MASARYK UNIVERSITY
Faculty of Social Studies
Department of Political Science

DISSERTATION

Brno 2019

Ina Fujdiak
Contemporary Cooperation between Czech and German Far Right Movements

Dissertation

Supervisor: doc. PhDr. Věra Stojarová, Ph.D.
Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank Prof. Miroslav Mareš, who had been my supervisor for most of my time as a PhD student and guided me through all challenges I have encountered on the way. His encouragement, professional knowledge and valuable tips contributed a great deal to this dissertation and he always found a good balance between giving me plenty of rope and providing as much support as I needed. Also doc. Stojarová, who was leading me during the last year of my studies, was a great support and I am thankful for the input she gave me and the understanding she had for my struggles.

Further, Dr. Petr Ocelík was helping me to get first insights into the method of social and hyperlink network analysis and patiently looked over my confusing datasets and my first graphs. Without his encouragement and lead I most likely would not have dared using the method of hyperlink network analysis. Also Dr. Matteo Gagliolo was providing me with methodological input and gave me the chance to present an outline of my research and first analyses on the Free University of Brussels.

Finally, I would like to thank my husband Radek for his support and understanding. Knowing what it means to write a dissertation he was solid as a rock in turbulent waters and gave me the strength to write this work. Also, I thank my parents for supporting my Czech adventure after overcoming their initial scepticism and my whole family for holding my back and supporting me.

I dedicate this work to our son Elias.
Declaration

I hereby declare that this PhD dissertation is my own work, that is has been written on the basis of the sources listed here, and that these listed sources have been referred to and acknowledged in the text.

Date.......................................... Signature.................................................
Table of Content

1 Introduction ...........................................................................................................................................10
2 Research targets ....................................................................................................................................13
3 Research questions ..................................................................................................................................15
  3.1 First research question ..................................................................................................................15
  3.2 Second research question ..............................................................................................................16
  3.3 Third research question ..................................................................................................................17
4 Methodology ..........................................................................................................................................18
  4.1 Case Selection ...................................................................................................................................19
    4.1.1 Countries ..................................................................................................................................20
    4.1.2 Segments ..................................................................................................................................21
    4.1.3 Far right movements ..............................................................................................................24
  4.2 Social network Analysis (SNA) ......................................................................................................31
    4.2.1 Hyperlink Network Analysis (HNA) ......................................................................................34
    4.2.2 Web crawler VOSON .............................................................................................................36
  4.3 Content Analysis ..............................................................................................................................38
  4.4 Data sources ......................................................................................................................................39
5 Related Work ..........................................................................................................................................40
6 Far right – insights into the phenomenon ..........................................................................................45
  6.1 Basic attributes of the far right .......................................................................................................46
  6.2 Radicalism and extremism ................................................................................................................49
  6.3 Populism ............................................................................................................................................51
7 Theoretical Framework ..........................................................................................................................52
  7.1 Far right as a social movement .........................................................................................................52
  7.2 Collective and Connective Action .....................................................................................................55
  7.3 Connective Goods: Hyperlink networks ............................................................................................60
  7.4 Usage of the Internet by the far right ...............................................................................................63
  7.5 Social Movement Coalitions, Alliances and Collaborations ............................................................65
  7.6 Mobilization in the context of collective action ..............................................................................69
8 Historical Background ..........................................................................................................................73
  8.1 Transformation period 1987-2002: Establishment of the foundations ..............................................75
  8.2 2002-2014: Autonomous Nationalism as a new approach ..............................................................78
# Results

## Network evolution during the investigation period

- 9.1.1 Individual Communities
- 9.1.2 Density
- 9.1.3 Betweenness centrality
- 9.1.4 Degree centrality

## Extent of ideological overlap

- 9.2.1 Ideological overlaps between countries
- 9.2.2 Ideological overlaps between segments
- 9.2.3 Ideological overlaps between individual Social Movement Organisations

## Ideological overlaps as a basis for coalition building

- 9.3.1 Direct hyperlinks between the movements
- 9.3.2 Hyperlinks to the same content

# Discussion

## Sample size

## Segmentation

## The Internet as data source

## Network Layout

## Weaknesses of the data crawler

# Conclusion

# Literature

## Secondary sources

## Primary sources

## Webpages of the selected Social Movement Organisations

## Webpage of the used data crawler

# Appendix
List of Tables

Table 1 Overview on the levels for the analyses ................................................................. 20
Table 2 Identified segments of the far right movement in CZ and DE ............................... 23
Table 3 Classification scheme of different far right actors (Braun et al., 2009: 15, translated by the author) ........................................................................................................ 48
Table 4 Basic characteristics of extremism and radicalism, own table, based on Bötticher (2017) .......................................................................................................................... 51
Table 5 Connective and Collective Action (Benett, Segerberg 2012: 756) ....................... 58
Table 6 Settings for the web crawl in the first research question ...................................... 89
Table 7 Basic SNA data for the datasets extracted on 20.09.2017 and on 17.09.2019 .... 90
Table 8 Degree in Network 1 and Network 2 ................................................................... 97
Table 9 Percentages of categories identified in the self-presentation of the selected movements, sorted country-wise .............................................................. 101
Table 10 Percentages of categories identified in the self-presentation of the selected movements, sorted segment-wise .............................................................. 103
Table 11 Ideological Orientations of the selected movements ........................................ 106
Table 12 Settings used for the web-crawl by VOSON in the third research question .... 107
Table 13 Basic SNA data for the hyperlink networks ........................................................ 108
Table 14 Overview on pagegroups represented by the nodes in the seeds and most important network above ......................................................................................... 114
Table 15 Overlaps - links to the same content by the seed pages ................................. 116
Table 16 Categories and Codes developed for the second part of the research ............... 149
Table 17 In- and outbound from the seeds to the shared content .................................. 151
List of Figures

Figure 1 Asylum Requests in Germany and the Czech Republic in Comparison, own Figure, based on Hanzelka, Schmidt (2017) ................................................................. 21
Figure 2 Rise of Nationalism in Europe (BBC 20190) ..................................................... 74
Figure 3 Comparisons of Network 1 and Network 2 .......................................................... 92
Figure 4 Hierarchy Network 1 – Dataset from 20.09.2017 ............................................... 94
Figure 5 Hierarchy Map Network 2 - 17.09.2019 ............................................................... 95
Figure 6 In- and Outdegree in Network 1 and 2 for all movements ................................... 98
Figure 7 Frequencies of categories assigned to the “about us“ section of all different movements, comparison of countries ................................................................. 101
Figure 8 Frequencies of categories assigned to the “about us“ section of all different movements, comparison of segments ................................................................. 103
Figure 9 Ideological orientations of the single movements ................................................ 104
Figure 10 Hyperlink network of the different movements – complete network ................. 109
Figure 11 Hyperlink network of the seed websites ........................................................... 110
Figure 12 Subnetwork of the dataset from 17.04.2019 – seeds and most important page groups ................................................................................................................. 112
Figure 13 Same dataset with application of LinLog (Noack) and Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm .................................................................................................................. 122
**List of Abbreviations**

AfD – Alternative für Deutschland; Alternative for Germany

ANO – Akce Nespokojených Občanů; Unsatisfied citizen’s action, meaning also “Yes”

CDU/CSU – Christdemokratische Union/Christsoziale Union; Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union

CZ – Czech Republic

DE – Germany

DM – Dělnická Mládež; Young Workers

DS – Dělnická strana; Worker’s Party

DSSS - Dělnická strana sociální spravedlnosti; Worker’s Party of Social Justice

EU - European Union

GDR – German Democratic Union

HNA – Hyperlink Network Analysis

IBDE – Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland; Identitarian Movement Germany

IVČRN – Islám v ČR nechceme; We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic

JA – Junge Alternative – Young Alternative

JN – Junge Nationalisten; Young Nationalists

IMCZ – Generace Identity; Identitarian Movement Czech Republic

JN – Junge Nationalisten; Young Nationalists

NPD – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands; National Democratic German Party

NSF – Národní a Sociální Fronta; National and Social Front

ODS – Občanská demokratická strana; Civic Democratic Party

PEG – Pegida, Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident

SMO – Social Movement Organisation

SNA – Social Network Analysis

SPD – Svoboda a přímá demokracie; Freedom and Direct democracy
1 Introduction

With the arrival of over a million people coming from countries outside Europe in 2015, far right political parties and movements gained political influence and societal importance all over Europe and became a frequently discussed topic in academic circles and the general public (Rosůlek, 2018). Though this is by no means a new phenomenon, the so-called refugee crisis triggered racist sentiments within the population and lead to various different forms of riots against migrants and to the strengthening of far right actors (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018). Besides right-wing parties, which gained great influence in various different European governments or parliaments, also the informal part the far right movement increased its strength. It includes less institutionalized groups of varying sizes and organizational forms, subcultures and individuals. Generally, these informal organizations were worse off in terms of reaching supporters and spreading their message than parties for a long time, as they do not receive funding and do not have access to financial and other means in the same way as parties. However, the emergence of the Internet fundamentally revolutionized the communication and extensive financing is not anymore crucial to spread political messages. The Internet and other modern communication technologies recently account for 70-80 percent of the far right’s networking, hence they are of key importance for the mobilization of supporters (Köhler, 2015; Polletta et al., 2013). Additionally, movements are not subject to legal regulations in the same way as parties and their procedures and structures are not as rigid, which makes their communication among each other and with their supporters faster, easier and oftentimes even more efficient.

As described, the informal part of the far right movement is gaining influence and impacts societal processes, which makes its understanding very important. However, there are just few analyses or systematic juxtapositions (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018) which provide an overview and systematically compare different segments belonging to the far right movement. Also, there are barely any recent researches that compare the development within different countries, even though the transnational dimension of right wing extremism and radicalism should not be underestimated and is gaining importance recently (Grumke, 2017; Mareš, 2006). Up to now, the research on the topic has heavily concentrated on the formal party sector, while the research on the informal sector has grown rather slow (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018; Minkenberg, 2018,). Hence, this dissertation aims to contribute to a better understanding of recent processes and dynamics within the informal part of the far right
movement. It focuses on transnational cooperation and exchange and exemplarily selected the Czech Republic and Germany as case studies for the analyses.

Exploring the newer history of both countries shows that feelings of xenophobia, nationalism and authoritative-conservative points of view, which are key characteristics of the far right, have already existed prior to the refugee crisis. With the Internet becoming more and more established, the dissemination of far right sentiments in the society starts to happen in different ways and recently the public attention, which these actors attract, has increased. Hence, the dissertation does not deal with a new or short-time development but just with a comparably new way of spreading and sharing far right ideologies. The developments in both countries are in many aspects similar but still are based on the individual histories and socio-economic backgrounds of both countries. Their similarities have already in the past led to frequent exchanges and communication between single far right groups. Also the geographic proximity of the countries contributed to the exchanges and cooperation between the national far right movements. On the downside there is the fact that different languages are spoken, which might sometimes slow down and complicate the cooperation. As the theory of social movement cooperation claims, a common enemy triggers both the building of long-term alliances and short-term cooperation in social movements. In the current situation, such a common enemy for the far right movement might be represented by the people that arrived as refugees to Europe and are seeking asylum in European countries. Cooperation and exchange between national far right movements are thus an expected reaction to the refugee crisis and their research contributes to the overall understanding of the far right as well as to its assessment as a social movement.

The dissertation focuses on several different aspects of transnational and national coalition building, ideological orientations and usage of the Internet by far right social movement organisations. It concentrates on the contemporary development in the Czech Republic and Germany and their comparison as well as exploring the mutual ties between the far right movements in both countries. It is based on a theoretical conceptualization of radicalism, extremism and populism as well as of the far right. Further, the development and foundations of the far right in Germany and the Czech Republic, starting from 1987 and the transformation period to the recent developments in the time after the peak of the refugee crisis in 2019 are described. The work focuses on cyberspace, the websites that are maintained by the selected movements themselves and the hyperlinks they provide to each other and to external content. As research methods hyperlink network analyses and qualitative
content analyses are used and their findings are combined. The empirical part of the dissertation consists of three main research questions which are built upon each other and contain sub questions. As a qualitative study, the work is based on a limited number of cases and aims to understand the phenomena in great depth. The research is of explorative nature and does not contain hypotheses.

The first empirical part of the dissertation is dedicated to gaining an insight into the networking behaviour of far right movements and the strategies they are employing in cyberspace. The evolvement of the network will be analyzed by extracting network data at the beginning and the end of the main investigation period and comparing the networks. Main network features as density, betweenness and degree centrality and community structure will be analyzed and compared. In the following section the overlaps and differences in the ideological orientation of different selected movements are analysed based on the self-description the selected movements provide on their respective websites. The ideological orientations are compared country-wise, segment-wise and for the individual movements. This provides an insight into the far right movements of both countries as a whole but also on its smaller parts. In the third and last section of the empirical part the cooperation of the movements is analyzed in detail and linked to the before identified ideological overlaps. In this section, both direct hyperlinks between the single movements and hyperlinks via which the selected movements refer to the same external content are considered.

Build on the theory of social movements and online dynamics of collective action, the dissertation provides an in-depth insight into the behaviour of the selected social movement organizations in cyberspace. Their self-depictions and the content they provide to their supporters together with the sources that refer to them are analyzed in detail and at various different points of time. The work retraces the similar developments of the far right movement in the Czech Republic and Germany starting in 1987 to the most recent developments in 2019. Also, it describes how the Czech far right scene successfully developed its neo-Nazi segment while the German far right movement rather gained supporters within the anti-immigration segment and provides the reader with possible reasons for and consequences of these developments. Also, it contributes to the theoretical understanding of online coalition building within the far right movement and its processes of mobilization.

Moreover, the dissertation gives an English-speaking audience insight into the far right movements of two countries with differing native languages and additionally also analyses the interrelations between the two countries. It connects the analysis of German and Czech
language sources in an English text and makes the described phenomena accessible for an audience that does not understand one or both languages.

2 Research targets

Though transnational cooperation of the far right has already been researched with different foci (see subchapter 5 – Related Work), most of the authors concentrated rather on one country instead of researching coalitions between social movement organisations over state borders. Also, many of the studies are already outdated or focus on different aspects. The following research concentrates on the time after the arrival of a lot of immigrants to Europe, which impacted the development and the transnational cooperation of the far right substantially. According to the theory of social movements and of movement cooperation and alliance forming, the presence of a common enemy does have a significant impact on the forming of coalitions between social movements or their single organisations. Large external threats are fostering cross-movement coalitions while local threats rather inspire within movement coalitions (Van Dyke, 2003: 226).

The research focuses to the cooperation within and among the far right movements of two selected countries. Concretely, it concentrates on coalitions that emerge between their single units, the individual far right SMOs, which are represented by movements exemplarily selected for the research and on the activities of these movements in cyberspace. Coalitions between movements are illustrated by their direct references to each other or by connections established via external content. In the context of the research, hyperlinks are understood as proxies for connections between movements. The hyperlinked content will be analyzed in detail, thus also possible connections to other social movements could be revealed. Though, these transmovement coalitions are not expected, as the far right is in its entire nature fundamentally different than the “classical” social movements (human rights, ecologists etc.). Also, immigrants who might represent an enemy and a large threat for the far right are surely not perceived in the same way e.g. by the human rights movements, nor by any other social movement, which makes the cooperation of the far right movement and a different social movement rather unlikely.

Scholars that have researched the field emphasize both the importance of opportunities as for example new advantages and of threats, (e.g. the impending loss of benefits or fewer available resources) for the mobilization in the context of social movements (Tilly, 1978; Van Dyke and Soule, 2002). The huge number of foreigners that arrived to Europe since 2015 might, on
the one hand be perceived as a common enemy by far right movements, in other words, a threat. On the other hand it might be seen as an opportunity to gain supporters. The basic assumption of the research is that the transnational cross-movement cooperation benefitted from the above described situation and that transnational connections and cooperation can be expected. Therefore, analyses that have been conducted prior to the refugee crises are outdated and need to be complemented by current analyses. It is important to understand mechanisms of coalition forming between social movements, as this is potentially a strategy that makes extra-institutional challengers more powerful, thus, coalitions can be causally significant factors in explaining social change (Van Dyke, 2003). Also, as Soule writes, the research till now has mostly focused on coalitions as a key dependent variable, analyzing which kinds of factors support or hinder their formation. However, not many authors have taken a closer look at the effects of social movement coalitions and treated them as an independent variable (Soule, 2013). As will be detailed later in the research questions, both approaches will be included in the research. Three far right movements from the two selected countries have been picked as starting points for the research. During the investigation period, two additional movements gained importance in the Czech Republic and Germany respectively and were added to the group of research subjects later.

The goal of the dissertation is to analyze the cooperation that is taking place between different far right social movement organisations, focused on the transnational ties between the Czech Republic and Germany. The research first of all includes a closer look to the characteristics of the hyperlink network in between these movements and its development over a certain period of time in order to understand its key characteristics. This also includes a closer look to the strategies of the single movement and to the development of these strategies. Secondly, the extent of the ideological overlap between the movements will be analyzed to find out on what the single movements focus in their programs. Overlaps between the whole far right movements in both countries, between the identified segments of the far right movement and between individual organizations will be considered. In the last part of the research the correlations between ideological overlap and coalition forming are analyzed, as ideological proximity is on the one hand required to form coalitions but on the other hand might turn movements into competitors for various different kinds of resources. In the analyses itself, the network structure and the mutual ties between the selected far right movements from the Czech Republic and Germany shall be researched, together with the individual pages these movements hyperlink to. Also external pages that link to the movements or connect them with each other will be considered in the work. The focus in this analysis is set to the causes as
well as to the consequences of movement mobilization strategies, cooperation and alliance forming between different SMOs and is taking a closer look at the particular orientations of the respective movements.

3 Research questions

The research is based on a description and comparison of the Czech and German networks of far right SMOs. The research proceeds from a more general understanding of the subject to its details and follows an inductive argumentation structure. It aims for general findings and insights in the far right movement and its contemporary coalition building and mobilization strategies, based on the concrete cases of the Czech and German far right SMOs. However, it also uses already existing theories as a part of departure and aims to add new insights into the far right movement and transnational processes of exchange and cooperation between social movement organizations. The single parts of the research are build on one another and should foster a comprehensive and in-depth understanding of the different, identified segments and their similarities and differences in the aspects ideological position and strategies of networking and mobilization.

In the following, the three main research questions, their backgrounds and the respective hypotheses if any will be introduced.

3.1 First research question

The first part of the research is a quantitative hyperlink network analysis of the hyperlink network in between the SMOs selected for the research. It serves to get a first insight into the hyperlink network of the selected movements and to the strategies employed by the individual actors. The network will be extracted twice with the same parameters and based on the same websites to retrace its development. The data crawler that was used for the research does not offer a possibility to set a time frame for the crawl, however, by extracting the network two times with the same settings it is possible to analyze its evolvement over a period of time. The network will be extracted at the beginning of the main investigation period in 2017 and at its end in 2019 and both networks will be compared. The first part of the research is divided into two subquestions, which are related to the individual communities of the single movements and to basic network parameters. It is rather explorative and does not include any hypothesis.

Q1a: How differ the individual communities of the single SMOs in the hyperlink network of all selected movements and how do they evolve during the investigation period?
**Q1b: How did the basic network parameters density, betweenness and centralization of the hyperlink network of all selected movements change during the investigation period?**

Complete networks from the beginning and the end of the investigation period shall be drawn to get a first insight and overview on the evolvement of the hyperlink network. The individual communities of the single movements will be compared with each other and at the two points of time. This also includes the differentiation of in-and outbound links to and from the single movements and an evaluation of their ratio. Analyzing the individual communities of the movements and the in- and outbound allows conclusions on the strategies employed and the popularity of the movements. Also, their overall inclusion into the network will be considered.

In the second part of the research, the central network characteristics density, centrality, and betweenness will be compared to get an insight into the structural changes that took place in the networking strategies of the movements. This includes the identification of main actors and most central nodes in both hyperlink networks to find out whether or not they have changed during the investigation period. Also the overall connectedness of the networks and their size will be accessed and discussed in this part of the research.

3.2 Second research question

The second part of the research is based on two subquestions as well and uses qualitative content analyses of the self-presentation of the movements on their websites to gain a deeper understanding of their ideological position and inherent point of view.

In this part of the research, the ideological position of the selected far right movements represents the dependent variable. In subquestion a) the countries represent the independent variable. Subquestion b) used the before introduced segments within the far right movement as independent variable while subquestion c) takes a closer look to the individual SMOs that are included in the research.

**Q2a. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the selected countries?**

**Q2b. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the different segments of the far right movement?**
Q2c. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the individual SMOs that are included in the research?

There still is a significant language barrier between the countries; while some members of the Czech far right movement will understand and speak German, German members of the far right movement that do understand Czech will be rather rare. Also, while single contents on the respective pages might be provided at least in English, none of the selected movements offers the possibility to change to a different language on its webpage. Still, practical cooperation between the movements takes place, as visible e.g. on the website of Dělnická Mládež (2015).

To get an insight in and understand the ideological position of the movements, their self-presentation instead of descriptions made by third parties will be used. These are to be found on the webpages in sections like about us (DE: über uns, CZ: o nás), which will be extracted and coded. Summing up the assigned codes then provides quantified information about topical areas to which the movements pay increased attention. This approach based on the often cited and used differentiation of right wing extremism on the level of attitudes or opinion in contrast to right wing extremism that is located on the level of behaviour. This differentiation of two levels was among the first used by Wilhelm Heitmeyer (e.g. Greiffenhagen, 1981; see also Stöss, 1994). Referring to the ideological orientation of the movements allows concentrating exclusively to the level of attitudes and opinions, for which the self-presentation of the movements represent a valid source.

3.3 Third research question

The third part of the research builds on the second research part, which analyses ideological overlaps between the different movements. The identified ideological overlaps between the movements represent in this part of the dissertation the independent variable, while the networking that is happening between these movements and their mobilization strategies take the position of the dependent variable. Also this last part of the research is split up into two subquestions.

Q3a. Does the amount of hyperlinks directly between the selected movements increase with increasing ideological overlap?

Q3b. Does the amount of hyperlinks to the same external content increase with increasing ideological overlap?
The first subquestion of the third part of the research concentrates on the hyperlinks with which any of the selected far right movements directly links to one of the other selected movements, i.e. direct references between them. The second subquestion of the research takes a closer look on the hyperlinks that are going from the movements to the same external content, i.e. other pages than the movements and their subpages that indirectly connect movements with each other. As mutual, direct and indirect connections are in the focus of this part of the research, the individual clusters of the respective movements are not taken into account and a reduced network is used that consists only of the webpages of the selected movements and pages that have in- and/or outbound hyperlinks to at least two seed pages.

Social movement scholars argue that a critical ingredient for the formation of coalitions between movements is their ideological congruence (McCammon and Campbell, 2002; Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). Also, “Competition theory predicts that coalitions will form only under non-competitive conditions, when resources are plentiful” (Okamoto, 2010: 149). On the other hand, we have to consider that movements might turn into competitors when the overlaps between them are too high, as they are dependent on the same resources as public support and attention (Minkoff, 1997) and might be unwilling to share.

4 Methodology

The analyses are based on the online presence of the selected movements, more precisely the websites all of them operate to provide their followers with information, organize themselves and discuss. Some of the movements share a lot of newspaper articles that support their point of view, others rather share calls for their next demonstrations or alert their supporters for upcoming events in the far right movement. Also, sections to download propaganda material, order merchandise articles or support the movement with donations are found on the webpages. Further, hyperlinks to Facebook, Twitter and Youtube are provided.

Generally, the analyses aim to identify categories of meaning from the data using content analyses and combine them with Hyperlink Network Analyses to reach meaningful conclusions and new insights. In the end it should be possible to better understand the process under investigation, in our case the networking, cooperation structures and mobilization strategies of the selected SMOs. In its nature and also due to the limited number of case studies from only two countries that have been selected the study is of qualitative nature. Rather than generalizing or providing universal conclusions it gives an insight into the
phenomena under investigation and aims for a deep understanding of the mobilization structures and coalition building mechanisms of the movements selected for the investigation.

4.1 Case Selection

The research is based on case studies that, while referring to the same concrete cases, are located at three different levels. The most general, macro level for the research is the analysis based on the different countries included. The meso level is formed by the three identified segments of the far right movement that are present both in the Czech Republic and Germany and are represented by one to two movements from each country respectively. At the micro level finally the phenomena are investigate on the level of the individual movements. All three levels have been taken into account for the analyses at some point, depending on research interest and -questions. In the following sections, the basis for selecting the Czech Republic and Germany at the macro level will be described, followed by the description of the identification of the far right movement’s segments and their incorporation in the research. Also the basis for selecting the respective far right SMOs will be detailed. In the different research questions both the more general level of the countries and the particular single movements, in some aspects grouped together as different segments of the far right movement form the basic groups that are analyzed and compared.

The research is based on a multiple case study as defined by Yin (2014), expecting contrasting results correlated to the nationality of the SMOs and/or the segment of the far right they belong to. Hence, it is required to discuss the methodology for selecting the countries as well as selecting the single movements and the split of the far right movement into different segments. Generally, a case study is defined as an “in-depth study of a single unit” with the “aim to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring, 2004: 341). Table 1 provides a schematic overview on the different levels of case studies based on which the analyses have been evaluated.
4.1.1 Countries

At the macro-level the research is based on case studies of two different countries, namely the Czech Republic and Germany. These two countries were selected as fundamentally different case studies based on the most different approach by Seawright and Gerring (2008). Using fundamentally different cases is an often used method to select case studies for a research (Gerring, 2004). The aim of this approach is to “identify cases in which just one independent variable as well as the dependent variable covary” (Seawright and Gerring, 2008: 306). If possible, all other independent variables that could influence the dependent variable should show different values. Hence, the most different cases selected for the study are similar in two key aspects, which are the causal variables of interest and the outcome (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).

The selected countries represent very different situations; Germany, a high-income western democracy, has a diversified far right scene which is quiet influential for the developments in Europe. The Czech Republic on the other hand is a post-communist, post-transitional regime and the far right is quiet differentiated; though, it is not as influential in the European context as the German one. In section 5 - Historical background, the far right scenes and their backgrounds are compared in more detail, taking into account the historical developments in both countries and their similarities and differences. With respect to more recent events Germany was confronted with a lot of refugees arriving to the country and requesting asylum, while the Czech Republic did not receive as many refugees (see the comparison of both countries in Figure 1 below). Generally, the Czech Republic does stand for a very different,
less welcoming approach towards all different kinds of immigrants and foreigners not only in the context of the refugee crisis.

Figure 1 Asylum Requests in Germany and the Czech Republic in Comparison, own Figure, based on Hanzelka, Schmidt (2017)¹

Even so, as detailed in Chapter 8 Historical background, the far right scenes in both countries have a similar heritage and underwent similar or same episodes of development after the fall of communism and only recently the development of their far right movements seem to take different turns. The most different approach is therefore applicable in this context.

4.1.2 Segments

At the meso-level, different segments of the far right that occur both in the Czech Republic and in Germany have been used as basic case studies. Based on discussions with experts,

¹ It might seem that the graph does not contain any pillars with the numbers of asylum requests for the Czech Republic at the first sight. However, the pillars for the Czech Republic are, compared with the ones for Germany, that small that they are barely visible in the graph, as the difference in the numbers of asylum requests is that enormous. The numbers that are provided in the graph show as well how huge the difference of the asylum requests for both countries has been between 2010 and 2016.
literature reviews, and observations of long-time trends and with respect to currently active, influential far right movements in the Czech Republic and Germany, three different key segments have been identified, whose characteristics are shortly described in Table 2 below. These segments have developed within the last decades and according to the author represent the main directions within the informal part of the far right movement that are currently active in the countries selected for the research. There might be some actors within the far right who represent characteristics of more than one segment; the division is not necessarily mutually exclusive. However, the SMOs that have been selected for the research all can clearly be allocated to one segment. A possible forth sector could be formed by the Autonomous Nationalists; however, as they are not very active at the moment neither in Germany, nor in the Czech Republic they were not included into the research. Also, they do not operate a central website for neither of the selected countries and thus do not fulfil basic requirements for the research. Further, they are a rather specific phenomenon within the far right movement and sometimes even described as a specific, modern form of neo-Nazism (Schedler and Häusler, 2011), hence it stays questionable whether they would form an own segment or be included into the neo-Nazi segment.

Each segment is represented by at least one far right SMO per country. The selection of the movements was tightly connected with the literature review, the trend observations during the investigation period and the identification of the different segments themselves. In the available literature, no suitable categorization or segmentation of the far right movement was found that could have been used as a basis for the dissertation. An important criterion in the process of forming the segments for the research was that the movements had to have their own, freely accessible websites on which they provide a description of themselves, their main point of views and ideology. Maintaining a website that serves as a platform to share content and discuss possibly enables exchange between likeminded people and helps to spread the respective worldview. This already signifies a certain significance and influence of the particular actor. Also, it was required to be able to collect network data for the movements. The lack of an own website was the reason to not include the Czech far right movement Mladí Vlastenci, which could, according to Miroslav Mareš, be understood as the Czech equivalent to the movement Junge Alternative from Germany (Fujdiak and Mareš, 2019). However, without a website the movement seems to pursue a fundamentally different mobilization strategy and apparently also addresses a different target group than the other movements in the analyses. Therefore, this movement was not considered in the analyses and not included into the research. The same applies for Autonomous Nationalist groups from both countries.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Anti-Islam</th>
<th>New Right</th>
<th>Neo-Nazism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Opposing immigration and the refugee crisis, against the islamization of the occident</td>
<td>Patriotism, aid on the ground and ensure sovereignty over European borders, ethnopluralism: cultural instead of biological racism (Rydgren, 2005)</td>
<td>People, nation, traditions and culture to be kept; homeland, freedom - traditional topics of the far right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political position</td>
<td>Self-positioning: centre-right; strong critique of the current state, government, politics etc. Populist elements</td>
<td>Classification unclear, sometimes referred to as &quot;own entity“ or “beyond left and right”, however, characteristics of the far right</td>
<td>Often beyond the edge of democracy. Orienting at the approach of national socialism but adapting their official statements carefully.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supporters, target group</td>
<td>Fuelled by the refugee crisis in Europe, attracting also conservative/moderate right voters.</td>
<td>Addressing young people, presenting itself as not belonging to the far right and as intellectuals</td>
<td>Youth movements of far right parties and individuals, small cells; old-fashioned approach.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selected Examples</td>
<td>CZ: Islám v České Republice nechceme</td>
<td>CZ: Identitarian Movement CZ</td>
<td>Youth organisations of neo-Nazist parties: CZ: Dělnická Mládež DE: Junge Nationalisten</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>DE: Pegida</td>
<td>DE: Identitarian Movement DE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formed recently</td>
<td>DE: Junge Alternative</td>
<td></td>
<td>CZ: Národní a Sociální Fronta</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2 Identified segments of the far right movement in CZ and DE

As depicted also in Table 2, the German far right movement recently expanded in the anti-immigration segment with the formation of the Junge Alternative², while in the Czech Republic the movement Národní a Sociální Fronta was established, that can be rather allocated to the sector of neo-Nazism. This recently occurring division and the different developments of the far right movement in the Czech Republic and Germany have influenced

---

² The youth organization of the party Alternative für Deutschland (AfD).
the research, as they occurred while its single parts had not yet been finished. The new movements were added to the group of the research subjects, which will be further explained in the following results section and in the discussion part of the dissertation.

4.1.3 Far right movements

At the micro-level, single far right SMOs from both selected countries represent the case studies. All of the selected SMOs belong to the far right social movement based on basic features, which are introduced in section 3 of this work. Further, they operate their own Internet pages; hence fulfil the basic requirements for the research. The respective URLs to the home pages of the movements can be found in the section Primary Sources at the end of this work. The selected SMOs belong to different segments of the diversified far right movements in both countries, some being stronger populist than others. The selection aims to enable an insight into the respective far right movements but does not necessarily cover all their facets. Instead, an overview on the complete social movements should be provided, which means taking its various different segments as well as populist and non-populist actors into account. Also, the selected Czech and German movements can be allocated to the same segments respectively but might differ in other aspects, e.g. their size and number of followers, main communication channels, influence or political importance etc. Their direct comparison in this sense does not belong to the goals of the research. Selecting concrete individual movements from different segments should make a comprehensive overview on the far right movements in both countries possible.

For the analyses, the Czech and German branches of the Identitarian Movement, Dělnická Mládež, Junge Nationalisten, Islám v ČR nechceme, Pegida, Junge Alternative and Národní a Sociální Fronta have been selected for the analyses. All selected movements will be shortly described in the following.

4.1.3.1 New Right: Identitarian Movement Czech Republic (IMCZ) and Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland (IBDE)

The Identitarian Movements represent the new right segment in the research. The Identitarian Movement is a youth subculture and has recently been very popular in Europe. Its origins can be found in France, from where the movement has spread to various different European countries as Spain, the Netherlands, Austria, the Czech Republic, Scandinavia, Germany, Slovakia and others. Establishing a branch in a new country always happened by first
occupying cyberspace, founding small, connected cells and from cyberspace claiming the public space and establishing their presence there (Bergmann, 2017; Verfassungsschutz, 2019a). The movement strongly focuses on the ideas of a planned exchange of populations and on the imminent loss of European culture and values. In the world view of the Identitarian Movement, different cultures are incompatible with each other and likely to extinguish each other. Therefore, they want to establish a heterogeneous world consisting of homogenous nations (Dlouhý, 2016). Also, the culture a person belongs to is understood as an inherited feature that is not changeable. Therefore, multiculturalism cannot work and must be abandoned (Generace Identity, 2018; Identitäre Bewegung, 2018; Verfassungsschutz, 2019a). Their basic ideology has been referred to as ethnopluralism by some authors (Spektorowski, 2003). Ethnopluralist ideas are also present in the ideologies of other new right actors and are sometimes used to mask right wing ideologies, even though they only replace the classical, biological racism of the neo-Nazis by a cultural form of racism.

Populist features are hardly found in the context of the Identitarian movement, it rather consists of closed groups which are interacting with each other than addressing a broad audience as populist actors do. However, like other populist forces, the Identitarian Movement clearly separates the good people from the corrupt elites which are responsible for the attempt to exchange the populations. Also, the Identitarian Movements understand themselves as opponents of the system (Douhý, 2016). Their own structure lacks a clear hierarchy and its single members often do not have clear functions or positions, as any kinds of elites are generally seen with scepticism. The informal structure of the Identitarian Movement is a part of their heritage from the Autonomous Nationalists that has persisted till today (Dlouhý, 2016).

On their website the movements present themselves as modern and reasonable and e.g. on the German page introduce main members and leaders of regional groups with their full names and backgrounds. The leaders of regional groups or suborganisation are introduced with short biographies and pictures; often even a direct link to their Facebook profiles is included. It is striking that only men in the age between 20 and 38 seem to fill the leading positions of the German Identitarian Movement; the website does not introduce any woman (Identitäre Bewegung DE, n.d.). The Czech Identitarian Movement does not introduce its leaders in the same way. The movement is known for its media affinity and uses the Internet extensively and in a competent manner (Tagesschau, 11.07.2019; Verfassungsschutz, 2019a). Small actions that took just a few minutes or involved few members only are in skilful cut videos
and with the right background music presented as successful, thrilling actions with the participation of a lot of people. To the favourite action forms of the Identitarian Movement belong e.g. flash mobs or banner actions (Verfassungsschutz, 2019a).

The Identitarian Movement in Germany had been under observation of the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution since 2016; in July 2019 it was classified as a right-wing extremist organization, which provides the authorities with more possibilities to observe and control them. This classification means that the movement has been found to violate the constitutional democratic order and enables its close monitoring (Tagesschau, 11.07.2019). More specific, the followers of the movement are requesting an “identitarian” instead of our representative democracy and their strong focus on ethnic homogeneity lead to the conclusion that they do not respect the basic principles of human dignity and democracy (Verfassungsschutz, 2019a). Also the Czech Identitarian Movement can be described as extremist and opposing the democracy. In a questionnaire, 70 percent of the interviewed members stated that it is necessary to change the basic character of the democratic system, while 30 percent stated that many changes are required (Dlouhý, 2016). This indicates a general opposition of democracy as such, which is one characteristic of extremism (Bötticher and Mareš, 2012).

The Czech Identitarian Movement has been described as a “rehabilitation and revitalization of the radical right wing in the Czech Republic (Dlouhý, 2016). The Identitarian Movement in the Czech Republic was established by activists that had been active in the context of the Autonomous Nationalists before and consists mostly of young people. The Czech branch formed around 2013 and besides the French and German influence was also inspired by the Italian far right movement Casa Pound (Dlouhý, 2016).

4.1.3.2 Neo-Nazism: Dělnická Mládež (DM) and Junge Nationalisten (JN)

The movements Dělnická Mládež (DM, engl.: Workers’ Youth) from the Czech Republic and Junge Nationalisten (JN, engl. Young Nationalists) from Germany represent the neo-Nazi’s segment in the research. These movements constitute the youth groups of the right-wing parties Dělnická Strana Socialní Spravedlností (DSSS, engl. Workers’ Party of Social Justice) and of the Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands (NPD, engl. National Democratic Party of Germany). The movement Junge Nationalisten has changed their name in January 2018, until then they had been active under the name Junge Nationaldemokraten (eng.: Young National Democrats) (Verfassungsschutz Baden Württemberg, 2018).
Until 2010, Dělnická Mládež had been the youth organization of the Czech party Dělnická Strana (DS, engl. Workers’ Party). However, in 2010 this party was banned by the Czech Supreme Administrative Court due to incitement of hate and their general opposition towards Roma, homosexuals, Jewish and Vietnamese people. Also, the court stated that the party was cooperating with neo-Nazis (Novinky.cz, 17.02.2010). After the dissolution of the DS, the DSSS took over its position and continued with a nearly unchanged programme and rhetoric; hence also for its youth organisation the change was more of administrative nature. Also in Germany, two attempts to forbid the NPD took place, however, neither of them had been successful. The first attempt in 2003 had been stopped due to administrative mistakes before the court made a decision on the nature of the NPD. In the second attempt to forbid the party that was launched in 2013, the court in 2017 finally decided that the NPD was not significant enough to potentially endanger the constitutional democratic state and that there was no justification for its ban (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2017a). Hence the party continues to exist but recently won only very few votes.

As the two youth organizations focus on similar topics and ideologies and are active in neighbouring countries, they already have been in contact with each other. On their website, Junge Nationalisten are officially calling Dělnická Mládež their “partner organisation“ and stated that since DM had been established, both movements have been in close contact and have been working together closely for years. Their cooperation mostly happens in the form of “mutual visits at political events or common cultural trips” (Junge Nationalisten, 16.10.2017). The chairman of Dělnická Mládež in turn stated that his organization is aware of the hardships and dangers in contemporary Europe and lists foreign cultures, the neomarxist left and the centralization of the European Union as concrete points. He continues by pointing out the awareness of his movement for these dangers and saying that the change in a small country in the middle of Europe is not enough. By this, he drew the attention to the Junge Nationalisten and called them the “force that will shape Europe’s future policy” (Junge Nationalisten, 16.10.2017). Thus, the German movement is a role model for Dělnická Mládež and perceived as a stronger force with more influence than they have themselves. This function as a role model and a generally more dominant German far right has already been confirmed for the anti-Islam segment in an earlier research of the author (Hanzelka, Schmidt 2017).

Both movements are adopting the strategies of the parties they are connected with and their respective narratives about the ethnical pure nation and protection of the homelands. The
movement Junge Nationalisten perceives itself according to its statute as “integral part” of the party NPD (Verfassungsschutz, 2019). Also, the movement Junge Nationaldemokraten was referred to as the “most important extremist right youth organization in Germany” (Verfassungsschutz Baden Württemberg, 2018). Further, both movements, same as their parties, are partly displaying characteristics of neo-Nazism (Dělnická Mládež, 2018; Junge Nationalisten, 2018). To a certain extent they also exhibit populist characteristics, e.g. by opposing the governments, by their strong emphasis on the nation and identity of the people and by their claim to be the only actor truly representing the people. However, these populist features are not as important as their neo-Nazis’ ideology and strong focus on their homelands, culture, values and the protection of these things.

4.1.3.3 Anti-Islam segment: Islám v ČR nechceme (IVCRN) and Pegida (PEG)

Islám v ČR Nechceme, (IVCRN, eng.: We do not want Islám in the Czech Republic) from the Czech Republic and Pegida (PEG, German shortcut for “Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident”) from Germany are the movements that represent the anti-Islam segment in the research. Both are anti-immigration/anti-Islam movements, which are referring to an imminent Islamization of the occident that endangers the Western democracies. Pegida was established at the end of 2014 based on a Facebook group and could gain a lot of supporters in a very short time. The movement was organizing so-called “evening walks“, which took place once per week in the city of Dresden and attracted a lot of people in the first weeks already. Also, it quickly spread to other German cities in the shape of new movements that called themselves Legida, Bärgida and similar. Further, Pegida even spread to other European countries, but nowhere was as successful as in Germany (Schmidt, 2015b). The supporters of Pegida were a very heterogeneous group that was composed of citizens that never had been active in any far right context as well as of known neo-Nazis and hooligans (Begrich, 2016), which were demonstrating side by side. To find out more about the supporters, various researches were conducted, which amongst some social demographic data found out that the supporters of Pegida very often were voting for the conservative Christian democratic party or for the Alternative for Germany (Walter et al., 2015); thus, they have a conservative to right political orientation.

The movement Islám v ČR nechceme had its beginnings, same as Pegida, as a Facebook group under the name “Islám v Česke Republic nechceme”. It was established by Martin
Konvička, who had also established the Czech Defence League. Legal proceedings due to incitement of hate and limiting the rights and freedom of others have been launched against Konvička in 2018 (Česká televize, 15.04.2018), same as against Dirk Bachman, the founder and main head of the German Pegida. The Facebook page of the group was active till 2016 and reached as much as around 160,000 followers (Ferebauer, 2016, cited in Merc, 2016). However, in 2016 the page was banned by Facebook due to incitement of hate towards Muslims, just to appear a little later with nearly the same content and the just slightly changed name “Islám v ČR nechceme” one more time (Merc, 2016). The Czech Ministry of Interior was classifying the movement as right-wing extremists in 2015 already (Ministerstvo Vnitra České Republiky, 2015).

Pegida was for a very long time emphasizing its democratic nature and could gain a lot of supporters in a very short time in Germany in the end of 2014; IVCRN can be seen as its imitator in many aspects (IVCRN, 2018; Pegida, 2018,) even though it had already existed before Pegida was founded. In some researches the movements are even directly compared with each other, which confirm their allocation to the same segment of the far right movement and their similar agendas (Prokůpková, 2018). Both movements clearly make use of populist strategies, visible for example in the direct claim by Pegida that the government or the leaders of the country are corrupt, their slogan “we are the people” and their strong opposition against the government, which is also found within the movement Islám v ČR nechceme. Both movements set the pure and good people against the corrupt elites in their narratives and claim themselves as the true representatives of the people.

4.1.3.4 Added during the investigation period: Junge Alternative (JA) and Národní a Sociální Fronta (NSF)

The movements Junge Alternative (Young Alternative, JA) from Germany and Národní a Sociální Fronta from the Czech Republic (National and Social Front, NSF) do not belong to the same segment; while the JA is close to the German Anti-Islam segment, the NSF rather belongs to the Czech neo-Nazi scene. However, they have in common that they gained popularity in the far right movements in their respective countries in the course of the research. While both movements have not been of importance in 2017 when the first network was extracted, they reached popularity in the following time and in the end of 2018 and 2019 when the later analysis were conducted could not be omitted in the analysis of the ideological orientation of the far right movements and the later network analyses. These movements
additionally signify the divide in the German and Czech far right that occurred towards the end of the research time. Both movements will be described in the following.

The movement Junge Alternative is the youth organisation of the German populist right party Alternative for Deutschland, which was established in 2013, same as its youth organisation. JA has been rated as a case of suspicion and put under observation by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution in 2019, as the movement was classified as extremist, directed against the constitutional democratic state. The movement was accessed as hostile towards migration and especially the Islam and as using an aggressive rhetoric to voice this position. Further, the movement was described as opposing the principles of democracy and human dignity in general. Same as the Identitarian Movement they are frequently referring to a planned exchange of populations and sharply criticised the German government for their “experiment” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2019b), with which they refer to their decision to take in as many immigrants. On their website the movement published their so-called “Deutschlandplan”, which includes popular demands as creating a “fortress Europe” and Europe of nations and reasons in favour of establishing direct democracy. Also, it refers to strengthening traditional values as family, investing into education and protecting homeland, environment and nature. Amongst other points the JA further wants to strengthen the state, regain sovereignty in the country and strongly opposes migration (Junge Alternative, 2019). Topical similarities with the Identitarian Movement as especially visible in their claim that an exchange of populations is happening are not accidental. The Junge Alternative was recruiting its supporters amongst the new right and the German fraternities (Burschenschaften), which causes their topics to appear in the program of the movement. It also makes the movement the “bridgehead” of the party AfD with the new right (Häusler, 2015).

The movement Národní a Sociální Fronta came into existence in the end of 2017 and was formally established in the beginning of 2018 (Obchodní rejstřík firem, 2018). It was already in 2018 classified as extremist right by the Czech Ministry of the Interior (Heller, 2018), which results in the increased attention of the ministry on the movement. On their website they provide access to an e-shop which offers “everything for the activist” and various different types of content from reviews of typical music to articles that discuss reasons to support them and interviews. They describe themselves as idealists in a world of consume that are living for “big things” and socialists. Further, they want to replace capitalism by a socialist alternative based on the national principle and correspondingly describe nationalism as
another important part of their character. Also, they position themselves against the system of slavery. On their website they refer to the action “Fortress Europe” as planned event\(^3\) which they are supporting. Various groups from all over Europe were expected to participate in this even, amongst them Die Rechte from Germany, Bulharský Nárdoni Svaz from Bulgaria, Legio Hungaria from Hungary and Reconquista.sk from Slovakia (Národní a Sociální Fronta, 2019). The place of the event was not made public on the website but apparently provided on request, most likely to avoid counteractions from far left groups or increased presence of the police. This invitation confirms the integration of Národní a Sociální Fronta in the European far right cooperation.

Counteractions to a demonstration of Národní a Sociální Fronta happened for example in Brno, where the movement organized a demonstration on 01.05.2019. The demonstration attracted hundreds of counter-activists and only dozens of supporters of the movement themselves were attending it. They were equipped with torches and could not finish their planned route due to the counter-activists. Mostly the torches are a tribute to the national socialists and confirm the allocation of NSF to the segment of neo-Nazism. Attempts to forbid the torches that were undertaken prior to the demonstration were not successful. Though the present police tried to make the demonstration possible and form a corridor for the far right activists, the demonstration had to be ended early by the police as it endangered health and property of people (Heller, 2019). According to Miroslav Mareš, the comparably new movement recruited its main activists from Dělnická Mládež and tried to take up the tradition of demonstrations on First May as established by the neo-Nazis’ scene. Even so, the symbols the group displayed during the demonstration were, according to Mareš, not directly connected to neo-Nazism, even though their used propaganda points to this ideology. Further, the movement seems to try finding out how big is their support among the population, aims for media attention and later might even go for political representation. This is also connected with the fact that the neo-Nazis’ party Dělnická strana did not live up to the expectations of some activists (Mareš, cited in Heller, 2019), so there still is unoccupied political room.

4.2 Social network Analysis (SNA)

Social Network Analysis (SNA) is a general research method to analyze various different kinds of relationships between varieties of actors. These relationships can be as diverse as emotional relations, representing very abstract and unspecific kinds of ties, to ties that are as concrete as legal or business connections or hyperlinks in the concrete case of hyperlink

\(^3\) This action was planned for 31.08.2019, as of 25.09.2019 the information on the website was not updated.
analyses. Accordingly, also the actors in a social network can take various different forms; in many cases they are single persons, sometimes groups of people in varying sizes but also countries, companies or websites and many others can be actors in a social network that maintain ties to other actors (Tabassum et al., 2018). While actors are depicted as nodes in the graphical representation of a network, the connections between them are presented as edges or ties. Ties might be, based on the nature of the underlying relationship between the actors, undirected (e.g. marriage – if A is married to B then B is also married to A) or directed (A is purchasing goods from B but that does not necessarily mean that B is also purchasing goods from A. However, it is possible - in this case the tie would be of mutual nature). Undirected ties do not need any indicator of direction as they are mutual, which makes an indication of the direction redundant. Directed ties are depicted with an arrow to express the direction of the relationship between the nodes. Also, ties can be valued, which means that their respective intensity differs, with some ties being stronger than others (e.g. A is purchasing a lot of goods from B, or X rates their friendship to Y as being especially close) (Prell, 2012; Tabassum et al., 2018).

Social Network Analyses can help to identify the most influential, prestigious or central actors within a network using statistical measures. It might be used to identify hubs or authorities, to discover communities within the network or to understand how information is flowing through the network. Due to their versatility the method is used in a wide range of different contexts and its popularity is growing recently (Tabassum et al., 2018). There are ego networks that are centred onto one actor and depict all connections that this selected actor maintains with other actors without showing the relations these other actors might have to each other. Contrary to that, complete networks include all ties that connect an entire set of actors with each other (Prell, 2012). Also, networks can greatly vary in their size; some might include only a few nodes while others are composed of several hundreds or even thousands of nodes. The data are mostly presented in a graph that may contain information as the direction of ties, the number of incoming and outgoing ties to and from the single nodes, their strength, communities within the network and many others (Robins, 2015). Further, social network data can be presented as lists or in form of a matrix and in these forms are also stored in computers to further analyze them with the help of automatic tools (Tabassum et al., 2018). Networks might consist of single clusters, which are groups of nodes that have many connections between each other and are more tightly grouped than other parts of the network or might be fragmented in several, individual communities with none or just weak connections (Golbeck, 2015). There are graph measure and popular metrics that provide the user with an insight into
the role and position of single nodes within the network or, at a higher level, with insights into the network as a whole.

To the graph measures which are used in the research belong density, betweenness centrality and degree centrality. When comparing networks of different sizes it is necessary to normalized measures like degree, betweenness and closeness (Tabassum et al., 2018). The first central indicator provided by a social or hyperlink network analysis is the overall level of network cohesion, which can be measured based on the density of the edges among the nodes. This allows conclusions on the degree of integration of the network (Vicari, 2014). A low cohesion value is in the case of hyperlink networks signified by a small number of hyperlinks that connect the single websites and a weak overall network interaction (Van Aelst and Walgrave, 2004: 117, cited in Vicari, 2014). In other words, the network density describes the proportion of potential connections within a network that are actual connections. A potential connection is a connection that could potentially exist while an actual connection is a connection that actually exists (Rosenblatt, 2013). Hence, a network in which all nodes are connected with each other has a density of 1 and is also called a completely connected network.

Further, in the environment of a network, the power of a node is defined by its centrality within the network and measured in terms of relational strength. One important function of a hyperlink or social network is the possibility to identify central actors. Central websites in a hyperlink network or actors in a social network usually take over the roles of hubs, brokers or authoritative or prestigious actors, (Vicari, 2014). Centrality, sometimes referred to as prestige, is a measure of the position of an actor within the network and can be computed based on several different metrics. Most common are degree centrality, betweenness centrality and closeness centrality which were proposed by Freeman (1978, cited in Tabassum et al., 2018) and Eigenvector centrality, proposed by Bonacich (1987, cited in Tabassum et al., 2018).

a) The degree centrality serves to identify nodes with many connections; it is simply a measure of the number of connections a node has (Golbeck, 2015).

b) Closeness centrality indicates which nodes are located at the heart of the social network (Golbeck, 2015).

c) Betweenness centrality describes which nodes serve to connect groups or clusters that apart from each other. Hence nodes with a high betweenness centrality enable the flow
of information or other things from one community of the network to the other (Golbeck, 2015).

d) Eigenvector centrality is a measure of the influence a node has within a given network (Golbeck, 2015). To calculate the eigenvector centrality, relative scores are assigned to all nodes in the network, with connections to high scoring nodes contributing more to the own score of a node than connections to low scoring nodes. Hence, a high eigenvector centrality of a node indicates that this node is connected to many other nodes which also have a high eigenvector score (Negre et al., 2018).

To identify central websites within the hyperlink network it is possible to either use the freeman test or the betwenness of nodes in the network. Betweenness centrality measures, how often a node lies on the shortest geodesic path between two other nodes of the network (Vicari, 2014: 98). In the research, among others betweenness centrality is used as measure, which is related to closeness centrality but refers to a different feature of the network, hence both measures should not be confused. Both betweenness centrality and closeness centrality refer to the shortest path between nodes. Betweenness centrality is a measure of the dependency of others on a given node and hence a measure of potential control of an actor in the network. Closeness centrality on the other hand might be interpreted as a measure of access efficiency or independence from potential control by intermediaries (Brandes et al., 2015).

4.2.1 Hyperlink Network Analysis (HNA)

Even though Social Network Analysis (SNA) and Hyperlink Network Analysis (HNA) are closely related, HNA is a special subform of SNA with its own subtleties, concerning mostly data collection and network drawing and the theory behind hyperlinks. This subchapter introduces methodological aspects of HNA and its application in the context of the research. For the theoretical interpretation of hyperlinks in the context of the research and the implications and expectations connected with them, please refer to subchapter 7.3 in the theoretical framework of the dissertation.

Generally spoken, a website is a collection of webpages that are linked to each other (Li, 2008) and a hyperlink, which might be provided in form of an icon, graphic, or text, is a reference in a document that links to another file or object. It is mostly based on HTML-tags and usually has a different colour than the rest of the text. There is a difference between internal hyperlinks that refer to content on the same website and external hyperlinks that refer
to content on different websites (netzmarketing, n.d.). Also, hyperlinks are the basic element that contributes to structuring the Internet (Park, 2003). HNA is an area of webmetrics (sometimes also referred to as webometrics), which is an example of infometrics, a subfield of information science. Webmetrics make use of mathematical-statistical approaches to conduct analysis of communication in science (Ackland, 2015). HNA applies the theory of SNA to the World Wide Web and focuses on the extraction of data from the Internet and the creation of graphs in which the nodes represent websites and the ties represent hyperlinks between these websites. The method has already been described in 2003 as a “newly emerging methodology” (Park, 2003: 49). In its beginnings, Hyperlink analysis was characterized as being based on two main assumptions, which were

a) A hyperlink from page A to page B is a recommendation of page B by the author of page A.
b) If page A and page B are connected by a hyperlink then they might refer to the same topic (Henzinger, 2001).

Hyperlink networks with web data mined by web crawlers have the structure of whole or complete networks, in which the ties between all actors are included (Robins, 2015). In general, hyperlink networks are an often used possibility to research online networks, besides the approach to extract data directly from social media using various different tools (Robins, 2015). Recently, the research and the knowledge about the field have greatly expanded. In 2015, Ackland wrote that

a) The more information is included in a web document, the more links point to it.
b) The higher the quality (e.g. usefulness, credibility) of the information in a web document, the more inlinks point to it.
c) Quality is not absolute but relative, depending e.g. on the timeliness of the information or the availability of information on other sites.
d) The longer a web page has maintained the same URL, the more inlinks it receives (Ackland, 2015: 8).

The process of collecting the data from the web is called crawling and differs from a classical web search insofar as the collection is not given to the search engine but it has to find the content. A great variety of different web crawlers are available for the process of searching the web and mining hyperlink network data, but they all have in common that the start from a set of source webpages, the so-called seed sites, and follow the hyperlinks on these webpages.
to find more content. This might either be repeated until no new websites are found or until a predefined number of pages or depth of the crawl is reached (Henzinger, 2001). Based on the settings in which order to collect hyperlinked pages that have not been crawled, different crawlers might collect different data sets. Hyperlink networks might for example provide information on the quality of the pages, assuming that pages that are frequently hyperlinked are of higher quality (Henzinger, 2001) or point to connections and overlaps between the pages and the authors behind them.

4.2.2 Web crawler VOSON

After having tried a few different web crawlers, among them SocSci Boot⁴ and a web crawler package for R as well as different possibilities to visualize the data for example by using Gephi⁵ or various online tools, I decided to use the web crawler VOSON (Virtual Observatory for the Study of Online Networks), which will be introduced in the following, for my research. The special settings and parameters used for the research questions will be introduced and discussed in the respective sections below. In the beginning of the research, VOSON offered limited free access and among others a student subscription for 25 dollars per year, which covered all functions required for the research. This was later changed to monthly subscription packages that could be purchased according to the requirements of the researcher.

VOSON has been developed at the Research School of Social Sciences of the Australian National University by Robert Ackland and his team. The software was formally established in 2005 and was since then supported by several different research grants. Its main developer and programmer is Robert Ackland (Ackland, 2010; vosonlab.net). VOSON is a web application that enables the user to crawl selected websites based on parameters the user has to set up before the crawl starts. Besides hyperlink networks the crawler also offers the possibility to extract data from twitter and do text analyses, however, in the context of this research only the function to extract data and create hyperlink networks has been used. Also, the software offers various different possibilities to carry out analyses of the crawled data and depict them graphically. This means that there are no problems to convert data to the required format and transfer them from the crawler to the visualization tool, which easily occurs when using separate tools for crawling and visualization. In the hyperlink network graphs drawn by the application VOSON, selected seed webpages and the websites they hyperlink to are

⁴ http://socscibot.wlv.ac.uk/.
⁵ https://gephi.org/.
depicted as nodes. Hyperlinks, which the application extracts during the crawl from the websites and all their subdirectories, are depicted as ties between the nodes. Additionally, together with the extraction of the complete network, VOSON has a feature that allows the identification of the most important websites, i.e. the websites that have two or more connections with the seed pages. These are summed up in an individual dataset, which also includes the selected seed webpages and saved separately from the main dataset. This reduced dataset can be analyzed individually and provides a first impression and quick overview on the most important websites in the crawl and their connections to the seed pages as well as showing which seed pages link to the same content or to each other.

For the interpretation of the data, VOSON offers different kinds of graphs, as for example the possibility to create a minimum spanning tree, a complete network or a hierarchical network, which might serve for various different purposes and varying research interests. VOSON also offers several functions to customize the depiction of the data to point out their different features. It is possible to add an indication of direction to the ties in the graph, nodes might be coloured based on various different attributes (e.g. ringset, html-code, user-defined etc.) or might be depicted in different sizes based on the number of in-or outbound hyperlinks and many others. Also, it is possible to select the Ling-Long (Noack) or the Fruchtermann-Reingold algorithm for the creation of the graphs. The crawler offers the option to group subpages of a webpage together to a page group, remove links that have no significance in the dataset (e.g. hyperlinks to install Adobe Reader or advertisements) and some additional features to work with the dataset and actively shape it based on the respective criteria and requirements given by the research interest.

In the process of crawling the web, the user first sets up the parameters for the crawl as for example crawl level (depth of the crawl), seed webpages from which the crawl should start and the crawling of inbound and/or outbound together with the maximum number of pages that should be crawled. When the settings are finalized the application performs the crawl which is taking, based on the amount of data that is crawled (i.e. based on the level of the crawl and the number of seed pages) just a few minutes up to several hours. As result, a database is created, which contains all the URLs identified during the crawl, their characteristics and connections. This database subsequently serves as the basis for the graphical depiction of the network and its interpretation.
4.3 Content Analysis

Besides the quantitative approach of hyperlink network analysis, content analysis constitutes the second methodological pillar of the work. This approach offers a possibility to transfer quantitative data as for example text into qualitative information and hence is located at the intersection between qualitative and quantitative research methods (Duriau et al., 2007). More general, Holsti defines content analysis as the “application of scientific research and analysis methods on documentary evidence” (Holsti, 1969, cited in Kim and Kuljis, 2010). In their text that aims to introduce the method of content research, Erlingsson and Brysiewicz write that “The objective in qualitative content analysis is to systematically transform a large amount of text into a highly organised and concise summary of key results” (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2017: 94). Hence, content analysis is a research method to objectively, systematically and quantitatively examine content related to communication (Berellson, 1952).

The basic sources for content analysis are various different forms of text or documentation and also transcribed interviews might be analysed using content analysis. Naturally, the recognition of the importance of language in human cognition is central to the value of content analysis (Duriau et al., 2007: 6). Further, the method is based on the assumption that word frequency is an indicator of cognitive centrality or importance and that word groups serve to uncover underlying themes. In this way, for example the co-occurrence of certain keywords can be interpreted by the researchers as pointing to an association between the underlying concepts (Duriau et al., 2007). Content analysis is used in a wide range of different fields, ranging from management analysis to the emergency care context in Africa (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2017) and helps to get a insight into deep individual or collective structures as for example values, intentions, attitudes and cognitions. Also, the method is applicable both in inductive and deductive researches (Duriau, 2007).

Conducting a qualitative content analysis is not based on a rigid step-by step procedure that is followed by the researcher and might at first sight seem chaotic and unregulated. It includes reading and re-reading the materials, develop codes and refine them and moving forward and backward between the data and the research results (Erlingsson and Brysiewicz, 2017). During content analysis, single codes are developed that are subsequently summed up in categories. This approach is rooted in the method of grounded theory, which has been developed by Anselm Strauss and Barney Glaser in 1967. Their aim was to establish a method which allows the researcher to move from the data to the theory and by this formulate new theories. These new theories should be “grounded” in the available data and specific to the
context in which they had been developed (Kendall, 1999; Willig, 2013). Further, the theory should be developed through a process of constant comparison (Kendall, 1999). One of the aims of grounded theory is the identification and integration of so-called categories of meaning from data (Willig, 2013). Grounded theory defines categories as grouping together instances (events, processes, occurrences) that have central features or characteristics in common. From a relatively low level of abstraction, the researcher is able to proceed to a higher, analytical level of abstraction. The categories in the research are developed during the process of coding and emerge from the data itself (Willig, 2013). In the coding process of the research, the data were first of all coded using the method of open coding, which serves to break down, examine, compare, conceptualize and categorize the data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61, cited in Kendall, 1999). The codes and categories are in this process generated directly from the data instead of fitting the data to pre-existent categories and codes; often, they even consist of words found in the data themselves (Kendall, 1999). The codes are the intermediate step and the bridge between the text and the rather abstract categories. The coding process included two rounds of reading and a refinement of the categories after the first reading. In the second round the codes have then been refined and grouped together into categories of meaning that identify the main aspects of the respective texts. In the end the developed categories were summed up for every actor. This process enables the comparison of the different actors based on source texts.

4.4 Data sources

Key sources for the analyses are data which were extracted from the websites of the German and Czech far right SMOs that have been selected for the analysis. The selected movements had to operate Internet pages and to fulfil the basic definition of the far right as described in chapter 6 - Far Right Insights into the Phenomenon. Further, the movements had to be both active on their Internet pages, i.e. the last contribution on the page had been added within the last months when the research data were extracted and had to be involved in some kind of street activism in their countries during the last months. The web pages of the selected movements have on the one hand been used as seed websites for the hyperlink analyses, i.e. the web crawling application started the data extraction from their pages. Subsequently the hyperlink network graph was drawn based on the obtained data. On the other hand the websites were used as a source for the qualitative self-presentation of the movements. These presentations were found in sections that are usually called “About us”, “Who we are” or
similar and are provided by all of the included SMOs. These texts were analyzed using content analyses.

The webpages of social movement organisations, which are an important means for them to stay in touch with their supporters, share their messages and be present, offer a great amount of data about the respective organisation. Hence, these websites present both a meaningful source of text for content analyses and material for hyperlink analysis. Hyperlinks provide information about the other actors and the external content movements are referring and by whom they are referred. This enables insight about cooperation that exists between various different actors.

Further, the self-presentations of the movements were used as a basic to get an insight into their ideologies instead of working with interpretations and assumptions that other actors or scientists made about them. By the means of content analysis, the ideology of the single movements has been coded manually, in the original languages of the respective SMOs (i.e. Czech and German). Codes were assigned and categories developed to sum up the texts and get a structured overview on it. Based on the developed categories it subsequently became possible to verify the ideological overlap of the organizations by checking for repeating categories and also look into the specific content of the categories, i.e. the codes that are forming the categories and their frequencies. The resulting ideological overlaps and differences were then linked to the coalition forming of the movements for the last part of the research. In this way, the processes of cooperation and networking and the mobilization strategies employed by the different movements, in different segments and in the two selected countries are closely analyzed and can be understood in great detail.

5 Related Work

This section should provide the reader with an overview on the researches that to date have been conducted with the focus on social movements and their coalition building, far right movements their transnational cooperation. It also takes works into account that use a similar methodological approach, employing either social network analyses or hyperlink analyses and possibly also combining them with other methods as content analyse, observations or others. As these are wide areas for research and new publications keep appearing, the section cannot possibly include all existing researches but aims to give an insight into the state of art in the research field.
The study of social movements is a traditional field of sociology, which came up in the 1950’s with the emergence of the first social movements in Europe and the United States (Sen and Avci, 2016). As early as 1965 the path breaking theory on the phenomena of collective action was published by Olson Mancur, whose theory became a basic work in the area of social movement studies. Other basic studies are the book by Charles Tilly (1977) with the title “From Mobilization to Revolution”, which is already based on the theory of collective action and Sidney Tarrow’s “Power in Movement” (1994). Another important theoretical contribution, however covering a broader range of social groups and also already older, is the research carried out by Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink (1998). In their book with the title: “Activists beyond borders. Advocacy networks in international politics” they discuss transnational advocacy networks, which are broad phenomena that involve individuals and groups, including both institutional and non-institutional actors, who are networking around a common interest, for example, human rights, environment and women’s rights, which all have their own agendas and targets (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Their definition includes far more actors than just social movements and they focus on the transnational ties of these actors. The book has been a very important contribution to the field of international relations and they considered both the influence these actors exercise on the national politics and their international dynamics (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).

The topic of resource mobilization has been analyzed for example by Craig Jenkins (1983), who, in contrast to the traditional theories of social discontent, also took resources, organization and political opportunity into account to explain mobilization by social movements (Jenkins, 1983). Though social movements as such have been researched from various different perspectives, social movement coalitions have been described as an understudied topic (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010), and especially the area of cross-movement cooperation (Beamish and Luebbers, 2009; Van Dyke, 2003), i.e. the cooperation between two completely different, separated social movements has been described only in a few articles and books so far. A key work about social movement coalitions is the volume edited by Nella Van Dyke and Holly McCammon in which the authors bring together various contributions referring to social ties and the development of movement coalition, movement ideologies, political influences and causal factors (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). Thomas Beamish and Amy Luebbers researched processes of alliance building between social movements. They refer to the successful cross movement alliance of environmental justice and peace and anti-weapons proliferation groups (Beamish and Luebbers, 2009). They pay special respect to the way in which the groups overcame their differences and identify cause
affirmation, strategic deployment, exclusion and co-development of cross-movement commitments as key features. In this way the groups could build trust and mutually accommodated one another over time (Beamish and Luebbers, 2009). Also Dominika Polanska and Grzegorz Piotrowski researched social movement cooperation based on the example of the squatting and tenants’ movements in Poland (2015). They analyze how the alliance building between the squatters and tenants is working, considering the organizational differences, social composition and differing targets. The authors focus especially on the transformative power of alliances between the movements and base their research on interviews with activists (Polanska and Piotrowski, 2016). The topic of social movement mobilization is researched till today, for example in the context of the refugee crisis by Emma F. Thomas et al. (2019). The team of researchers analyzed mobilizations of solidarity with refugees over national boundaries. They focused on the formation of transnational movements as shaped by the already existing world views of the individuals and their exposure to social media.

The method of social network analyses and the related field of hyperlink analysis have been applied to a broad range of different research topics so far, as it is a flexible method which, provided that it is applied correctly, provides reliable and reproducible results. Thus, amongst others social network analysis has been used in researches on transnational cooperation, the far right and other social movements. To one of the examples of applying social network analysis directly to the context of the far right belongs the dissertation written by Shannon Jones. The main goal of her work is the identification of structural and ideological patterns within far right networks. Further, the author wants to research the influence these patterns exercise on the sustainability of far right parties (Jones, 2015: 2). Jones analyzed how relationships between far right organizations impact nationalist mobilization and party sustainability in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom (Jones, 2015). Further, social network analysis was used in a mixed methods approach by Manuela Caiani and Linda Parenti to research the far right in Spain (Caiani and Parenti, 2011). Their goal was to research the potential role of the Internet for the Spanish radical right, especially for their national and international contacts, their mobilization and their promotion of a collective identity (Caiani and Parenti, 2011: 719). Also, Derek O’Callaghan and his team applied social network analysis to the far right and their usage of the Internet. The researchers were analyzing the potential for Twitter to act as one possible gateway to communities within the wider online network of the extreme right. They were using other social media as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and websites as additional sources (O’Callaghan et al., 2013). Manuel
Caiani and Claudius Wagemann applied social network analysis to study the communication networks in between the Italian and German extremist right. To their results belongs the identification of a quiet fragmented network in Italy and a dense and concentrated network structure in Germany (Caiani and Wagemann, 2009). Jirina Avukatu and Petr Lupac concentrated exclusively on the Czech far right online networks in their network analysis based on data from 2011 and 2012. As a result of their study they were able to confirm the centralized network structure hypothesis for the selected online network of the Czech far right. The authors conducted a hyperlink analysis based on the web pages of the respective movements (Avukatu and Lupac, 2014).

Also Salvatore Catanese and his team were crawling data from Facebook to analyse the connections between participants to online social networks. Their background lies with computer science and in their research analyze various different network science parameters of the online network they extracted (Catanese et al., 2011). Nicole Dörr used SNA to analyze transnational networks of far right parties, focusing on the visual and discursive translation of nationalist symbols (2017). In a comparative study of Islamophobic online- and offline movements, Farid Hafez (2018) used social movement theory to analyze why activism on the street level was not as successful in the Visegrad countries as in Germany. The research was based on the fact that anti-Muslim sentiments are to be found in these countries and he took windows of opportunity and online activism into account to explain their comparable failure in these countries. He concluded that Islamophobia plays a strong role in the formal sector and the official discourse in the Visegrad countries, which does not leave as much room and need for street activism (Hafez, 2018). In the field of computer science, Mikhail Petrovskiy and Maxim Chikunov research how extremists use online social networks as a means of communication. The authors propose a method how to identify radical users in networks among unknown ones by analyzing their relationships with other users and the features of the graph. The method does not require knowledge of the text content generated by the users and, according to the authors, might serve for real-time monitoring of extremists (Petrovskiy and Chikunov, 2019).

Basic research on the topic of hyperlink network analysis has been done by Robert Ackland and his team. Ackland is the main programmer of the web crawler and data visualizing application Voson, which has been used in this work. He published various different researches on hyperlink analysis, the theory behind them and the practices of extracting data from the net and creating a network (i.e. Ackland, 2010; Ackland and Gibson, 2004). Further
research on hyperlink networks was done by Andrew Pilny and Michelle Shumate, who understand hyperlinks as extension of offline instrumental collective action behaviour (2012). Hyperlinks are a means to express collective identity and related to various different offline characteristics as common social aims, financial, collaborative and membership ties and media visibility (Pilny and Shumate, 2012). A very important research for this dissertation was the article by Stefania Vicari. Vicari describes the study of new media use as central in contemporary investigations of transnational movements (Vicari, 2015: 92). In her paper she combines the interest in transnational dynamics of social contention and the usage of digital media in the context of protest actions and researches, in which ways social movement coalitions use the Internet to build transnational collective identities (Vicari, 2015: 92). She concludes that transnational contention, culture and the respective location still are major factors in the emergence of transnational mobilization networks (Vicari, 2012).

With respect to the far right, Miroslav Mareš analysed the transnational cooperation of right wing extremist parties in Europe. He concluded that both the Western and the Eastern extreme right have a significant influence on the East Central Europe scene, a fact which significantly influences the transnational contacts between the individual far right parties (Mareš, 2012). Further, Mareš published a broad range of research papers on the radical and extremist right, often focused on East Middle Europe but some also with broader scopes (Mareš, 2009; Mareš, 2003; Mareš, 2008). Also Petra Vejvodová researched transnational cooperation patterns of Czech neo-Nazis with special emphasis on their transnational framing (Vejvodová, 2014). The authors Nora Langenbacher and Britta Schellenberg write in the introduction of their edited volume on right wing extremism and populism that “transnational processes of exchange and cooperation play an important role in the success of right-wing extremism and right-wing populism in Europe” (2011: 22). Jakub Merc wrote his bachelor thesis on the movement Islám v České Republice nechceme (We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic) and analyzed the movement based on the theory of radicalism and extremism (Merc, 2016). Treating the movement as a representative of the Czech Anti-Islam movement he analyzed history and current character of the movement. He concludes that Islám v České Republice nechceme does not fulfil key criteria of the extremist right but rather belongs to the radical right scene (Merc, 2016). The study published by Přemysl Rosůlek and his team (2018) provides the reader with insights into the Muslim community in the Czech Republic, the discourses of the Islamophobes and the political reactions, critique of Islam in cyberspace and other areas related to Muslims and the refugee crisis.
Daniel Köhler wrote about individual radicalization processes in the German far right and the role of the Internet (2015). Based on a grounded theory method, he conducted and evaluated individual interviews, concluding that the Internet is a major force in the establishment of radical right contrast societies. It helps to translate radical and violent ideologies into political activism and significantly shapes or even enables the individual process of radicalization (Köhler, 2015). A former work of the author in cooperation with Jan Hanzelka researched the topic of Anti-Islam movements in the Czech Republic and Germany. The authors compared Czech and German populist far right movements on Facebook and concluded that the German users frequently referred to domestic events and hate comments made were less explicit, while the Czech users extensively referred to international incidents and tolerated explicit and violent hate comments from other supporters (2017). Vendula Prokůpková (2018) analyzed the coalition building between the German movement Pegida and the Czech Block against Islam, using a mixed methods approach of participant observation, interviews and document analysis. The author identifies three main factors that shape the cooperation between the movements, which are the presence of a commonly perceived enemy, no significant ideological disputes and the abundance of resources in combination with the benefits of resource-sharing in the same time. According to the author, the split of the cooperation of the movements was due to a lack of social ties between the members of the movements (Prokůpková, 2018).

6 Far right – insights into the phenomenon

The applied term far right has already been used in 2007 (Kopeček) and since then has been established as an umbrella term that includes radical as well as extreme right actors (e.g. Davies and Jackson, 2008; Georgiadou et al., 2018; Mudde, 2014; Stojarova, 2014). However, using this umbrella term does in no case mean negating the differences between the anti-constitutional extreme right and the radical right which stands at the edge of the democratic spectrum (e.g. Bötticher, 2017; Bötticher and Mareš, 2012). Their differentiation will be further discussed below. With respect to the organizational structure the dissertation distinguishes between party- and non-party forms of the far right. A political party is characterized by the following key features:

a) Aiming to influence the political opinion and exercise political impact for a longer period of time and in a wider region; no concentration on single issues of local level
b) Association of citizens holding individual memberships, minimum number of members

c) Demonstrating the will to constantly take part in the political representation of the people during elections

d) Independent and permanent organization

e) Willingness to appear in public

f) A party must not necessarily win a seat in parliament, but it has to fulfil the other criteria (all features based on Hofmeister and Grabow, 2011).

In contrast, in the non-formal sector, we can distinguish based on the extent to which the respective actors are organized. On the one hand there are movements and networks, which aim to mobilize other people for their ideology but are not structured strictly and do not participate in elections, neither do they take over any public offices as parties. On the other hand we can find also subcultural environments, mostly organized as small groups, which operate rather autonomous and are stronger prone to violence than movements and networks (Minkenberg, 2011; for the threefold division into parties, movements and subcultures see also Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018: 3). The focus of the dissertation is set to the non-or semiformal movement sector, actors that have a certain formal structure and organization but do not aim for parliamentary representation or participation in the elections and are not organized as formally as classical parties. The movement sector is located in between the formal party sector and the non-formal subcultures. Extremist parties face, most of all in militant democracies like Germany and the Czech Republic, a certain risk to be banned and therefore mostly take good care to stay within the limits of the constitutional democratic state. Movements in countries with a less restrictive legislation might more openly represent violent positions. Also subcultures are harder to grasp for the legislation and are in many cases strongly prone to violence. In the context of a subculture, repressions mostly target individual members, but as there is no formal organization the legal possibilities to suppress them are rather limited. However, subcultures develop very quickly; often they do not persist as long as parties and also their influence is limited and rather local. Located in between these two groups, movements face their own risks and have their own dynamics. Discussing, analyzing and contributing to the understanding of these dynamics is one of the goals of the dissertation.

6.1 Basic attributes of the far right

Far right actors in general are characterized by their nativist stance, which is a particularly radical and exclusive form of nationalism (Gattinara and Pirro, 2018). Another characteristic
which is often found within far right movements is xenophobia, in modern far right movements oftentimes replaced by anti-Semitism or Islamophobia, generally conservative approaches, revisionism and authoritarian tendencies (Davies and Jackson, 2008; Jaschke, 2006). Modern far right groups oftentimes differ in one or more key aspects from traditional far right groups, e.g. taking a pro-Israelian stance or defending gay rights (Siegel, 2017). However, in many cases these seemingly open, liberal approaches are rather superficial or, as a closer look reveals, serve to support their elitist, exclusive agenda in different kinds of ways. In general, far right actors perceive people as being fundamentally unequal, which might be based on different criteria (Bundesministerium für Verfassungsschutz, 2016) and might not always be visible at the first sight. However, this assumption of a fundamental inequality is the key feature of far right actors and the strongest characteristic for their identification.

A clear definition and allocation of single actors to the far right is in many cases complicated and not always unanimously. Any assessment of an actor might be significantly influenced by the decision of the researcher to either take the official position or the real actions of a group as the basis for their assessment. Also, various different definitions might be used as a basis for the classification of the respective actor. This has to be considered especially when researching movements, as they are not as consolidated as for example parties with a clear program. Another point is that as part of the new developments in the far right scene, movements and parties are no longer homogenous actors but are composed of people with various different backgrounds and targets (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018). A far right movement might unite people who fill the definition for extremists with other supporters that should rather be perceived as being conservative. Both the problem with the different definitions of far right, radical and extreme and the issue of movements being very heterogeneous actors can be clearly illustrated based on the case of the German movement Pegida. After the movement had been established there were heated discussions on whether it consisted of worried citizens that were voicing legitimate concerns or of hardcore Nazis who should at all costs be excluded from the public discourse. As found out later, Pegida apparently offered expression channels for both of these groups, who were demonstrating side by side. This also considerably complicated the classification of Pegida in the context of the far right and influenced the discussion on to whether ban the movement or not (Schmidt, 2015c).

Additionally, also the individual supporters of far right movements are increasingly mixing up different approaches in their personalities, a phenomenon which Radke and Staud (2012) refer to as “patchwork identities” and which stands in contrast to the old-fashioned approach.
While in the past supporters of far right movements or parties had to comply with unofficial guidelines that prescribed their whole lifestyle and mindset, including clothes, eating style and musical preferences, today’s far right movements do not impose such strict rules on their followers (Radke and Staud, 2012). Also this makes it harder to unanimously identify the individual followers of far right movements and in the same time gives them a certain kind of anonymity and protection, as they cannot be identified at first sight.

For the research, the approach of the far right was selected as it includes different right wing actors, which serves well to mirror the heterogeneity of the far right movement as a whole. It supports the aim of the work to research the complete ideological spectrum of the far right movement and not to focus on a single part of it. Also, it enables the reader to understand the different parts of the far right movement and partly also focuses on the comparison of individual segments within the far right movement. Table 3 below provides an overview on different streams belonging to the far right.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Orientation</th>
<th>Democratic Right</th>
<th>Far Right</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Social)conservative</td>
<td>Radical Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>New Right</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argumentation</td>
<td>Sceptical about immigration &quot;traditional&quot; perception of the family cultural oriented patriotism (&quot;Debate on the core culture&quot;)</td>
<td>Ethnopluralistic critical towards democracy xenophobic islamophobic nationalistic historical relativistic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible strategies</td>
<td>Right-wing populism right globalization/modernization critic Borrowings from the political left</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3 Classification scheme of different far right actors (Braun et al., 2009: 15, translated by the author)

⁶ as defined by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Verfassungsschutz).
6.2 Radicalism and extremism

Even though the terms radicalism and extremism are often used as synonyms in the discourse or their differentiation is very unclear and blurred in some contexts, the terms are not interchangeable. Both radicalism and extremism denote socio-political forces and are used to describe actors which can be found at the edges of liberal democratic societies. They might be related to the far left or the far right or even refer to Islamists, ecologists or any other conviction. It is important to note that radicalism, extremism and also terrorism are attributes that are in most cases associated by third parties with certain groups. The terms are not used by the extremists themselves, as we all know that “one man’s freedom fighter is another man’s terrorist“.

The extreme right, which differs from the radical right by its anti-constitutional stance, is characterized by elements as nationalism, chauvinism, xenophobia and the desire for a strong state (Caiani et al., 2012). Mudde (2007, cited in Vejvodová, 2016) developed a minimal definition of the extreme right, which includes ‘nativism’ and authoritarianism. Nativism describes the belief that a state should be inhabited by members of one ethnic group only and, same as authoritarianism, it implies nationalism and xenophobia. Authoritarianism is an emphasis on order and strict social control including severe sanctions for people that do not obey the law. The basic idea of right wing extremism is that “belonging to a specific ethnic group, notion or race determines a human being’s value” (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2017). Right wing extremists are a priori intolerant and perceive themselves as the conveyors of truth (Novotný, 2009). This inequality was for a long time defined as being based on a biological differentiation, most evident in the social Darwinist approach and the biological, race-based racism of the Nazis in the 3rd Reich. Nowadays, the new notions are shifting to a culturally determined inequality, accompanied by the perception that culture is naturally given, unchangeable and that different cultures are not compatible with each other (Radke and Staud, 2012; Vejvodová, 2014). The change from biological racism to this type of cultural racism for example enables populist parties to openly promote xenophobic and racist bodies of thought but avoiding a stigmatization as racists (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018; Rydgren, 2005). This approach is often referred to as ethnopluralism (Spektorowski, 2003) and recently represented for example by the Identitarian movement.
Bötticher has deconstructed various different definitions of the terms radicalism and extremism, using on the method of concept analysis developed by Sartori. Her target was to provide a consensus of these various different definitions and reduce them to their key elements and form. The applied concept analysis by Sartori is based on 3 main steps. The first step is the identification of so-called reference points, the main meanings, structures and connotations of the definitions. In the second step criteria to decompose the definitions into central elements are determined to analyze and examine the form of the definition. In the last step the structural features that express the content of a term are identified (Bötticher, 2017). Based on the decomposition of a great number of different definitions from various different contexts and fields into reference points, form and content, Bötticher suggests the following elements to distinguish the terms radicalism and extremism:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Use of political violence</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pragmatic, selective</td>
<td>Legitimate form of political action</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Point of reference</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Idea of a golden future</td>
<td>Glorified past</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position towards democracy</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Emancipatory, not anti-democratic per se</td>
<td>Anti-democratic, opposing democracy as such</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position towards Human Rights</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Not opposed to equal human rights</td>
<td>Confronting the notion of equal human rights</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position towards other approaches</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tolerant; open societies to continue existing</td>
<td>Diversity in the society must be destroyed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position towards the establishment</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rebellious opposition towards the establishment</td>
<td>Directed against the establishment and against all citizens opposed to the extremist group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Co-existence with the plural society</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Possible, might exist as a niche culture without seeking confrontation</td>
<td>Not possible, continuously engaging into provocative and aggressive interventions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Morality</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oriented towards an universal moral</td>
<td>Particularistic morality only valid for members of the group</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Linked political concepts</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oriented towards egalitarianism; less elitist than extremism</td>
<td>Authoritarian dictatorships, totalitarianism; opposing the sovereignty of the people</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Roots</th>
<th>Radicalism</th>
<th>Extremism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>18th century enlightenment including ideas of human progress and power of reason</td>
<td>Irrational, often religious and fanatical system of beliefs, claiming a truth monopole</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
6.3 Populism

Besides the terms extremism and radicalism, the concept of populism has recently gained great importance, with many authors claiming that populism is on the rise in Europe’s far right and in America (Molloy, 2018). However, there is nothing like a generally accepted theory or any coherent criteria to define populism (Müller, 2016). Two of the key features of populism are the division of society into the good, pure people and the corrupt elites and the idea that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people (Mudde, 2017, cited in Kaya et al., 2019). Additionally, bad manners that are demonstrated by the populist leadership so as not obeying the rules and conventions of political and/or polite discourse and making use of a crisis or threat narrative are possible criteria to identify populism (Moffitt, 2016). Further, the term has been described as a combination of expressive rhetoric, a demagogic way of speaking, folksy, content wise simplifying messages and a direct form of political leadership (Holtmann et al., 2006: 32).

Populist leader often refer to myths, traditions, religion, heritage, memories and nativism. Populist right parties mostly try to mobilize their supporters with anti-globalism, Euroscepticism, nationalism, nativism and anti-multiculturalism. They promise to protect the people against various different kinds of enemies of the nation and often present simplistic and univocal stories and conceptions (Kaya et al., 2019). Müller, who strongly influenced the German conception of the term populism, defined it as undermining the idea of pluralism by claiming to be the sole power that truly represents the people and by calling any political opponents the “enemies of the people” in order to deny their legality (Müller, 2016). Populism has been defined as antipluralist and as based on the claim to be the sole representation of the people without any legitimate competitor for force. Additionally, citizens that do not support the populist group are considered to not belong to the real people (Müller, 2016). The followers of populist leaders often have experienced social-economic and nostalgic deprivation in the age of globalization (Kaya et al., 2019) and thus are receptive to the populist rhetoric. Nostalgic deprivation has been defined as “the feeling of loss resulting from the disappearance of established notions of nation, identity, culture and heritage in the age of globalism.” (Gest et al., 2018).

As defined by the authors above, populism rather denotes a style of politics than a political ideology, so it might be connected with various different political ideologies (Moffitt, 2016).

Table 4 Basic characteristics of extremism and radicalism, own table, based on Bötticher (2017).
Other authors are referring to it as a “thin ideology” which can be easily combined with other political ideologies as communism, ecologism, nationalism or socialism (Mudde, 2007). In the current European context, populism is strongly associated with the political right and, according to Mudde, “most successful populists today are on the right, particularly the radical right” (Mudde, 2017, cited in Molloy, 2018); however, there are also left wing populist as for example Syriza in Greece, Podemos and Hugo Chavez (Müller, 2016). Also in the context of the research, populism is rather understood as a certain style of political behaviour and acting and a certain type of political strategies. With respect to the movements selected for the analyses, populist strategies are strongly used by Pegida and the Initiative against Islam in the Czech Republic and to a certain extent also by the youth groups of the far right parties, while the Identitarian movements do hardly use any populist strategies.

7 Theoretical Framework

7.1 Far right as a social movement

As the work applies social movement theory to the context of the far right, which for a long time has not been a very common approach, this section will discuss the integration of the far right movement into the context of social movement studies. Most of the researches concerning processes within social movements refer to rather “typical” types of social movements. These are for example women’s rights movements, environmental movements or anti-war movements. In fact, the far right is in most cases not included in the traditional understanding of social movements and its inclusion into this context has been controversially discussed among scholars. One of the first to access the German far right as a social movement was Jaschke (1994), who concentrated especially on the ethnicisation of social and political issues by right wing extremists, based on which they were able to attract protest voters. With reference to various different authors and in the specific context of the far right in Germany, e.g. Grumke and Klärner conclude that the contemporary right wing extremism in Germany cannot be understood in any other way (2006: 16) and Novotný (2009: 594) writes that today it is clear that Jaschke accessed the situation correctly. Also I argue that only through the recent developments within the far right and its rather new faces it became an appropriate option to apply social movement studies to the far right. First of all, far right movements are still an understudied topic. As Gatinarra and Pirro write “the recent rise in far right street politics has not been matched by an increase in the scholarly interest for non-party organisations and grassroots politics” (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018: 8). The dissertation aims to close this gap and study the far right movement in two selected countries through the
lens of social movement studies. In this aspect it is important to note that recently social movements are increasingly understood as being composed both of social movement organisations and individual activists (Simpson, 2015); however, the focus of this work lies on social movement organisations acting as groups and not on the individual actions of single activists.

While in the 1960s and 1970s movements were exclusively oriented to the left, this is no longer the case today. In fact, Western democracies are recently confronted with a variety of different movements and mobilization contexts (Klandermans, 2015). Based for example on the argumentation of Sidney Tarrow, who defined social movements as “collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interactions with authorities and elites” (Tarrow, 1994: 4), the new types of far right movements might be included in the context of social movement studies. Also Mario Diani suggested a broad definition of social movements, that might be applied to the context of the far right. He defined movements as “networks of informal interactions between a plurality of individuals, groups, or associations engaged in a political or cultural conflict on the basis of a shared collective identity” (Diani, 1992: 13). Both Tarrow and Diani are well known for their research and contributed to the basic literature of social movement studies. Their definitions aim to grasp the most fundamental characteristics of the phenomenon of social movements. The application of these definitions to the far right shows that also the recent far right actors are covered by these definitions. Hence, social movement theory was selected as one of the theoretical pillars of the work.

An extensive example of using social movement theory to explain the nature of far right organizations is the dissertation submitted by Frank Tridico, where he uses resource mobilization theory and new social movement theory to approach four selected far right movements. The author states in the beginning that there is a limited focus on applying social movement theory to help explain the nature of far right movements (Tridico, 2011: 2). Though, it must be taken into account that this work dates already eight years back and that the far right since then developed gradually. In the last years the far right increasingly attracted the attention of social movement scholars, as no longer foremost parties were to be found, but also informal groups with a nativist, authoritarian stance developed. This is also confirmed by a special issue of European Societies, published in 2018, which deals with the far right as a social movement. In the introduction the editors Gatinarra and Pirro state that “The literature on the far right is trying to connect with social movement studies” (Gatinarra
and Pirro, 2018: 2) and that the extra parliamentary forms of grassroot extremism are increasingly used also by far right actors. They set the focus of their work to the different levels of mobilisation factors and to the cooperation of party and non-party actors. Same as in this work, also the editors of the special issue decided to go beyond an exclusive focus on radical or extreme right actors and widened their scope to the far right (Gatinarra and Pirro 2018). In the same special issue, also Minkenberg states that “recent research has (re)discovered the movement characteristics of the radical right” (Minkenberg, 2018: 2). Mostly in their framing of globalization the far right is comparable to other social movements and also the manners in which far right parties develop, organize themselves and mobilize public support has been often linked to social movements. I.e. Minkenberg states that radical right parties, almost by definition, exhibit movement characteristics as they continuously engage in contentious politics. He further argues that in Eastern Europe the borders between radical right movements and parties are more porous than in Western Europe, along with symbiotic interactions between these two (Minkenberg, 2018: 1). Far right actors oftentimes politicize issues that have been neglected or treated one-sided by the mainstream parties (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018) and in this way are able to attract supporters that do not feel represented by mainstream parties.

Generally, the social movement as a whole consists of a number of concrete groups that are representing the respective subject, which are referred to as social movement organisations (SMOs) I.e. there is the whole far right movements that consists of concrete organisations in different countries, as local branches of the Identitarian Movement all over Europe, groups like Islám v ČR nechceme and Pegida, Autonomous Nationalists and so on. The far right SMOs selected for the research are purposeful organized groups which are informal or semiformal and strive towards a common goal in the sense of the above provided definitions of social movements. The actor that is farthest from this definition is the group Junge Alternative from Germany with their rather organized membership approach and very thigh connection to the mother party AfD, serving also as a point of connection for different other far right movements with their mother party (Frank, 2018). However, the basic definition of a social movement by Tarrow or Diani is applicable also to them. Far right SMOs in general have gained importance and influence in the last years and some of them, most notable the autonomous nationalists, which were active in various countries, differ at least in some aspects significantly from the established far right parties. In certain points the established far right parties are assessing the newly developing movements very critical, also because they go against their basic principles with regards to organisation, mobilization and general behaviour
The autonomous nationalists, which have been established in 2002 in Berlin, were one of the first modern far right SMOs and marked the beginning of the modernization of the whole far right movement (Staud and Radke, 2012). However, the autonomous nationalists are not researched in the context of the dissertation as their importance was already declining in the investigation period and as they do not operate one central website as of July 2019. Instead, movements that are shaping the far right movements in the two selected countries have been identified by literature review and included into the research. During the research period two new movements gained importance and were added to the research objects retrospectively, as will be described in detail below.

7.2 Collective and Connective Action

Researching the far right through the lens of social movement studies also requires taking a closer look to the theory of collective action, i.e. the emergence and development of action dynamics in groups. As the work extensively draws on the actions of movements in cyberspace the special action dynamics of collective action in this context are one of the basics of the work. It must be considered that the emergence of modern communication technologies that are based on the usage of the Internet has transformed modern collective action (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). These technologies fostered the development of a related, newer phenomenon related to collective action in cyberspace, the so-called connective action that already has been theoretically and empirically explored (Bang and Halupka, 2017; Bennet and Segerberg, 2012; Shumate and Lipp, 2008). The approach of connective action tethers the relationship between personalized politics and digital media and traces, how personal action frames interact with social technologies to organize digitally networked action (Bang and Halupka, 2017). Discussing and understanding these phenomena provides the background for analyzing the behaviour of far right movements and its effects in the sphere of the Internet.

Formal as well as informal and semiformal networks of individuals that associate themselves with the far right can be assessed as collective actors. For example Minkenberg has conceptualized the radical right in liberal democracies as a collective actor with different ideological and organizational manifestations (Minkenberg, 2018: 1). The basic theory of collective action has been established by Olson on 1965 and reformed the theories and assumptions about behaviour and dynamics of groups that had been valid till this time (Czech, 2016). Olson assumes that group behaviour cannot be treated and assessed in the same way as
individual behaviour. In his opinion a group should be seen rather as an assembly of rational individuals that all act based on their self-interest. In his opinion a group does not constitute an entity in itself and thus, group behaviour should be predicted by taking into account which incentives and costs every single member of the group faces. That means that the logic that drives individual behaviour and the reactions to costs and benefits are the main determinants of group behaviour for Olson, while common interest and collective gains are not sufficient to explain it. Even if all members of the group share the same goal and would all profit in the same manner from the achievement of this goal the action dynamics are still different from the action dynamics that drive individuals to do something (Czech, 2016; Olson, 1965).

Olson was additionally also discussing problems as free-riding of certain members on the effort of the others which might complicate the mission of the group and affect its success. Key features for the success or failure of a group are, according to Olson, firstly the mechanism of selective incentives, which must be provided to motivate individual members to contribute to the group. Secondly, small groups are according to Olson more successful, as they might control their members easier and their incentive structure is different. Olson argues that this also is the reason why large groups often split up the work or distribute single tasks to smaller subunits as boards, committees, working groups and similar (Czech, 2016; Olson, 1965). While Olson’s model originally had a purely economic focus, the theory was later extended to public goods in the context of political economy. It was Knoke who argued that collective actions in the sphere of politics seek to garner public goods such as tax rates, election reforms or the right to own firearms (Knoke, 1990). With this argumentation he made the theory by Olson applicable to the context of social movements and other political actors as the far right.

Nowadays, collective action is no longer found only in the offline world and in the formation and actions of social movements, but certain kinds of group dynamics are present in cyberspace as well. Lupia and Sin were among the first who discussed the ways in which the new communication technologies affect the logic of collective action (Lupia and Sin, 2003). One important point is that the usage of digital communication technologies blurred the dimension of membership in the new theories of collective action. The level of contribution that is required for a collective action has been significantly reduced and thus members and non-members become indistinct (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). However, also in real life social movement organizations as in this research do not offer any kind of formal membership, no member badge or similar. Often, their members are even not recognizable for
outsiders but rely on insider codes and signs and in this way also avoid being publically stigmatized as members of the right wing (Radke and Staud, 2012). What differs for cyberspace and real life context is the extent of the required effort to take part in the movement and its actions. In the Internet a contribution might take just a few seconds, while attending meetings, going to demonstrations or putting up banners in the street requires more commitment. The second dimension that became blurred with the usage of digital communication is the formal organization, which has long been assumed as necessary for the coordination of action but seems to be no longer required in the modern, loosely organized networks (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). In some cases the informal structure even might become an advantage, as the communication is very fast and efficient. In some cases it took the far right only hours to organize large-scale demonstrations and in this way react very fast to current happenings (Hill, 2018).

The usage of digital media by social movements was amongst others extensively researched by Bennet and Segerberg, who came to the conclusion that besides the already known principles of collective action, digital media also foster the development of connective action. Connective action is defined as being based on “personalized content sharing across media networks” (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012: 739). Collective action is subdivided into two ideal forms, which differ in the extent to which formal organisation is central for enabling a connective communication logic. The authors especially focus on communication as a prominent part of the organizational structure of the actors and emphasize that digital media are used in ways that go beyond sending and receiving messages (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012). Additionally, they claim that digital media are a tool to reduce the costs of spreading collective identification, including mobilization strategies, but that using the Internet or social media for communication and exchange does not necessarily change the action dynamics in a fundamental way. Depending on the ways and the extent to which digital media are used, their influence onto the dynamics and processes of collective action might be more or less extensive (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012). Collective action forms that have been digitally mediated are often “more personalized, larger, have scaled up more quickly and have been flexible in tracking moving political targets and bridging different issues” (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012: 742). Also, connective action does not require a collective framing of identity, high organizational resources or a strong and hierarchically organized leadership in order to react effectively and in a timely manner to opportunities. However, the influence of digital media and the resulting action forms vary. The differences concern the underlying logics and the role that is taken over by communication as an organizing principle (Bennet
and Segerberg, 2012). Table 5 below shows the differentiation between the three forms of collective and connective action that have been identified by Bennet and Segerberg:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Connective Action</th>
<th>Connective Action: Organizationally Enabled Networks</th>
<th>Collective Action: Organizationally Brokered Networks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Self-Organizing Networks</td>
<td>Loose organizational coordination of action</td>
<td>Strong organizational coordination of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Little or no organizational coordination of action</td>
<td>Loose organizational coordination of action</td>
<td>Strong organizational coordination of action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Large-scale personal access to multi-layered social technologies</td>
<td>Organizations provide social technology outlays - both custom and commercial</td>
<td>Social technologies used by organisations to manage participation and coordinate goals</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communication content centres on emergent inclusive personal action frames</td>
<td>Communication content centres on organizationally generated inclusive person action frames</td>
<td>Communication content centres on collective action frames</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal expression shared over social networks</td>
<td>Some organizational moderation of personal expression through social networks</td>
<td>Organizational management of social networks – more emphasis on interpersonal networks to build relationships for collective action</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collectivities often shun involvement of existing formal organisations</td>
<td>Organizations in the background in loosely linked networks</td>
<td>Organizations in the foreground as coalitions with differences bridged through high resource organization brokerage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5 Connective and Collective Action (Benett, Segerberg 2012: 756)

The approach of Bennett and Segerberg stands in contrast to many other scholars, who problematised the decoupling of citizen engagement from formal institutions to initiate political and social changes. Often, the degradation of collective action frames is evaluated as pointing to an anti-pluralist populism (Müller, 2016, cited in Bang and Halupka, 2017) and to technocratic neoliberal depoliticizations (Hay, 2007, cited in Bang and Halupka, 2017).
Bennett and Segerberg concentrate on the other side of these developments, depicting personalization, globalization and digitalization as fostering democratic processes from below. The digitally enabled networks allow for conflicts to be debated instead of mirroring the articulation of legitimate demands of conflicts and collective decisions (Bang and Halupka, 2017)

As the research topic of this dissertation is based on the websites of the selected movements, their content and the provided hyperlinks, the underlying logic of action is closest to the ideal type of organizationally enabled networks, hence the logic of connective action as described by Bennett and Segerberg applies. The websites of the movements are maintained and monitored by defined administrators, there is a loose coordination of action and certain moderation and control is taking place. Bennett and Segerberg refer to this middle form in between classical collective action and connective action as a hybrid form. They describe mostly its very loose manner, without any central, leading organizational actors and technologies taking over the role of important organizational agents. Also, according to these authors, this hybrid form in between collective and connective action includes informal organizational actors. These actors oftentimes have similar capacities as conventional organizations with respect to resource mobilization and coalition building. However, even so they do not impose strong brands and collective identities (Bennet and Segerberg, 2012: 757).

Based on their conclusions the classical theories of resource mobilization and coalition building, which will be described below, are applicable to the behaviour of social movement organisations in cyberspace. Generally, their research is of great theoretical importance for the work, as it provides impulses for the application of collective action theory to cyberspace. It also shows in which aspects and how cyberspace influences the action dynamics of groups and which considerations should be taken into account for the concrete case of websites.

Another important point is to clarify who are the actual actors in the context of the research. The dissertation focuses on websites and the hyperlinks they maintain to each other and to other content in combination with the self-perception and the thematical foci the movements set for themselves. However, websites naturally cannot be actors in the traditional sense of the word, as they do not act themselves. Rather, they are media, means to a certain purpose, while the real actors are “behind the scene”, in the form of the administrators and users, all people who contribute to the websites and their content. While e.g. on Facebook the group of contributors is very wide and everybody with a user account can post, comment, like and share, the websites in the research are actually administered by a defined, limited group of
people, which narrows down the actors “behind the scene”. It still stays open what these people do in real life; whether they are not active in various different websites and to which extent they represent the opinions of the rest of the supporters of the movement (Hoffman and Fujdiak, 2017). However, I argue that the administrators of a certain website do shape the respective movement by their activities and the content they share on the website. Their decisions to post or not post something, link or not link to a different movement or certain content contribute to and form the identity of the movement. People who do not agree with the information and opinions provided in the format might as well turn their backs to the movement and rather support a different one which comes closer to their opinions. Off- and online activities of social movements hence are in a permanent exchange and shape each other. In this sense hybrid action spaces develop (Hoffman and Fujdiak, 2017), which even are typical for today’s social movements, considering the great importance the Internet has for them. Another point is that the members of a social movement are a very homogenous and frequently changing group of people and general conclusions about them are of limited value. However, this is a typical problem in social movement research and nothing that particularly concerns the research of social movement activities in cyberspace.

7.3 Connective Goods: Hyperlink networks

Hyperlink network analysis is one of the methods that are applied in the research. Its underlying theory, the features of hyperlink networks and the applications of the method by other authors will be described in the following.

Same as in social network analysis, hyperlink network analysis is closely connected with the theory of collective and/or connective action, which are described above. The theory of collective action was used in the context of the research of hyperlink networks amongst others by Shumate and Lipp in 2008. According to Shumate and Lipp, hyperlink networks, which are composed of single webpages or websites as nodes and the hyperlinks between them as ties, are a communication-based public good (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). They further wrote that “Contributions to these systems become a public good only if others also contribute. Thus, communication-based public goods are sustained through collective actions of individuals and/or organizations” (Shumate and Lipp, 2008: 180). They conclude that hyperlink networks fulfil basic characteristics of public goods, which are, according to Olson
the factors jointness of supply\textsuperscript{7}, impossibility of exclusion\textsuperscript{8} and commonality\textsuperscript{9} (Olson, 1965). A hyperlink network is a connective good that provides inter-organizational links via which other actors, ideas or events with similar focuses are brought to the attention of the audience (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). Exclusion is impossible in the context of hyperlink networks and within the public for which they are intended, as hyperlinks are accessible for everybody who has access either to the Internet generally or to an access-restricted website that e.g. requires a login. Together with the factor jointness of supply and the commonality, expressed in the common topic and at least overlapping languages, hyperlink networks represent a type of public good (Pilny and Shumate, 2012).

Shumate and Lipp further subdivide communication-based public goods into communal and connective communication based public goods, in the following referred to as communal and connective goods. Communal goods are collections of information that has been assembled by members and is publically accessible, e.g. different kinds of databases. Connective goods in contrast are technology-enabled communication systems through which the members of a collective might connect (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). Connective goods thus are defined as set of “inter-organizational links that enable members and nonmembers to reach like-minded organizations in order to enhance the visibility of the network’s goals” (Shumate and Lipp, 2008: 180), a definition that applies to various different kinds of hyperlink networks. These hyperlinks are the evidence that a symbolic relationship between the entities in the network exist and enable members as well as non-members to communicate and exchange with each other (Shumate and Lipp, 2008). Hyperlink networks are institutionalized connective public goods (Shumate and Lipp, 2008) which influence, which events, actors and what aspects of social issues are made visible to the public (Fu and Shumate, 2016). Consequently, a hyperlink network analysis offers an insight into the contextual environment that is generated by websites, rather than focusing on the content of the websites as such (Vicari, 2014). Therefore, they offer a possibility to evaluate and represent the nature of the respective structure of communication (Jackson, 1997) that is taking place in cyberspace. A hyperlink

\textsuperscript{7} Meaning that these goods can be consumed in common and no one’s consumption of the good diminishes the consumption of any other person (Hardin 1982, cited in Shumate, Lipp 2008).

\textsuperscript{8} Meaning that it is impossible to exclude any person who belongs to the public for which the good was created from the use of the public good (Olson 1965, cited in Shumate, Lipp 2008).

\textsuperscript{9} Meaning that the good must be common to all the organizations. With respect to a communication-based public good this means that the organizations must have a common purpose and must speak the same language(s) (Shumate, Lipp 2008).
network analysis can in this way “uncover factors affecting a website’s network overall cohesion [and] helps to investigate online dynamics of self-representation and identification with others (Vicari, 2014: 96). Also, hyperlinks are both a means of alliance and a sign of belonging and might help to identify symbolic master frames (Vicari, 2014) in groups of like- or similar minded actors. As self-representation, cohesion within the network of far right movement’s communication and identification with others and master frames belong to the key target of this dissertation, hyperlink network analysis has been selected as an appropriate research approach.

SMOs which belong to various different social movements use the new communication technologies to build their online presences, communicate with their followers and each other and share content. As discussed above, the provision of hyperlinks is a central means that is used to share content and draw attention to likeminded actors or other SMOs in this context. Hence, the modern, digital communication technologies lead to the development of various different forms of networks, which in turn take over important functions within the mobilization strategies of social movements (Lim, 2012).

In the context of the research, online interactions, concretely hyperlinks are understood as one particular way of popular mobilization and both as a means of alliance and a sign of belonging (Vicari, 2014). A similar approach has been applied by Rogers and Marres, who used hyperlinks to measure mobilization potential and patterns of alliance building (2000). Researching hyperlinks gives insights in mobilization strategies of SMOs, as they transport content these SMOs aim to share with their followers and perceive as supporting their goals and ideologies. Hyperlinks might be used to draw the attention of the visitors of the website to particular content, actors, events etc. and based on this are understood as a way of mobilizing popular support and creating alliances (Rogers and Marres, 2000). Also Simpson (2015) applied a similar approach of researching social movement coalitions by analyzing the hyperlink network between the websites of various social movement organizations. Simpson additionally suggests equivalence between traditional movement alliances and online alliances (Simpson, 2015: 43). Further, addressing the nature of hyperlinks in relation to traditional social movement alliances, he understands the network of hyperlinks as an associational space (Rogers, 2013, cited in Simpson, 2015). Hyperlinks are purposeful created by social movement organizations to signify with whom or what they wish to be affiliated. Hyperlinks are a system of representational communication and the provision or non-provision of hyperlinks is a political act, as it contributes to the organisational reputation of the respective
actor. Also, by creating hyperlinks as a form of digital pathways, the social movement organisations facilitate the construction of a collective identity and contribute to the collective visibility of movement actors (Simpson, 2015: 43-44). In this perspective, hyperlinks are used to construct categories and establish boundaries. Thus, to the extent that SMOs: (a) actively manage their personas and; (b) are cognisant of public understanding of organisational identity by means of comparison to others, the creation, maintenance and modification of hyperlinks are understood to reflect the strategic communicative choices and agendas of actors (Simpson, 2015: 44). Further, also the ratio between incoming and outgoing hyperlinks and its development might reveal information on the mobilization strategies a movement is using and its perception by outsiders.

7.4 Usage of the Internet by the far right

The fast evolution of the digital communication technologies has triggered a number of researches and analyses on the effects that these media have on social movements. Taking into account that far right actors often face constraints and stig mata in the public sphere, the Internet has become very important and interesting for them and is frequently used as a tool of mobilization. Already in 1977, McCarthy and Zald wrote that “the technologies available for resource accumulation should affect the ability of SMOs within the sector to mobilize resources” (1977: 1225). As Gatinarra and Pirro write, far right networks in many cases are established and operate online and use the various possibilities that the digital area offers for their purpose (Gatinarra and Pirro, 2018). In general, social movement scholars agree that the Internet and other digital communication technologies have significantly influenced different forms of protest as well as its extent (Polletta et al., 2013). Also, digitalized communication is an integral part of the personality and the everyday life of young people (Bang and Halupka, 2017), who represent the majority of activists in the contemporary social movements of different orientations. Hence, it seems very natural and expectable that also political activism and the associated communication and organization are shifted to the digital sphere. The new information and communication technologies are offering new resources for mobilization and political opportunities, which are used by social movement coalitions of the twenty-first century in general (Vicari, 2014) and the far right in particular. Within the digital media they can find and/or establish platforms that help them framing their purposes and that facilitate transnational mobilization, diffused strategies and polycentric protest events (Vicari, 2014: 95).
The Internet enables fast, cheap communication between individuals, defined groups or with the general public and provides opportunities to share any desired content with others. It significantly simplifies the organization of events as concerts, demonstrations or other kinds of meetings. Far right SMOs, same as other social movements, use it to communicate with each other, present and organize themselves, and make use of its anonymity. Another crucial point is that the Internet fosters transnational processes of communication and exchange between far right groups in different countries (Caiani and Kröll, 2015), even though the language barrier must still be considered. Also, the Internet is a major factor in the establishment of radical contrast societies and used to transmit radical and violent ideologies that in this way are easier translated into political activism (Köhler, 2015). Global and transnational thinking is very important for the far right to be able to realize its fundamental goals in a political manner (Grumke, 2017). To the advantages of the Internet as perceived by members of far right groups belong according to a field research by Köhler amongst others the following characteristics:

1) it provides a cheap and efficient way to communicate, network and organize meetings, which leads to a high integration of the individual members,
2) it provides a space that is perceived to be constraint-free, together with anonymity,
3) it serves as a platform to share information connected to the selected lifestyle (e.g. indexed music or literature, clothes, manuals etc),
4) it offers a major basis for ideological development and advancement based on the potentially unlimited number of people participating (all based on Köhler, 2015: 118-120).

Also Rohr Lopes identifies five key aspects which the media offers for the formation of social movements, which are communication, organization, mobilization, validation and scope enlargement (2014). For social movements, the Internet can in this way become a very helpful tool for the mobilization of new members, reducing the costs of communication between individuals and making communication in the context of large groups possible (Della Porta and Mosca, 2006, cited in Caiani and Kröll, 2014). It helps to solve the problem of leadership and networking and allows the organization of global and transnational events (Caiani and Kröll 2014; Petit, 2004), exceeding the limited possibilities that only regional mobilization offers to far right groups. Based on these conclusions, Caiani and Kröl refer to the modern information and communication technologies as “force multipliers” (Caiani and Kröll, 2014:
Also, social media provides a virtual space in which people can exchange about their sense of grievance about the current status quo and generate new identities, based on their understanding and ideal picture of the world, through social interactions (Smith et al., 2015, cited in Thomas et al., 2019).

An additional point is that the far right is increasingly using digital communication technologies to circumvent national legislation and criminal proceedings (Bartlett et al., 2011; Caiani and Wagemann, 2009; Tateo, 2005). Content that is considered illegal in one country is typically placed on servers that are located in a different country with a less restrictive legislation. In this way the groups are able to avoid legal consequences and in the same time can provide listed content to the users in the home country. In general, information and communication technologies make it easier for right wing and populist movements to reach their regular audience (Groschek and Engelbert, 2012) and additionally enable them to gain the attention of a transnational audience (Caiani and Kröll, 2014). The Internet recently became a “key factor for creating new connections and networks across the globe” for far right movements (Roggeband and Duyvendak, 2003: 101). Activists are seeking collaborators across national borders as a response to the globalization and the rise of transnational corporations and governing bodies (Van Dyke and McCammon, 2010). Also, distances between political actors and citizens have been shortened through the new technologies and there is a great potential to use them for political organization and mobilization. Further, the barriers for individual, political participation have been lowered (Groschek and Engelbert, 2012), which generally is also a consequence of the shift of collective action frames to cyberspace.

7.5 Social Movement Coalitions, Alliances and Collaborations

As pointed out above, the general dynamics of coalition building are not changing significantly in organizationally enabled networks, which are the subject of the research. Hence, the theory of coalition building in the context of social movements has been applied to the work. Coalitions are a means that helps social movements to mobilize the large numbers of people that are required to be successful (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). The mechanisms of cooperation and coalition forming within the far right movement are in the focus of this dissertation. Coalitions in the context of social movement have been described as “structuring mechanisms that bring a broad spectrum of otherwise distinct organizations into contact, spreading interpretive frames, organizational structures, political analysis and tactics” (Meyer and Whittier, 1994: 290). Further, both coalitions and collaborations are described as
the pooling of resources by distinct organizations to pursue shared goals (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). While a social movement coalition consists of individuals, social movement organizations and whole social movements, an intergroup socio-political collaboration focuses on members of social categories and groups instead than on formal organizations as such (Steinman, 2019). As basic theoretical framework, the theory of social movement coalitions within a social movement is applied in the context of this work. Together with the topic of the effects that such coalitions exercise on the involved social movement organizations, their theoretical background shall be closer discussed in the following. Also, understanding mechanisms of coalition building and their influence is important to understand the actions and backgrounds of social movements in general. Often, framing of issues is taking place in the interchanges that happen within coalitions, so understanding the organizational interaction helps us to understand the background of the frames (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017).

Coalitions, collaborations and alliances between and within social movements offer them the possibility to combine and mutually profit from their resources and influence. On the downside the involved actors might lose their autonomy in questions of strategy and tactics and additionally will find themselves in competition for resources and legitimacy with the other coalition members (Steinman, 2019). However, as the mobilization of a large number of people is one of the basic targets of most social movements, coalitions, which help them to be more successful and reach more people, are of central importance for them. Many cases have been described, where social movements have been unsuccessful because a coalition failed (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). The forming of coalitions between social movements is gaining importance in the overall social movement strategies (Obach, 2010). Also, “the research on coalitions is critically important to understand the dynamics of collaboration between social movement organizations” (Soule, 2013: 115). At the level of the actors themselves and taking also external influences into account, the reasons for social movements to form coalitions are:

a) Threats and opportunities: political conditions that pose significant threats to shared interests, pushing groups within a movement to work together, or, if large enough, search coalitions beyond their social movements (Almeida, 2003, cited in Steinman, 2019: 1073)

b) Ideologies: broad, inclusive or flexible ideologies facilitate coalitions; narrow, distinctive and inflexible ones inhibit them (Staggenborg, 1986, cited in Steinman,
Van Dyke and Amos add culture and identity to this point of the ideologies (2017).

c) Social ties, especially also bridge builders and coalition brokers within the movement are required to successfully form a coalition (Rose, 2000, cited in Steinman, 2019: 1073).

d) Conducive organizational structures: mostly broad, multi-issue goals and a rather formal organizational structure are associated with the successful formation of coalitions. Additional, organizational features as the division of labour and professional leaders facilitate the forming of coalitions (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017).

e) Institutional environment: Van Dyke and Amos (2017) summarize political opportunities, threats and institutional structures under this subpoint, stating that these factors are important for social movement mobilization in general. Institutional structures shape, which groups work together while opportunities and threats facilitate coalition building (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017).

f) Resources: considerations of the costs and benefits that are connected with coalition building shape decisions made by social movements; gaining access to resources that the organisation otherwise lacks are an important reason to decide in favour of a coalition (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017).

Coalitions as well as collaborations often are challenged by inequalities of power between the participants and by ideological differences that are not necessarily visible at first sight but come to the surface when the cooperation is extended and gets closer. Also, coalitions and collaborations that have been formed in response to a common threat often vanish when the threat ceases to exist (Steinman, 2019). Also, coalitions and collaborations differ in their duration and also their degree of formality; there might be very informal coalitions that split up after one common event and coalitions that cooperate for years. Also, the involved actors might keep separate formal, organizational structures or create formal alliances (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). In many cases on or several of the factors that contributed to the formation of the coalition cease to exists and lead to the disintegration of the whole coalition or collaboration. Additional factors that shape whether or not a coalition continues to exist are for example the extent of commitment to the coalition’s goals, which might differ in between the partners and lead to differences between them. Also interpersonal interactions and changes in the social environments of the involved actors might influence the success of a coalition (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017). As outcomes and successes of coalitions can hardly be separated from outcomes and successes reached by social movements, also the results
organizational changes, movement mobilization and political outcomes are mentioned in the literature as results reached by coalitions (Van Dyke and Amos, 2017).

Collaborations that per definition emerge between the members of different social groups are formed out of similar reasons and, same as coalitions, based on similar interests of the involved actors. Collaborations often develop as a reaction to the perceived own-group self interest that may be impacted by various different kinds of threats. A second key factor is the ideology regarding the own-group autonomy and socio-political agency (Roth, 2010, cited in Steinman 2019). Also, the existence of significant social ties that is affected by social and cultural distance and the interactions between the individuals both have been mentioned in the literature as important influences to the formation of collaborations (Lien, 2001, cited in Steinman 2019). Some groups might value their autonomy as much that they will not enter collaborations, even when the existing threats are significant. On the other hand for example mutual trust can be developed through common experiences of individuals, in the same neighbourhood, visiting the same school etc. and might then become the basis for the formation of collaborations (Steinman, 2019). Not as often used is the notion of alliances, which are defined as “ad-hoc and largely informal type of means-oriented cooperation” (Tarrow, 2005, cited in Simpson, 2015) and explicitly refer to two or more social movement organizations working together on a common task (Simpson, 2015). In the context of the study of social movement coalitions, alliances and collaborations, special attention is paid to coalition brokers or bridge builders, these metaphors are, however rooted in network theory and are not based on empirical studies on the topic (Simpson, 2015). The usage of network terminologies in the context of the research of coalitions of social movements is not a coincidence and confirms the two fields as being related to each other. Applying social network theory, or more concretely hyperlink network analysis to research coalition building between social movements hence seems to be a valid approach for the research.

Referring to the far right, which is build upon a strongly exclusive, narrow identity I do not expect significant coalitions that go beyond the far right movement and connect it with other social movements. In fact, while the traditional social movements in many cases are oriented on the same basic values the far right movement represents a notable exception. This has contributed to its exclusion from the theory of social movement studies. It is unimaginable that the far right movement would form i.e. a coalition with the human rights movement, which represents the opposite stance not only with respect to the refugee crisis. Thus, in the research, different far right movement organizations will be considered, which differ in their
ideologies and are allocated to different segments of the far right movement. Based on their respective segment the far right movement organizations address different clienteles and differ in their organizational structures. However, they still belong to the same social movement, so the research does not focus on cross-movement coalitions between different social movements but on coalitions and alliances that are formed within a single movement. Additionally, as case studies from two different countries are used, both the cooperation within the segments and the transnational cooperation are analyzed.

Related to cross-movement and within movement coalitions, research has shown that the availability of resources is important for events within movement coalitions but not for the formation of cross movement coalitions. Further, local threats inspire the coalition within movements, while larger threats inspire the formation of cross movement coalitions and the activity of multi-issue movement organizations is associated with higher levels of cross movement coalition events and other forms of protest (Van Dyke, 2003: 226). Also, social movements that form coalitions with other social movements are more likely to achieve success (Gamson, 1990; Steedly and Foley, 1979, both cited in Van Dyke, 2003). Related to transnational coalition forming, recent research has shown that the level of transnationalism of protest movements continues to increase and protest ideas and actions are exchanged in between different countries. This diffusion and international mobilization enabled the adaption and reformulation of similar protest practices throughout different countries (Vicari, 2014).

7.6 Mobilization in the context of collective action

There are different approaches to social movement theory which all circle around the question what motivates individuals to engage in social movements. Most prominent are the deprivation and relative deprivation theory, resource mobilization theory, political process theory, structural strain theory and new social movement theories (Sen and Avci, 2016). As this work focuses on the coalition building of social movements and one of the key motivations to form a coalition are resources that can be used commonly, foremost resource mobilization theory will be closer described in the following. Mobilization itself has been defined by Fernandez as “the movement and synchronization of ideas, people or resources for a specific social goal” (2014: 1) and as a collective phenomena that requires among others communication and social interaction (Fernandez, 2014). Mobilization theory is a key component of social movement theory, as social movements themselves have been characterized as “mobilizations by challengers who have the goal of generating systematic
change in a social field and meet with resistance from the incumbent actors who occupy the dominant positions in a field” (Hess, 2018). Mobilization structures enable the development of social ties, networks, community and a shared collective identity, which subsequently can be activated in various different actions (Ortiz and Ostertag, 2014).

One of the central problems in the field of social movement studies has been to explain individual participation in social movements, in other words to find out what mobilizes the supporters of a movement (Jenkins, 1983). Social psychologists, who researched why people participate in social movements found out that “people will act together to support a cause they are committed to, when they perceive that something is wrong and believe that they can succeed” (Thomas et al., 2019: 213). While this approach might help to explain individual motivation, it still leaves open how, when and why the formation of the social movement as such takes place. In an attempt to find out under which circumstances social movements form to mobilize action, a team of researchers identified pre-existing world views and social media exposure to result in a group consciousness. This group consciousness then was the proximal predictor for the key area the respective social movement addresses and hence affects the formation of the social movement (Duncan, 2012; Thomas et al., 2019). In this approach from the field of social psychology, the so-called group consciousness draws onto perceived injustice, social identity and perceived efficacy. Injustice and efficacy were found to mediate the relationship between social identity and collective action (Duncan, 2012). Further, research proved that the perceived efficacy of a particular action affects the decision of an individual on whether or not to participate into that action (see also chapter 7.2 Collective and Connective Action), while other analyses concentrated on the efficacy at group level (Duncan, 2012).

As a part of mobilization theory, resource mobilization theory has a long tradition in social movement studies. It has been discussed as early as in 1983 by Jenkins and since then has gradually developed. In addition to the classical theory of social discontent, Jenkins argued that social movement formation is also a result of available resources, organization and political opportunities. He further claimed that group organization is the major determinant of the mobilization potential and -patterns (Jenkins, 1983). In the context of resource mobilization theory, mobilization is referred to as the process, by which a certain group gains and subsequently also holds control over resources that are required for collective action (Jenkins, 1983). The types of resources are manifold and of material as well as non-material nature. There are tangible resources, as money, facilities and means of communication and
intangible resources, as the “human assets”, the labour of the supporters that form the basis of the movement (Freeman, 1979, cited in Jenkins, 983) legitimacy (McCarty and Zald, 1977, cited in Jenkins, 1983) and technical expertise (Tilly, 1978, cited in Jenkins, 1983). Recently, authors have described also the new communication technologies as resources of key importance in the process of mobilization, referring especially to the Internet and social media. They argue that these technologies contribute to the successful organization and implementation of social movements. The Internet is of special importance for actors that otherwise lack resources of mass communication and gives them a possibility to efficiently spread their message (Eltantway and Wiest, 2011; see also chapter 7.4 Usage of the Internet by the far right). In case that there are no available organizations or social networks which traditionally foster the development of collective action, the web might serve as a virtual mobilizing structure. Digital media might become a flexible and decentralized mobilizing structure that allows the involved members to contribute to some areas and opt out of others. Also, the Internet provides the involved members with the possibility to move back and forth in between their individual civic engagement and fully organized collective civic action (Ortiz and Ostertag, 2014).

A different approach to explain the foundation of social movements is the theory of deprivation. Proponents of this theory argue that social movements are founded, when certain people or groups feel deprived of goods, resources or services, Absolute deprivation theory treats the grievances of the respective group in isolation from the position of the group within society while relative deprivation sets the group in relation to other groups within society (McAdam et al., 1988, cited in Sen and Avci, 2016). However, as deprivation in some cases does lead to the creation of a social movement while it does not in others, deprivation as such might be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the establishment of a social movement (Sen and Avci, 2016).

There are three key determinants in the resource-centred approach. These are firstly the resources the group can access prior to the process of mobilization itself, secondly the processes by which the respective groups pools its resources and uses them to initiate or foster social change and thirdly the extent to which external actors contribute to the pool of available resources (Jenkins, 1983: 533). Resources as such are generally accessed as critically influencing the success of the social movement while organizational dynamics are the basis for the assessment of the collective actor (Eltantway and Wiest, 2011). Additionally, resource
mobilization theory was the first approach that considered also influences outside the social movement as being of importance (Johnson, 2000, cited in Eltantway and Wiest, 2011).

An appropriate classification of the resources has been controversially discussed, as many resources might be used in different contexts. Some authors have classified different resources based on their usefulness in controlling the actions of targets or based on their field of application (i.e. Gamson, 1968; Rogers, 1974, both cited in Jenkins, 1983). Others, by contrast, have just listed resources (i.e. McCarthy and Zald 1977; Tilly, 1978, both cited in Jenkins, 1983). Resource mobilization theory has been criticized for its assumption that discontent and collective interests are constant over time; for the overly attention it pays to outside resources and for its inability to adequately address social movements that begin with substantial resources or are instigated by some minority groups (Eltantway and Wiest, 2011: 1209).

The outcomes of social movement mobilization are summarized in the concept of the “opportunity structure” (Hess, 2018). Mobilization is affected by long-term structures of a state or a political issue, the configuration of the parties in power and the state of the public opinion on an issue or mobilization context. These factors might additionally change to varying degrees in response to mobilizations (Hess, 2018). Besides these structural factors, there are factors related to agency and strategy that influence the process of social movement mobilization (Hess, 2018).

Resource mobilization theory used to clash with traditional approaches of explaining social movements, as collective action and collective behaviour. This clash is based on a different conception of social movements as such. Supporters of collective behaviour understand social movements as “any set of non-institutionalized collective actions consciously oriented towards social change (or resisting this change) and possessing a minimum of organization” (Jenkins, 1983: 529), and as an extension of more elementary forms of collective action (Jenkins, 1983). Supporters of the resource mobilization thesis define social movements as “extensions of institutionalized actions” (Jenkins, 1983: 529), restricting their focus to movements that stand up for institutional change and aim to alter aspects of the social structure and the reward distribution that takes place within society, organize previously unorganized groups or represent excluded groups (Jenkins, 1983). Scholars that have researched the field emphasize both the importance of opportunities as for example new advantages and of threats, (e.g. the impending loss of benefits or fewer available resources) for the mobilization in the context of social movements (Tilly, 1978; Van Dyke and Soule,
Though resource mobilization theory has been applied in the dissertation, social movements are rather understood in the traditional way.

The mobilization process in the context of far right movements might differ in certain aspects, as the active participation in a movement that is based on an exclusive ideology might be based on a more self-centred, less altruistic motivation than in the context of other, traditional social movements. Even so, mobilization theory contributed to the theoretical backbones of this work, as its main assumptions, the mechanisms it described and the conclusions it draws from them are applicable also to the dynamics identified for the movements in the context of the research. While the underlying ideology might be different than when considering classical social movements, basic mobilization problems and mechanism that refer to the gaining of new resources stay the same. Also the described factors that mobilize individuals to participate in collective action and the various different types of resources are not value-bound and apply to the context of the far right in the same way as in any other social movement.

8 Historical Background

Europe has witnessed an increase of radical, extreme and populist right-wing sentiments in the last years. This has been visible in the election result of nationalist and far right parties, as Figure 2 below shows. The augmented right-wing sentiments were often described as a reaction (Decker, 2016) or at least as positively correlated (Steinmayr, 2017) to the refugee crisis and the high amounts of foreigners that arrived to the countries. However, the foundations for the rise of radical right ideas in Europe have already been laid earlier. Right wing extremism and radicalism are no new phenomena but right-wing parties, movements and subcultures existed in Europe also prior to the refugee crisis. Additionally, these tendencies exist in countries with a high number of immigrants and in countries with barely any foreigners and oftentimes are even stronger in places where the non-native population has a low share than in places with high amounts of foreigners.

Both the character and the development of radical ideas were predestined by historical developments, and the refugee crisis rather provided a trigger for their expression than being the reason for their development. In order to understand the reasoning and impact of today’s far right actors, it is crucial to analyze their historical background and development. While many authors concentrate rather to the formal sector of far right parties and often limit their
analyses to one country, the research interest of this work lies with the informal sector and the transnational relations between the Czech Republic and Germany. The following subchapters will describe the historical background of the far right movement for these two countries.

Figure 2 Rise of Nationalism in Europe (BBC 2019)

Three main periods within the development of the far right are identified, which all have own characteristics and dynamics. Also, the developments in the two selected countries run parallel to each other in many aspects, as will be described, a fact that contributed also to the selection of these two countries as case studies in the research. The start of the historical background is set to 1987, shortly before the German reunification, as important
characteristics of the German far right, which shape it till today, have their origins in this time. Further, the German far right has been influential for the developments also in the Czech Republic. The phenomenon of right wing youth subcultures has been “imported” from Western Europe to East Middle Europe (Vejvodová-Papičzová and Smolík, 2014), but also the communist past contributed to its shape.

In the case of Germany focus is set to the Eastern parts of Germany, as right wing sentiments are till today particularly strong there; however, also the Western parts of the country will be taken into account. The Czech Republic does not have any significant concentration of right-wing sentiments in a particular part, so the analysis takes the whole country into account.

8.1 Transformation period 1987-2002: Establishment of the foundations

The time shortly before the fall of communism and the following years are in the literature often referred to as transformation period, as it marks the transformation to a new regime type for the former communist countries. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in Germany, the old system ceased to exist and a new political, economic, cultural and societal system was implemented in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). This resulted for many citizens from Eastern Germany in a cultural shock as well as entailing economic consequences as e.g. temporary losing their jobs. The reunification lead to an economic collapse in Eastern Germany, as the large companies, that had dominated the economy before, were ousted by middle and small sized companies. Many of the established companies lost their traditional markets and on top of that faced competition from Western companies and exposure to the free market, which they had never experienced before. All these factors led to a production slump and temporary unemployment (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2016), which in turn caused dissatisfaction and insecurity among the Eastern German citizens.

In the Czech Republic the situation was different, but also there a change of the regime after the Velvet Revolution in 1989 took place, which was accompanied by various different types of insecurities. The communist regime had exhausted itself and no longer had the power to stand up against the whole population. So political parties were formed again and the first free election were held in 1990 (Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2010). However, while Germany was reunified, Czechoslovakia split up into two independent states in the end of 1992. Similar as in Eastern Germany, the economy in Czechoslovakia and subsequently in the Czech Republic and Slovakia had to adapt from the model of a command economy to a free market. Main steps in this adaption process were price liberalization, the opening of markets.
to foreign trade and investment, internal convertibility of the country’s currency, privatization of state-owned enterprises and a tax reform (Britannica, n.d.). However, the Czech Republic had a comparably well-educated and skilled labour force, a low level of foreign debt and is geographically close to Western Europe. Thanks to these factors, the level of unemployment remained low and the economic performance was stable after the revolution and the split of Czechoslovakia. The Czech Republic has been referred to as one of the greatest economic successes in postcommunist Europe (Britannica, n.d.). Nonetheless, compared with Western European countries the Czech Republic is still weaker than Western countries from an economical point of view.

After the fall of communism, the extremist right developed from a phenomenon at the margins of society into an actor who influenced the political and media agenda by massive use of force. In this context subcultures were providing the basis for the development of various different extremist right, militant organizations (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018). It is hard to find any reliable information on the spread of the far right ideology in the time of the communist regime and its end, as for example in the case of East Germany the regime officially stated that right-wing extremism had been successfully eradicated in the GDR (Grjasnov, 2008). When incidents with a right-wing motivation occurred, the regime simply called them “rowdyism” (Stöss, 2007: 106) and thus denied right wing tendencies to not admit its failure. However, as known today, the far right tendencies gained strength in the communist regime and became increasingly violent (Bugiel, 2002; Stöss, 2015) and finally a secret research project was launched to analyze them. Among its findings was that a network consisting of Nazi-skinhead and Nazi-hooligan groups had developed in the GDR (Wagner, 2017). The cooperation structures of this network were used to build up first structures that covered the whole reunited Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall. In general, xenophobia, dissatisfaction and feelings of being disadvantaged grew in the transformation period, fanned by high unemployment rates and large amounts of refugees that arrived to the GDR. Also, the xenophobic and extremist right potential for violence grew in Eastern Germany (Bugiel, 2002) and peaked in the 5-day long attacks against immigrants and foreigners that took place in Hoyerswerda (Saxony) in 1991 (Janzik, 1997). In the following year the number of criminal attacks that were based on an extremist right motivation decreased by 60 percent, however, the relative number of propaganda offences grew. These were committed in most cases spontaneously and by young people, which points to a spread of extremist right attitudes among young people (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz Sachsen, 1994: 8).
In that time a new form of organization within the subcultures emerged which was referred to as “cells”, sometimes also as “companionships” (German: Kameradschaften). These cells were small groups that concentrated around one leader and held the contact to other cells mostly via these leaders, which made it harder for the police to grasp them (Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 1993). These informal organizations were a reaction to the often imposed bans of right wing organizations and a way to bypass the German legislation. Extremist right structures that covered the whole, united Germany and were active also internationally developed, as for example the Hammerskins or Blood & Honour (Bugiel, 2002). Not only the subcultural sector but also the right-wing parties gained support within the transformation period. As Oppelland (2017) argues, the increasing support had been connected with the feeling of many people living in the GDR to be “second class citizens”. The same argumentation applies to the informal sector as well, only the organization form differs. Oppelland further reasons that East Germany was lacking a strong connection between the population and the established parties compared the western parts of Germany and was experiencing a stronger “anti-party affect” (Oppelland, 2017).

Same as for Germany, also for the Czech Republic information about right wing tendencies in the socialist regime are hard to find. The literature often describes punks as having been very influential in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; however, this might also be connected with incomplete information about the skinheads (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018). The communist state security (Státní bezpečnost) reported already in 1983 Nazi-punks in Prague that wore for this time typical clothes and stirred up hatred against Vietnamese people (Mareš, 2005). The racial orientation of parts of the punk scene remained unchanged until the end of the communist era, while towards the end of the 1980’s the anarchy movement formed within the other part of the punk movement (Mareš, 2003). During the last years of the socialist regime, main motivations for the Czech youth to join extremist right subcultures were, same as in East Germany, the protest against the regime and the bourgeois population. Also the aggressiveness of some young people that was directed against Roma, Vietnamese, Arabs or other, “enemy” youth subcultures influenced their decision to join extremist right organizations. Additionally, it is important to emphasize that there were also fascist and neo-Nazi groups active that cannot be assigned to any subcultural identity (Daniel et al., 2016). Mixed groups, consisting of punks and skinheads carried out racist attacks against Roma and Vietnamese people and in 1990 the first racial motivated murder of a truck driver took place. It was followed by attacks from extremist right skinheads to left-wing punks and anarchists and attacks to Roma resulting into five deaths in the years 1990-1992 (Mareš, 2010). This
ideological background for the nationalism in the Skinhead-subculture in the Czech Republic draws from various different sources, which caused disunity within the movement. There were anti-Germanic streams, groups that followed the tradition of the Italian vision of fascism and parts of the extremist right that took up the nationalism of the Sudeten Germans and the Czech collaboration during the Second World War (Mareš, 2008). As early as in 1990 the Czech Skinheads established contacts with the German groups, main points of contact were in this time located in Bavaria and Berlin. The cooperation flourished, even though there were historical obscurities and burdens and mostly white power music was very popular among Czech skinheads (Vávra, 2017). The contacts with the German far right movement significantly influenced the “Nazification” of big parts of the Czech extreme right skinheads, leading to a growing gap in between the national socialist skinheads and the majority of the population (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018). Similar as Germany also the Czech racist skinheads experienced from approx. 1995 till 2002 a “golden era” (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018). The Czech neo-Nazis joined transnational networks (i.e. in 1995 the establishment of Blood & Honour Division Bohemia) and racial motivated attacks to Roma, the left and foreigners peaked. These assaults evocated political reactions as well as anti-racist demonstrations. The internal security measures were improved but their effectiveness stayed limited (Čakl and Wollmann, 2005). As a result of the regular contact between the Czech and German extremist right groups the National Resistance (Národní odpor) was established in the Czech Republic in 1999, based on the role model of the German free companionships (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018).

8.2 2002-2014: Autonomous Nationalism as a new approach

The above described subcultural developments form the basis for the foundation of the right wing parties as well as of the violence-prone right wing extremism. Also the new formed types of right wing extremist groups in the Czech Republic and Germany kept up their cooperation after 2002 (Vejvodová, 2014). While the transformation period slowly came to its end, autonomous neo-Nazi companionships were established all over Germany, which is often described as a reaction to the stricter legislation on extreme right organizations that fostered the creation of rather informal organization structures (Bringt and Begrich, 2008). These companionships were not keeping any formal member lists or any kind of official structures (Klarmann, 2017), which made it a lot harder for police and other law authorities to approach and prevent them. Around the year 2000 the National Socialist Underground
(Nationalsozialistischer Untergrund, NSU) was founded, which was an extreme right terror cell consisting of three key members and an unknown amount of supporters. The group conducted several bomb attacks, bank robberies and murdered nine foreigners based on an extreme right motivation. Additionally, one policewoman died during an armed confrontation between the police and the NSU (Schmidt, 2015a). The NSU was active until 2011, when two members committed suicide and the last one was arrested by the police and put to trial later on. The NSU is a very typical and also one of the last examples of the organization in small companionships and cells. Their non-hierarchical structure and most of all their small size provided them with great freedom, made them hard to approach for the police and ensured their efficiency (Schmidt, 2015a). The described example of the NSU vividly illustrates this. The structure of companionships is also found in the Czech Republic, where they continued to exist even longer than in Germany (Mareš, 2013).

In the course of the far right’s restructuring, the autonomous nationalists as a new actor had developed which marked a clear break with the previous ideology and approach of traditional far right parties and most of all made the far right ideology attractive for younger generations. Their origins are to be found in the organization in companionships and lie in Germany, from where they spread to various different European countries (Mareš, 2009). However, while far right companionships in the late 1990s in Germany, as described above, were organized rather loosely, the new concept of the autonomous nationalists was based on a much clearer organizational structure and the groups were often strongly violent (Schedler, 2010). Groups of autonomous nationalists gained importance with the stricter legislation related to the companionships and their first offsets developed in Berlin (Senatsverwaltung für Inneres und Sport, 2008). One characteristic feature of these groups is the explicit reference to tactics, appearance, argumentation structures and slogans that up to this time had been associated with the far left only. They were for example forming “black blocks” on demonstrations and had a very liberal dress code that tolerated hooded sweaters, sneakers and similar clothes (Schedler, 2010). The typical neo-Nazi with combat boots and a bomber jacket thus became an image of the past, symbolizing the rigid, old-fashioned approach of parts of the far right movement. As this new approach offered great individual freedom for its members, the far right scene became attractive for a significantly wider part of the population than before. Radke and Staud (2012) refer to this concept as “patchwork identities”, as the members of the autonomous nationalists freely mixed lifestyle and habits of various different subcultures with their nationalist ideology. Mixing up different approaches made it harder for outsiders to identify people who ideologically belong to the far right and protected the members of these
groups from stigmatizations. In the same time, insiders could still recognize each other based on certain symbols, brands or other signs (Staud and Radke, 2012). In Germany, the autonomous nationalists had their peak times around 2005, subsequently their popularity and visibility slowly declined, even though they did not disappear completely but continued to exist also in the following years. The neo-Nazis established also so-called “national liberated zones”, areas to which foreigners had limited or no access and which were completely under the control of the far right. In these zones the only figures of rule and the enforcement of law were the right-wing extremists, in most cases neo-Nazis (Novotný, 2009).

The autonomous nationalists in the Czech Republic were strongly inspired by the German groups and in many aspects are similar to these. According to Mareš (2010), they represent a branch of Blood & Honour Division Bohemia. The first elements of the autonomous nationalists were observed in 2004, their real rise began in 2006. Members of the autonomous nationalists were involved in violent assaults against Roma and the police in 2008 and 2009. The autonomous nationalists have inspired the establishment of divisions in Slovakia and Poland and have cooperated both with the Worker’s party and its youth organization (Mareš, 2009). However, in 2010 the autonomous nationalists published a document on their main server in which they officially distanced from the Worker’s Party of Social Justice (Dělnická strana social spravedlnosti, DSSS), accusing them of intolerance towards other ideological trends in the national socialist movement and of unwillingness to support prosecuted activists. However, later it became evident that not all members were standing behind this position, as invitations to events hosted by the Worker’s Party continued to appear on the new main server of the Autonomous Nationalists (Mareš, 2010). Even so, these happenings point to a rift between more traditional forms of (neo-)Nazism and the new, modern subcultural forms as represented by the autonomous nationalists, same as in the case of the German far right. The approaches of these two groups are fundamentally different, so that even though they represent the same ideology they often are in disagreement and conflict with each other.

Within the formal sector, the German National Democratic Party (Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschland, NPD) continued to exist throughout this time period, even though its poll results did not gain significance. Between 2001 and 2003 the first attempt to forbid the NPD took place, which was unsuccessful. The court procedure had been terminated before it actually began as there were too many undercover agents in the top positions of the NPD which weakened the position of the party in the court proceedings (Geuther, 2017). The attempt to forbid the NPD was triggered by a wave of extremist right events and sentiments
and an increasingly confident behaviour of the party (Wolf, 2006). The official sector of the far right in the Czech Republic also was not particularly active after the end of the transformation period. In general the party sector is not as strong in the country but there is a strong, militant ultra right youth spectrum (Mareš, 2009). In the Czech Republic, former members of extremist right skinheads groups have been active in various different radical right parties, including the newly founded Worker’s Party (Dělnická Strana, DS). This party and its youth organization were since 2005 closely cooperating with the Autonomous Nationalists (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018) as well as with the NPD and its youth organization Young Nationalists (Junge Nationalisten, JN). The party Dělnická Strana was officially banned in 2010; its successor party Worker’s Party of Social Justice (Dělnická Strana Sociální Spravedlnosti, DSSS) continued with a nearly unchanged program and also maintained the cooperation with the NPD. This cooperation includes also their youth organisations (Mareš, 2012), which will be analyzed in the context of this work.

8.3 2014-2018: Populist era

In the above described foregoing time episodes since the fall of communism the developments of the far right movement in the Czech Republic and Germany took a similar course and went through comparable periods. However, since approximately 2014 their developments are taking different directions, which shall be discussed in the following. In Germany the far right has been popularized, broadened its activities in the Anti-immigration segment and gained popularity within the formal sector which they did not use to have beforehand. The new actors are heterogeneous and use a populist style of policy-making. The Czech far right in contrast rather underwent a radicalization and its informal part expanded in the neo-Nazis’ segment. In the formal part of the Czech far right, populist and populist right to conservative parties gained great popularity. Generally, the far right movement in the Czech Republic stayed more in the informal sector and in comparison to Germany is more radical. Far right parties have never been very successful in the country but there are strongly populist and conservative parties that represent moderate right ideas.

In the fall of 2014, the German right-wing movement Pegida – Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the occident (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes, Pegida) was established in Dresden (Saxony). The supporters of the movement positioned themselves against the loss of European values and the growing number of Muslims in Europe. The demonstrations peaked in January 2015, just three months after the establishment of Pegida, with around 25.000 demonstrators that were reported to have participated in one of
the evening marches organized by Pegida in Dresden. Although various offshoots were later on founded all over Germany and even in other European countries the core of the movement and its greatest success was located in eastern Germany (Schmidt, 2015c). Pegida had been established prior to the refugee crisis in 2015 and already had lost popularity by the time when a lot of refugees arrived to Germany. However, Pegida paved the way for the success of the party Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland – AfD) as stated by a leading member of the party (Frankfurter Rundschau 2016). Some authors argue that the AfD was the first far right party in the newer history of Germany which was able to cooperate with a likeminded social movement (Grabow, 2016) and thus overcome the traditional division between the formal and informal sector. The idea that Pegida contributed to the success of the AfD is also confirmed by the fact that 47 percent of the supporters of Pegida stated to have voted for the AfD, followed by nearly 25 percent that claimed to have voted for the Christian Democratic/Social Union (Christlich Demokratische/Christlich-Soziale Union CDU/CSU) (Geiges et al., 2015). In comparison, in the federal elections 2017 the CDU received 26.8 percent of the votes while the AfD reached 12.6 percent of the votes (Bundeswahlleiter, 2017; Novotný and Šárovec, 2018). In conclusion nearly half of the people that went to Pegida-marches also claimed to vote for the AfD, which equals the real success of the party multiplied by four. With this election outcome the AfD became the most successful populist right party in the newer German history and Germany no longer forms an exception without any populist right party in its parliament (Novotný and Šárovec, 2018).

Pegida was an important coalition partner, inspiration and role model for the Czech anti-Islam movement (Prokůpková, 2018). While strong anti-Muslim sentiments are existing in the Czech Republic as well, the Czech anti-Islam movement “Islám v České Republice nechceme“ (We do not want Islam in the Czech Republic) was not as successful as its German equivalent Pegida (Hafez, 2018). Also a Czech branch of Pegida and other movements as for example Naštvané matky (Angry Mums) were not able to mobilize as many people as the German Pegida (Prokůpková, 2018) and additionally were rather short-lived. One of the biggest demonstrations of the main movement Islám v České Republice nechceme, which was even organized in cooperation with Pegida from Germany, took place in February 2016 and attracted approximately 1500 people (iDnes, 06.02.2016; Prokůpková, 2018), while in other cases demonstrations of the movement did not attract more than 1000 people. Hafez argues that the comparable low success of the anti-Islam movement in the Czech Republic can be explained by the fact that mainstream political parties have co-opted the issue so effectively that no further popular mobilization has been required (Hafez, 2018). This
assumption is also in line with the fact that the Czech far right mobilization targeted rather radical forces, as moderate opinions are sufficiently represented by the official parties. In Germany on the other side, people who were tending to the right did not feel sufficiently represented by the existing political parties, which contributed to the success of Pegida.

Another new actor in the informal far right sector in the Czech Republic is the movement National and Social Front, (Národní a Sociální Fronta, NSF), the supporters of which refer to themselves as opponents of the system of slavery and proud nationalists. Further, they want to replace capitalism by a socialist system based on the national principle (Národní a Sociální Fronta, n.d.). All in all they represent the ideology of the neo-Nazis as apparent from their web presence and self-presentation. On their Facebook page the group is very active and regularly organizes meetings and other kinds of events, also with international participation. The movement Národní a Sociální Fronta is comparably new and rather extreme and has not equivalent in the German far right movement as of October 2019.

While Pegida still was an informal actor within the far right, the consolidation of a formal actor was not far away. The AfD filled the representation gap at the right of the political spectrum and thus could attract as many supporters as it did. The party, which has been established in 2013 as a eurosceptic party (Arzheimer, 2015), gained a lot of supporters in a very short time after its establishment. While the AfD stayed below the German electoral threshold of 5 percent in the federal election in 2013, they received 12.6 percent of the votes in the federal elections in 2017 and by this became the third strongest party in Germany and the largest opposition party (ARD, 2017). With this success the AfD became the first far right party that was represented on the federal level, as the far right parties before have had only regional success (Decker, 2016). The political classification and orientation of the AfD was strongly disputed in the politics and media and no final consensus could be established about it. Some authors call the AfD populist, others nationalist or völkisch (Häusler, 2018) and some even claim that it is an extremist party that should be forbidden or at least be put under observation by the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Thurm et al., 2018). During the refugee crisis Chancellor Angela Merkel positioned herself at the political centre to centre left, while actually being the leader of the conservative Christian Democratic Party, a centre right party. The conservative to moderate right position in the German federal council therefore stayed without representation, which the AfD utilized to broaden its own position and fill the opening gap. In this way they were taking over the representation of the
conservative and moderate right voters in the time of the refugee crisis (Lees, 2018), which had been left without political representation at this time.

While still existing, the NDP stayed political insignificant in the last analysis period. Although there had been a second attempt to forbid the NPD, the Federal Constitutional Court decided in 2017 that even though the basic program of the NPD is in disagreement with the constitutional democratic state, the party did not actively seek to abolish this order and that there was a lack of potentiality (Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2017b). The decision was discussed controversially among the observers of the trial and the NPD tried to use it to gain new members and influence, which was, however, unsuccessful (Oppelland, 2017).

In the Czech Republic the recent development within the far right were quiet different. Though extremist right parties have never been very successful in the Czech political landscape, moderate and populist right approaches are represented in several different ways. Within the formal sector, a traditional, conservative to centre right party in the Czech Republic is the Civic Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS), which was founded in 1990. It used to be an enduring and electorally successful party that contributed to a stable pattern of centre right politics. The party follows a neo-liberal approach and originated in the transformation of a broader grassroots movement (Hanley, 2010). However, in the elections in 2010 and in the following ones in 2013 there were drastic changes in the party system and the period of relative stability came to its end (Kopeček, 2016). In the most recent elections in 2017 the ODS reached 11 percent of the popular mandate, which was a success compared to the 7 percent they had won in the elections before. The circumstances of the centre-right government’s fall and the strong dissatisfaction of the voters contributed to the success of a comparably new party. This most successful party in this last elections was the populist party ANO 2011 (Eng: Yes 2011, standing also for „Akce nespokojených občanů” - Unsatisfied citizen’s Action), which won nearly 30 percent of the popular mandate (Czech Statistical Office, 2017). From 2013-2017 the party had been in the government as a junior partner in a coalition with the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats; since its success in 2017 the party forms the government on its own. ANO 2011 is often accessed as a strongly populist party and positioned against the political elite and against corruption. This approach is often found within the far right, also, the party positions at the right of the political spectrum in the context of other aspects, i.e. it strongly opposes the inclusion of refugees. However, ANO 2011 is neither a right, nor a left wing party but is mixing up various different approaches in its political program. Also, the populist appeals of the party
were voiced mostly in the time of its emergence; since the party entered the government these appeals have been rather in the background (Kopeček, 2016). ANO is a very clear example for populism as a style of politics and not an own ideology as described in the subchapter 6.3 Populism. According to Havlík (2016), the autocratic structures of the party and the concentration of economic and political power and control over the media that the leader and prime Minister of the Czech Republic Andrej Babiš wields are a danger for democracy. Also Babiš’s approach to lead the state in the same way as a business enterprise, as unlimited decision-maker, is undemocratic and amongst others a danger to the rights of minorities and the rule of law (Havlík 2016). ANO 2011 has been referred to as an extreme form of a business firm party (Kopeček, 2016) and its leader announced amongst others that “I am paying, so I decide”, calling the Czech Republic a company with 10 million shareholders.

A second major populist right force in the Czech Republic is the party Freedom and Direct democracy (Svoboda a přímá demokracie, SPD), which has been established in 2015 only and won nearly 11 percent in the election in 2017. The party is strongly eurosceptic, opposes immigration and favours direct democracy. They are also against the multicultural society and against Islamization, which they perceive as a threat to the Czech homeland (spd.cz). Some sources refer to the SPD as a far right party (Muller and Lopatka, 2017). The party centres around the leader Tomio Okamura, who is half Japanese himself but promotes anti-immigration laws and opposes foreigners, especially the Roma living in the Czech Republic (Muller and Lopatka, 2017). Also, the SPD cooperates with other far right parties from Europe, as for example the French Front Nationale or the Dutch Party for Freedom (Willoughby, 2017).

A key development within the far right that can be observed in the context of Pegida and the AfD is the extensive use of social media, for organization and networking. The use of social media significantly contributed to the success of Pegida in Germany (Hafez, 2018) and analyses of the content posted on social networks and the audiences have confirmed significant overlaps between Pegida and AfD (Stier et al., 2017). Also the Czech groups as the movement Islám v ČR nechceme and Národní a Sociální Fronta extensively use social media as Facebook and Twitter for communication and organisation.

8.4 Conclusion and outlook: Heritage of the Transformation

The gradually occurring erosion of the socialist regimes in the 1980’s resulted in the Czech Republic as well as in the GDR into the influence of the extremist right ideology onto the
youth subcultures. While the GDR was affected especially by the developments in West Germany, the Czech Republic was under the general influence of Western Europe. The expansion of the extreme right skinheads was made possible by the fall of communism in both states. While the complicated heritage in the Czech Republic lead to a fragmentation of the extremist right skinheads into several different streams, in the former GDR and mostly in Saxony the neo-Nazi ideology dominated (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018).

During the transformation period, the foundations for the far right were established and structures that covered the whole, united Germany were founded after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Transnational connections were as well formed in the context of the Czech far right subcultures. In East Germany a wave of extremist right violence occurred, which peaked in the pogrom-like attacks to an immigrant hostel in Hoyerswerda. Though there also was a wave of extremist right violence in the Czech Republic, directed rather against Roma and Vietnamese people, there were no comparable incidents with broad support from the population as in Hoyerswerda (Schmidt and Mareš, 2018). When the ideological and structural foundations of the far right had been firmly established and the scene in Germany was confronted with a stricter approach of police and other law enforcement authorities in the late 1990’s, the concept of cells and companionships gained importance, as their informality and non-hierarchical structure made them less vulnerable to police and the legislation in general. Around 2002, this concept became outdated and the first groups of Autonomous Nationalists emerged in Germany, which mostly changed and softened the outer appearance of the far right subcultures but kept a strongly violent, extremist ideological approach. The concept of the Autonomous Nationalists has its origins in Germany, where the first of these groups were active around 2002 in Berlin. From there it spread to other countries and in the Czech Republic the Autonomous Nationalists had their peak times around the year 2006.

In Germany, the rather informal structure of the Autonomous Nationalists was in 2014 superseded by the anti-Islamization movement Pegida, which attracted a lot of supporters, amongst them also people that never had been active in any far right mobilizations, in a very short time. These people apparently did not feel represented by the mainstream parties anymore and found in Pegida an informal political actor who voiced their opinions and concerns. Pegida paved the way for the success of the AfD, which could, during the refugee crisis, occupy a centre right position while also representing more extreme positions. Thus, the party mixed up rather moderate and more extreme approaches, which made its evaluation and general assessment very difficult. When the topic immigration and foreigners became a
central issue in the German politics, Pegida developed into a mass movement and attracted a 
lot of political and public attention, different than for example the Autonomous Nationalists 
and other far right actors in the years before. New in the development is the excessive use of 
social media and the Internet in general, which signifies the new public space these 
movements and parties occupy and via which they exercise their influence, convey their 
messages and create meaning.

A movement in the Czech Republic that was similar to Pegida was the movement Islám v ČR 
nechceme, which, however, did not reach the same popularity and the mass support as Pegida. 
According to different authors, moderate right ideas were sufficiently represented in the 
politics, as populist and populist right parties could win a lot of support in the recent elections 
in the Czech Republic. This resulted in reduced moderate street activism, while the far right 
movement seemed to proceed in a more radical direction that its German counterpart.

Analyzing and comparing the historical background of the far right movements in the Czech 
Republic and Germany allows conclusions on the relationship between the formal and 
informal sectors of the far right movement. The cases of the Czech Republic and Germany 
confirm the hypothesis by Hafez:

- “Strong representation of populism in parliament reduces the potential for street protest” 
  (Hafez, 2018).

On the basis of the existing case studies which both are countries and their far right 
movements in times of crisis, we can broaden the assumption by Hafez and further 
hypothesize that

- Strong representation of populism in parliament radicalizes street protest

- Weak representation of populism in parliament fosters street protest

Throughout the different time periods, right-wing sentiments, xenophobia and nationalism 
were more distinctive in Eastern Germany than in Western Germany. This had been already 
visible during the transformation period and continues also in the following years. Voters of 
the far right parties like for example the German AfD or the populist right SPD in the Czech 
Republic are significantly more often unsatisfied with the political situation in the country 
(Decker, 2016). These feelings of being disadvantaged and the dissatisfaction were present 
already during the transformation period in both countries and continued to exist also after the 
fall of communism in certain parts of the population. As the insights into the historical
background of the far right movement in both countries showed, their heritage and episodes of development are in many aspects similar, even though the two countries apart from that differ in many aspects.

9 Results

9.1 Network evolvement during the investigation period

In the first research question should be analyzed, how the hyperlink network evolved during the main investigation period of the research from 2017 to 2019. This serves to get an insight into the hyperlink network and its development as well as providing information on the single SMOs. The analysis includes central network measurements, timeline data and consideration of the individual communities of each movement. A crucial point in this analysis is the differentiation between in- and outbound hyperlinks, as they carry fundamentally different information about the individual actors. Additionally, the critical look to the different network characteristics and to the change of the network over time provides an insight into the strategies the single movements employ in their hyperlinking behaviour. This allows preliminarily conclusions on the movements’ approaches to mobilize supporters and the changing perception of the social environment.

The settings detailed in Table 6 below were used for the web crawls with the application Voson. The first web crawl was conducted on 20.09.2017; 2 years later on 17.09.2019, the web crawl was repeated with the same settings and based mostly on same seed websites to analyze how the network evolved over the time span of two years. The difference in the seed pages concerned Pegida, who appeared to use a different websites than two years earlier as its main page\textsuperscript{10}. Additionally, the Czech movement Národní a Sociální Fronta and the German movement Junge Alternative have been added to the second crawl as seeds, as both movements gained importance in the far right movements in their countries during the investigation period.

\textsuperscript{10} In 2017 Pegida use the website https://pegidaoffiziell.wordpress.com/pegida-deutschland/ as main medium of communication. Besides the German branch of the movement it also contains references to various other branches of Pegida in different European countries. In 2019 by contrast the movement was most active on the website https://www.pegida.de/, which exclusively referred to the German branch of Pegida.
| **Inbound** | discovered -1000- inlinks (max. incoming links) |
| **Crawler did not look for inbound links to each internal page that was discovered** |
| **Outbound** | discovered -1000- outlinks (max. outgoing links) |
| crawled -25- pages without finding a new outbound link (max. unproductive pages) |
| crawled -50- pages (depth of crawl – Pages) |
| crawled -4- levels (depth of crawl – Levels) |

Table 6 Settings for the web crawl in the first research question

Based on the extracted websites, complete networks were drawn for both datasets, which depict all crawled sites, their direct and indirect connections and common as well as separately hyperlinked page groups. As usual for a hyperlink network, webpages are depicted as nodes, while hyperlinks are depicted as edges, further, the direction has been added to the graphs to indicate which page is hyperlinking to which or whether the connection is mutual. The option to group subpages of a website into a so-called pagegroup and depict them as one node was used to ensure clarity and readability. This means that instead of a number of nodes that represent various different subpages of one website, all subpages of a website are grouped together and represented in the network graph as one node. This ensures better readable and uncluttered graphs. Hyperlinking to the same page group, even if not referring to exactly the same subpage, points to a similar orientation and/or motivation of the different actors, which allows grouping subpages together into one node without losing important information from the network. Further, the Fruchterman Reingold algorithm layout was used to draw the graph. Table 7 below provides basic network data for the networks extracted on 20.09.2017 and on 17.09.2019.
### Network feature and short explanation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network size (number of nodes, representing pagegroups)</td>
<td>414</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of edges (hyperlinks)</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>548</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of components</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness – proportion of nodes in the network that are connected</td>
<td>0.891304</td>
<td>0.9375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network density</td>
<td>0.00232773</td>
<td>0.00209455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of dyads (pairs of nodes, might not be linked or connected by an unidirectional/reciprocated edge)</td>
<td>85491</td>
<td>130816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of mutual dyads (pair of nodes with reciprocated links)</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of asymmetric dyads (pair of nodes with unidirectional links)</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of null dyads (pair of nodes with no link)</td>
<td>85098</td>
<td>130286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic reciprocity 1 (ratio mutuals to all - The number of mutual dyads as a proportion of all dyads)</td>
<td>0.000058485711</td>
<td>0.000137598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic reciprocity 2 (ratio mutuals tononnull - The number of mutual dyads as a proportion of all non-null dyads)</td>
<td>0.0127226</td>
<td>0.0339623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edge reciprocity (The proportion of edges that are reciprocated)</td>
<td>0.0251256</td>
<td>0.0656934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (indegree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.203976</td>
<td>0.286136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (outdegree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.172423</td>
<td>0.0724109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (degree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.125397</td>
<td>0.179625</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7 Basic SNA data for the datasets extracted on 20.09.2017 and on 17.09.2019

---

11 This number was originally provided by VOSON in the scientific notation 5.84857e-05 and was converted by the author to the decimal notation in order to ensure better comparability with the second network.
9.1.1 Individual Communities

Figure 3 below shows a comparison of the complete network graphs that have been created based on the extracted data. As visible, the second network contains more connections in between the selected movements and they also link more frequently to the same content. Further, in Network 2 most of the mutual connections to the same content belong to the first ringset, while in Network 1 they are more frequently part of the second ringset only. The ringset refers to the level of the crawl at which the hyperlink was identified. With focus to the individual movements and their communities especially Pegida has a significantly larger community in the second network than in the first one. They seem to more actively use the website that has been created later and appear to have changed their communication strategy.

The communities of the Czech Identitarian Movement and of the movement Junge Nationalisten seem to be larger in the first network. This implies that not only none or few new hyperlinks have been added between 2017 and 2019, but also that old hyperlinks must have been deleted (outgoing links) by the administrators and/or that external sources less frequently refer to these websites (incoming links). Deletion of hyperlinks from the webpage of the movement could be a reaction to changes in the legislation – i.e. in Germany the so-called “Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz” has been enacted in October 2017 (Bundesamt für Justiz, 2017), which regulates hate speech and other illegal content in the Internet, mostly in social media. Further, the deletion of hyperlinks could also be a reaction to other kind of negative publicity. Additionally, the individual community of the Czech Identitarian Movement does consist mostly of nodes belonging to the second ringset in Network 1, while in Network 2 the nodes are belonging to the first ringset.
Figure 3 Comparisons of Network 1 and Network 2
The individual community of the movement Dělnická Mládež and of the movement Islám v ČR nechceme appear to not have changed their size significantly during the research period. Dělnická Mládež provides more links to common content in the second network but apart from that seem to have not changed as much. Also the individual community of the German Identitarian Movement did not change as much. The movements Junge Alternative and Národní a Socialní Fronta, which were added to the research later, have rather small individual communities. Also, they are not as good integrated into the network of shared content and do not have as many connections to other movements. As a last point, the majority of hyperlinks in their individual communities belong to the second ringset, while the other, established movements have more hyperlinks to the first ringset. Hence, the newcomers clearly differ from the already established movements with respect to their hyperlinking strategies.

9.1.2 Density

The number of links between the nodes in a network, in other words its density, is an important indicator of the overall level of network cohesion and the degree of its integration (Vicari, 2014). A completely connected network, i.e. a network in which all nodes are linked to all others, would have a density of 1. The network extracted on 20.09.2017 has a density of 0.00232773, the second one from 17.09.2019 a slightly lower density of 0.00209455. These are rather low densities compared with other types of networks, which might be explained by the fact that the hyperlink networks consist mostly of individual communities that belong to each of the selected movements. These communities are connected via single nodes and edges, but the individual communities of the movements do not have connections among each other. Also, the decreasing density of the networks over the research period signifies that the second hyperlink network is even less integrated than the first one. The very nature of hyperlink network and the data collection by the crawler, originating from the defined seed webpages, does not feature highly connected networks. Rather, the networks can be described as individual communities that are connected via selected external content.

Also the depth of the crawl might have influenced the results; however, crawling four levels as done in the case of the discussed networks was already the maximum which was possible with the used crawling application. Also, the relatively high number of null dyads and the comparably low numbers of mutual and asymmetric dyads are related to the low density of the networks. Most of the nodes in the networks are simply not connected with each other but are part of to the individual communities of the respective movements. There are nodes that
are connecting the single seed websites but these nodes still are a minority in the networks. Though, especially the ratio of mutual dyads has increased for the second network, while the ratio of asymmetric dyads stayed on a comparable level. In other words, the second network contains more nodes with a mutual connection – more pages mutually link to each other than in the beginning of the research period.

9.1.3 Betweenness centrality

To identify important nodes in the network that have a high betweenness centrality degree, Voson offers the possibility to create a hierarchy map and use betweenness as the hierarchy field. This means that the betweenness centrality degree is used as the deciding value for sorting the nodes in the hierarchically organized network. Figure 4 and 5 below show these hierarchy maps for both networks, followed by their discussion and interpretation.

Figure 4 Hierarchy Network 1 – Dataset from 20.09.2017
Figure 4 as well as Figure 5 clearly identifies the website of the German Identitarian Movement as the node with the highest betweenness, i.e. the most influential player in the network with the highest potential to control others, which did not change during the research period. In Network 1 the German Identitarian Movement is followed by the nodes for the websites of the movements Junge Nationalisten and Islám v ČR nechceme. In Network 2 Pegida took over the position of Junge Nationalisten, while Islám v ČR nechceme stayed at the third position.

In Network 1, all seed websites that have been used for the crawl are in the upper part of the network and have a higher betweenness centrality degree than all other websites that have been identified during the crawl. In Network 2 by contrast, the forth position is already occupied by YouTube, which has a higher betweenness than some of the seeds and the Czech branch of the Identitarian Movement is located in the bottom part of the Network 2. Hence, YouTube is connected to more nodes in the network than some of the seed pages. The two newly added movements are at the bottom part of the betweenness hierarchy graph for Network 2. Once again, they clearly differ from the older, already established movements and occupy less influential positions in the network.
Summing up, Pegida has gained influence and importance in the hyperlink network, while the movements Junge Nationalisten and especially the Identitarian Movement CZ lost importance and influence. Also YouTube has gained importance as a medium to share information and possibly also propaganda material of the far right. Finally, the two newly added movements have been found to still be not as influential as most of the other seeds with respect to their betweenness centrality degree.

9.1.4 Degree centrality

As a last, essential characteristic of the networks, the degree centrality should be discussed and compared for both networks. Besides the above described betweenness centrality, Voson does not provide data for the often used eigenvector centrality, but calculates the values of the degree centrality for each node. Degree centrality is nothing more than a count of how many connections a node has, including both in- and outbound. As other basic SNA data, this measure can be normalised. In this case the node with the most connections has a degree centrality of 1, while the degree centrality of all other nodes is calculated as fraction of the degree of this most connected node. Voson offer the option to normalize the degree centrality values, however, the application also provides total values, which are used in Table 8 below.

For degree centrality, higher values mean that a node is more central (Golback, 2015), respectively the whole network is more or less connected when the value refers to the complete network. Also, as hyperlinks are directed edges, in- and outbound might be differentiated as done by Voson. Thus, there is not only degree centrality but also in- and outdegree centrality for nodes in hyperlink networks. The following Table 8 contains a comparison of the degree values for Network 1 and Network 2 for all selected movements and also provides separate values for the in- and outdegree centrality.
In Network 1, the German Identitarian Movement has the highest degree centrality value, followed by the movement Islám v ČR nechceme and the Czech Identitarian Movement. At the lower end of the scale we can find Junge Nationalisten, Dělnická Mládež and Pegida on the last position. In Network 2 by contrast, Pegida is the node with the highest degree centrality, followed by the Identitarian movement DE and Islám v ČR nechceme. The movements Dělnická Mládež, Identitarian Movement CZ and Junge Nationalisten have the same degree centrality, i.e. they have the same number of in- and outbound links. Junge Alternative and Národní a Socialní Fronta are together at the bottom of the scale.

Hence, Pegida has jumped from the bottom of the scale to its top with the transition to the new website. The German Identitarian Movement and Islám v ČR nechceme have descended to the second and third place and both have a lower degree centrality than before. Also the movements Junge Nationalisten and the Czech Identitarian Movement have a lower degree centrality, while Dělnická Mládež gained some connections. Finally, that the two newly added movements Národní a Socialní Fronta and Junge Alternative are not as integrated in the network shows also in their comparably low degree values.

However, as hyperlinks are directional connections it is not sufficient to take only the degree values into account. Whether a hyperlink is incoming or outgoing is of great importance and

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Degree</td>
<td>Indegree</td>
<td>Outdegree</td>
<td>Degree</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islám v ČR nechceme</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dělnická Mládež</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge Nationalisten</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identifies CZ</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>identifies DE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Národní a Socialní Fronta</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge Alternative</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 Degree in Network 1 and Network 2
points to completely different conclusions. Therefore, the following Figure 6 provides a graphical overview on the in- and outdegrees in both networks for all movements.

Figure 6 shows a very high number of incoming links for Pegida in Network 2, which points to a great popularity of the website. Also the outdegree in the second network is among the highest in the graph. The movement Islám v ČR nechceme first had a lower number of incoming links than outgoing, while in the second network this ratio has turned. More incoming links than outgoing ones point to an increased popularity of the movement, while the administrators of the website seem to have removed some of the content they were referring to. Both Dělnická Mládež and Junge Nationalisten have more incoming links than outgoing, which could be interpreted in a way that these movements, as established actors, are frequently hyperlinked by others while they themselves might not use the Internet as much but rather rely on other forms of communication and exchange. The two included branches of the Identitarian Movement seem to differ significantly in their hyperlinking strategies. While
the German Identitarian Movement lost incoming links during the investigation period the Czech Identitarian Movement gained additional references. Further, the outdegree in the German branch does not change as much, while the outdegree of the Czech movement falls rapidly between 2017 and 2019, i.e. the movement has removed hyperlinks from its webpage. Finally, the two newly added movements both have a significantly higher number of outgoing links than incoming ones, which might be interpreted in a way that they are trying to increase their visibility within the network, while still not being as often referenced by other actors.

9.2 Extent of ideological overlap

In the context of the second research question has been analyzed, to which extent the ideologies of the selected far right movements overlap between the selected countries and between the different segments of the far right movement. Additionally, the ideologies of the single movements have been compared directly. The basic for this part of the research has been found in the self-presentation of the movements that are provided on their web pages in sections that are usually named “about us”, “who we are” or similar. The self-presentations of all involved movements are used as basic data sources to systematically code and analyse the ideological points of views of the different movements as well as the topics they place most emphasis on. Content analysis has been used to understand the respective ideological positions and identify overlaps in the ideological points of view of the single far right movements. The source material in Czech and German language respectively has been extracted from the main webpages of all movements and in the process of analysis its main content has been split up into its fragments. In the next step all fragments have been collected in tables and in a first round of coding, categories and the more specific codes have been developed to schematize the content as described in subchapter 4.3 Content Analysis. Subsequently, the developed codes and categories were refined, some were combined or renamed and in a second round of coding the assigned codes were standardized and unclear content was controlled one more time to reflect the source material as exactly as possible. Finally, the single categories that had been developed were added up for each movement separately and the data visualized in several figures and tables.

This part of the research already includes also the two later added movements, whose ideological positions are analyzed and described together with the positions of the original movements of the research. Same as for the second network in the first research area, this also means that for Germany the anti-Islam segment is represented by one additional SMO, while
for the Czech far right it is the neo-Nazi segment which includes three and not only two SMOs. However, the analysis should refer to the far right movement as a whole, which was the reason why the additional actors were included in the research. The number of single SMOs analyzed for both countries stays the same. Over the two rounds of coding, the codes and categories were developed that are depicted in Table 16 in the appendix. The source text from the websites was gathered from the official websites of all movements in February 2019 and subsequently coded by the author. The same websites as in the second network for the first research question have been used.

9.2.1 Ideological overlaps between countries

To answer the first subquestion of this part of the research, ideological overlaps between different countries have been analysed. The coding and evaluation of the self-presentations allows a direct comparison of the key areas each movement sets as important for itself, as well as a systematic, schematic understanding of the way in which the movements present themselves on their websites. The results are presented in Figure 7, which includes the results for each movement and the total of codes in each category per country. Significant differences in the self-presentation were found in the frequencies of the categories “Identity”, “Law and Order” and “Threats”. While German movements place a lot of attention on the nation and on maintaining law and order in the country, the Czech movements more often include remarks about their identity and frequently speak about various kinds of threats they perceive. Most significant was the difference in the category “Law and Order”, which was the second strongest category within the German far right movement (19 percent) while being of nearly no importance at all and the weakest category in the Czech far right movement (3 percent). In the areas “Critique”, “Defence”, “Goals”, “Ideology” and “Organisation” the frequencies of the assigned categories reach similar percentages. Both the German and the Czech far right movement frequently refer to their ideology in their self-presentation, the German far right paid slightly more attention to critique and defence while the Czech far right rather focuses on their organisation and on holding events. The results of the analysis can be found in Figure 7 and in Table 9 below. Table 9 sums up the percentages in each category reached by the Czech Republic and Germany and the differences in the categories
Figure 7 Frequencies of categories assigned to the “about us” section of all different movements, comparison of countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critique</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Law and Order</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>DE</strong></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>CZ</strong></td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Standard deviation</strong></td>
<td>2,828</td>
<td>2,121</td>
<td>0,707</td>
<td>1,414</td>
<td>7,071</td>
<td>4,242</td>
<td>4,242</td>
<td>11,313</td>
<td>9,192</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 9 Percentages of categories identified in the self-presentation of the selected movements, sorted country-wise

Table 9 also contains the standard deviations for all categories, i.e. the average variation of the values. This number is a measurement of how close the values contained in a data set are to the mean values. A small standard deviation means that the values in a data set are close to the mean of a data set, while a large standard deviation means that the values in the data set are farther away from the mean, on average (Rumsay, n.d.). Also the standard deviation confirms that the categories “Law and Order”, “Threats” and “Identity” have the highest variation, while the variation for “Ideology” and “Goals” is very small. I.e. “Ideology” and
“Goals” and of the same importance for the Czech and the German far right movements, while the emphasis they put on “Law and Order”, “Threats” or “Identity” varies significantly.

9.2.2 Ideological overlaps between segments

In the context of the second subquestion of this part of the research has been analyzed, how much and in which aspects the self-presentations of far right movements differ in between the identified segments. The analyses showed first of all that there are frequent overlaps in the categories on which the Anti-Islam segment and the New Right focus in their self-description, while the movements of the neo-Nazi segment rather emphasize other features. The anti-Islam segment and the New Right are similar in the extent to which they refer to the categories “Goals”, “Identity” and “Organisation”, while the neo-Nazi movements reach in all three categories higher percentages. The New Right movements are placing more attention on the category “Nation” than the other two segments, while the anti-Islam segment is especially often referring to the category “Law and Order” in their self-presentation. Surprisingly, the neo-Nazi segment is the least referring to “Threats” of various different kinds (only 8 percent) followed by the anti-Islam movement with 17 percent. For the new right the category “Threats” was found most frequent in their self-presentation (21 percent). Also, the neo-Nazi segment placed least attention on the category “Defence”, while for New Right and anti-Islam segment “Goals” and “Organisation” were the weakest categories. “Ideology” was among the strongest categories for all segments, same as in the comparison of the ideological overlaps in between the two selected countries.

All in all, there seem to be more differences when comparing the complete far right movements in the Czech Republic and Germany than when comparing the different segments within the far right movement. In other words, the segments of the far right movement are more similar to each other than the complete far right movements of the involved countries. Looking only to the segments, there are a lot of ideological overlaps in the self-presentation of the Anti-Islam segment and then New Right, while the Neo-Nazi movements present themselves in a different way. The results of the second part of the analysis can be found in Figure 8 and Table 10 below.
Figure 8 Frequencies of categories assigned to the “about us“ section of all different movements, comparison of segments

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critique</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Law and Order</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Neo-Nazi</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anti-Islam</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Right</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard deviation</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,6458</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,7859</td>
<td>3,21456</td>
<td>6,3509</td>
<td>6,2449</td>
<td>6,6583</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10 Percentages of categories identified in the self-presentation of the selected movements, sorted segment-wise

Besides the single percentages reached by the different segments in each category the table contains also the standard deviation for every segment, which also has been calculated for the differences between the countries.

As the dataset consists of three values for each category, the standard deviation must be treated with caution. A low standard deviation in this case means either, that the values in the respective category are all relatively close to each other, or that two out of three are very close and the third value is an outlier. Hence, also value sets with a low standard deviation must be critically examined. The categories “Critique”, “Defence” and “Ideology” have a very low standard deviation and all of the selected movements refer to it in a comparable proportion.
The categories “Goal”, “Identity” and “Nation” also have a comparably low standard deviation but all contain one outlier with a higher percentage; the neo-Nazi segment in the categories “Goals” and “Identity” and the new right in the category “Nation”. Finally the categories with the highest standard deviation are “Organisation”, “Law and Order” and “Threats”. In the categories “Organization” and “Threats” the neo-Nazi segment is one more time the outlier; in the category “Law and Order” it is the anti-Islam movement that reaches a significantly higher percentage than the other two segments.

9.2.3 Ideological overlaps between individual Social Movement Organisations

To complete the second part of the research and as it became necessary for the last part of the research, the following subsection takes a final look at the ideological overlaps between the individual SMOs. It does not contain new data, individual data for each movement are also included in the subchapter 9.2.1 Ideological overlaps between countries. However, the following subchapter serves to describe the already introduced data from a different perspective and thus provides the basis for the last part of the research. Figure 9 below contains a graphical overview on the categories assigned to each individual movement.

Figure 9 Ideological orientations of the single movements
The graphical depiction of the assigned categories helps to identify outliers. As visible, both Junge Nationalisten and Junge Alternative pay great attention to the category “Ideology”. “Law and Order” seems to be a central topic for the movement Pegida, while the Czech Identitarian Movement and the movement Islám v ČR nechceme focus on “Threats” towards their nations. Besides the graphical depiction the percentages reached by all movements in all of the different categories are collected in Table 11 below, which contains also the standard deviation for each category. “Threats” is by far the category with the highest standard deviation; the values in this category are very widespread, from the movements that do not pay any attention to it as Junge Nationalisten and Junge Alternative to the movement Islám v ČR nechceme for which this category accounts for 37 percent of their self-description. Further, also the categories “Law and Order”, “Identity” and “Ideology” have comparably high standard deviations and an average wide spread of values. However, as before it is insufficient to just consider the standard deviation. Individual outliers are very important as well to understand individual overlaps, as especially visible in Figure 9 above.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Critique</th>
<th>Defence</th>
<th>Goals</th>
<th>Ideology</th>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Law and Order</th>
<th>Threats</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Junge Nationalisten</td>
<td>10,71</td>
<td>5,36</td>
<td>7,14</td>
<td>26,79</td>
<td>1,79</td>
<td>14,29</td>
<td>14,29</td>
<td>19,64</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge Alternative</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>15,15</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>30,30</td>
<td>15,15</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>6,06</td>
<td>0,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>11,54</td>
<td>5,77</td>
<td>7,69</td>
<td>11,54</td>
<td>1,92</td>
<td>15,38</td>
<td>15,38</td>
<td>28,85</td>
<td>15,38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement DE</td>
<td>13,56</td>
<td>8,47</td>
<td>1,69</td>
<td>18,64</td>
<td>6,78</td>
<td>20,34</td>
<td>3,39</td>
<td>15,25</td>
<td>11,86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dělnická Mládež</td>
<td>8,14</td>
<td>4,65</td>
<td>8,14</td>
<td>20,93</td>
<td>8,14</td>
<td>13,95</td>
<td>3,49</td>
<td>11,63</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islám v ČR nechceme</td>
<td>6,90</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>20,69</td>
<td>13,79</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>6,90</td>
<td>13,79</td>
<td>37,93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement CZ</td>
<td>7,61</td>
<td>8,70</td>
<td>5,43</td>
<td>22,83</td>
<td>8,70</td>
<td>15,22</td>
<td>4,35</td>
<td>0,00</td>
<td>27,17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Národní a Sociální Fronta</td>
<td>3,33</td>
<td>3,33</td>
<td>13,33</td>
<td>3,33</td>
<td>23,33</td>
<td>20,00</td>
<td>20,00</td>
<td>3,33</td>
<td>10,00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Standard Deviation</td>
<td>3,2926474</td>
<td>4,488982</td>
<td>4,0899703</td>
<td>8,5338928</td>
<td>8,1380964</td>
<td>6,6528275</td>
<td>6,4320487</td>
<td>9,8490412</td>
<td>12,904648</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11 Ideological Orientations of the selected movements
9.3 Ideological overlaps as a basis for coalition building

In the context of the third research question and its subquestions, two types of online interactions were researched, which are firstly the direct, mutual connections social movement organisations uphold in cyberspace and secondly the connections via external content they share with their audiences. For this last part of the analyses another hyperlink network has been extracted which has been reduced to the seed page and the external content that connects different seeds with each other.

The data for the hyperlink network were extracted on 17.04.2019 using the web crawler application Voson as before and the main web pages of the selected movements as seed pages, including the two movements that were added to the selected movements in 2019, namely Národní a Sociální Fronta from the Czech Republic and Junge Alternative from Germany. The settings described in Table 12 below were used for the web crawl, which stopped for each seed when one the following occurred:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inbound</th>
<th>discovered -1000- inlinks (max. incoming links)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Crawler did not look for inbound links to each internal page that was discovered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Outbound</td>
<td>discovered -1000- outlinks (max. outgoing links)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crawled -25- pages without finding a new outbound link (max. unproductive pages)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crawled -50- pages (depth of crawl – Pages)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crawled -3- levels (depth of crawl – Levels)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12 Settings used for the web-crawl by VOSON in the third research question

After the web crawl had been complete, the data were visualized as complete network (depicted in Figure 10) and as a network of the most important pages and seed pages only (Figure 11) using VOSON as in the analyses before. For the layouts of both graphs the Fruchterman-Reingold graph drawing algorithm was selected, which is a force-directed algorithm. Also, the graphs include arrows to show whether hyperlinks are outgoing or incoming to the respective website. The complete network, which is the basis for both subquestions of this part of the research, is shown below. Additionally, both subchapters contain reduced forms of the network that correspond to the differing research interests.
Table 13 below provides basic information on most central network data from the complete network and the network consisting of seeds and most important page groups.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Complete Network</th>
<th>Seeds, most important Network</th>
<th>Seed Network</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Network size</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of edges</td>
<td>587</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of components</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusiveness</td>
<td>0.936248</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.625</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Network density</td>
<td>0.00195113</td>
<td>0.0356954</td>
<td>0.0535714</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of dyads</td>
<td>150426</td>
<td>1891</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of mutual dyads</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of asymmetric dyads</td>
<td>553</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...number of null dyads</td>
<td>149856</td>
<td>1773</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic reciprocity 1 (ratio mutuals to all)</td>
<td>0.000113012</td>
<td>0.00898995</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dyadic reciprocity 2 (ratio mutuals to nonnull)</td>
<td>0.0298246</td>
<td>0.144068</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Edge reciprocity</td>
<td>0.0579216</td>
<td>0.251852</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (indegree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.272267</td>
<td>0.446923</td>
<td>0.102041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (outdegree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.0675149</td>
<td>0.113679</td>
<td>0.102041</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Centralisation (degree, normalised)</td>
<td>0.16837</td>
<td>0.276503</td>
<td>0.119048</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13 Basic SNA data for the hyperlink networks
9.3.1 Direct hyperlinks between the movements

In the context of the first subquestion was analysed, whether direct hyperlinks between the selected movements increase with increasing ideological overlap. To identify direct connections between movements a network was created that contains only the seed pages and straightforward shows their connections between each other. Figure 11 below gives an overview on the hyperlinks that were found in between the different seed movements. Basic SNA data for this network are to be found in Table 13 above which contains also the network data for the complete network and the network consisting of seeds and most important pages and thus enables a direct comparison of the extracted data.
Overall the hyperlink network in between the seed websites is not very connected. It consists of eight nodes, which represent the eight movements that are selected for the research and only three edges. The movements Junge Alternative, Národní a Sociální Fronta and Pegida do not have any direct connections to the other movements. The German movement Junge Nationalisten provides a hyperlink to the Czech movement Dělnická Mládež. Most connected is the Czech branch of the Identitarian Movement, which hyperlinks both to the German Identitarian Movement and to the Czech Movement Islám v ČR nechceme. Hence, the most active movement with respect to coalition building is the Identitarian Movement from the Czech Republic. Referring to network theory, the Czech branch of the Identitarian Movement plays the role of a broker within this very limited network. The web page links to other key entities within a certain context – in our case the far right movement – that are not connected to each other and thus provides its supporters with extended access to information.

The sample is very small and does not allow general conclusions but it does provide an insight and possible directions for further researches. It seems that a very important factor in the coalition building in between far right movements is, how established the respective actors are. Both movements that have been added to the research later than the others, namely Národní a Sociální Fronta and Junge Alternative do not have any connections with the other seed movements. Out of the movements that are existing already longer only Pegida is an isolate\textsuperscript{12} in the system, which is a comparably new movement as well. More important, Pegida changed its website during the research period, which might have also influence its

\textsuperscript{12} A node without connections to other nodes.
integration within the network of movements. Further, the country of origin seems to not influence the coalition building, and what is more even a different language did not turn out to be an obstacle to coalition building for the far right. The Czech Republic and Germany do not have the same language but even so, Czech and German SMOs hyperlink to each other in both directions.

However, the segment to which a certain movement belongs seems to influence the coalition building. Direct connections within the neo-Nazi segment were found (Junge Nationalisten, Dělnická Mládež) and also the New Right hyperlinks to each other (Identitarian Movement Czech Republic to Identitarian Movement Germany). Only one cross-segment connection was found, going from the New Right to the anti-Islam segment. This corresponds to the finding from the foregoing part of the research that there are frequent ideological overlaps between the new right and the anti-Islam segments, while the neo-Nazi segment differs. With respect to the ideological orientation the movements Junge Nationalisten and Dělnická Mládež reached similar percentages in four categories (Critique, Defence, Goals, and Organisation) but significantly differ in five categories (Ideology, Identity, Nation, Law and Order, Threats). The different branches of the Identitarian Movement reach similar percentages in five categories (Defence, Goals, Ideology, Identity, Organisation) and differ in four categories (Critique, Nation, Law and Order, Threats) and the movements Identitarian Movement Czech Republic and Islám v CR nechceme only reach similar percentages in three categories (Critique, Ideology, Organisation) while differing in all others.

All in all there seems to be no systematic correlation between individual ideological overlaps and direct hyperlinks between movements, even though a bigger sample including more movements would be required to verify this result. Also, the country does not influence whether or not a direct hyperlink to another website is provided on the website of a movement. However, the SMOs included in the research seem to have a tendency of linking to actors within the same segment and also the time a SMO already exists and maintains its web presence seems to influence how well it is connected with other movements.

Further, it is possible that the movements do not see each other as much as alliance partners, but rather as competitors for the same audiences, which could be a reason for them to not directly link to each other. Movement coalition theory describes competition among actors as one important reason that hinders the formation of coalitions. However, also this stays an assumption that by now could not be verified or falsified, considering the small sample size and the very low overall number of connections.
9.3.2 Hyperlinks to the same content

In the second subquestion of the third research area was analyzed, whether the amount of hyperlinks to the same external content increases with increasing ideological overlap. In other words, it was researched whether movements with a similar ideological orientation provide their followers with hyperlinks to the same external content. For this research question a reduced network was created, which consists of the most important page groups identified in the crawl and the defined seed web pages. In this subnetwork of the original database from 17.04.2019, page groups that are connected to two or more seed pages with ingoing and/or outgoing hyperlink are defined as most important and hence included in the network. Figure 12 below shows the subnetwork of seeds and most important page groups.

Figure 12 Subnetwork of the dataset from 17.04.2019 – seeds and most important page groups
In the subnetwork, all nodes are assigned with a number as identifier for a certain page group. Table 14 below provides information on the page groups which are represented by the nodes in the subnetwork. Basic SNA data can be found in Table 12 in the subordinated chapter 9.3. Ideological overlaps as basis for coalition building.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>URL-Pagegroup</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>URL-Pagegroup</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td><a href="http://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/">http://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/</a></td>
<td>34</td>
<td><a href="http://schuelersprecher.info">http://schuelersprecher.info</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td><a href="http://jungealternative.com/">http://jungealternative.com/</a></td>
<td>34</td>
<td><a href="http://voat.co">http://voat.co</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td><a href="http://www.junge-nationalisten.de/">http://www.junge-nationalisten.de/</a></td>
<td>37</td>
<td><a href="http://revolta114.blogspot.com">http://revolta114.blogspot.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td><a href="http://www.youtube.com/">http://www.youtube.com/</a></td>
<td>43</td>
<td><a href="http://nassmer.blogspot.com">http://nassmer.blogspot.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td><a href="http://www.dsss.cz/">http://www.dsss.cz/</a></td>
<td>46</td>
<td><a href="http://www.websitelists.in">http://www.websitelists.in</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td><a href="http://www.remigration.net/">http://www.remigration.net/</a></td>
<td>49</td>
<td><a href="http://montagsdemonstration.blogspot.com">http://montagsdemonstration.blogspot.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td><a href="http://identitaere-schwaben.de">http://identitaere-schwaben.de</a></td>
<td>53</td>
<td><a href="http://www.fuerunserezukunft.org">http://www.fuerunserezukunft.org</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 14 Overview on pagegroups represented by the nodes in the seeds and most important network above

A matrix that shows the inbound and outbound from every seed to the shared external content can be found in the Appendix in Table 17. This matrix was used as the basis for the below table, which shows the overlaps in between the seeds generally in the bottom part and the same number split up into in- and outbound in the upper part. Two seeds can both link to the same content with an inbound link (i-i), there can be an outbound link from both seeds to the common external content (o-o) or one seed can be connected with an inbound link to the shared content and the other with an outbound link (i-o). Additionally, there is a possibility that one or both seeds have an inbound- as well as an outbound connection with the respective common external content. This case is listed in the table as b-b (both seeds have in- and outbound links) or b-i/b-o (one of the seeds has both in- and outbound, the other only in- or only outbound). While the upper part of the table lists, whether the connections to the shared content are inbound to the seed, outbound from the seed or both, the lower part of the table sums up the connections that exist.

The most extensive overlap in between the movements exists for the movements Pegida and the German branch of the Identitarian Movement. They refer via links to the same content in 19 cases, which is an extraordinary high number in comparison with the other overlaps that have been identified. This case represents the overlap between the anti-Islam and the new right segment, further, the connection is not transnational, as both movements are from Germany. As described in the subchapter 9.2.2, new right and anti-Islam segment are similar in their ideological orientation. There is a comparably high overlap in links to the same content also between the Czech branch of the Identitarian Movement and Pegida (five overlaps), which is as well an overlap between the new Right and the anti-Islam segment.
is, however, complicated by its transnational nature and the fact that the two involved countries have different languages, which might be the cause that it is lower than in the case of the overlap within one nation and the same segments. High numbers of connections to the same content have also been identified between Pegida and the Movement Islám v ČR nechceme and Pegida and the Movement Junge Alternative (seven overlaps in both cases). In the first case the overlap is within one segment- the anti-Islam segment- but of cross-country, transnational nature, while in the second case the overlap is within the same country but crossing segments, as it involves the anti-Islam segment and the neo-Nazi segment. The overlap in between one segment seems to be natural, however, the overlap of anti-Islam and neo-Nazi segment came as a surprise, as the neo-Nazi segment followed different ideological orientation. Pegida is the movement that links to the same content as other movements in most cases, however, the movement does not have any direct links to other selected movements of the research. Another comparably high overlap in links to the same content has been identified for the Movement Junge Alternative, which belongs to the segment of Neo-Nazism and the German branch of the Identitarian Movement, which belongs to the new right segment. These movements link to six same webpages.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Dělnická Mládež</th>
<th>Identitarian Movement CZ</th>
<th>Identitarian Movement DE</th>
<th>Islám v ČR nechceme</th>
<th>Junge Alternative</th>
<th>Junge Nationalisten</th>
<th>Národní a Sociální Fronta</th>
<th>Pegida</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dělnická Mládež</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>i-i: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 2, i-i: 2</td>
<td>o-o: 2</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-o: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 1, o-b: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-i: 2, o-o: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement CZ</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>i-i: 3</td>
<td>i-i: 2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>i-i: 1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>i-i: 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identitarian Movement DE</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>b-i: 1, o-o: 2, i-o: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 3, i-i: 3</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-i: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 2</td>
<td>b-b: 1, o-o: 1, b-o: 1, i-i: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islám v ČR nechceme</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>o-o: 2, i-i: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 2</td>
<td></td>
<td>b-b: 1, o-o: 1, b-o: 1, i-i: 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge Alternative</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-i: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 3</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-i: 4, i-o: 1, i-b: 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junge Nationalisten</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o-o: 1</td>
<td>o-o: 1, i-i: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Národní a Sociální Fronta</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>o-o: 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pegida</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15 Overlaps - links to the same content by the seed pages
Medium amounts of links to the same external content were identified between the Czech Movement Dělnická Mládež, which is a representative of the neo-Nazi segment, and the Czech neo-Nazi movement Národní Socialistní Fronta (four links to the same content). Dělnická Mládež further hyperlinks to the same content as the German anti-Islam movement Pegida and the Czech anti-Islam movement Islám v ČR nechceme (four overlaps in both cases). Finally, a medium overlap of four hyperlinks to the same content has been identified for the Czech anti-Islam movement Islám v ČR nechceme and the German branch of the Identitarian Movement, hence an overlap between the New Right and the anti-Islam segment. Overall, the small sample does not allow general conclusions on the preferences in the linking of far right movements. Links to the same content were found both within the segments and crossing them, they exist within segments that show more ideological overlaps and between those that are ideologically more different from each other. Also, the connections cross in between the countries, however, the linking to the same content is higher within one country than in the transnational context. An outstanding actor that hyperlinks to many websites that are also provided by other movements and hence provides its audience with a wide range of different sources and information is the German anti-Islam movement Pegida. This movement does not have any comparable counterpart at the Czech side.

The analysis point to the final conclusion that ideological differences in between the different segments of the far right movement, related to the areas they assign most attention to, are not significant enough to be a deciding factor in the coalition building behaviour of those movements. Probably they do face a lot of opposition from various different actors in the society and do not have such a width choice of possible coalition partners.

10 Discussion

The following section serves to take a critical look at the overall achievements of the dissertation and discusses them in the context of the contemporary state of the art. It provides an overview onto the extent to which main research targets could be fulfilled and which difficulties and challenges were encountered by the author. Also, it introduces and discusses additional fundamental questions or complications that appeared during the work with the topic. It covers ethical as well as technical and general issues and describes in which ways these issues manifested in the research and how they were dealt with. Finally, the section refers to possible future challenges for the research of the far right and hyperlinking networks. As introduced in chapter 5 Related Work, earlier researches have either analyzed the online behaviour of far right actors, or the transnational cooperation of these actors. The presented
study adds to these researches by combining these two points and by its depth. As a qualitative study it focuses on a few case studies only and aims to understand them profoundly. While most researches focus rather on far right parties, the dissertation concentrates exclusively on the informal sector, which is, according to the author, gaining importance and influence mostly nowadays. Consequently, it is of key importance to research and understand far right movements, to which this dissertation contributes. Also, there has been no comparison of the networking over a certain time period and no researches which focused extensively on the cooperation and mobilization strategies of different parts of the far right movements.

10.1 Sample size

One of the main weak points of this work is the comparably small sample size on which the analyses are based. Only two countries have been exemplarily selected and from each country only four far right movements have been included in the research and analyzed in the network- and content analyses. Each segment of the far right is represented by one or two far right organizations per country. One the positive side and as the main characteristic of a qualitative research, this made detailed content analysis and interpretation of the extracted hyperlink networks possible. Not only could the ideological orientations in detail be coded and compared for all selected actors, but also the mutual connections and the connections to the same external content could be analyzed to the core. The whole research gained great depth in this way. The downside of this is that the results and findings correspondingly cannot be understood as generally valid for the whole far right movement, for the identified segments or as applicable to all other countries. Due to the small size of the sample, it is impossible to exclude that results are influenced by specific, third variables that are not present in other contexts. Here, everything from specific characteristics of the German-Czech relationship to particularities of the organizations that represent the different segments appears to be plausible.

Hence, although mostly hyperlink analysis in its whole logic and approach is a rather quantitative method, the research should be understood as a qualitative work. It has the characteristics of a comparative case study and provides in-depth insights in the given context, i.e. the selected countries, segments, movements and their cooperation and networking behaviour. The findings of the research might serve as impulses for further studies
and provide the basis to develop hypotheses. Future studies might dwell on more extensive networks of far right movements that i.e. include movements from more countries or add more examples to the respective segments. Further, they might analyze the development of various different segments and their cooperation; refer to the ideologies represented by the segments and their similarities and differences and various other topics.

10.2 Segmentation

As one key feature, this work is based on the identification of single segments within the far right movement, which have their foundations on the historical development of the far right in the Czech Republic and Germany. These segments differ in their organisational degree, their main forms of action, their historical background and their basic ideology. The literature offers various different types of classification schemes, groupings, scaling and others of the far right, some of which are introduced in Chapter 6 and its subchapters. However, no comparable, suitable approach to the far right movement was found in the literature which could have been used as an already established basis for the work instead. Therefore, the introduced approach of segments within the far right movement has been developed. In their design and structure the segments are general and in comparable form exist also in the far right movements of other countries. It is however not excluded that dealing with the situations in other countries will lead to the identification of additional segments or the refinement of the introduced segments in certain aspects.

In the presented research, the segments are developed as a practical tool to differentiate miscellaneous groups that belong to the diversified Czech and German far right movements. For this purpose, the segments in the suggested form are sufficiently developed and founded both on theory and on the history of the concerned countries. In the context of the given research that focuses on the Czech Republic and Germany and on contemporary online activism the provided theoretical background is adequate. However, the approach of the segmentation of the far right movement is not based on extensive theory or discussion, neither on multiple case studies. Additional theoretical discussion and possibly also refinement of the theory could be another area for future research. The segmentation of the far right movement as applied in the analysis has proofed to be a useful tool for a detailed differentiation within the far right movement. It is especially useful for researches that look at inner dynamics and processes of the far right movement as the above analysis and provides the researcher with a possibility to differentiate within the far right movement based on empirical criteria.
10.3 The Internet as data source

The dissertation exclusively draws on the websites of the selected SMOs as a source of data and does not include other empirical data as i.e. observations or interviews. One basic problem when using the Internet as a data source is the open question to which extent the behaviour of actors in the Internet corresponds to their behaviour in the real life. I.e. does finding a hyperlink from one movement webpage to the other really signifies a connection these two movements maintain in real life as well? Does the self-presentation of the movements really mirror their ideological position?

One possibility to counter this problem is to do not concentrate as much to the relation between on- and offline actions but to see all these things that are happening in cyberspace and are subject of this research (the creation of networks, hyperlinking, sharing of content, presenting oneself) as social processes with their own relevance, regardless of the question how on- and offline activities shape and influence each other. Real people are deciding to spend their real time with these actions, which they could also spend in various other ways. Based on this, online processes are of great social relevance, especially in the contemporary activities of social movements, as the Internet has gained great importance for them and is used frequently and regularly (Hoffman and Fujdiak, 2017). Hence, the Internet and the action dynamics in cyberspace become part of our contemporary social reality. In this way, the online activities represent an own empirical field in which it is possible to observe how meaning frames are created, identities are formed and alliances built (Hoffman and Fujdiak, 2017). Various different researches have already focused on the mutual influences on- and offline activities exercise on each other, some of which are described in Chapter 5 – Related Work. Further, also, the effect the Internet has on the dynamics of collective action is discussed in subchapter 7.2 – Collective and Connective Action, of the dissertation. Thus, rather than dealing with the question whether online activities shape offline actions or vice versa, this dissertation perceives the activities of social movements in the Internet as social processes with their own social relevance.

With respect to the content analyses of the self-presentation of the SMOs, it has been pointed out e.g. by Dlouhý (2016: 56) that the research of anti-systemic far right has certain special features, which differ from the research of other social movements or political actors. As this author states, relying on their official statements is of little meaning, as these sources are self-censored to avoid confrontations with legal regulations. According to Dlouhý, it is therefore
required to carry out field work in order to understand far right actors, in his case the Czech Identitarian Movement (Dlouhý, 2016). In the presented research, the self-presentations of the movements, i.e. official statements published by the movements themselves, have been used as one source of data. In the context of the analyses, these self-presentations are not the only source but are combined with the hyperlinks the movements provide to their followers. Hence, the work does not rely exclusively on their statements. Also, the dissertation does not aim to evaluate the movements selected for the research in their position towards the constitutional democratic state but takes a close look at their relations among each other and their ideological differences and similarities. As all of the movements are part of the larger far right movement, it is possible to look to their ideological orientation and compare them with each other, also assuming that the movements rely on the same or similar codes in their self-presentations and all are subject to the same law within their country.

Another difficulty when using the Internet as a data source as done in the dissertation is that the people whose basic data are used for the analyses did not agree to participate in a scientific research. Respectively, they do not know about the research until it is published and did not get a change to provide their consent or dissent. This is especially a problem for the research ethic if the researcher in some way gets access to information that are not intended for the general public and uses them in his analyses, i.e. in case that the researcher uses a false identity to get access to a closed chat, group of individuals or some other private setting or exchange of information between members of a group. However, the presented research first of all does not make use of information that was shared confidentially and/or provided exclusively for a limited group of people. The websites of the selected movements and all information that are shared on them are open to the general public and accessible for everybody. Secondly, the research does not draw onto opinions, statements or connections to other actors that are related to a single person. The selected movements as a whole are the actors in the research, represented through the information and references to other actors which the administrators of their websites decide to publish on the Internet. Hence, the problem of protecting the privacy and sensitive information of the research subjects does not apply to the research in the given form.

10.4 Network Layout

The following section describes a rather technical, methodological complication that occurred during the first network analysis. As evident from the first analyses and pre-tests, the selection of an algorithm to create the graph from the data significantly influences the appearance of the
graph. Figure 13 below shows, how the same dataset can look different with the application of two different algorithms to create the network graph. While the first graph seems to represent a network with a high density and many connections between the different nodes, the second networks rather seems to consist of single communities that have only few connections among each other. However, both networks are based on exactly the same set of data and ultimately contain the same information which just is visualized in a different way.

![Network Graphs](image)

Figure 13 Same dataset with application of LinLog (Noack) and Fruchterman-Reingold Algorithm

Hence, the choice of the algorithm for the graphic representation of the data should not be underestimated. The algorithm used in the analyses was the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm, which is frequently applied in network science and belongs to the force-directed layout algorithms. Thomas Fruchterman and Edward Reingold based their layout algorithm on different aesthetic criteria, among them distributing the vertices evenly in the frame, minimize edge crossings and make edge lengths uniform. Further, the main principles for their graph drawing are that vertices connected by an edge should be drawn near to each other and that vertices should not be too close to each other (Fruchterman and Reingold, 1991). In this layout nodes push away other nodes, while edges attract neighbour nodes (Fatemi et al., 2016). When using this algorithm, nodes are positioned in a way that ensures similar length of
the edges and as few crossing edges as possible. This should generate a “clean” layout, in which nodes that are closer to each other have more common connections than nodes which are far from each other (Barbera, 2017). In Figure 13 the second graph has been created using the Fruchterman-Reingold algorithm while the first one has been drawn using the LinLog (Noack) algorithm. The LinLog layout algorithm in contrast is an energy model which aims for minimum energy drawing to reveal the clusters of the drawn graph. In this layout model, clusters are clearly separated from the other nodes and the nodes that belong to a certain cluster are closer to each other. It is especially useful for graphs with small diameter (Noack, 2003). The diameter of a graph is the largest number of vertices which must be traversed in order to travel from one vertex to another, which implies that it is equal to the maximum of all values in the graph distance matrix (Weisstein, n.d.).

As the above Figure 13 clearly shows, for the data in the research the LinLog (Noack) layout algorithm did not produce a very clear graph but a rather confusing one. Most likely the algorithm identified small clusters within the larger communities of each movement and arranged them in a way which leads to many edges crossing each other. This, in turn, suggests connections between nodes where are none, as the graphs consists of a lot of nodes and edges. The resulting graph layout in this way contains many, unnecessary crossings and is not very straightforward. After a pre-test with both layout algorithms that were applied to the same dataset, the graphs in the various different analyses were drawn using the Fruchterman Reingold layout algorithm. This allowed avoiding unnecessary crossings of edges and the drawing of graphs that were clear-cut and better to interpret than the graphs drawn with the LinLog (Noack) layout algorithm.

10.5 Weaknesses of the data crawler

Another subject for the discussion are two weak points of the data crawler application Voson, which was used for the analysis. First of all, the application does not offer any possibility to analyse the strength of a tie in the hyperlink network. The reason for this is, that a tie in a hyperlink network, i.e. a hyperlink, by definition cannot be stronger or weaker. A hyperlink exists or does not exist between two web pages; there is no such thing as strong or weak hyperlinks. However, there is a possibility that a web page links more often to another web page, e.g. from or to various different subpages. Providing a number of hyperlinks to different subpages of one website would, as I argue, signify a stronger connection between these two pages than just one, single hyperlink. Though, Voson does not evaluate the number of hyperlinks, the connections between the websites are not valued but all have the same
strength. It is possible to display the direction of the connection in the graph, i.e. which page links to which or whether the connection is a mutual one. However, there is no possibility to find out whether there is just one or several hyperlinks between two web pages.

Further, Voson does not offer any possibility to set a time frame, e.g. have the crawler extracting all hyperlinks that have been provided on the page before a certain date in the past or from a date in the past till now. The crawler always only withdraws the network in the form it has on that particular day, using the settings for the number of crawled pages and depth of the crawl that are defined by the user. More advanced software might offer the possibility to set a time frame for the network data. However, Voson was selected for its user friendly interface and the fact that it unites both a web crawler and graphical depiction of the data. To cope with this and get an insight into the evolvement of the network over a certain time frame, the hyperlink network has been extracted at the beginning of the research period, in 2017 and at its end in 2019. This allowed a comparison of two networks that were extracted based on the same settings and the same seed websites but at different points of time. The only change has been the addition of two new seed websites to the second network, which gained importance in the respective far right movements during the investigation period and the usage of the new webpage of Pegida.

11 Conclusion

This dissertation analyzed the coalitions and the cooperation between far right social movement organizations from the Czech Republic and Germany and their ideological overlaps. For this, eight social movement organisations have been exemplarily selected that belong to the different segments that form the informal part of the far right movement in both countries. These social movement organisations have been analyzed using a combination of hyperlink network analyses and qualitative content analyses. The goal of the dissertation was to understand the networking strategies and hyperlinking behaviour of the selected movements in depth and analyse its correlation to the ideologies of the selected movements. In the context of the work, the following three research questions, divided into 2-3 subquestions each, have been answered:

- Q1a: How differ the individual communities of the single SMOs in the hyperlink network of all selected movements and how do they evolve during the investigation period?
• Q1b: How did the basic network parameters density, betweenness and centralization of the hyperlink network of all selected movements change during the investigation period?

• Q2a. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the selected countries?
• Q2b. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the different segments of the far right movement?
• Q2c. To which extent do the ideologies of the selected case studies of far right movements overlap between the individual SMOs that are included in the research?

• Q3a. Does the amount of hyperlinks directly between the selected movements increase with increasing ideological overlap?
• Q3b. Does the amount of hyperlinks to the same external content increase with increasing ideological overlap?

Methodologically, the research is based on the application of hyperlink network analyses in combination with qualitative content analysis. A hyperlink network depicts web pages as nodes and hyperlinks by which they refer to each other as edges between these nodes. It is a possibility to map the online activities of selected actors including their direct connections and connections to the same content they maintain. Also, their individual communities can be accessed and understood. Qualitative content analysis on the other hand enables in-depth insights into a given text and its systematically and schematically understanding. The respective text is spit up into its fragments which are coded based on their content and underlying ideas. The researcher in this way gains insight into basic concepts and ideas that are included in the text and is able to compare the main content of texts from different sources in a systematic way.

The far right is accessed as a social movement in the context of the work; hence, social movement theory is one of the pillars of the dissertation. Further, as the work draws extensively on the happenings in cyberspace, the theories of collective action and its manifestation in cyberspace, the so-called connective action, are introduced. Another important part of the theoretical background discussion is dedicated to the significance of the Internet for the contemporary far right movement and the ways in which digital
Communication technologies influence communication and other processes of exchange within the movement. Also, processes of coalition building and mobilization strategies of social movements are integrated in the theoretical part of the dissertation and form, together with the other mentioned points, the theoretical background for the empirical part of the work.

Subsequently, the dissertation discusses the historical background of the far right in the Czech Republic and Germany, going back to the transformation period and the end of communism in 1987. As chapter 8 – Historical Background clearly shows, there are many similarities between the two selected countries and until recently the far right movements have developed in a very similar fashion. Both countries experienced how far right groups developed as a phenomenon at the margins of society into a societal actor with great relevance and power. Towards the end of communism important foundations of the far right were established and the heritage of this time influences the far right movements in both countries till today. In the Czech Republic as well as in Germany violent skinheads groups emerged after the fall of communism, which later were superseded by the Autonomous Nationalists. Recently, both countries have entered a new, populist era, however, while the German far right movement seems to drift rather towards the anti-Islam segment, in the Czech Republic the more violent segment of neo-Nazism is gaining influence.

Taking the main influential actors of the informal part of the far right movement into account, the author of the research has identified three main segments within the far right movements of the Czech Republic and Germany. These segments are the New Right, represented by the Identitarian Movements of both countries, the anti-Islam segment, represented by Pegida and Islam v ČR nechceme and the neo-Nazis’ segment, represented by youth groups of main right wing parties from both countries with neo-Nazis’ ideologies. During the research period, two supplementary movements have been added to the group of the selected movements, as they gained influence in the far right movements in their countries. For the Czech Republic the neo-Nazis’ movement Národní a Socialní Fronta has been added, while the group of German movements has been enlarged by the anti-Islam movement Junge Alternative.

The research is split up into three main areas as introduced above. Its first part with the research question Q1a and Q1b focuses on the comprehension of the hyperlink network of the movements selected for the research, its main characteristics and on its evolvement during the research period. The hyperlink networks of the movements consist mainly of the individual communities of each movement and some of the movements also directly link to each other. An important feature is the common external content which is hyperlinked by two or more
movements, as well as websites which themselves link to two or more movements and act as connectors or bridges in this way. The hyperlink network has been extracted at the beginning (2017) and the end of the main research period (2019), in order to analyze how it has changed. For the two data crawls the same parameters and seed sides have been used, with the only difference that the later crawl contained the two additional movements which were of no influence during the first crawl and that one movement had changed to a different main webpage during the research period. Main results were that the density of the hyperlink network increased during the research period. The later extracted network is more interconnected and contains significantly more connections from the selected movements to the common external content. The individual communities of some of the SMOs became smaller during the research period; either because the movements themselves removed links from their own websites (outbound) or because there are fewer references to them by other actors (inbound). Possibly reasons for declining outbound might be changes in the legislation, as i.e. Germany introduced a new law related to hate speech on the Internet in the research period. A reason for third actors to remove references to the movements from their pages (resulting into declining inbound) might have been their worsening reputation or generally bad publicity of the respective movements. On the other hand does a growing number of outbound links from a webpage signify a more active communication with the supporters and points to a changed mobilization strategy of the concerned movement. A growing number of incoming links signifies the growing popularity of an actor.

Further, the later added movements could be identified clearly as being less integrated in the network and having smaller individual communities. They were not hyperlinking to as many pages as the other movements and were occupying rear positions in the betweenness and centralization hierarchies, i.e. their positions in the network were not as influential. Also, their number of inbound links was clearly lower than their amount of outbound links, which points to the fact that they are still in the process of building up their online presence and increase their visibility within the network. Among the other movements Pegida significantly developed during the investigation period. The movement changed to a different website and seems to use the new website a lot more active than the previous one. From one of the least important nodes in the first network the movement developed into the most central actor in the second network, with a lot of incoming and outgoing hyperlinks as well as many connections to the common external content. Other actors with great influence in the network were the German branch of the Identitarian Movement and Islám v ČR nechceme. The movement Junge Nationalisten on the other hand gradually decreased its betweenness degree.
during the research period. Generally, this part of the research showed clear differences in the strategies the single movements applied. The relationship between incoming and outgoing links varied greatly in between the selected movement, which points to the fact that some are using the Internet very active to share content and refer to other movements while others seem to be rather cited as a source of authority while not being as active themselves.

The second part of the research has been dedicated to the identification of ideological overlaps between the movements and their extent and answers the research questions Q2a, Q2b and Q2c. The overlaps are taken a closer look at on three different levels, which are firstly the countries, secondly the overlaps between the segments that have been determined in the theoretical part of the research and as a last area the ideological overlaps between the individual movements are discussed. This part of the analysis uses the method of qualitative content analysis and the self-descriptions that each of the movements publishes on their websites as source texts. In several steps the extracted texts have been coded to find out which areas are especially important to the individual actors in their self-description. The categories that were assigned to the texts have been developed and refined during the process of analysis and each consists of a number of codes, i.e. more concrete statements made by the single movements. After two rounds of coding and refinement the categories have been summed up for each movement and their frequencies have been compared. The far right movements from the Czech Republic and Germany in direct comparison were found to differ in their emphasis on identity, law and order and threats. German movements refer frequently to the nation and place a lot of attention on keeping up law and order in their country. For the Czech movements in contrast keeping up law and order was the category that was the least mentioned in the self-descriptions. They rather focus on their identity and various different kinds of threats they perceive to endanger their country. “Ideology” was a category that seems to be of importance for the far right movements in both countries.

Considering the overlap between different segments showed that the anti-Islam segment and the new Right are similar, while the neo-Nazi segment seems to set other priorities for itself. This difference applied mostly in the categories “Goals”, “Identity” and “Organisation”. Further, the new right especially emphasizes the nation and various different threats in their self-description, while law and order seems to be of great importance for the anti-Islam movements. As a surprise came the fact that the categories “Threats” and “Defence” were least important for the neo-Nazi segment. “Ideology” was a very important category for all segments, same as in the country-wise comparison. In the segment-wise comparison the
standard deviation was additionally used to identify categories were all three segments were close to each other and categories that either contained three comparable widespread values or two similar values and one outlier. In most cases the analysis showed that a high standard deviation was caused by the neo-Nazi segment to break ranks, which one more time confirmed the similarity of anti-Islam and new Right and the neo-Nazi segment to differ ideologically.

The last part of the identification of ideological overlaps contains a comparison of the ideologies for the individual movements and the analyses for research questions Q3a and Q3b. It serves as a background for the last research part and therefore does not contain detailed description of all movements in comparison, as they are not required for the research. As the above described comparison of segments, also this part has been based on the standard deviation for the single categories. The category “Threats” reaches the highest standard deviation, which means that individual movements differ gradually in the attention they pay to this category. Other categories that are very important to some and of nearly no meaning to others are “Law and Order”, “Ideology” and “Identity”. Also outliers are identified among the single movements. These included the movement Islám v ČR nechceme focusing strongly on threats towards the country, further Pegida and the movements Junge Nationalisten and Junge Alternative.

The third and last research area focused on ideological overlaps as the basis for the establishment of online coalitions between the selected movements. Its basic research interest is to find out whether increasing ideological overlaps also increase the chance for coalition building. Coalitions between the movements are present either as direct connections between the movements or as connections via third page groups, which serve to link the movements to the same audiences. The movements might refer to the same content, the respective third page groups might refer to them or they might act as bridges or hubs for the movements. As already described in the context of the first research question, hyperlinks represent the basic mobilization strategies of the movements. For this analysis, the results from the second research area are connected with the results of another network extracted for this purpose. Also, a reduced network graph has been used for the analysis, which contains only seed pages and pages that have a connection to two or more seeds, i.e. connect to seed pages or in a few cases contain in- and outbound to the same seed page.

The results for the direct connections between the movements allow some preliminary conclusions. However, as the overall amount of direct connections is very low, drawing
general conclusions seems to be impossible. The results showed that in the case of the analyzed actors, only two movements link to other movements, which are Junge Nationalisten and the Czech Identitarian movement, the later one linking even to two other movements. This means that it is taking over the role of a broker within the network. Two out of the three direct connections stayed within one segment and where crossing countries, one was staying within the country but reached out to a different segment. This means that language differences do not hinder the formation of coalitions between movements in our case and that the segments seem to influence the coalition forming in between the movement. Furthermore, the two actors that were added later to the research and Pegida, which moved to a different website during the research period, are the only actors that are isolates in the network. Hence, how established a movement is, seems to influence its position and the network and connections with others. The included movements seem to perceive each other rather as competitors than allies with respect to the direct connections.

The last subarea of the third part of the research was analyzing whether increasing ideological overlaps lead to increasing links to the same content. The analysis showed that the largest overlap in links to the same content is present in between Pegida and the German Identitarian Movement, which represent the anti-Islam and the new right segments and are from the same country. These segments have been found to be similar in their ideological orientation. Also, Pegida and the Czech Identitarian movement are frequently linking to the same page groups, the connections are, however, transnational and possibly complicated by different languages. Further, some of the overlaps in hyperlinks from or to the same content stayed within the segments but also segments with low ideological overlaps often linked to the same content, e.g. the anti-Islam and neo-Nazis’ segments. Pegida was the actor which the most connections to content that was also hyperlinked by other pages, within the countries more connections to shared content were found that in the transnational context. Overall the ideological orientation seems to not influence the linking to the same content significantly, even though most links to the same content were identified for two segments whose representing actors base their ideological points of view on similar focus points.
12 Literature

12.1 Secondary sources


Stier, S., Posch, L., Bleier, A. and Strohmaier, M. (2017). When populists become popular: comparing Facebook use by the right-wing movement Pegida and German political parties,


Tridico, F. (2011). Social movement theory and far right organizations. Wayne State University Dissertations, Paper 481, Online at:


12.2 Primary sources


12.3 Webpages of the selected Social Movement Organisations


Identitäre Bewegung Deutschland https://www.identitaere-bewegung.de/ .


Junge Nationalisten: https://junge-nationalisten.de/.

12.4 Webpage of the used data crawler

Uberlink: https://www.uberlink.com/.

VOSON – Virtual Observatory for the Study of Online Networks: http://vosonlab.net/.
### 13 Appendix

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Assigned codes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation</td>
<td>Culture, traditions people, comminity sovereignty home</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law and Order</td>
<td>Law democracy Political principles Against law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critique, Threats</td>
<td>current state politician laws Modern Ideologies muslims, immigrants, immigration Consum, alienation Criminality, security threats, conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>nationality, religion values denial</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defence</td>
<td>nation values traditions, culture people democracy, law sovereignty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>youth party unique, independend, established political patriotic actions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>equality, freedom, power nohate, noneonaz nomulti none, neither right nor left nogovernm ent diversity, ethnopluralism political activism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goal</td>
<td>Improvemnt, change Educatio n</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 16 Categories and Codes developed for the second part of the research
| Seed                        | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 | 15 | 16 | 17 | 18 | 19 | 20 | 21 | 22 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 26 | 27 | 28 | 29 | 30 | 31 | 32 |
|-----------------------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| Dělnická Mládež             |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | o | o  | o  | o  | b  | i  | i  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| Identitarian Movement CZ    |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Identitarian Movement DE    |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | b | o  | o  | o  | b  | b  | b  | b  | b  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |
| Islám v ČR nechceme          |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | o | b  | o  | o  |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Junge Alternative           |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Junge Nationalisten         |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | i |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Národní a Sociální Fronta   |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | o | b  | o  | o  | o  |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| Pegida                      |   |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|                            | b | o  | i  | i  | b  | o  | o  | b  | b  | i  | i  | b  | i  | b  |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| 33 | 34 | 35 | 36 | 37 | 38 | 39 | 40 | 41 | 42 | 43 | 44 | 45 | 46 | 47 | 48 | 49 | 50 | 51 | 52 | 53 | 54 | 55 | 56 | 57 | 58 | 59 | 60 | 61 | 62 |
|-----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
|     | i  |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| i   | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| i   | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| i   | i  |     | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |     |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
|     | i  |     |     | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |     |     |     | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  | i  |     |     |     |     |     |
| b   | b  | i  | i  | i  |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |     |

Table 17 In- and outbound from the seeds to the shared content

i-Inbound to the seed,
o-outbound from the seed,
b-both in- and outbound