HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

J 2018

HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

LIPOVSKÁ, Hana; Lucie COUFALOVÁ and Libor ŽÍDEK

Basic information

Original name

HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY

Authors

LIPOVSKÁ, Hana (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution); Lucie COUFALOVÁ (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution) and Libor ŽÍDEK (203 Czech Republic, belonging to the institution)

Edition

DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, Walter de Gruyter, 2018, 1804-6746

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Article in a journal

Field of Study

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Country of publisher

Germany

Confidentiality degree

is not subject to a state or trade secret

RIV identification code

RIV/00216224:14560/18:00101518

Organization unit

Faculty of Economics and Administration

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85061695459

Keywords in English

Economic Crimes; Legal Cases; Shortage Economy; Socialist Enterprises; State Development Plan

Abstract

V originále

Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.

Links

GA15-09404S, research and development project

Name: Reálné fungování centrálně plánované ekonomiky v Československu

Investor: Czech Science Foundation

Cite

LIPOVSKÁ, Hana; Lucie COUFALOVÁ and Libor ŽÍDEK. HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY. DANUBE: Law and Economics Review. Walter de Gruyter, 2018, vol. 9, No 4, p. 207-226. ISSN 1804-6746. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013.

@article{1483896,
   author = {Lipovská, Hana and Coufalová, Lucie and Žídek, Libor},
   article_number = {4},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013},
   keywords = {Economic Crimes; Legal Cases; Shortage Economy; Socialist Enterprises; State Development Plan},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1804-6746},
   journal = {DANUBE: Law and Economics Review},
   title = {HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY},
   volume = {9},
   year = {2018}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1483896
AU  - Lipovská, Hana - Coufalová, Lucie - Žídek, Libor
PY  - 2018
TI  - HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY
JF  - DANUBE: Law and Economics Review
VL  - 9
IS  - 4
SP  - 207-226
EP  - 207-226
PB  - Walter de Gruyter
SN  - 18046746
KW  - Economic Crimes
KW  - Legal Cases
KW  - Shortage Economy
KW  - Socialist Enterprises
KW  - State Development Plan
N2  - Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.
ER  -

LIPOVSKÁ, Hana; Lucie COUFALOVÁ and Libor ŽÍDEK. HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY. \textit{DANUBE: Law and Economics Review}. Walter de Gruyter, 2018, vol.~9, No~4, p.~207-226. ISSN~1804-6746. Available from: https://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013.

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