2024
The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions
KOSAŘ, David, Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ a Ondřej KADLECZákladní údaje
Originální název
The Case for Judicial Councils as Fourth-Branch Institutions
Autoři
KOSAŘ, David (203 Česká republika, domácí), Katarína ŠIPULOVÁ (703 Slovensko, domácí) a Ondřej KADLEC (203 Česká republika, domácí)
Vydání
European constitutional law review, Cambridge, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2024, 1574-0196
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor
50501 Law
Stát vydavatele
Velká Británie a Severní Irsko
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Odkazy
Impakt faktor
Impact factor: 2.100 v roce 2022
Organizační jednotka
Právnická fakulta
UT WoS
001174005900001
Klíčová slova anglicky
Judicial councils; separation of powers; fourth-branch institutions; judicial independence; four ideal types of judicial councils; a judge-controlled
Štítky
Příznaky
Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 22. 4. 2024 13:24, Mgr. Petra Georgala
Anotace
V originále
Many European countries have transferred powers concerning judicial careers and court administration to judicial councils. These independent bodies were intended to depoliticise the judiciary, maintain a balance between judicial independence and accountability, and ideally increase the quality and efficiency of the judicial branch. Supranational organisations, judges, policymakers, lawyers and political scientists argue vehemently whether judicial councils delivered the goods they promised. Constitutional theorists lag behind. They either skipped the debate on where to place judicial councils within the separation of powers, assuming that they belonged to the judicial branch, or lament that judicial councils violate the classical tripartite separation of powers without addressing new advancement in the separation of powers scholarship. This article aims to fill this gap and theorises about the place and role of judicial councils in the separation of powers. It argues that all judicial councils gravitate towards one of four ideal types – judge-controlled, politician-controlled, inter-branch and fourth-branch – each placing the judicial council in a different position vis-à-vis the three classical branches. Based on the experience with judicial councils so far, we argue that conceptualising judicial councils as fourth-branch institutions provides the best protection against the two greatest dangers judicial councils face – corporativism and politicisation.
Návaznosti
101002660, interní kód MU |
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