J 2018

Court Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Judicial Governance

KOSAŘ, David a Adam BLISA

Základní údaje

Originální název

Court Presidents: The Missing Piece in the Puzzle of Judicial Governance

Autoři

KOSAŘ, David (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Adam BLISA (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

German Law Journal, Frankfurt am Main, Goethe University Frankfurt, 2018, 2071-8322

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50501 Law

Stát vydavatele

Německo

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14220/18:00104968

Organizační jednotka

Právnická fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

court presidents; judicial governance; court president power index

Štítky

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 10. 7. 2020 14:23, Mgr. Petra Georgala

Anotace

V originále

The aim of this paper is to provide a new comprehensive understanding of roles of court presidents in judicial governance in Europe. It argues that in order to better understand the role of court presidents in comparative perspective it is necessary to unpack their power into smaller components that can be analyzed separately. We define seven such components: judicial career, jurisprudential, administrative, financial, ambassadorial, and media power, and ancillary powers as a residual category. Subsequently, we zero in on 13 European jurisdictions and rate them according to the strength of their court presidents’ powers. By doing so we are developing a Court President Power Index. Based on this Index we question the claim that Western court presidents are always weaker than their Eastern European counterparts and argue that powers of court presidents diverge both within Western Europe and within Eastern Europe, and hence it is difficult to draw the easy line along the West/East axis on this ground. Finally, we problematize our Court President Power Index and show that powers in the meaning of faculty do not necessarily translate into influence since various contingent circumstances (such as the length of court presidents’ terms of office, information asymmetry, the structure of the judiciary, the existence of competing judicial self governance bodies, the role of individuals, the proximity of court presidents to political leaders, the legal profession, legal culture, and the political environment) affect to what extent court presidents may exploit their powers in practice.

Návaznosti

46943, interní kód MU
Název: JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect (Akronym: JUDI-ARCH)
Investor: Evropská unie, JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect, ERC (Excellent Science)

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