Arguing on Uncertainty

a 2017

Arguing on Uncertainty

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš

Základní údaje

Originální název

Arguing on Uncertainty

Autoři

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)

Vydání

The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017, 2017

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Konferenční abstrakt

Obor

60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion

Stát vydavatele

Česká republika

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14210/17:00096659

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

ISBN

978-83-8088-673-5

Klíčová slova anglicky

Hume’s gap; moralistic fallacy; is-ought problem; factual uncertainty; normative uncertainty; burden of proof; theory of argumentation

Štítky

rivok

Změněno: 12. 3. 2018 08:10, Mgr. Vendula Hromádková

Anotace

V originále

Hume’s gap divided two main types of propositions: is-propositions and ought-propositions. According to this we cannot argue for an ought-proposition by some is-propositions. The same is true vice versa by so called moralistic fallacy (or reverse naturalistic fallacy). Thus we cannot argue even for an is-proposition with some ought-propositions. The uncertainty can be defined as a state in which we are unable to say that X is the case (or should be the case) pointing out only factual propositions (or norms) and in strictly rational debate we should abstain from any conclusion made that way. But there are practical reasons in real life (e.g. cases of negligence) when this abstain is not acceptable. In these cases, we do not want to depart from ratio, thus we have to find means how to bypass the gap. In the cases where the problem of crossing from ought-propositions to is-propositions is considered, the possibility lies in adding the procedural rule which makes clear which party needs to reject the state of what should be the case by presenting contradicting facts. This can be done by placing a burden of proof. Thus in some examples the party without this burden can argue for an is-proposition by ought-propositions. E.g., in a court of law this is done by presumption of innocence. In a simplified way, the defender can use the argument that he has done Y because he should have done it. On the other hand, the prosecutor has to point out contradicting evidence. Much more complicated is the situation when there is a presumption of guilt.

Návaznosti

MUNI/A/0837/2016, interní kód MU

Název: Výzvy současné filozofie

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Výzvy současné filozofie, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

Citovat

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš. Arguing on Uncertainty. In The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017. 2017. ISBN 978-83-8088-673-5.

@proceedings{1380408,
   author = {Ondráček, Tomáš},
   booktitle = {The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017},
   keywords = {Hume’s gap; moralistic fallacy; is-ought problem; factual uncertainty; normative uncertainty; burden of proof; theory of argumentation},
   language = {eng},
   isbn = {978-83-8088-673-5},
   title = {Arguing on Uncertainty},
   url = {http://filologia.uni.lodz.pl/philang/},
   year = {2017}
}

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AU  - Ondráček, Tomáš
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SN  - 9788380886735
KW  - Hume’s gap
KW  - moralistic fallacy
KW  - is-ought problem
KW  - factual uncertainty
KW  - normative uncertainty
KW  - burden of proof
KW  - theory of argumentation
UR  - http://filologia.uni.lodz.pl/philang/
L2  - http://filologia.uni.lodz.pl/philang/
N2  - Hume’s gap divided two main types of propositions: is-propositions and ought-propositions. According to this we cannot argue for an ought-proposition by some is-propositions. The same is true vice versa by so called moralistic fallacy (or reverse naturalistic fallacy). Thus we cannot argue even for an is-proposition with some ought-propositions. The uncertainty can be defined as a state in which we are unable to say that X is the case (or should be the case) pointing out only factual propositions (or norms) and in strictly rational debate we should abstain from any conclusion made that way. But there are practical reasons in real life (e.g. cases of negligence) when this abstain is not acceptable. In these cases, we do not want to depart from ratio, thus we have to find means how to bypass the gap. In the cases where the problem of crossing from ought-propositions to is-propositions is considered, the possibility lies in adding the procedural rule which makes clear which party needs to reject the state of what should be the case by presenting contradicting facts. This can be done by placing a burden of proof. Thus in some examples the party without this burden can argue for an is-proposition by ought-propositions. E.g., in a court of law this is done by presumption of innocence. In a simplified way, the defender can use the argument that he has done Y because he should have done it. On the other hand, the prosecutor has to point out contradicting evidence. Much more complicated is the situation when there is a presumption of guilt.
ER  -

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš. Arguing on Uncertainty. In \textit{The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017}. 2017. ISBN~978-83-8088-673-5.

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