2021
The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?
HAPLA, MartinZákladní údaje
Originální název
The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?
Název česky
The Problem of Recognition of Human Rights: Does Explicative-Existential Justification Really Work?
Autoři
HAPLA, Martin (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí)
Vydání
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej: Journal of the Polish Section of IVR, Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy – the Polish Section IVR, Wolters Kluwer Polska, 2021, 2082-3304
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
50501 Law
Stát vydavatele
Polsko
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14220/21:00119071
Organizační jednotka
Právnická fakulta
Klíčová slova anglicky
Human rights; justification; explicative-existential justification; is-ought problem; universality of human rights
Štítky
Příznaky
Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 22. 2. 2023 16:18, Mgr. Petra Georgala
Anotace
V originále
This paper analyses Robert Alexy's explicative-existential justification of human rights. The author identifies several problems that are associated with it. An analysis of Alexy's explicative argument suggests that it cannot cope with the transition from facts to norms. Notably, this argument does not explain why its requirements cannot be overruled by some other moral reason (for example, the utility principle). The answer that Alexy offers in his existential argument is not considered sufficient by the author of this paper. Although this argument complements the necessary normative premises, the existential decision preferred by Alexy is not the only one necessary. It can be admitted that for many people such a decision is attractive. However, even if we accept that explicative-existential justification is credible in some context, it is correct to apply it only to the rights of persons and not to the rights of human beings. In the final part, the author shows that the claim that this theory can justify even the rights of human beings who are not persons is indefensible.
Návaznosti
GA20-10464S, projekt VaV |
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