2021
Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii
MENCL, Matouš a Pavel DUFEKZákladní údaje
Originální název
Ideální konsenzus, reálná diverzita a výzva veřejného ospravedlnění : k limitům idealizace v liberální politické teorii
Název anglicky
Ideal Consensus, Real Diversity, and the Challenge of Public Justification : On the Limits of Idealisation in Liberal Political Theory
Autoři
MENCL, Matouš (203 Česká republika) a Pavel DUFEK (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)
Vydání
Acta Politologica, Praha, Univerzita Karlova, 2021, 1803-8220
Další údaje
Jazyk
čeština
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
50601 Political science
Stát vydavatele
Česká republika
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14230/21:00118933
Organizační jednotka
Fakulta sociálních studií
Klíčová slova česky
ideální teorie; anti-utopismus; normativní diverzita; Gaus; Estlund; liberalismus; rozumnost, veřejné ospravedlnění
Klíčová slova anglicky
ideal theory; anti-utopianism; normative diversity; Gaus; Estlund; liberalism; reasonableness; public justification
Štítky
Příznaky
Recenzováno
Změněno: 23. 3. 2022 12:01, Mgr. Blanka Farkašová
V originále
The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone
Anglicky
The paper deals with the methodological clash between idealism and anti-idealism in political philosophy, and highlights its importance for public reason (PR) and public justification (PJ) theorising. Upon reviewing the broader context which harks back to Rawls’s notion of a realistic utopia, we focus on two major recent contributions to the debate in the work of David Estlund (the prototypical utopian) and Gerald Gaus (the cautious anti-utopian). While Estlund presents a powerful case on behalf of ideal theorising, claiming that motivational incapacity and other non-ideal features of “human nature” – the so-called bad facts – do not normally refute the desirability of highly utopian theories of justice, we show that Gaus is correct in stressing the importance of feasibility considerations, including empirical knowledge about human societies. Because moral disagreement is to be expected even among cognitively and morally excellent reasoners, we argue that Estlund’s search for Truth about justice must idealise away normative diversity as just another bad fact. This methodological dispute has important ramifications for current debates about PR and PJ as the grounds of liberal legitimacy. Because consensual approaches rely on strong idealisation which results in exclusion of numerous comprehensive doctrines from consideration, we conclude that convergence-based liberal political theory has distinct advantage as regards exploiting normative diversity to the advantage of everyone
Návaznosti
| GA19-11091S, projekt VaV |
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