2020
Security improvements of several basic quantum private query protocols with O(log N) communication complexity
YU, Fang; Daowen QIU; Xiaominf WANG; Qin LI; Lvzhou LI et. al.Základní údaje
Originální název
Security improvements of several basic quantum private query protocols with O(log N) communication complexity
Autoři
YU, Fang (156 Čína, domácí); Daowen QIU; Xiaominf WANG; Qin LI; Lvzhou LI a Jozef GRUSKA (703 Slovensko, domácí)
Vydání
Theoretical Computer Science, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2020, 0304-3975
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics
Stát vydavatele
Německo
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Impakt faktor
Impact factor: 0.827
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14330/20:00115600
Organizační jednotka
Fakulta informatiky
UT WoS
000512219400021
EID Scopus
2-s2.0-85077397571
Klíčová slova anglicky
Private database query protocol; O (log N) communication complexity; Cheat-sensitivity; Rhetoric query; Dishonest database; Privacy
Příznaky
Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 20. 9. 2022 11:09, RNDr. Pavel Šmerk, Ph.D.
Anotace
V originále
New quantum private database (with N elements) query protocols are presented and analyzed. Protocols preserve O (log N) communication complexity of known protocols for the same task, but achieve several significant improvements in security, especially concerning user privacy. For example, the randomized form of our protocol has a cheat-sensitive property - it allows the user to detect a dishonest database with a nonzero probability, while the phase-encoded private query protocols [6,7] for the same task do not have such a property. Moreover, when the database performs the computational basis measurement, a particular projective measurement which can cause a significant loss of user privacy in the previous private query protocols with O (log N) communication complexity, at most half of the user privacy could leak to such a database in our protocol, while in the QPQ protocol [5], the entire user privacy could leak out. In addition, it is proved here that for large N, the user could detect a cheating via the computational basis measurement, with a probability close to 1/2 using O(root N) special queries. Finally, it is shown here, for both forms of our protocol, basic and randomized, how a dishonest database has to act in case it could not learn user's queries.