| CHYTILEK, Roman a Michal TÓTH. Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System. In Maturo, A., Hošková-Mayerová, Š., Soitu, D.-T., Kacprzyk, J. Recent Trends in Social Systems : Quantitative Theories and Quantitative Models. Heidelberg: Springer, 2017, s. 89-103. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol. 66. ISBN 978-3-319-40583-4. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9. |
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@inbook{1353539,
author = {Chytilek, Roman and Tóth, Michal},
address = {Heidelberg},
booktitle = {Recent Trends in Social Systems : Quantitative Theories and Quantitative Models},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8_9},
editor = {Maturo, A., Hošková-Mayerová, Š., Soitu, D.-T., Kacprzyk, J.},
keywords = {elections; framing; experiment; electoral systems},
howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
language = {eng},
location = {Heidelberg},
isbn = {978-3-319-40583-4},
pages = {89-103},
publisher = {Springer},
title = {Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System},
year = {2017}
}
TY - CHAP
ID - 1353539
AU - Chytilek, Roman - Tóth, Michal
PY - 2017
TI - Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System
VL - Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol. 66
PB - Springer
CY - Heidelberg
SN - 9783319405834
KW - elections
KW - framing
KW - experiment
KW - electoral systems
N2 - The strategic voting across families of various electoral systems is often depicted as “settling for lesser evil” (e.g. Cox, 1997, Gschwend, 2004) in order to prevent the worst outcome of elections. In this paper we experimentally (13 sessions with 18-30 participants, 546 voting situations) explore the degree of strategic voting (as compared to non-voting) framed in situations with (non-compulsory) costly voting where voters face outcomes with positive and negative payoffs (“stopping the evil” framing) and/or with solely negative payoffs (“settling for lesser evil” framing). We explore voters’ decisions in rather complex environment of the two-round electoral system, with symmetric amount of private information about the preferences of electorate available to them and show that voters’ behavior does differ markedly in both the situations. The results have implications for the representation and democracy.
ER -
CHYTILEK, Roman a Michal TÓTH. Stopping the Evil or Settling for the Lesser Evil : An Experimental Study of Costly Voting with Negative Payoffs in a TRS Electoral System. In Maturo, A., Hošková-Mayerová, Š., Soitu, D.-T., Kacprzyk, J. \textit{Recent Trends in Social Systems : Quantitative Theories and Quantitative Models}. Heidelberg: Springer, 2017, s.~89-103. Studies in Systems, Decision and Control, vol. 66. ISBN~978-3-319-40583-4. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-40585-8\_{}9.
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