2017
Critical discussions, Ought-propositions, and Is-propositions
ONDRÁČEK, TomášZákladní údaje
Originální název
Critical discussions, Ought-propositions, and Is-propositions
Autoři
ONDRÁČEK, Tomáš (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)
Vydání
Poznań Reasoning Week (PRW 2017), Poznań, 4-7 July 2017, 2017
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Prezentace na konferencích
Obor
60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Stát vydavatele
Polsko
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14210/17:00097150
Organizační jednotka
Filozofická fakulta
Klíčová slova anglicky
Critical discussions; Ought-propositions; and Is-propositions; Moralistic Fallacy
Štítky
Změněno: 12. 3. 2018 08:42, Mgr. Vendula Hromádková
Anotace
V originále
According to the problem of Hume’s gap there are two main types of propositions, is-propositions and ought-propositions, and we cannot proceed from the former to the latter. In argumentation, arguing for an oughtproposition by an is-proposition is usually called the naturalistic fallacy or the is-ought fallacy. The same is true vice versa, i.e. arguing for an is-proposition by an ought-proposition. This is called the moralistic fallacy or the reverse naturalistic fallacy. Even though these moves are generally regarded as fallacious, they are often used in practice. The goal of this paper is to present an appropriate description of such cases where an is-proposition was justified by an ought-proposition in an unfallacious manner. The description is done using the pragma dialectical approach and the PVF-model. Within this approach, it is also necessary to examine a possible structure of starting points.
Návaznosti
| MUNI/A/0837/2016, interní kód MU |
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