k 2013

What Are the Inference Steps Really Stepping on? Brief History of Two-Dimensional Inference (konference)

PEZLAR, Ivo

Základní údaje

Originální název

What Are the Inference Steps Really Stepping on? Brief History of Two-Dimensional Inference (konference)

Autoři

PEZLAR, Ivo (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)

Vydání

4th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, Rio de Janeiro, 29th March - 7th April 2013, 2013

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Prezentace na konferencích

Obor

60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Stát vydavatele

Brazílie

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/13:00068078

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

two-dimensional inference; inference step; theory of deduction

Štítky

Příznaky

Recenzováno
Změněno: 26. 3. 2014 08:54, Mgr. Vendula Hromádková

Anotace

V originále

Our main aim is to examine various shapes that inference steps took in the not so distant past. In particular, we focus on similarities that can be found in the works of Frege (1879), Tichý (1988) and de Queiroz, de Oliveira and Gabbay (2011). Their general approach to logical inference constitutes quite distinct school of thought which may be roughly dubbed as two-dimensional conception of inference (deduction). Frege himself, however, never explicitly used the term two-dimensional inference, unlike Tichý and de Queiroz, de Oliveira and Gabbay, who view him as their main source of inspiration. Although Tichý and de Queiroz, de Oliveira and Gabbay slightly differ in their motivations for the introduction of the so called two-dimensional inference and despite the fact that they rely on different proof theories Tichý prefers as a basis for his deduction system Gentzen's sequent calculus, while de Queiroz, de Oliveira and Gabbay favour natural deduction), deep conceptual similarities can be found between their notions of two-dimensional inference, which can be indeed traced back to the father of modern logic, Frege. In other words, all of them seem to share common goal: do better "book-keeping" of proof steps, so that no unacknowledged assumptions get in the inferential sequence. And by better book-keeping methods for inference we mean more rigorous, elaborate and extended way of recording inference steps, i.e., explicit tracking of all the assumptions, which have been previously made, withdrawn or are still in force. As Frege put it himself in the preface of his Begriffsschrift, we need to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/0795/2012, interní kód MU
Název: Filozofie přítomnosti
Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Filozofie přítomnosti, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty