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@article{1593996, author = {Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher and Reggiani, Tommaso}, article_location = {USA}, article_number = {4}, doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6}, keywords = {Delegation; Threshold public goods; Laboratory experiment; Fundraising}, language = {eng}, issn = {1386-4157}, journal = {Experimental Econonomics}, title = {Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence}, url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6}, volume = {23}, year = {2020} }
TY - JOUR ID - 1593996 AU - Corazzini, Luca - Cotton, Christopher - Reggiani, Tommaso PY - 2020 TI - Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence JF - Experimental Econonomics VL - 23 IS - 4 SP - 1030-1068 EP - 1030-1068 PB - Springer SN - 13864157 KW - Delegation KW - Threshold public goods KW - Laboratory experiment KW - Fundraising UR - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6 L2 - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6 N2 - When multiple charities, social programs and community projects simultaneously vie for funding, donors risk mis-coordinating their contributions leading to an inefficient distribution of funding across projects. Community chests and other intermediary organizations facilitate coordination among donors and reduce such risks. To study this, we extend a threshold public goods framework to allow donors to contribute through an intermediary rather than directly to the public goods. Through a series of experiments, we show that the presence of an intermediary increases public good success and subjects’ earnings only when the intermediary is formally committed to direct donations to socially beneficial goods. Without such a restriction, the presence of an intermediary has a negative impact, complicating the donation environment, decreasing contributions and public good success. ER -
CORAZZINI, Luca, Christopher COTTON a Tommaso REGGIANI. Delegation and coordination with multiple threshold public goods: experimental evidence. \textit{Experimental Econonomics}. USA: Springer, 2020, roč.~23, č.~4, s.~1030-1068. ISSN~1386-4157. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-019-09639-6.
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