commercial route lost its
allure as it was highly risky, expensive and also time-consuming matter to
navigate through it. Several scientific and adventurous expeditions operated in
the region in the first half of the twentieth century, military operations took place
there during and after the Second World War, and it was not until the late 1960s
the Northwest Passage has became again a current issue. The twentieth
century events connected to the Passage are more closely discussed in
Chapter 3 which is devoted to the political disputes over the region.
2 Changing Climate and the Northwest Passage
2.1 Climate Change and Global Warming in General
It has already become a common knowledge that Earth's climate has
been changing, albeit there are various opinions on why this is happening. The
climate change and global warming have been among the most current
scientific issues at least for two decades. "The phrase global warming refers to
the documented historical warming of the Earth's surface based upon worldwide
temperature records that have been maintained by humans since the 1880s
while climate change refers to changes caused by global warming in weather
(temperatures, precipitation, frequency of heat waves, etc.) and other climate
system components, such as Arctic sea ice extent" (Nodvin). Hundreds of
16
studies have been produced and thousands of observations have been taken to
analyze and describe global warming, climate change and its impacts on the
Earth. Although the causes of the change are still highly discussed, the results
and impacts of the change have become rather recognizable.
As for the causes of global warming, especially impact of human
activities on the globe climate is emphasized because the fact that rising
atmospheric carbon dioxide levels are associated with rising global
temperatures is generally regard as established. Arctic Climate Impact
Assessment from 2004 (ACIA) says that "human activities, primarily the burning
of fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas), and secondarily the clearing of land,
have increased the concentration of carbon dioxide, methane, and other heattrapping
("greenhouse") gases in the atmosphere" (Hassol 8).
The results and impacts of global warming are easier to describe
because there are statistics with exact numbers which can be only hardly
questioned. For instance according to ACIA the concentration of atmospheric
carbon dioxide since the start of industrial revolution has increased by about
thirty-five percent and the global average temperature has risen by about 0.6°C
(Hassol 8). These changes then subsequently cause shifts in atmospheric and
oceanic circulation patterns and wider variation in precipitation. The rise of
temperatures also cause melting of icebergs and glaciers of which
consequence is an accelerating rate of sea-level rise. Further consequences
then emerge including significant impacts on communities of animal and plant
species, water resources and human health. Even though impacts of global
warming appears in every region all over the world, there are regions, as for
17
instance Arctic, which are more vulnerable to climate or any other change. In
such the change is therefore more evident and the impacts are immense
2.2 Impact of Climate Change on the Arctic and the Northwest Passage
Life in the Arctic is both vulnerable and resilient. Its vulnerability is
contributed to several factors include Arctic's relatively short growing season,
small variety of living things and high variability of arctic climate ­ a sudden
summer storm or freeze can wipe out an entire generation of young birds and
mammals. "Yet some arctic species have also displayed remarkable resilience
to historic extremes, as evidenced by the recovery of populations that have
occasionally been decimated by climatic variations" (Hassol 10). It is therefore
obvious that such a region is among the first environments which respond to the
changing climate and where the consequences are most evident. The
increasingly rapid rate of recent climate changes (which are being experienced
particularly intensely in the Arctic) in combination with many other stresses
brought about by human activities is highly threatening to arctic ecosystem.
According to ACIA, Arctic average temperature has risen at almost twice
the rate as the temperatures in the rest of the world in the past few decades.
There are regional variations due to atmospheric winds and ocean currents but
for the Arctic as a whole, there is a clear warming trend; moreover, in most
places, temperatures in winter are rising more rapidly than in summer (there are
even regions where winter average temperature increased as much as 3-4°C in
the past fifty years). Major and most evident result of the rise of average
temperatures is widespread melting of glaciers and of sea ice and rising
permafrost temperatures (Hassol 14). Due to reduction of permanent ice and
18
snow there are increasing areas of uncovered sea and land which subsequently
lead to absorbing more heat from the sun "causing the ice to melt still further
and so reinforcing a vicious cycle of melting and heating" (Connor). Sea ice
reflects about seventy percent of the sun's rays back into space ensuring that
the waters of Arctic ocean do not become too warm in summer but this effect is
mostly lost when the sea is uncovered (Hall 180). Expanse of ice has been
measured for about thirty years and there is an explicit result provided - the
area covered by sea ice in the Arctic during summer has been shrinking. The
reduction of the ice has even accelerated in the last decade. In September
2007 the historically lowest level of sea ice was witnessed. Even though these
changes are under way within the Arctic they might impact the planet as a
whole. For instance Arctic ocean according to Hall "acts as a thermostat
controlling the temperature of the atmosphere" (Hall 181) and any change
therefore can have significant effects on global and regional climate.
Rising temperature and consequent melting of ice are also projected to
impacts inside the Arctic. But the whole problem is not black and white.
"Whether a particular impact is perceived as negative or positive often depends
on one's interests" (Hassol 14). The reduction of sea ice is for example mostly
devastating for animals which are perfectly adapt to unique arctic environment
but are not able to withstand forthcoming stresses and changes; it is also
devastating for local people who are dependent on the animals as their primer
food source. On the other hand due to the reduction of sea ice there is a great
potential to increase shipping in the region and to enable access to the
resources (potential of the region as a whole is more closely discussed in the
following subchapter) especially through the Northwest Passage.
19
The Passage had been historically ice-bound or, to put it differently,
impassable throughout the year. Due to climate change, described above, sea
ice cover has been steadily shrinking which made the route fully navigable for
the first time in summer 2007. According to the European Space Agency (ESA)
in summer 2007 the ice-covered area drop to just around three million square
kilometers which is about one million square kilometers less than the previous
minima observed in 2005 and 2006. ESA in its report adds, "There has been a
reduction of the ice cover over the last 10 years of about 100 000 sq km per
year on average, so a drop of 1 million sq km in just one year is extreme" (The
European Space Agency). Another problem related to sea ice reduction is that
multi-year ice (ice that survives more than one melt season) has been
disappearing. The multi-year ice sometimes also called "permanent" ice tends
to be thicker and therefore more resistant to melt and more difficult to break
through than the first-year ice formed over just one winter. According to National
Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC) the ice year by year has been entering the
melt season in an already weakened state. NSIDC research scientist Julienne
Stroeve says, "The spring of 2007 started out with less ice than normal, as well
as thinner ice. Thinner ice takes less energy to melt than thicker ice
[...]" (National Snow and Ice Data Center). Scientists predict that the Northwest
Passage will be open much more frequently from now on which makes it highly
strategically important region.
2.3 Strategic Value and Potential of the Northwest Passage Region
The greatest potential of the Northwest Passage is that of a new
transportation route. The opening of the Passage will shorten the distance
20
between Europe and Asia by some 4,000 nautical miles (about 7,400
kilometers ) because ships would not have to go all the way south to Panama
and then back northward toward Asia. In shipping that would mean an immense
savings in time, fuel and crew expense. An increased marine access in the
Passage and adjacent areas means also access to the mineral and other
resources in the region. Resources already mined would be easily transported
as well as re-supply operations to mining communities might become more
frequent and more easily realized. More importantly, new resources would be
located and steps to fully exploitation of those would be taken. The potential of
natural resources in the Arctic has not been fully discovered yet but "they
[natural resources] are found wherever anyone is looking. One of the things that
is being increasingly understood about the Arctic is that iťs a treasure trove of
natural resources." as said Rob Huebert, a specialist on the politics of the Arctic,
in an interview for Scitizen. Sam Hall in his The Fourth World among the
mineral resources waiting to be mined mentions "massive deposits of lead and
zinc, copper, nickel, iron, manganese and uranium" as well as "treasure store of
platinum, gold, silver and diamonds" (Hall 36). Those are of course important
but with no doubt the highly discussed and the most coveted are supposed
immense deposits of oil and gas. According to Huebert there are known
"substantial oil and gas resources in the Beaufort Sea" and in the northwest
section of Russia. About oil and gas potential he also says, "There are
suspicions that oil and gas go all the way up to the North Pole. We are not
entirely sure, because the necessary exploration hasn't taken place. But the
suspicions are starting to develop that the oil and gas from the Beaufort Sea
21
and the Russian side basically represent one unified field right across the entire
Arctic Ocean" (Huebert).
Although the best-known arctic potential relates to mineral resources,
there are also other matters making the Arctic a highly attractive region. The
region is home to any marine fishing grounds and lower sea ice extent and
higher temperatures would make fishing possible and less challenging for
longer periods of the year as well as it would allow fishing further to the north.
As ACIA says, "Higher ocean temperatures are likely to cause northward shifts
of some fish species, [...] possible expansion of feeding areas, and increased
growth rates. [...] More southern fish species, such as mackerel could move into
the region, providing a new opportunity[...]" (Hassol 115). Changing climate is
also likely to cause a shift in Arctic vegetation zones - forests would replace a
significant fraction of existing tundra, and tundra vegetation would move into
polar deserts. It would mean a shift of more productive vegetation into the Arctic
which could brought there considerable agriculture for the first time as Hassol
says, in certain regions where "suitable soils are present, agriculture will have
the potential to expand northward due to a longer and warmer growing
season" (Hassol 10). Last but not least is the Arctic region taken as highly
potential tourist attraction. Tourism has already penetrated into the Arctic in
recent decades but the decline of sea ice, longer navigable season and easier
access into the region would cause an immense expansion of tourism.
As the ice has been melting and the region has been becoming better
accessible, the value and the potential of the Northwest Passage and adjacent
regions has been increasing. Subsequently, various countries have made their
22
claims to the region. The issue has become a highly political matter and an
international dispute.
3 Disputes Over the Northwest Passage
As we have seen in preceding chapters, the Arctic is a vast region that is
extremely difficult to access. Climate change is reshaping the region and that
results in a race looming over the resources and potential of the region as a
whole and all the states involved want to benefit of the Arctic potential as much
as possible. Due to remoteness and historic economic unattractiveness of the
region, the boundaries of individual states had not been set unequivocally.
Therefore there are various disputes between the five Arctic states over certain
areas in the Arctic (for instance dispute over the North Pole, Baufort Sea,
Barents Sea and the Northwest Passage) which are discussed in this chapter.
3.1 Arctic Boundaries and Essential Terminology Set by the Law of the
Sea
There are five states whose boundaries reach the Arctic region. These
states which are referred to as the Arctic states are Canada, Denmark (via
Greenland), Norway, Russia and the United States of America (via Alaska)
(Rebhan 1). When talking about international cooperation in the Arctic region,
specialists often do not refers to five but to eight arctic states. Other nordic
countries as is Iceland, Sweden and Finland, also participate in significant
councils and committees on Arctic matters and therefore are included among
the Arctic states (Hassol v.). This thesis always use the number as well to avoid
any ambiguity which states are discussed at the particular moment.
23
Due to the fact that there is mostly an ocean in the region where the
boundaries of the five Arctic countries run through, those are set by the Law of
the Sea about which Rebhan says, "according to article 76 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, all of these states are entitled to an
exclusive economic area of 200 nautical miles, no matter if their continental
shelf exceeds so far or not. Their exclusive rights include the exploration and
exploitation of all the resources, whether living or non-living, within this
area" (Rebhan 1).
The continental shelf is defined, as "the seabed and subsoil of submarine
areas which because of their geological characteristics, are considered as the
natural prolongation of the continental or land mass beneath the oceans or seas
to the outer edge of the continental margin" (Rebhan 1). According to article 76
a state with a large continental shelf can be entitled to an exclusive economic
zone up to a maximum of 350 miles (states have to make an official submission
into the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf in order to claim
an exclusive economic area beyond the usual 200 miles).
The dark grey lines on the map on the following page (Picture 1.33) show
the boundaries of the five Arctic states in the Arctic as are defined at present.
The red line then shows the rough route of the Northwest Passage. The green
line represents the Northern Sea Route (NSR), also known as the Northeast
Passage (see Chapter 3.3.2)
24
3 the map was created by the author according to the map published in IceMun 2007 (Rebhan
1)
3.1.1 The Law of the Sea and the Northwest Passage
As for the Passage, also another component of the Law of the Seas
Convention is important. As Rob Huebert in an interview for Scitizen says, the
key problem is to decide whether the Passage fits into the official definition of
an international strait or rather into that of an internal waters (Huebert). Internal
waters are defined as waters over which the particular state have full
sovereignty (McRae). In this case it would be Canadians who would have
sovereignty over most of the Passage because it runs mostly through the
territory of Canada (Picture 1.3). For international waters, often called high
25
Picture 1.3
Northwest Passage Five Arctic States BoundariesNortheast Passage
EUROPE
FINLAND
SWEDEN
NORWAY
DENMARK
ICELAND
R U S S I A
GREENLAND
CANADA
JAPAN
AMERICA
NORTH
ASIA
ALASKA
(USA)
(DENMARK)
USA
A T L A N T I C O C E A N
ARCTIC OCEAN
Beaufort Sea
Hudson
Gulf of Alaska
Baffin
Bay
Norwegian
Greenland
Sea
North
Sea
Baltic
Sea
Black Sea
Sea of Japan
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Barents
Kara
Sea
Leptev Sea
Caspian Sea
Sea
Sea
Bay
NORTH POLE
seas, there is an general dictionary definition provided by Encyclopedia
Britannica which defines them as "all parts of the mass of saltwater surrounding
the globe that are not part of the territorial sea or internal waters of a
state" (Encyclopedia Britannica) but it is not a fully satisfactory one. The
international waters issue includes numerous international conventions, treaties,
and agreements and is especially complex. There are two major criteria used to
define an international strait. "Geographic" criterion says that "an international
strait must connect two bodies of the high seas." The second, "functional"
criterion requires that an international strait must be also "a useful (not just
potentially useful) route for navigation, and must have experienced a sufficient
number of transits. (Carnaghan, Goody 4). The Northwest Passage connecting
the Atlantic and Pacific Ocean allows no ambiguity over the "geographic"
criterion but that is not so over the "functional" criterion. The crux of the dispute
centers on the requirement that international straits "are used for international
navigation" (Byers). The question therefore is wether the Passage is or is not
used for such navigation. To this Huebert says, "The problem when it comes to
the Arctic is that so few vessels had ever used these waters until very recently,
so iťs very difficult to know which interpretation can be applied." Then he adds,
"The convention provides you with what the rulebook is, but it doesn't provide
the answers for what exactly the Northwest Passage [...] is" (Huebert). The very
opacity or rather ambiguity of the official definition permitting more then one
interpretation is therefore the root of the disputes over the Passage.
26
3.2 American-Canadian Dispute
Several routes of the Northwest Passage runs between thousands of
islands of the Arctic Archipelago but ownership of the islands is not at issue.
These islands were assigned to Canada by Britain in 1880 and that title has not
subsequently been contested with one small exception of Hans Island which
has been matter of dispute between Canada and Denmark (see Chapter 3.3).
The problem comes with the question of sovereignty over the waters between
islands of the Archipelago. As Byers says, "the history of Canada's claim over
the Northwest Passage is fraught with confusion and indecision" (Byers).
Canadians claim that the Arctic waters of the Passage constitute internal waters
and thus Canada has full sovereignty over the region ­ that means that Canada
should have "supreme legitimate authority within a territory" as well as the
region should fall under Canadian jurisdiction and control (Carnaghan, Goody
3).
There are two principal foundation in law for Canada's claim ­ it is that
the waters of Arctic Archipelago "lie behind the proper baselines for the
measurement of the territorial sea (and hence are internal waters of Canada)"
and that "the Northwest Passage does not constitute an international strait (and
hence there is no right of passage through it for foreign vessels)" (McRae). But
this claim has been disputed, especially by the United States of America that
have never recognized Canadian full sovereignty over the region. It is
necessary to add that "Canada's approach to asserting its claim to sovereignty
over these waters has been largely a reactive one" (McRae). Instead of longterm
efforts to obtain an approval of other states for its position, Canada reacted
only in moments when its sovereignty over Arctic waters might have been
27
challenged. Only then certain actions were taken by Canadian Government to
reinforce Canada's authority. Especially two events questioning Canadian
sovereignty were of high importance because of their consequences as well as
high publicity that accompanied them.
As explained above, the core of the dispute is in the different
interpretations of the definition of an international strait. Especially the
"functional" criterion has been highly challenged by the United States in the late
1960s and then again in the mid-1980s. As Franklyn Griffiths in his Politics of
the Northwest Passage says, "there was no clear policy during the 1950s and
early 1960s on the status of Arctic waters." There were two conferences on the
law of the sea in 1958 and 1960 but the question of jurisdiction over Arctic
waters was not among the major concerns of Canada because in that time
there was more pressing need for Canada to extend fisheries jurisdiction to
protect its fishing industry against foreign vessels (Griffiths 100). But the events
of 1969 had brought the issue of sovereignty over the Northwest Passage into
the forefront of Canadian interests.
In 1969 the supertanker S.S. Manhattan flying the American flag became
the first commercial ship to go through the Northwest Passage. "The U.S.
government in co-operation with the oil companies undertook an experimental
voyage to test the feasibility of oil shipments in the rigorous conditions of the
mass ice floes." Thus, the major purposes of the voyage were to prove that the
Passage was commercial feasible and also to test Canadian sovereignty over
the region because "the Canadians had not been consulted about the
voyage" (Hall 181). The whole event was a serious challenge to Canada's
sovereign control over the region because a commercially feasible transit
28
through the Passage would have made it in a law an international strait.
"Canada would, therefore, have lost the opportunity to ensure that the waters
were the internal waters of Canada through which no right of passage
exists" (Griffiths 100). Canada's reaction to the event is presented by the Arctic
Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) which was enacted in 1970. The Act
extended Canadian regulatory control over pollution in waters north of 60°N
within a one-hundred-mile zone and it said that "within this zone Canada would
have the authority to regulate all shipping" (Griffiths 234). Due to this statement
"the Act came into direct conflict with traditional doctrine on freedom of the
seas" (Griffiths 101) because at that time international law did not recognize
coastal state rights beyond the internal sea (the legal extension of internal sea
in 1970 was twelve nautical miles from the land). In response, a U.S. foreign
relations document from 1970 stated that the USA "cannot accept the assertion
of a Canadian claim that the Arctic waters are internal waters of Canada"
because "such acceptance would jeopardize the freedom of navigation
essential for United States naval activities worldwide." The 1970 Act was
subsequently made legal "by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS III), which allows coastal states to pass laws against
maritime pollution out to 200 nautical miles" (Byers) and which came into force
in 1994, but even that had not changed the attitude of the United States which
had not accepted Canadian sovereignty over the Arctic waters.
Only sixteen years later in August 1985, the voyage of the U.S.
icebreaker C.G.S. Polar Sea through the Northwest Passage raised the
question of sovereignty over the Passage again. The event was a clear
indication that the United States had not accepted Canada's claim of
29
sovereignty over the waters of the archipelago - the U.S. Government informed
and consulted Canadians about the voyage but did not seek for permission to
cross the Passage. As Hall says, "the Canadians were outraged", such an open
challenge of their sovereignty provoked Canadian government to defend their
sovereign control over the region as never before stating its claim to the
Passage in no uncertain terms saying clearly that "the waters of the arctic
archipelago, including the Northwest Passage, are internal waters of Canada
and fall within Canadian sovereignty" (Hall 210). "Canada strengthened its claim
with the announcement on 10 September 1985 that it was enclosing the
channels of the archipelago as internal waters" (Griffiths 8), effective to
1 January 1986.
Since the Polar Sea event the relations in matter of the Northwest
Passage dispute between the two countries had been frosty. However, in 1988,
Canada and the United States forged an agreement on Arctic Cooperation,
which says that the two states "recognize that it is desirable to cooperate in
order to advance their shared interests in Arctic development and security."
More importantly it pledges that "all navigation by U.S. icebreakers within
waters claimed by Canada to be internal will be undertaken with the consent of
the Government of Canada." The agreement had not resolved the dispute at all,
both states only agreed to accept each other's differences in interest of mutual
cooperation in the region. Simply said, the agreement set that on the one hand
the United States have to inform Canadian Government and seek permission
but on the other hand Canada cannot refuse giving them the permission.
Michael Byers, academic director of the Liu Institute for Global Issues, in
a panel discussion on Canadian svereignty hosted by the Canada Institute on
30
December 11, 2007 said that historically, Canada and the United States have
simply "agreed to disagree" (Huebert, Byers) over the Northwest Passage
navigational rights. They have found a way how to cooperate in the Arctic but
the problem of sovereignty over the Passage is still there and with the arctic ice
melting it has became a pressing issue. Especially for Canadians the Passage
and their arctic sovereignty are among the most significant matters and much
greater emphasis has been placed on the Arctic region and sovereignty
concerns in recent years. Particularly two major actions has been taken to
bolster their sovereign control over the waters of Arctic Archipelago. Those are
determining of continental shelf and reinforcing marine and military units
operating in the region that would prove their ability to secure and govern the
region.
In 2003 Canada ratified UNCLOS III which also says that they have ten
years from when they have ratified the convention to engage upon the scientific
examination of whether or not they have a continental shelf and how far it
extends. According to Rob Huebert, the continental shelf seems to be in future
the key argument in the Arctic disputes as most of the five Arctic states follows
the same policy of ratifying UNCLOS III and determining what exactly their
continental shelf is; since the size and length of the shelf is that what
determines internal waters of each state. However, the United States seem to
have a different strategy as they have not ratified the treaty yet (Huebert). They
signed the treaty in 1994 but all moves towards ratification had failed because
both, supporters and opponents of the treaty have very strong arguments.
According to an informational article on Law of the Sea Treaty, supporters of the
treaty say that it "secures American rights over territorial waters (including the
31
mineral resources underwater)" and moreover, "ratification of the treaty ensures
the United States will have a seat at the table when disputes arise or
modifications of the treaty are considered (Porter)." Especially the latter is a
strong argument because if the United States is not part of UNCLOS, it will not
have a voice in the outcome of any dispute. Opponents of the treaty in contrast
argue that it "impinges on U.S. national sovereignty and sets up an international
bureaucracy which may act in ways counter to American interests" (Porter).
However, the same article also informs that in May 2007 President Bush called
on the Senate to ratify UNCLOS. It was the second time in three years, the
Bush administration has put on a major effort for Senate ratification of the treaty
what experts sees as a signal that the USA is moving towards the same policy
as is that of Canada and other Arctic states.
At the 2007 panel discussion hosted by the the Canada Institute Michael
Byers said that "to win its sovereignty claim, the Canadian government must
convince the United States that the Northwest Passage would be more secure if
it recognized Canada's jurisdiction over the Arctic strait" (Huebert, Byers). And it
is exactly what Canada is trying to do because one of the strongest argument of
its opponents in the Passage issue is that Canada do not have the capability to
secure the region. As is said in the parliamentary information paper on
Canadian sovereignty, the Canadian Coast Guard operated a fleet of only five
icebreakers in 2006 that had to "guide foreign vessels through Canada's Arctic
waters and assist in harbour breakouts, routing, and northern resupply [...] they
must also serve in the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the Atlantic." The conclusion
therefore has been that "the Canadian Navy does not currently have the
capacity to operate within the Arctic ice" (Carnaghan, Goody 8). That same year
32
the Washington Post informed that "Canada has no search-and-rescue
helicopters regularly based in the north and [...] no submarine that can travel
under the ice cap" (Struck). Micheal Byers to the Canadian arctic presence then
adds that it is "made up largely of the Canadian Rangers" who are part-time
volunteers living in hamlets stretching from Baffin Island to the Alaska frontier.
He says that they "know the land and ice and provide a useful-if slow-movingsearch
and rescue capacity" but he argues that "their abilities are dwarfed by
the expanse in which they operate" (Huebert, Byers). Canadian government has
been taking steps to improve their surveillance in recent years but the situation
still is not fully satisfactory.
Experts envisage that the dispute between Canada and America is not to
be resolved very soon due to a long-time process of determining a continent
shelf of both states and the fact that the United States has not ratified UNCLOS
III and therefore its ten-year time to define its shelf have not even begun yet.
Huebert at the 2007 conference in the Canada Institute pointed out that Canada
and the United States could develop a special scheme over the region that
would allow both countries to prosper. Also he cautioned that efforts to resolve
Arctic disputes must begin now in order to avoid major international
confrontations over Arctic land and resources. Byers at the same conference
stated that the probability of Canada winning its sovereignty claim hinges in part
on the Canadian governmenťs ability to convince the United States that it is in
its own national security interest to allow Canada to control the Northwest
Passage (Huebert, Byers). General opinion on the Arctic issue was presented in
the final report of Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium saying,
"The differences between Canada and the U.S. on these issues are significant
33
and have a direct impact on the development of national and maritime
strategies for naval operations in an ice-free Arctic. These differences must be
resolved, probably through bilateral agreement(s)" (Office of Naval Research
35).
3.3 Other States Involved
As already mentioned, the disputes over certain areas in the Arctic are
not matter only of Canada and the United States and are not related only to the
Northwest Passage; although the dispute discussed above is regard as of high
importance, especially because of "the fact that it is occurring between two
nations that possess strong economic, social and political alliances relative to
each other" (Zorzetto). The role of other states involved in Arctic matters is not
related exactly to the Northwest Passage but it is necessary to understand all
disputes and conflicts among the Arctic as a highly complex issue where
individual actions always have considerable consequences in matter of other
disputes. Especially in case of applying various laws of UNCLOS III is the key
issue due to the fact that once a particular law is applied it is then taken as
precedence for other disputes. A sought for solution to a particular dispute
therefore must consider all consequences to other suchlike disputes that makes
the whole matter a highly complex issue where no one wants to take the first
step. All the discussed disputes are peaceful and more or less formal, however,
they are at the same time long-term matters determined by persistence of
attitude of all involved countries none of which will make concessions. The
disputes therefore remain unsolved and legal status of the disputed regions is
unclear. That means it is not clear which law (whether international or particular
34
internal law), regulating exploitation and transportation, the regions come under.
Such ambiguity then results in runaway and uncontrollable activity of various
countries in the regions.
All five Arctic states (Canada, USA, Denmark, Russia and Norway) as
well as other states involved in northern matters (for instance Iceland, Finland,
Japan, etc.) monitor all the disputes and also take part in councils and
organizations dealing with the Arctic. This chapter therefore is taken as a
sequence of short subchapters, each dealing with certain issue put into context
of the Arctic and the Northwest Passage issues as a whole. The aim of the last
subchapter devoted to the Arctic Council is to show that regardless the
disputes, the states are also able to cooperate. There is number of various
councils and organizations in which the states cooperates, the Arctic Council is
therefore only an example chosen to demonstrate a one possible way of
cooperation in the Arctic.
3.3.1 Canada and Denmark ­ Hans Island Dispute
Hans Island is a small uninhabited island with an area of only 1.3 square
kilometer situated between Canada's Ellesmere Island and Greenland, which is
a territory of Denmark. Both Canada and Denmark claim Hans Island as
sovereign territory but "these competing claims have never been finally settled
in international law." The territorial dispute has persisted since 1973 when
Canada and Denmark signed an agreement on the maritime boundary between
Canada and Greenland or in other words an agreement on the "delimitation of
the continental shelf" (Carnaghan, Goody 5). In 2005 ministers of Foreign
Affairs of Canada and Denmark met and provided a statement saying that they
35
"have decided that, without prejudice to [their] respective legal claims, [they] will
inform each other of activities related to Hans Island" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada). Although that is a peaceful dispute and both
countries cooperate in other Arctic matters, Canada as well as Denmark are
persistent in their statement of sovereignty over Hans Island. The Danish and
Canadian governments both pay regular visits to the island planting flags of
their respective countries and claiming their sovereignty. The island may seem
totally worthless nevertheless it is an highly important piece of land because its
possessing could have an immense influence on exploration and exploitation
rights in the Arctic region in future.
Although both countries are stubborn in their statement, the most recent
events of 2007 "have shown [...] that a possible agreement is not too far away.
Both countries seem at last to be prepared to divide the island between
them" (Rebhan 4). Final decision, according to 2005 joint statement of both
governments would be probably based on arctic "research being planned in the
context of the International Polar Year 2007-08" (Foreign Affairs and
International Trade Canada).
3.3.2 USA and Russia ­ the Northern Sea Route Dispute
Northern Sea Route (NSR), also known as the Northeast Passage, is a
shipping lane from the Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean running along the
top of Russian coast. According to ACIA, the NSR represents up to a forty
percent savings in distance from northern Europe to northeastern Asia and the
northwest coast of North America compared to southerly routes via the Suez or
Panama Canals (Hassol 83). Due to climate change and the ice melting, the
36
NSR is becoming navigable for longer periods of year which makes the
passage a highly important shipping route. The region also holds a vast supply
of energy and mineral resources (Rebhan 1).
The dispute over the NSR is therefore very similar to the Northwest
Passage issue. The USA and Russia disagree in the matter of sovereignty over
the region and the cause of the disagreement (like the one of the Northwest
Passage dispute) lays in the different application of the Law of the Sea. "The
legal status of the NSR has long been one of the most contentious political
issues in US Soviet/Russian Arctic relations" (Office of Naval Research 1), says
the final report on Naval Operation in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium from 2001.
The report also explains the cause of the dispute - like in the Northwest
Passage, the USA claims the ice-covered straits of the NSR to be international
waters and therefore a transit passage, while Russia asserts them to be its
internal waters. According to ACIA, the NSR has been open to marine traffic of
all nations since 1991 being administered by the Russian Ministry of Transport
(Hassol 83). Russia therefore asserts policies holding navigable straits in the
NSR under its exclusive control (icebreaker escorts are not required but there is
a tariff for passage charged by Russia).
3.3.3 USA and Russia ­ Bering Sea Dispute
The Bering Sea is an 878,000 square mile (about 2 253 289 square
kilometer) extension of the Pacific Ocean that lies between Russia and Alaska.
It is the third largest sea in the world, and the combination of its natural
characteristics, such as shallow continental shelves and seasonal ice, have
created one of the richest fisheries in the world. The major issue there is the
37
setting of boundary between the United States and Russia and subsequently
exploitation of the area which does not belong to any of the two countries and is
therefore regard as international waters. According to the International Bering
Sea Forum, "the Western part of the Bering, out to 200 miles from shore, is
Russian territory, and the Eastern part belongs to the United States" (The
International Bering Sea Forum). Problem comes with the section between
(lying two hundred miles out from the coastlines of both countries and
comprising ten percent of the entire Bering Sea area) that is known as "The
Donut Hole" and is therefore considered as international waters. The exact
borders of "The Donut Hole" remains in doubt although there is an agreement of
1990, signed by the former Soviet Union and the United States, regulating the
lines of the borders. As Rebhan in IceMUN 2007 says, "the Russian parliament
has not ratified it yet" claiming that "the agreement has taken 50,000 square
kilometers away from Russia which denies it rights to essential resources in the
area" (Rebhan 5).
3.3.4 USA and Canada ­ Beaufort Sea Dispute
There is a potential territorial dispute over the demarcation of the
maritime boundary between Canada and Alaska, in the region of the Beaufort
Sea where both states use different ways to measure their maritime boundary.
This creates a wedge-shaped piece of maritime territory which is claimed by
both nations. The executive summary on Sea Changes from 2004 says that the
Canadian position is "that the boundary should [...] be demarcated as a straight
continuation of the geographic border between Canada and Alaska," in contrary
38
to the American's who asserts "that the boundary follows the landform in a
continuous northeasterly line" (Parker, Byrne 3).
The area under the disputed wedge is supposed to hold significant
hydrocarbon and oil reserves thus the conflict could take on increased
significance when comes to exploitation of the reserves in the region. No
solution to the dispute has been reached yet, because the USA has not yet
ratified the UNCLOS III as explained above. If the treaty was ratified the issue
would be probably settled at a tribunal and solution would be settled according
to the international Law of the Sea.
3.3.5 Norway and Russia ­ Barents Sea Dispute
Another region where the maritime boundaries have not been set yet is
the Barents Sea where Norway has disputed over the border line with Russia/
the former USSR. The issue of fishing rights and also the expectation of
substantial gas and oil reserves in the disputed region have been central to the
dispute (Laegreid). The problem of setting the boundary again emerges from
the ambiguity of UNCLOS III allowing more possible application of the Law of
the Sea. Setting boundaries between states, UNCLOS III on the one hand
operates with a term "median line" (Article 15, Part II) that sets the boundaries
between countries according to the length of their nearest coastline. On the
other hand there is also continental shelve principle explained above. The text
of the Law of the Sea states that the median line should be a guiding principle
in case of disputes, however it also mentions the possibility of "special
circumstances" in which the median line principle is not in force. This is exactly
what the dispute between Norway and Russia emerges from because Norway
39
asserts that the border is set by the median line principle, whereas Russia
asserts the continental shelve principle. As Laegreid says in the case study The
Dispute Over the Barents Sea, to support its claim, Russia claims to have two
"special circumstances" - the first is the then USSR declaration of 1926 of a
"sector line" which stretched a line from the then-valid Soviet Western border to
Finland and along the meridian up to the North Pole which is by Russians
applied as "a historic precedence which should be taken into
account" (Laegreid). The second "special circumstance" according to Russia is
the difference between the two nations territorial land areas. Norway argues
that the delimitation of boundaries must be based upon geographic
circumstances without allowing for unrelated issues like differences in
population size or economic factors. "The power balance between these two
nations is clearly asymmetric, but international law dictates that this asymmetry
should be irrelevant to the discussions" (Laegreid).
3.3.6 The North Pole Dispute
It was already mentioned that under Article 76 of UNCLOS III a state can
claim a two hundred nautical mile exclusive zone from the end of its continental
shelf. According to Reynolds, a world affairs correspondent for BBC News
website, nobody's shelf at the moment extends up to the North Pole. Thus,
there is an international area around the Pole but "the five [Arctic] countries are
pushing for one of two [...] potential ways of sharing the region, in which the sea
would be divided between the five nations" (Reynolds). If the region was divided
in accordance with the "median line" principle (governed by the length of
nearest coastline of each country), the Pole itself would be given to Denmark
40
but as Rebhan says, "Canada would gain as well." The second, so-called sector
method "would take the North Pole as the centre and draw lines south along
longitudes." That would "penalize Canada but Norway and, to a lesser extent,
Russia would gain (Rebhan 7)."
The North Pole dispute escalated in August 2007 when it was announced
that "Russian explorers have planted their country's flag on the seabed 4,200 m
below the North Pole to further Moscow's claims to the Arctic" (Reynolds). That
provoked various reaction from the states involved - from indifference of the
USA who did not show any special reaction to Canadian reaction which stated
clearly that still regards significant part of the Arctic as its sovereign property
(Rebhan 6). The final decision in the case of the North Pole is expected to be
taken only after the five Arctic states determine their continental shelves as
UNCLOS III assigns.
3.3.7 Arctic Cooperation and Arctic Council
First attempts to set an international regime and cooperation in the Arctic
were taken in the early twentieth century. Those were for example the 1911
treaty dealing with preservation and protection of fur seals or the 1920 Treaty of
Spitsbergen which "created an international regime for Svalbard Archipelago
that remains in force today" (Young 29). Throughout the second half of the
twentieth century, the prospects for international cooperation in the Arctic were
regarded as poor "due to the combined effects of cold war tensions [and] a
pattern of core/periphery relations within individual Arctic countries" (Young 1).
However, with the end of cold war in the 1990s this situation has changed and
the last two decades have brought dramatic changes in the situation which has
41
led to formation of a variety of cooperative initiatives. As Young says in the
paper on The Structure of Arctic Cooperation, significant is especially "the
emergence of a number of innovative arrangements involving subnational units
of government, nonstate actors, and distinctive forms of interstate cooperation
as well as more traditional types of international cooperation" among which a
particular important objective involves the growth and development of the Arctic
Council (Young 1).
3.3.7.1. Arctic Council
In 1991, the eight Arctic countries signed the Arctic Environmental
Protection Strategy (AEPS) which was the first step to the formation of the
Arctic Council. The Council itself was formally established by the Ottawa
Declaration of 1996 which defines the Council as "a high level
intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation,
coordination and interaction among the Arctic States" (Arctic Council). Special
attention should be paid also to the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous
communities and to particular issues of sustainable development and
environmental protection in the Arctic. Members of the Arctic Council are the
eight Arctic states - Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russian
Federation, Sweden, and the United States of America. The Council also has
the category of Permanent Participants that is open equally to Arctic
organizations of Indigenous peoples, and a category of official observers which
includes some non-arctic state (for instance France, Germany, the Netherlands
and others) and also non-governmental organizations or scientific and other
international bodies (Arctic Council).
42
The Arctic Council is not an "institution" nor it is an "organization", since
its founding document describes it as a "high level forum". The Council in its
current configuration therefore "suffers from severe limitations." It has "little
regulatory content" and "has no organizational capacity, no resources of its own,
and no authority to make decisions that bind its members" (Young 14). Because
the counciľs decision making authority is severely limited, Young in his paper on
The Structure of Arctic Cooperation proposes that the performance of the Arctic
Council should be judged "in terms of its generative capacity rather than asking
about its effectiveness in administering a regime that is already in place" (Young
10). The only executive of the Council therefore are the six small secretariats ­
so called Working Groups created to operate certain activities concerning
various ecological and economical Arctic issues. Their responsibility as is
defined on the official website of the Arctic Council is "to execute the programs
and projects mandated by the Arctic Council Ministers" (Arctic Council). Among
the Working Groups are for instance the Arctic Monitoring and Assessment
Programme (AMAP), the Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment (PAME),
and the Sustainable Development Working Group (SDWG).
4 Current State and Possible Future Development in the Region
4.1 Summary of the Most Current State in the Region
As was said in the preceding chapters, the five Arctic countries are
involved in various disputes over many regions. The disputes in all likelihood
are not to be solved soon due to a slow-going procedures of international law.
According to United Nations official website, Norway ratified UNCLOS III in
1996 and Russia did so in 1997, therefore they already had to make an official
43
submission on the information on the limits of their continental shelf. Norway did
the submission in 2006 and that is still in the process of examining by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Russia submitted the
information in 2001 claiming a large area of the Arctic (including the North Pole)
and was recommended by the Commission to do an additional research. In
summer 2007 Russia supported their claims of 2001 by planting their flag on the
seabed under the North Pole. Canada ratified UNCLOS III in 2003, Denmark in
2004 and the United States have not ratified it yet. None of these three
countries therefore have made the official submission yet. All the five Arctic
countries are taking various researches in the Arctic to collect as much
information about their continental shelf as possible (United Nations).
As for the Northwest Passage, the current "assertion against assertion"
state of Canada and the United States is not to be solved soon as well. The
United States are taking steps to ratify UNCLOS III as well as preparing their
military and other capabilities for the future Arctic missions. As is said in the final
report of Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium, "The timeline for a
significantly navigable Arctic may extend decades into the future. However, the
group noted that U.S. Naval operational missions in the Arctic, and related
requirements, must be identified in the nearer term to ensure that the necessary
operational capabilities exist when future Arctic missions do present
themselves" (Office of Naval Research 6). Canada is taking steps to augment
and improve its capacities operating in the Arctic to prove that it is able to
secure and govern the region which regards as its internal waters.
Actions taken by the governments of the five Arctic countries are
influenced by various factors among which are of the high significance scientific
44
prognosis on future development of global warming and its impact on the Arctic
region. Such prognosis say also when the ice-free Arctic is expected and how
the changes will affect the region. Based on these prognosis, various political
and economical prognosis are prepared to advice policy-makers in taking
particular steps.
4.2 Future and Global Warming in the Arctic
The cause and impacts of global warming were already explained in
Chapter 2 but only little space was devoted to the future development in the
matter of global warming which is one of the significant factors determining also
the future development in political disputes in the Arctic.
The Arctic Climate Impact Assessment from 2004 states that it is
expected that there will be an "additional arctic warming of about 4-7°C over the
next 100 years" (Hassol 10) that will have serious consequences. Some of them
as melting of the sea ice and snow, thawing of the permafrost and increase in
precipitation that have already appeared, will continue and gradually accelerate
because "melting of highly reflective arctic snow and ice reveals darker land and
ocean surfaces" that will cause "increasing absorption of the sun's heat and
further warming" (Hassol 10). "Permafrosťs southern limit is projected to shift
northward by several hundred kilometers" during the twenty-first century and
snow cover is expected to decrease by "10-20% by the 2070s, with the greatest
declines in spring" (Hassol 12). As the impacts already existing accelerate
another new will appear.
ACIA gives number of realm that will likely to be affected by global
warming and climate change. River runoff will increase due to glacial melt and
45
"add more freshwater to the ocean, raising global sea level and possibly slowing
the ocean circulation that brings heat from the tropics to the poles, affecting
global and regional climate." Shift in the temperatures will influence biodiversity
among arctic sea and land. "Treeline is expected to move northward and to
higher elevations" and "disturbances such as insect outbreaks and forest fires
are very likely to increase in frequency" (Hassol 10). Also agriculture is
expected to have the potential to move northward. Reductions in sea ice will
negatively affect present marine and land animals. On the other hand
increasing temperatures and greater variability in vegetation may cause that
some new species will likely move in. Experts agree that it is highly probable
that there will be an domino effect in the Arctic, since each change in arctic
environment will arouse number of following consequences that will impact on
the whole world.
4.2.1 Ice-Free Arctic
As arctic sea ice and snow have been on the decrease throughout the
twentieth century, image of ice-free Arctic has became more real then ever
before and scientists forecast that ice-free Arctic is very likely to become reality
in the twenty-first century.
ACIA of 2004 projected that perhaps all ocean ice will disappear in
summers by 2060-2100. Science Daily informs on the research of 2005 lead by
University of Arizona geoscientist Jonathan T. Overpeck projecting that the
Arctic ocean will be for the first time entirely ice-free during summers within one
hundred years (Science Daily). Also prognosis provided by Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in the report, published in 2007, agrees that
46
"arctic late-summer sea ice disappears almost entirely by the latter part of the
21st century" (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 8). But yet in 2006
the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) News Release
published a study prepared by a team of scientists from NCAR that says that
"the recent retreat of Arctic sea ice is likely to accelerate so rapidly that the
Arctic Ocean could become nearly devoid of ice during summertime as early as
2040" The study expects that there will be "abrupt loss of ice" because "the
growing regions of ice-free water will accelerate the warming trend" (The
National Center for Atmospheric Research). The 2006 prognosis was confirmed
also by the research of 2007 by scientists at NCAR and the University of
Colorado's National Snow and Ice Data Center (NSIDC). In April 2007 NCAR
News Release stated that "the Arctic's ice cover is retreating more rapidly than
estimated by any of the 18 computer models used by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in preparing its 2007 assessments" and that
"the shrinking of summertime ice is about 30 years ahead of the climate model
projections" (The National Center for Atmospheric Research). Mark Serreze, an
Arctic specialist at NSIDC even stated that if the increased rate of melting
continues, the summertime Arctic could be totally free of ice by 2030 (National
Snow and Ice Data Center). For Guardian.co.uk he said, "if you asked me a
couple of years ago when the Arctic could lose all of its ice then I would have
said 2100, or 2070 maybe. But now I think that 2030 is a reasonable
estimate" (Adam).
As for the Northwest Passage, it was already said that the Passage was
witnessed ice free for the first time during a short period in September 2007.
The ice-free summer period is expected to become longer every year. Final
47
report of Naval Operations in an Ice-free Arctic Symposium states that "within
5-10 years, the Northwest Passage will be open to non-ice-strengthened
vessels for at least one month each summer" (Office of Naval Research 12).
The most dramatic forecast so far was released by BBC News website in
December 2007 that informed that US scientist Professor Maslowski and his
team prepared a model future projection for Arctic by using data sets from 1979
to 2004 and came to the conclusion that Arctic (and therefore Northwest
Passage as well) would be ice-free by summers 2013 (Amos).
When the ice-free Arctic will be witnessed for the first time is quite
uncertain because there is still too much unknown. Even if the prognosis are
based on scientific statistics and preceding researches, they are still quite
hypothetical and the final result may entirely change with every additional
information. In general, therefore, scientists agree that there is the highest
probability that ice-free Arctic will occur in relatively near future at least during
summer months. Some say that it will occur some time in the second half of the
century but there are also opinions that it may occur even decades earlier. It is
also regard as certain that the period of open Northwest Passage will be getting
longer year by year. Generally, it is supposed that the Passage will become icefree
for most of the year by the following decade or two, at most.
4.3 Future Political and Economical Development in the Region
As the climate changes, further economical exploitation of the Northwest
Passage and also Arctic as a whole is expected. Changing climate combined
with increasing natural-resource development will likely "transform this onceremote
region into a new region of importance of the global economy" (Brigham
48
27). There is a great overall potential of the Passage and adjacent region, as
was described in Chapter 2.3, but actual exploitation and sovereignty over the
potential of the Arctic is still an open question. According to ACIA, for example,
the navigation season in the Arctic will lengthen, marine access to the Arctic's
natural resources as well as offshore extraction of oil and gas will increase and
many security, safety, social, cultural and environmental concerns are likely to
arise. As the changes became more rapid, various scenarios of future Arctic
development have been set by experts to enhance a dialogue among a
multitude of decision makers. Especially two questions are of the highest
importance in these scenarios ­ how the political issues and disputes in the
region will be solved, and what will happen to the unique Arctic environment if
further economical exploitation arrives.
According to Birgham's Thinking about Arctic's Future: Scenarios for
2040, there are several possibilities, all of them working on an assumption that
the climate will change in the future resulting "in significant regional
warming" (Brigham 27) in the Arctic. Both, Birgham and ACIA agree, projecting
several examples that these changes will have subsequent impact on other
realms. Air and marine transportation of cargo and passenger loads will
increase having an immense impact on environment and safety of the region. A
need to set and respect new international regulations will become inevitable
because "increased industrial activity puts the Arctic region as a whole at
greater risk for major environmental catastrophe, such as spills and leaks from
aging oil and gas pipelines" (Brigham 30). Exploitation of Arctic resources "such
as nickel, copper, coal, and freshwater, as well as oil and gas" (Brigham 30) will
increase and overfishing will become a serious problem. Communities of arctic
49
indigenous peoples will be also seriously influenced. Some communities will
disappear or will be displaced and their traditional way of life will be seriously
challenged due to extreme environmental events, increasing commercial
exploitation and tourism. Birgham also proposes that increasing industry and
more commercial opportunities may bright prospects for Arctic indigenous
workers, improving their lives economically. New complication may arise as
illegal immigration into any subarctic regions may become a reality for the first
time in history due to influxes of environmental refugees and economic migrants
from southern regions of the planet.
As for the question of the political issues and disputes in the region,
experts agree basically on two possibilities. First, Arctic could in the future
become a region of prosperous international cooperation with the Arctic
governance system that "is viewed as a model for resolving complex
sustainable development and regional disputes" where "mutual respect and
cooperation among the circumpolar nations are the norm" (Brigham 33)
because the circumpolar nations will realize that "they have significant
environmental, social, and economic interests and responsibilities in the
Arctic" (Birgham 32). Or second, instead of calming of international tension,
disputes between circumpolar nations and international tension over the region
will increase. In a such case "the Arctic is viewed by much of the global
community as a storehouse of natural riches that is being jealously guarded and
developed by a handful of wealthy circumpolar nations" (Birgham 32).
ACIA warns that the unique Arctic environment is already being seriously
challenged and that any further exploitation of the region will only worsen the
situation. Experts therefore agree that strict restriction therefore must be set and
50
accepted in near future if the Arctic environment should be preserved. Birgham
proposes two possibilities, environment protection as an imperative will be
superior to other interests and various steps will be taken by the five arctic
nations to protect and preserve the Arctic environment. In this case, the Arctic
region, as Birgham says, could "become a model for habitat
protection" (Birgham 30). There is also another possibility that "environmental
concerns that once fostered circumpolar cooperation [will be] superseded by
economic and social interests, often driven by the private sector" (Birgham 31).
Exploitation in that case will be superior and probability of a serious
environmental catastrophe will become seriously threatening.
There is still confusion and lot of uncertainty about future of the Arctic
Northwest Passage and of the whole Arctic region. Even though well-founded in
statistics and scientific prognosis, the possible scenarios described above are
still theories.
Conclusion
The Arctic Northwest Passage and also the Arctic region as a whole are
changing. The process has started tens years ago and is not about to stop in
the near future. The overall consequences of the changes, as explained in this
thesis, already were, still are and also will be unforeseeable. Not only
environmental but also political impacts of the changes in the Arctic region are
regard as very acute and perilous issues.
This thesis showed the complexity of the Arctic Northwest Passage issue
in terms of environmental issues related to politics as well as in terms of close
relatedness of all disputes over the Arctic. There is no unequivocal conclusion
51
of the issue that could be provided here because the topic, from the
geographical, environmental as well as political point of view, remains open.
Experts, who deals with the future of the Arctic Northwest Passage and other
Arctic issues (e.g. Brigham, Young), point out that there does not even exist
single and "correct" solution because environmental issues do not match with
economical interests, policies of individual five Arctic states for many issues are
not in accordance with international law or with each other, boundaries of the
states are ambiguous and so forth. But as Young explains, "There is nothing
unique about such overlaps; they arise in one form or another in connection
with all human endeavors" (Young 9). Many international institutions and
organizations as well as governmental services deals with the Arctic region,
generally in terms of focusing on specific problems (e.g. overfishing, melting of
the ice, human rights and so on). As Young says, "The result is a patchwork
system that runs the risk of ignoring significant issues and that may come to
seem increasingly inadequate as the demand for governance grows in
international society [...but], it minimizes the risks of corruption and
oppression" (Young 9-10).
As experts propose, the "ideal" final solution to the all Arctic issues, when
it will come to it, should be a well balanced compromise that will consider all
aspects, from environmental and sociological to economical and political, and
that will achieve a balance between international and governmental powers. For
many, the Arctic is too remote to worry about what is happening there but as
ACIA say, "arctic changes will [...] impact the planet as a whole. For this reason,
people outside the Arctic have a great stake in what is happening there" (Hassol
8).
52
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