Další formáty:
BibTeX
LaTeX
RIS
@article{1614736,
author = {Fišar, Miloš and Krčál, Ondřej and Staněk, Rostislav and Špalek, Jiří},
article_location = {Brno},
article_number = {01},
language = {eng},
issn = {2571-130X},
journal = {MUNI ECON Working Papers},
title = {The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed},
url = {https://ideas.repec.org/p/mub/wpaper/2019-01.html},
year = {2019}
}
TY - JFULL
ID - 1614736
AU - Fišar, Miloš - Krčál, Ondřej - Staněk, Rostislav - Špalek, Jiří
PY - 2019
TI - The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed
JF - MUNI ECON Working Papers
IS - 01
PB - Masaryk University
SN - 2571130X
UR - https://ideas.repec.org/p/mub/wpaper/2019-01.html
N2 - Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. This paper proposes an experimental design that tests the anti-corruption effect of staff rotation in situations where public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the~share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The~outcome of the~staff-rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibria.
ER -
FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK a Jiří ŠPALEK. The Effects of Staff-rotation in Public Administration on the Decision to Bribe or be Bribed. \textit{MUNI ECON Working Papers}. Brno: Masaryk University, 2019, č.~01. ISSN~2571-130X.
|
