2019
Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition
BĚLOHRAD, RadimZákladní údaje
Originální název
Animalism and the Vagueness of Composition
Autoři
BĚLOHRAD, Radim (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)
Vydání
Organon F, Bratislava, 2019, 1335-0668
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
60301 Philosophy, History and Philosophy of science and technology
Stát vydavatele
Slovensko
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14210/19:00107392
Organizační jednotka
Filozofická fakulta
UT WoS
000469310400002
Klíčová slova anglicky
Animalism; Lockeanism; partial identity; personal identity; supervaluations; vagueness
Štítky
Příznaky
Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 2. 4. 2020 12:15, Mgr. Zuzana Matulíková
Anotace
V originále
Lockean theories of personal identity maintain that we persist by virtue of psychological continuity, and most Lockeans say that we are material things coinciding with animals. Some animalists argue that if persons and animals coincide, they must have the same intrinsic properties, including thinking, and, as a result, there are ‘too many thinkers’ associated with each human being. Further, Lockeans have trouble explaining how animals and persons can be numerically different and have different persistence conditions. For these reasons, the idea of a person being numerically distinct but coincident with an animal is rejected and animalists conclude that we simply are animals. However, animalists face a similar problem when confronted with the vagueness of composition. Animals are entities with vague boundaries. According to the linguistic account of vagueness, the vagueness of a term consists in there being a number of candidates for the denotatum of the vague term. It seems to imply that where we see an animal, there are, in fact, a lot of distinct but overlapping entities with basically the same intrinsic properties, including thinking. As a result, the animalist must also posit ‘too many thinkers’ where we thought there was only one. This seems to imply that the animalist cannot accept the linguistic account of vagueness. In this paper the author argues that the animalist can accept the linguistic account of vagueness and retain her argument against Lockeanism.
Návaznosti
GA17-12551S, projekt VaV |
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