What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech
Republic

J 2023

What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic

CHINI, Jakub; Martin KVIZDA a Ondřej ŠPETÍK

Základní údaje

Originální název

What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic

Název česky

Jaká je reálná tržní síla incumbenta? Případová studie na Českou republiku

Autoři

CHINI, Jakub; Martin KVIZDA a Ondřej ŠPETÍK

Vydání

Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, LONDON, SAGE, 2023, 1783-5917

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Stát vydavatele

Turecko

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/23:00130162

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063

EID Scopus

2-s2.0-85147164975

Klíčová slova anglicky

assessment of market power; relevant market; dominant position; railway industry

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 31. 1. 2026 18:05, Eliška Poláčková

Anotace

V originále

After an introduction of competition due to liberalisation, there is an expectation of lower prices and better quality. However, these overall positive effects could be also driven by the incumbent's incentive to exclude competition within the liberalised markets. Such a situation occurred on the Prague-Ostrava line where liberalisation brought lower prices and an increase in quality. However, it also brought multiple accusations by both the Czech competition authority and the European Commission of the state-owned incumbent, České dráhy, that it had engaged in predatory pricing. This paper then assesses whether the price decreases within this line were driven by actual competition or by predatory behaviour of České dráhy by analysing the position of České dráhy. The aim of this paper therefore is to assess the real market power of the Czech state incumbent, České dráhy, on the Prague-Ostrava line. To achieve this aim, we used unique data we had gathered from our previous research (such as price development, market shares and customer behaviour). Our results then show that it is unlikely that České dráhy could have acted independently of its competitors and customers, which indicates that it could not have had a dominant position.

Návaznosti

EF16_026/0008430, projekt VaV

Název: Nová mobilita - vysokorychlostní dopravní systémy a dopravní chování populace

Přiložené soubory

17835917231153063.pdf

Požádat o autorskou verzi souboru

What_is_the_real_power_of_incumbents.pdf Verze souboru

Citovat

CHINI, Jakub; Martin KVIZDA a Ondřej ŠPETÍK. What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic. Competition and Regulation in Network Industries. LONDON: SAGE, 2023, roč. 24, č. 1, s. 24-39. ISSN 1783-5917. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063.

@article{2245103,
   author = {Chini, Jakub and Kvizda, Martin and Špetík, Ondřej},
   article_location = {LONDON},
   article_number = {1},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063},
   keywords = {assessment of market power; relevant market; dominant position; railway industry},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {1783-5917},
   journal = {Competition and Regulation in Network Industries},
   title = {What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic},
   url = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063},
   volume = {24},
   year = {2023}
}

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AU  - Chini, Jakub - Kvizda, Martin - Špetík, Ondřej
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TI  - What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic
JF  - Competition and Regulation in Network Industries
VL  - 24
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SP  - 24-39
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PB  - SAGE
SN  - 17835917
KW  - assessment of market power
KW  - relevant market
KW  - dominant position
KW  - railway industry
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063
N2  - After an introduction of competition due to liberalisation, there is an expectation of lower prices and better quality. However, these overall positive effects could be also driven by the incumbent's incentive to exclude competition within the liberalised markets. Such a situation occurred on the Prague-Ostrava line where liberalisation brought lower prices and an increase in quality. However, it also brought multiple accusations by both the Czech competition authority and the European Commission of the state-owned incumbent, České dráhy, that it had engaged in predatory pricing. This paper then assesses whether the price decreases within this line were driven by actual competition or by predatory behaviour of České dráhy by analysing the position of České dráhy. The aim of this paper therefore is to assess the real market power of the Czech state incumbent, České dráhy, on the Prague-Ostrava line. To achieve this aim, we used unique data we had gathered from our previous research (such as price development, market shares and customer behaviour). Our results then show that it is unlikely that České dráhy could have acted independently of its competitors and customers, which indicates that it could not have had a dominant position.
ER  -

CHINI, Jakub; Martin KVIZDA a Ondřej ŠPETÍK. What is the real power of incumbents? Case study on the Czech Republic. \textit{Competition and Regulation in Network Industries}. LONDON: SAGE, 2023, roč.~24, č.~1, s.~24-39. ISSN~1783-5917. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1177/17835917231153063.

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