| FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK a Jiří ŠPALEK. Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration. Public Performance & Management Review. Abingdon (England): ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD, 2021, roč. 44, č. 2, s. 404-424. ISSN 1530-9576. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410. |
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@article{1674364,
author = {Fišar, Miloš and Krčál, Ondřej and Staněk, Rostislav and Špalek, Jiří},
article_location = {Abingdon (England)},
article_number = {2},
doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410},
keywords = {bribery; economic experiment; staff rotation; anti-corruption practices},
language = {eng},
issn = {1530-9576},
journal = {Public Performance & Management Review},
title = {Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration},
url = {https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true},
volume = {44},
year = {2021}
}
TY - JOUR
ID - 1674364
AU - Fišar, Miloš - Krčál, Ondřej - Staněk, Rostislav - Špalek, Jiří
PY - 2021
TI - Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration
JF - Public Performance & Management Review
VL - 44
IS - 2
SP - 404-424
EP - 404-424
PB - ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR & FRANCIS LTD
SN - 15309576
KW - bribery
KW - economic experiment
KW - staff rotation
KW - anti-corruption practices
UR - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true
L2 - https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410?needAccess=true
N2 - Periodic rotation of staff in public administration may lead to lower corruption, as it disrupts long-term relationships between public officials and potential bribers. We use an experimental design to test the anticorruption effect of staff rotation in situations in which public officials have committed to reciprocating bribes. We find that staff rotation does not influence the proportion of firms offering bribes but does reduce the share of bribe acceptance and inefficient decisions owing to bribery. The outcome of the staff rotation treatment, in which firms offered bribes even though they were rarely accepted by officials, is consistent with the game having a quantal response equilibrium.
ER -
FIŠAR, Miloš, Ondřej KRČÁL, Rostislav STANĚK a Jiří ŠPALEK. Committed to reciprocate on a bribe or blow the whistle: The effects of periodical staff-rotation in public administration. \textit{Public Performance \&{} Management Review}. Abingdon (England): ROUTLEDGE JOURNALS, TAYLOR \&{} FRANCIS LTD, 2021, roč.~44, č.~2, s.~404-424. ISSN~1530-9576. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15309576.2020.1812410.
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