Iran coercion success and the use of non-kinetic tools to support sanctions and prevent military escalation

CHOVANČÍK, Martin. Iran coercion success and the use of non-kinetic tools to support sanctions and prevent military escalation. In SGEM: Political Sciences Proceedings, Vol. I. 1st ed. Vienna, Austria: International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES & ARTS SGEM, 2016, p. 261-268. ISBN 978-619-7105-51-3.

Basic information

• Original name: Iran coercion success and the use of non-kinetic tools to support sanctions and prevent military escalation
• Authors: CHOVANČÍK, Martin (703 Slovakia, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
• Edition: 1. vyd. Vienna, Austria, SGEM: Political Sciences Proceedings, Vol. I, p. 261-268, 8 pp. 2016.
• Publisher: International Multidisciplinary Scientific Conferences on SOCIAL SCIENCES & ARTS SGEM

Other information

• Original language: English
• Type of outcome: Proceedings paper
• Field of Study: 50601 Political science
• Country of publisher: Bulgaria
• Confidentiality degree: is not subject to a state or trade secret
• Publication form: printed version "print"
• RIV identification code: RIV/00216224:14230/16:00092723
• Organization unit: Faculty of Social Studies
• ISBN: 978-619-7105-51-3
• ISSN: 2367-5659
• UT WoS: 000395726800034
• Keywords in English: economic sanctions; Iran; coercion; threat of force
• Tags: International impact, Reviewed

Abstract

The successful signing of a nuclear agreement between Iran and the EU+3 has been hallmarked as a historic achievement of diplomacy. However conservative literature is far more skeptical of what role international sanctions had in attaining this result. The argument presented by these critics relies on a thesis built over decades that economic pressure only works if it is backed by a credible threat of force. This article focuses on the instruments utilized to support economic sanctions short of threatening Iran outright with the use of force. The paper presents the pivotal role of non-kinetic force measures as an intermediate solution between both extremes in the coercive process. It is the finding of this paper, that more than an overt threat of the use of force, which yields mixed results in escalating crisis dynamics, the “middle ground” measures utilized in the case of Iran have the potential to support applied economic measures for a desirable outcome. Furthermore, the paper finds that such measures, albeit diversely categorized, build coercer credibility not only within the case at hand, but also for future crisis management. The paper concludes by drawing more general conclusions about the possibility of replicating the desired outcome in altered case conditions.