Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable
keys

D 2020

Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys

JANOVSKÝ, Adam, Matúš NEMEC, Petr ŠVENDA, Peter SEKAN, Václav MATYÁŠ et. al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys

Název česky

neuniformní privátní RSA klíče: Určování původu klíčů faktorizovatelných algoritmem GCD

Autoři

JANOVSKÝ, Adam (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí), Matúš NEMEC (703 Slovensko), Petr ŠVENDA (203 Česká republika, domácí), Peter SEKAN (703 Slovensko) a Václav MATYÁŠ (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

Cham, Switzerland, Computer Security – ESORICS 2020, od s. 505-524, 20 s. 2020

Nakladatel

Springer

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Obor

10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics

Stát vydavatele

Švýcarsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

tištěná verze "print"

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 0.402 v roce 2005

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14330/20:00115914

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta informatiky

ISBN

978-3-030-59012-3

ISSN

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_25

UT WoS

001229989600025

Klíčová slova anglicky

Cryptographic library; RSA factorization; Measurement; RSA key classification; Statistical model

Štítky

core_A, firank_A

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 25. 10. 2024 16:11, Mgr. Natálie Hílek

Anotace

V originále

In 2016, Švenda et al. (USENIX 2016, The Million-key Question) reported that the implementation choices in cryptographic libraries allow for qualified guessing about the origin of public RSA keys. We extend the technique to two new scenarios when not only public but also private keys are available for the origin attribution -- analysis of a source of GCD-factorable keys in IPv4-wide TLS scans and forensic investigation of an unknown source. We learn several representatives of the bias from the private keys to train a model on more than 150 million keys collected from 70 cryptographic libraries, hardware security modules and cryptographic smartcards. Our model not only doubles the number of distinguishable groups of libraries (compared to public keys from Švenda et al.) but also improves more than twice in accuracy w.r.t. random guessing when a single key is classified. For a forensic scenario where at least 10 keys from the same source are available, the correct origin library is correctly identified with average accuracy of 89\% compared to 4\% accuracy of a random guess. The technique was also used to identify libraries producing GCD-factorable TLS keys, showing that only three groups are the probable suspects.

Návaznosti

GA20-03426S, projekt VaV

Název: Ověření a zlepšení bezpečnosti kryptografie eliptických křivek

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Ověření a zlepšení bezpečnosti kryptografie eliptických křivek

MUNI/A/1076/2019, interní kód MU

Název: Zapojení studentů Fakulty informatiky do mezinárodní vědecké komunity 20 (Akronym: SKOMU)

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Zapojení studentů Fakulty informatiky do mezinárodní vědecké komunity 20, DO R. 2020_Kategorie A - Specifický výzkum - Studentské výzkumné projekty

Citovat

JANOVSKÝ, Adam, Matúš NEMEC, Petr ŠVENDA, Peter SEKAN a Václav MATYÁŠ. Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys. In Liqun Chen and Ninghui Li and Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider. Computer Security – ESORICS 2020. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020, s. 505-524. ISBN 978-3-030-59012-3. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_25.

@inproceedings{1669278,
   author = {Janovský, Adam and Nemec, Matúš and Švenda, Petr and Sekan, Peter and Matyáš, Václav},
   address = {Cham, Switzerland},
   booktitle = {Computer Security – ESORICS 2020},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0_25},
   editor = {Liqun Chen and Ninghui Li and Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider},
   keywords = {Cryptographic library; RSA factorization; Measurement; RSA key classification; Statistical model},
   howpublished = {tištěná verze "print"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Cham, Switzerland},
   isbn = {978-3-030-59012-3},
   pages = {505-524},
   publisher = {Springer},
   title = {Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys},
   url = {https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-59013-0_25},
   year = {2020}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1669278
AU  - Janovský, Adam - Nemec, Matúš - Švenda, Petr - Sekan, Peter - Matyáš, Václav
PY  - 2020
TI  - Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys
PB  - Springer
CY  - Cham, Switzerland
SN  - 9783030590123
KW  - Cryptographic library
KW  - RSA factorization
KW  - Measurement
KW  - RSA key classification
KW  - Statistical model
UR  - https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-59013-0_25
L2  - https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-030-59013-0_25
N2  - In 2016, Švenda et al. (USENIX 2016, The Million-key Question) reported that the implementation choices in cryptographic libraries allow for qualified guessing about the origin of public RSA keys. We extend the technique to two new scenarios when not only public but also private keys are available for the origin attribution -- analysis of a source of GCD-factorable keys in IPv4-wide TLS scans and forensic investigation of an unknown source. We learn several representatives of the bias from the private keys to train a model on more than 150 million keys collected from 70 cryptographic libraries, hardware security modules and cryptographic smartcards. Our model not only doubles the number of distinguishable groups of libraries (compared to public keys from Švenda et al.) but also improves more than twice in accuracy w.r.t. random guessing when a single key is classified. For a forensic scenario where at least 10 keys from the same source are available, the correct origin library is correctly identified with average accuracy of 89\% compared to 4\% accuracy of a random guess. The technique was also used to identify libraries producing GCD-factorable TLS keys, showing that only three groups are the probable suspects.
ER  -

JANOVSKÝ, Adam, Matúš NEMEC, Petr ŠVENDA, Peter SEKAN a Václav MATYÁŠ. Biased RSA private keys: Origin attribution of GCD-factorable keys. In Liqun Chen and Ninghui Li and Kaitai Liang and Steve Schneider. \textit{Computer Security – ESORICS 2020}. Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2020, s.~505-524. ISBN~978-3-030-59012-3. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-59013-0\_{}25.

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