Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

J 2021

Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

SPÁČ, Peter

Základní údaje

Originální název

Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level

Autoři

SPÁČ, Peter

Vydání

Public Choice, Springer, 2021, 0048-5829

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50601 Political science

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 1.780

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118755

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta sociálních studií

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2

UT WoS

000565644600002

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85089892989

Klíčová slova anglicky

Distribution; Pork barrel politics; Elections; Local elections; Reelection; Incumbents

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 17. 8. 2021 16:06, Mgr. Blanka Farkašová

Anotace

V originále

Does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents? Despite the attention of scholars to that question, the empirical results are mixed thus far. The present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections. I study the consequences of pork-barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018, finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection. The same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years. The effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are, however, moderated by municipal population. More specifically, a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas.

Návaznosti

GA18-16928S, projekt VaV

Název: Distributivní politika ve střední Evropě

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Distributivní politika ve střední Evropě

Přiložené soubory

Spac2021_Article_PorkBarrelPoliticsAndElectoral.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Citovat

SPÁČ, Peter. Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level. Public Choice. Springer, 2021, roč. 188, 3-4, s. 479-501. ISSN 0048-5829. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2.

@article{1676361,
   author = {Spáč, Peter},
   article_number = {3-4},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2},
   keywords = {Distribution; Pork barrel politics; Elections; Local elections; Reelection; Incumbents},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0048-5829},
   journal = {Public Choice},
   title = {Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level},
   url = {https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2},
   volume = {188},
   year = {2021}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 1676361
AU  - Spáč, Peter
PY  - 2021
TI  - Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level
JF  - Public Choice
VL  - 188
IS  - 3-4
SP  - 479-501
EP  - 479-501
PB  - Springer
SN  - 00485829
KW  - Distribution
KW  - Pork barrel politics
KW  - Elections
KW  - Local elections
KW  - Reelection
KW  - Incumbents
UR  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2
L2  - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2
N2  - Does the targeted spending of public resources provide electoral benefits for incumbents? Despite the attention of scholars to that question, the empirical results are mixed thus far. The present paper supplies insights into the electoral benefits of discretionary funding on local elections. I study the consequences of pork-barrel politics in 7355 competitive mayoral elections in Slovakia between 2006 and 2018, finding that more grants from the central government enhance the likelihood of mayors winning reelection. The same advantage applies to mayors whose municipalities receive grants in local election years. The effects of the number of grants obtained as well as the timing of their distribution are, however, moderated by municipal population. More specifically, a larger number of grants and resources obtained near the end of the mayoral term provides electoral benefits only to small town mayors but give no advantage to the mayors of larger urban areas.
ER  -

SPÁČ, Peter. Pork barrel politics and electoral returns at the local level. \textit{Public Choice}. Springer, 2021, roč.~188, 3-4, s.~479-501. ISSN~0048-5829. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-020-00841-2.

Přehled o publikaci