Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned
economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in
late socialism

J 2023

Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism

COUFALOVÁ, Lucie, Štěpán MIKULA a Libor ŽÍDEK

Základní údaje

Originální název

Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism

Autoři

COUFALOVÁ, Lucie (203 Česká republika, garant, domácí), Štěpán MIKULA (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Libor ŽÍDEK (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

Accounting History, London, SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD, 2023, 1032-3732

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50205 Accounting

Stát vydavatele

Velká Británie a Severní Irsko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 1.000 v roce 2022

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/23:00134007

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10323732221109652

UT WoS

000838277700001

Klíčová slova anglicky

centrally planned economy;Czechoslovakia;principal-agent problem;financial statements;creative accounting;manager bonuses;Benford’s law

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 8. 3. 2023 09:50, Ing. Mgr. Lucie Coufalová, Ph.D. et Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

Communist economies of the former Eastern Bloc were driven by systems of central planning. The central plan set detailed goals to be achieved by the state-owned enterprises, which often struggled to meet them and obtain bonuses or avoid the related sanctions. In line with the principal-agent theory, we study the behaviour of managers of the Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in this specific environment and investigate the possibility of using creative accounting methods and other methods to cover failures in meeting those plans. Statistical analysis based on accounting records from the 1970s and 1980s recovered from state archives indicates that meeting the central plans targets was often achieved through false reporting. This conclusion is further supported by two series of 75 and 80 interviews with former managers of socialist state-owned enterprises. We expect our findings to hold for other centrally planned economies, as managers’ original motivations were distorted by features which were inherent to the centrally planned system itself.

Návaznosti

GA20-23131S, projekt VaV

Název: Transformace českých podniků: socialistické podniky v tržní ekonomice

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Transformace českých podniků: socialistické podniky v tržní ekonomice

Přiložené soubory

misreporting.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

Citovat

COUFALOVÁ, Lucie, Štěpán MIKULA a Libor ŽÍDEK. Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism. Accounting History. London: SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD, 2023, roč. 28, č. 1, s. 170-191. ISSN 1032-3732. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10323732221109652.

@article{2210877,
   author = {Coufalová, Lucie and Mikula, Štěpán and Žídek, Libor},
   article_location = {London},
   article_number = {1},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10323732221109652},
   keywords = {centrally planned economy;Czechoslovakia;principal-agent problem;financial statements;creative accounting;manager bonuses;Benford’s law},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1032-3732},
   journal = {Accounting History},
   title = {Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism},
   url = {https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10323732221109652},
   volume = {28},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2210877
AU  - Coufalová, Lucie - Mikula, Štěpán - Žídek, Libor
PY  - 2023
TI  - Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism
JF  - Accounting History
VL  - 28
IS  - 1
SP  - 170-191
EP  - 170-191
PB  - SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD
SN  - 10323732
KW  - centrally planned economy;Czechoslovakia;principal-agent problem;financial statements;creative accounting;manager bonuses;Benford’s law
UR  - https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/10323732221109652
N2  - Communist economies of the former Eastern Bloc were driven by systems of central planning. The central plan set detailed goals to be achieved by the state-owned enterprises, which often struggled to meet them and obtain bonuses or avoid the related sanctions. In line with the principal-agent theory, we study the behaviour of managers of the Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in this specific environment and investigate the possibility of using creative accounting methods and other methods to cover failures in meeting those plans. Statistical analysis based on accounting records from the 1970s and 1980s recovered from state archives indicates that meeting the central plans targets was often achieved through false reporting. This conclusion is further supported by two series of 75 and 80 interviews with former managers of socialist state-owned enterprises. We expect our findings to hold for other centrally planned economies, as managers’ original motivations were distorted by features which were inherent to the centrally planned system itself.
ER  -

COUFALOVÁ, Lucie, Štěpán MIKULA a Libor ŽÍDEK. Misreporting in financial statements in a centrally planned economy: The case of Czechoslovak state-owned enterprises in late socialism. \textit{Accounting History}. London: SAGE PUBLICATIONS LTD, 2023, roč.~28, č.~1, s.~170-191. ISSN~1032-3732. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1177/10323732221109652.

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