LIPOVSKÁ, Hana, Lucie COUFALOVÁ and Libor ŽÍDEK. HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY. DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, Walter de Gruyter, 2018, vol. 9, No 4, p. 207-226. ISSN 1804-6746. doi:10.2478/danb-2018-0013.
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Basic information
Original name HOMO ECONOMICUS IN THE SHORTAGE ECONOMY
Authors LIPOVSKÁ, Hana (203 Czechia, guarantor, belonging to the institution), Lucie COUFALOVÁ (203 Czechia, belonging to the institution) and Libor ŽÍDEK (203 Czechia, belonging to the institution).
Edition DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, Walter de Gruyter, 2018, 1804-6746.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome article in a journal
Field of Study 50200 5.2 Economics and Business
Country of publisher Germany
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14560/18:00101518
Organization unit Faculty of Economics and Administration
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.2478/danb-2018-0013
Keywords in English Economic Crimes; Legal Cases; Shortage Economy; Socialist Enterprises; State Development Plan
Tags International impact, Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Mgr. Daniela Marcollová, učo 111148. Changed: 30/4/2019 09:15.
Abstract
Rational agents react to incentives in the market economy as well as in the centrally planned economy. Economic laws are persistent regardless of the economic system. The legislative system changes the outcome of the game between economic agents and managers. The aim of this paper is to show how rational agents reacted to legislative incentives in the Soviet-type economy in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s and 1980s, that is, how they reacted to the general shortage in the centrally planned economy. Based on the original survey among former managers as well as on the legislative sources from the 1970s and 1980s, a taxonomy was made of economic reactions to the shortage economy. This survey was possibly the last chance to map the experiences of socialist managers who tried to run companies in the centrally planned economy. We distinguish plan manipulation in order to ensure payment bonuses; bribery in order to obtain short-supplied inputs and the creation of reserves for the purpose of fulfilling the plan. It was shown that, if the rational agent wanted to obey the higher law, he was forced to ignore lower legislation.
Links
GA15-09404S, research and development projectName: Reálné fungování centrálně plánované ekonomiky v Československu
Investor: Czech Science Foundation, Standard Projects
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