

be clearer, but Cabrera rejects this approach, favoring more positive duties to *satisfy* vital interests (pp. 91 ff.).

Note that the imperfect, humane duties of assistance do not require reference to institutions in order to be understood and pursued. They are, in that sense, conceptually independent from the duties we might have in an “integrated institutional order.” “Advocacy duties” do refer to institutions, but these do not connect with existing people’s human rights. It is also even less clear what such (imperfect) duties might demand. Cabrera names two models: European Union integration and the incorporation of democratic accountability into the World Trade Organization. Yet, as we are witnessing, EU integration depends on contextual economic contingencies for its success, and it is unclear how to judge measures that any individual might take toward implementing either model globally. Focusing on imperfect duties of assistance seems more reasonable. So, as rich as the book is, more could have been said on the link between the humanist ethics motivating it and global justice that warrants putting “global citizenship” in the title.

Wide as the World: Cosmopolitan Identity, Integral Politics, and Democratic Dialogue. By Jack Crittenden.

Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011. 348p. \$80.00.
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— Pavel Dufek, *Masaryk University*

Jack Crittenden’s wide-ranging book taps into several important strands in contemporary political theory. There has been the so-called cosmopolitan turn, with many (if not all) authors devoting ever closer attention to political structures, processes, and underlying principles beyond domestic societies. We have also witnessed increasing interest in deliberative democratic theory, emphasizing the *democratic* element in liberal democracy. Finally, many theorists have employed the idea of a dialogue, or dialogical interaction, to address the issue of the relationship between equality and plurality both within domestic societies and among them—the former falling under the heading of multiculturalism, the latter of intercultural dialogue.

What *Wide as the World* brings to the table is an attempt to integrate these distinct strands of political theory while embedding such a synthesis within an all-embracing meta-framework, borrowing extensively from other social-scientific disciplines, such as developmental and social psychology, linguistics, cultural anthropology, and educational theory. Interdisciplinarity has long been invoked as the way to go in the social sciences, and the broad interdisciplinary reach represents one of the strengths of Crittenden’s contribution. Where the book definitely steps out of line, from an academic perspective, is in giving substantial space and weight to the spiritual or mystical dimension of human consciousness, which is a consequence of the author’s intellectual indebtedness to Ken Wilber and

his integral theory—a kind of nonphysicalist “theory of everything,” here applied to the political realm. This is not meant to dismiss the book out of hand, but only to point out that the suggested meta-framework rests in part on foundations that most political theorists and scientists will find difficult to accept, notwithstanding Crittenden’s defense of the epistemological validity of mystical insights (pp. 153–88).

The author acknowledges that the book has a somewhat “edgy nature” when compared to standard scholarly treatments on the subject(s), and that it “wasn’t written just or even primarily for academics” (p. ix). Formally, this is embodied in the—literally—dialogical mode of presentation, the book being a conversation between two fictional characters. Their seven “topical” encounters make up the seven regular chapters of the book, starting with a discussion of the cosmopolitan worldview, followed by the issues of national and cosmopolitan identity, what the author calls “integral politics” and “integral epistemology,” and concluding with an outline of the nature of deliberative democratic dialogue and the possibilities of its institutionalization on all levels, local to global. The discourse also highlights the central “methodological” role of dialectics and dialectical thinking in Crittenden’s framework: Besides mystical experience, which he somewhat confusingly considers both “essential” (p. 92) and not necessary (p. 138) for cosmopolitan identity, it is through dialectical synthesis that apparent moral and/or cultural disagreements are dissolved and reconstituted as parts of a more fundamental unity.

Crittenden accordingly aims at “creating, establishing and perpetuating cosmopolitan identity” (p. 1), which would facilitate, or make possible, a fundamental transformation of both human consciousness and the social (institutional) conditions of human life. Only then will humanity be capable of engaging in a planetary dialogue and tackle vital global issues (pp. 3–4). Such an identity will be a *felt* and not be just a stipulated one, whereby Crittenden hopes to transcend the stark dichotomy between *reason* and *emotions* that haunted Kant’s cosmopolitanism and that could probably be attributed to many contemporary authors working in the analytical tradition of political philosophy as well. Indeed, “standard” accounts of global democracy and justice (see, e.g., the work of Thomas Pogge, Simon Caney, Andrew Kuper, or David Held) usually do without the cultural-cosmopolitan aspect, couching their argumentation in the force of certain moral principles (fairness, equality of opportunity, human rights, etc.). Crittenden’s book is thus strong where theirs are generally lacking, but this also holds vice versa, as I mention in the following.

A question naturally arises as to *why* it is necessary to engender planetary cosmopolitan consciousness and couple it with a thorough democratization of all dimensions of individual and collective life. *Why ought we* to agree to

such a radical shake-up? As I see it, Crittenden builds on two general assumptions, one factual and one normative. The factual assumption concerns the existence of a fundamental unity of all human beings, unity that has moral, ontological, and spiritual dimensions. Once we learn to empathize with fellow humanity, we will have locked in the motivation to follow up in our actions. The normative assumption, which in fact provides the author's deepest motivation, restates the democratic belief that "[p]eople have the right, or should have, to participate in making those decisions that affect their lives" (p. 212). In a way, all the abovementioned theoretical resources are thus employed to buttress and justify a deliberative democratic vision of the world order.

Such an approach, however, though commendable for its breadth and integrative ambitions, renders the argumentation vulnerable to criticism and counterarguments from a great many perspectives—the same, as it were, that the author wishes to integrate. For example, a more thorough connection to contemporary debates on global justice might have furnished *Wide as the World* with substantial normative bedrock. As of now, it is unclear how Crittenden determines the existence, scope, and moral paramountcy of human rights (p. 55; it is also questionable whether Kant's duty of hospitality could be easily "construed" as honoring the contemporary list of human rights, which is implied on p. 294), or what the reasoning is behind assigning the central role in the imagined new world order to liberal democratic countries (p. 284)—neither position is necessarily implicated in the nonfoundationalist dialogical approach (Jürgen Habermas's account of communicative rationality might have been of use here). Similarly, there is nothing self-evident about the desirability of global egalitarian justice: Although David Miller's earlier work on national identity is criticized at some length (pp. 41–49), his important critique of global egalitarianism (summarized in *National Responsibility and Global Justice*, 2007) is ignored, as are other similar non-cosmopolitan perspectives.

Another issue is selectiveness in the perception of long-standing issues and problems of political theory. One example is democratic *political representation*: Crittenden's theoretical framework would have been strengthened by attending to recent debates on conceptual alternatives to the standard liberal model, including deliberative ones (e.g., by Michael Saward or John Dryzek), and the author could have thus relied on more theoretically robust resources than his random selection of both grassroots deliberators (forming the so-called Citizen Juries) and representatives in the new Peoples' Assembly of the United Nations (pp. 263–83). Not unrelated, the suggested deliberative framework as Crittenden imagines it—forming Citizen Juries for any major policy decision, plus interrogating each time both an array of experts and all affected persons—would most likely require inhuman levels of compassion,

willingness to listen, and ability to concentrate, not to mention spare time.

Lastly, I have doubts about the stipulative character of the alleged cosmopolitan harmony. Setting aside mystical experience, the claim that there is underlying moral unity to be discovered (or constructed; see p. 180) seems not to take the idea of pluralism seriously. The problem may not lie simply in our inability or unwillingness to listen to other perspectives or put ourselves in others' shoes, but in the fact that value pluralism is an inescapable fact of human life, and any attempts to theorize it out of existence may be not only futile but also positively dangerous. Crittenden's cosmopolitanism operates on the assumption that such unity either exists or is desirable. I have, however, always had difficulty reconciling the twin ideas of 1) nonfoundationalist democratic intercultural dialogue and 2) the conviction that a *pre hoc* delineated set of human rights (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights model), or even specific egalitarian principles of justice, are assuredly the expected outcome.

In the wake of the lofty and laudable goals that Jack Crittenden has set out to achieve, my comments may sound quibbling. As a political theorist, however, I cannot be unaware of the many hitches that surround the cosmopolitan enterprise. In spite of this, the book will be read beneficially as a vivid image of what a truly integral cosmopolitan worldview could require of us.

Missing: Persons and Politics. By Jenny Edkins. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011. 280p. \$29.99.
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— Claire E. Rasmussen, *University of Delaware*

This book is a powerful examination of the politics that emerge around missing persons in the aftermath of political violence. Jenny Edkins drops hints about her theoretical interlocutors—including Giorgio Agamben, Jacques Ranciere, Elaine Scarry, Judith Butler, and Michel Foucault—but the theoretical influences take a back seat to the stories she tells about the search for the missing across a range of cases. Her central argument critiques the ways that "personhood is regularly produced under current forms of political order in the West, a politics that misses the person, a politics that objectifies and instrumentalizes," a "politics that misses the person" (p. 2). In turn, she seeks to give life to the stories of those who highlight the singularity of our ethical and political responsibilities, a "politics of the person as missing" (p. 2). The result is an engaging text that illuminates its central argument by showing rather than telling, demonstrating with great force the dangers of the depersonalization, and depoliticization, of human life.

Edkins begins with a personal narrative about stories of displaced persons in United Nations archives. The anecdote sets the tone for the rest of *Missing*, bringing back to