Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics

k 2015

Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics

ŠTĚPÁNEK, Jan

Základní údaje

Originální název

Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics

Autoři

ŠTĚPÁNEK, Jan (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)

Vydání

5th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 25.-30. 6. 2015, Istanbul, 2015

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Prezentace na konferencích

Obor

60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Stát vydavatele

Turecko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/15:00083537

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

Klíčová slova česky

sorites paradox; vágnost; logika; vícehodnotové logiky

Klíčová slova anglicky

sorites paradox; vagueness; logic; many-valued logic

Štítky

mzok, rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam

Změněno: 23. 2. 2016 14:39, Mgr. Marie Skřivanová

Anotace

V originále

Sorites paradoxes are a class of paradoxical arguments which arise as a result of using vague terms such as "heap" or "bald". While precise terms have sharp boundaries of application, vague terms lack such precise boundaries. With vague terms there are objects to which: a) the vague term applies, b) the vague term doesn’t apply, and c) it is uncertain whether vague term applies or not (so called borderline cases). In borderline cases it is uncertain whether the vague term in question applies to them or not. Moreover, this uncertainty cannot be resolved by any enquiry. Since there are three aforementioned classes into which we can divide objects in a range of significance of any vague term, it might be tempting to use three-valued logic to deal with sorites paradoxes. This way we can ascribe exactly one truth value to all sentences of sorites paradox and we needn't resort to either supervaluationism or subvaluationism. Another approach to solving sorites paradoxes is based on an intuition that vagueness is a matter of degree and logic of vagueness should reflect that with different degrees of truth. If A measures 190 cm and B 195 cm then sentence "B is tall" seems to be truer than "A is tall". Fuzzy logic therefore takes advantage of its infinitely many truth values. In my talk I will critically assess many-valued logics and fuzzy logic. My goal is to show that these approaches to sorites paradoxes either have presuppositions that their proponents wouldn’t assent to or that they generate more problems than they claim to resolve.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/1153/2014, interní kód MU

Název: Soudobé problémy a minulé podoby filozofické diskuse

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Soudobé problémy a minulé podoby filozofické diskuse, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

Citovat

ŠTĚPÁNEK, Jan. Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics. In 5th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 25.-30. 6. 2015, Istanbul. 2015.

@proceedings{1308021,
   author = {Štěpánek, Jan},
   booktitle = {5th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 25.-30. 6. 2015, Istanbul},
   keywords = {sorites paradox; vagueness; logic; many-valued logic},
   language = {eng},
   title = {Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics},
   url = {http://www.uni-log.org/start5.html},
   year = {2015}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 1308021
AU  - Štěpánek, Jan
PY  - 2015
TI  - Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics
KW  - sorites paradox
KW  - vagueness
KW  - logic
KW  - many-valued logic
UR  - http://www.uni-log.org/start5.html
N2  - Sorites paradoxes are a class of paradoxical arguments which arise as a result of using vague terms such as "heap" or "bald". While precise terms have sharp boundaries of application, vague terms lack such precise boundaries. With vague terms there are objects to which: a) the vague term applies, b) the vague term doesn’t apply, and c) it is uncertain whether vague term applies or not (so called borderline cases). In borderline cases it is uncertain whether the vague term in question applies to them or not. Moreover, this uncertainty cannot be resolved by any enquiry. Since there are three aforementioned classes into which we can divide objects in a range of significance of any vague term, it might be tempting to use three-valued logic to deal with sorites paradoxes. This way we can ascribe exactly one truth value to all sentences of sorites paradox and we needn't resort to either supervaluationism or subvaluationism. Another approach to solving sorites paradoxes is based on an intuition that vagueness is a matter of degree and logic of vagueness should reflect that with different degrees of truth. If A measures 190 cm and B 195 cm then sentence "B is tall" seems to be truer than "A is tall". Fuzzy logic therefore takes advantage of its infinitely many truth values. In my talk I will critically assess many-valued logics and fuzzy logic. My goal is to show that these approaches to sorites paradoxes either have presuppositions that their proponents wouldn’t assent to or that they generate more problems than they claim to resolve.
ER  -

ŠTĚPÁNEK, Jan. Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics. In \textit{5th World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 25.-30. 6. 2015, Istanbul}. 2015.

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