Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and
the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents:
Evidence from Slovakia

J 2016

Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

SPÁČ, Peter

Základní údaje

Originální název

Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia

Autoři

SPÁČ, Peter (703 Slovensko, garant, domácí)

Vydání

Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science, Brno, Mezinárodní politologický ústav FSS MU, 2016, 1211-3247

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50601 Political science

Stát vydavatele

Česká republika

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14230/16:00088270

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta sociálních studií

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251

UT WoS

000445543300003

Klíčová slova anglicky

distributive politics; pork barrel politics; incumbents; local elections; Slovakia

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 15. 2. 2019 13:26, Mgr. Blanka Farkašová

Anotace

V originále

Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. In addition, allocated grants have the potential to increase the prospects of incumbents when seeking reelection. This paper elaborates on these expectations and it studies a governmental program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. The results show that better access to resources is given to towns led by mayors with closer ties to the central cabinet. In coalition governments, however, this advantage is provided primarily to municipalities with mayors supported by the ruling party that directly controls the distribution. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection. A greater number of grants awarded during one term or grants distributed at the end of the electoral cycle help local incumbents to an even greater extent. Hence the paper demonstrates that a program paid for by all taxpayers may operate as a mechanism fueled by political and partisan interests with an impact in the electoral arena.

Návaznosti

GA15-22754S, projekt VaV

Název: Kvalita demokracie: Česká republika v komparativní perspektivě

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Kvalita demokracie: Česká republika v komparativní perspektivě

Citovat

SPÁČ, Peter. Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia. Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav FSS MU, 2016, roč. 23, č. 3, s. 251-271. ISSN 1211-3247. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251.

@article{1358104,
   author = {Spáč, Peter},
   article_location = {Brno},
   article_number = {3},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251},
   keywords = {distributive politics; pork barrel politics; incumbents; local elections; Slovakia},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1211-3247},
   journal = {Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science},
   title = {Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia},
   volume = {23},
   year = {2016}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1358104
AU  - Spáč, Peter
PY  - 2016
TI  - Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia
JF  - Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science
VL  - 23
IS  - 3
SP  - 251-271
EP  - 251-271
PB  - Mezinárodní politologický ústav FSS MU
SN  - 12113247
KW  - distributive politics
KW  - pork barrel politics
KW  - incumbents
KW  - local elections
KW  - Slovakia
N2  - Distribution of resources is an essential part of politics and vast research has been done in this field. While the allocation of public money is primarily of an economic nature, the literature shows that political representatives tend to use it for rewarding their allies while punishing their rivals. In addition, allocated grants have the potential to increase the prospects of incumbents when seeking reelection. This paper elaborates on these expectations and it studies a governmental program of local grants in Slovakia in the period between 2004 and 2014. The results show that better access to resources is given to towns led by mayors with closer ties to the central cabinet. In coalition governments, however, this advantage is provided primarily to municipalities with mayors supported by the ruling party that directly controls the distribution. What is more, the subsidies are beneficial for mayors when seeking reelection. A greater number of grants awarded during one term or grants distributed at the end of the electoral cycle help local incumbents to an even greater extent. Hence the paper demonstrates that a program paid for by all taxpayers may operate as a mechanism fueled by political and partisan interests with an impact in the electoral arena.
ER  -

SPÁČ, Peter. Pork Barrel Politics in a Coalition Government Environment and the Effect of Grants on the Reelection of Local Incumbents: Evidence from Slovakia. \textit{Politologický časopis / Czech Journal of Political Science}. Brno: Mezinárodní politologický ústav FSS MU, 2016, roč.~23, č.~3, s.~251-271. ISSN~1211-3247. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.5817/PC2016-3-251.

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