Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental
Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network
Externalities in India

J 2018

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

MÜLLER, Malte, Jens ROMMEL a Christian KIMMICH

Základní údaje

Originální název

Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India

Autoři

MÜLLER, Malte (276 Německo), Jens ROMMEL (276 Německo) a Christian KIMMICH (276 Německo, garant, domácí)

Vydání

German Economic Review, Wiley, 2018, 1465-6485

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.638

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14230/18:00101962

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta sociálních studií

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117

UT WoS

000429543200001

Klíčová slova anglicky

Step-level public goods game; leading by example; group size; framed field experiment

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 9. 7. 2018 11:09, Mgr. Blanka Farkašová

Anotace

V originále

Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.

Přiložené soubory

Mueller__Rommel__Kimmich__2017__Technology_coordination_experiment__GEER_.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Citovat

MÜLLER, Malte, Jens ROMMEL a Christian KIMMICH. Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India. German Economic Review. Wiley, 2018, roč. 19, č. 2, s. 119-139. ISSN 1465-6485. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117.

@article{1366423,
   author = {Müller, Malte and Rommel, Jens and Kimmich, Christian},
   article_number = {2},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117},
   keywords = {Step-level public goods game; leading by example; group size; framed field experiment},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1465-6485},
   journal = {German Economic Review},
   title = {Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India},
   url = {https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117},
   volume = {19},
   year = {2018}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1366423
AU  - Müller, Malte - Rommel, Jens - Kimmich, Christian
PY  - 2018
TI  - Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India
JF  - German Economic Review
VL  - 19
IS  - 2
SP  - 119-139
EP  - 119-139
PB  - Wiley
SN  - 14656485
KW  - Step-level public goods game
KW  - leading by example
KW  - group size
KW  - framed field experiment
UR  - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117
L2  - https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/geer.12117
N2  - Electric irrigation contributes to food security in rural India, but deteriorating electrical infrastructures threaten the functioning of farmers’ pump sets. This problem could be solved through investments in energy-efficient technologies. However, network externalities create a coordination problem for farmers. We develop a framed field experiment to study the effects of group size, leading by example, and payoff structures on the ability to coordinate technology adoption investments. The experiment is based on a game that combines features of a step-level public goods game and a critical mass game. Our findings show that smaller groups more frequently coordinate on payoff-superior equilibria and that higher payoffs lead to more investments. Contrary to previous studies, leading by example reduces investments but has no effect on efficiency. Building on this analysis, we discuss possible bottom-up solutions to the energy crisis in rural India.
ER  -

MÜLLER, Malte, Jens ROMMEL a Christian KIMMICH. Farmers’ Adoption of Irrigation Technologies : Experimental Evidence from a Coordination Game with Positive Network Externalities in India. \textit{German Economic Review}. Wiley, 2018, roč.~19, č.~2, s.~119-139. ISSN~1465-6485. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/geer.12117.

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