How to Fight Court-Packing

J 2020

How to Fight Court-Packing

KOSAŘ, David a Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ

Základní údaje

Originální název

How to Fight Court-Packing

Autoři

KOSAŘ, David (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí) a Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ (703 Slovensko, domácí)

Vydání

Constitutional Studies, Madison, WI, USA, Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, 2474-9427

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50501 Law

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

Web časopisu

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14220/20:00115855

Organizační jednotka

Právnická fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

courts; judges; court-packing; court curbing; judicial independence; court presidents; separation of powers; unconstitutional constitutional amendments; informal institutions; Court of Justice of the European Union

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 29. 3. 2021 12:10, Mgr. Petra Georgala

Anotace

V originále

Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.

Návaznosti

46943, interní kód MU

Název: JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect (Akronym: JUDI-ARCH)

Investor: Evropská unie, JUDI-ARCH - The Rise of Judicial Self-Government in Europe: Changing the Architecture of Separation of Powers without an Architect, ERC (Excellent Science)

Přiložené soubory

KOSAR_SIPULOVA_-_How_to_Fight_Court-Packing_JOURNAL__2020_.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Citovat

KOSAŘ, David a Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ. How to Fight Court-Packing. Constitutional Studies. Madison, WI, USA: Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, roč. 6, č. 1, s. 133-164. ISSN 2474-9427.

@article{1664078,
   author = {Kosař, David and Šipulová, Katarína},
   article_location = {Madison, WI, USA},
   article_number = {1},
   keywords = {courts; judges; court-packing; court curbing; judicial independence; court presidents; separation of powers; unconstitutional constitutional amendments; informal institutions; Court of Justice of the European Union},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {2474-9427},
   journal = {Constitutional Studies},
   title = {How to Fight Court-Packing},
   url = {https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52},
   volume = {6},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1664078
AU  - Kosař, David - Šipulová, Katarína
PY  - 2020
TI  - How to Fight Court-Packing
JF  - Constitutional Studies
VL  - 6
IS  - 1
SP  - 133-164
EP  - 133-164
PB  - Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy
SN  - 24749427
KW  - courts
KW  - judges
KW  - court-packing
KW  - court curbing
KW  - judicial independence
KW  - court presidents
KW  - separation of powers
KW  - unconstitutional constitutional amendments
KW  - informal institutions
KW  - Court of Justice of the European Union
UR  - https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52
L2  - https://constitutionalstudies.wisc.edu/index.php/cs/article/view/52
N2  - Whether we like it or not, court-packing has flourished all over the world. Bolivian, Hungarian, Polish, and Turkish as well as Venezuelan political leaders have recently employed various strategies to stack their courts with loyal judges. Even in consolidated democracies, such as the United States, the possibility of court-packing is discussed with an intensity unheard of for several decades. Yet, our conceptual understanding of the phenomenon is still very limited. This article provides a novel conceptualization of court-packing and identifies three court-packing strategies: (1) the expanding strategy, which includes techniques that increase the size of the court; (2) the emptying strategy, which results in a decrease in the number of sitting judges; and (3) the swapping strategy, which aims at replacing sitting judges. Subsequently, it analyzes the potential safeguards, both formal and informal, against court-packing strategies and shows that formal institutions are rarely enough to fend off court-packing attempts.
ER  -

KOSAŘ, David a Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ. How to Fight Court-Packing. \textit{Constitutional Studies}. Madison, WI, USA: Center for the Study of Liberal Democracy, 2020, roč.~6, č.~1, s.~133-164. ISSN~2474-9427.

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