Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public
goods: experimental evidence

J 2020

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher COTTON a Tommaso REGGIANI

Základní údaje

Originální název

Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence

Autoři

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher COTTON a Tommaso REGGIANI

Vydání

Experimental Econonomics, USA, Springer, 2020, 1386-4157

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 2.367

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/20:00114002

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6

UT WoS

000541812600001

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85076932061

Klíčová slova anglicky

Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 24. 1. 2024 11:45, Mgr. Pavlína Kurková

Anotace

V originále

When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.

Návaznosti

GA18-19492S, projekt VaV

Název: Vliv kvality bydlení na preference a chování: ekonomické experimenty s účastníky randomizovaného kontrolovaného experimentu

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, The Effect of Housing on Preferences and Behavior: Lab-in-the-Field Experiments with Participants of a Randomized Controlled Trial

Přiložené soubory

ExpEcon_onlinefirst_10.1007_s10683-019-09639-6.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Citovat

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher COTTON a Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. Experimental Econonomics. USA: Springer, 2020, roč. 23, č. 4, s. 1030-1068. ISSN 1386-4157. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.

@article{1593996,
   author = {Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso},
   article_location = {USA},
   article_number = {4},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
   keywords = {Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1386-4157},
   journal = {Experimental Econonomics},
   title = {Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence},
   url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6},
   volume = {23},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1593996
AU  - Corazzini, Luca - Cotton, Christopher - Reggiani, Tommaso
PY  - 2020
TI  - Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence
JF  - Experimental Econonomics
VL  - 23
IS  - 4
SP  - 1030-1068
EP  - 1030-1068
PB  - Springer
SN  - 13864157
KW  - Delegation
KW  - Threshold public goods
KW  - Laboratory experiment
KW  - Fundraising
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
L2  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6
N2  - When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success.
ER  -

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher COTTON a Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. \textit{Experimental Econonomics}. USA: Springer, 2020, roč.~23, č.~4, s.~1030-1068. ISSN~1386-4157. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.

Přehled o publikaci