A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

u 2023

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

HANELT, Etienne a Attila VINCZE

Základní údaje

Originální název

A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary

Autoři

HANELT, Etienne (276 Německo, garant, domácí) a Attila VINCZE (348 Maďarsko, domácí)

Vydání

1. vyd. Brno, 20 s. 2023

Nakladatel

JUSTIN Working Paper Series

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Účelové publikace

Obor

50501 Law

Stát vydavatele

Česká republika

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

Open access časopisu

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14220/23:00133124

Organizační jednotka

Právnická fakulta

ISSN

Klíčová slova anglicky

judiciary; judicial independence; hybrid regime; Hungary; rule of law; patronage

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam

Změněno: 22. 1. 2024 14:33, Mgr. Petra Georgala

Anotace

V originále

Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.

Návaznosti

101002660, interní kód MU

Název: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Akronym: INFINITY)

Investor: Evropská unie, Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay, ERC (Excellent Science)

Citovat

HANELT, Etienne a Attila VINCZE. A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary. 1. vyd. Brno: JUSTIN Working Paper Series, 2023, 20 s. ISSN 2336-4785.

@misc{2364038,
   author = {Hanelt, Etienne and Vincze, Attila},
   address = {Brno},
   edition = {1},
   keywords = {judiciary; judicial independence; hybrid regime; Hungary; rule of law; patronage},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Brno},
   publisher = {JUSTIN Working Paper Series},
   title = {A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary},
   url = {https://justin.law.muni.cz/media/3574710/hanelt-vincze_a-hybrid-judiciary-in-a-hybrid-regime-2023.pdf},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - GEN
ID  - 2364038
AU  - Hanelt, Etienne - Vincze, Attila
PY  - 2023
TI  - A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary
VL  - Neuveden
PB  - JUSTIN Working Paper Series
CY  - Brno
KW  - judiciary
KW  - judicial independence
KW  - hybrid regime
KW  - Hungary
KW  - rule of law
KW  - patronage
UR  - https://justin.law.muni.cz/media/3574710/hanelt-vincze_a-hybrid-judiciary-in-a-hybrid-regime-2023.pdf
N2  - Hybrid regimes occupy a middle ground between democracies and autocracies. We argue that the same applies to their rule of law. Just as hybrid regimes maintain the façade of democracy, they sustain judiciaries that seemingly mirror those of a functioning Rechtsstaat. This is paradigmatically shown in Hungary, a case tightly integrated into international organisations such as the European Union and the Council of Europe. Due to constitutional and international demands for judicial independence, informal means are used to exercise control over judges. Building on interviews with Hungarian judges, we propose that the influence over the judiciary is divided among three institutions: the Supreme Court (Kúria), the National Judicial Office, and the Constitutional Court. The institutions and their leaders are incentivised to compete for resources and influence, checking each other at the expense of a de facto independent judiciary. The institutions are constantly redesigned based on their efficacy and reliability and due to external constraints, resulting in an ebb and flow of their power and influence. We conclude that hybrid regimes can maintain the appearance of the rule of law by delegating and incentivizing control over the judiciary. They thereby escape measurement, maintain plausible deniability, and evade international pressure.
ER  -

HANELT, Etienne a Attila VINCZE. \textit{A Hybrid Judiciary in a Hybrid Regime: A Case Study on Hungary}. 1. vyd. Brno: JUSTIN Working Paper Series, 2023, 20 s. ISSN~2336-4785.

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