Arguing on Uncertainty

ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš. Arguing on Uncertainty. In The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017. 2017. ISBN 978-83-8088-673-5.

Základní údaje

• Originální název: Arguing on Uncertainty
• Autoři: ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí).
• Vydání: The Fifth International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics (PhiLang 2017), Lodz, 12-14 May 2017, 2017.

Další údaje

• Originální jazyk: angličtina
• Typ výsledku: Konferenční abstrakt
• Obor: 60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
• Stát vydavatele: Česká republika
• Utajení: není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
• WWW: URL
• Kód RIV: RIV/00216224:14210/17:00096659
• Organizační jednotka: Filozofická fakulta
• ISBN: 978-83-8088-673-5
• Klíčová slova anglicky: Hume’s gap; moralistic fallacy; is-ought problem; factual uncertainty; normative uncertainty; burden of proof; theory of argumentation
• Štítky: rivok

Anotace

Hume’s gap divided two main types of propositions: is-propositions and ought-propositions. According to this we cannot argue for an ought-proposition by some is-propositions. The same is true vice versa by so called moralistic fallacy (or reverse naturalistic fallacy). Thus we cannot argue even for an is-proposition with some ought-propositions. The uncertainty can be defined as a state in which we are unable to say that X is the case (or should be the case) pointing out only factual propositions (or norms) and in strictly rational debate we should abstain from any conclusion made that way. But there are practical reasons in real life (e.g. cases of negligence) when this abstain is not acceptable. In these cases, we do not want to depart from ratio, thus we have to find means how to bypass the gap. In the cases where the problem of crossing from ought-propositions to is-propositions is considered, the possibility lies in adding the procedural rule which makes clear which party needs to reject the state of what should be the case by presenting contradicting facts. This can be done by placing a burden of proof. Thus in some examples the party without this burden can argue for an is-proposition by ought-propositions. E.g., in a court of law this is done by presumption of innocence. In a simplified way, the defender can use the argument that he has done Y because he should have done it. On the other hand, the prosecutor has to point out contradicting evidence. Much more complicated is the situation when there is a presumption of guilt.

Návaznosti

• MUNI/A/0837/2016, interní kód MU: Název: Výzvy současné filozofie

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Výzvy současné filozofie, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty