LEISURE, Patrick Casey a David KOSAŘ. Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover. Law & Policy. John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, Neuveden, 24 March, s. 1-21. ISSN 0265-8240. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238.
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Základní údaje
Originální název Court-hoarding: Another method of gaming judicial turnover
Autoři LEISURE, Patrick Casey (203 Česká republika, domácí) a David KOSAŘ (203 Česká republika, domácí).
Vydání Law & Policy, John Wiley & Sons and the University of Denver, 2024, 0265-8240.
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Článek v odborném periodiku
Obor 50501 Law
Stát vydavatele Spojené státy
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
WWW Open access článku
Impakt faktor Impact factor: 1.300 v roce 2022
Organizační jednotka Právnická fakulta
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12238
UT WoS 999
Klíčová slova anglicky judicial overstay; judicial tenure; conceptual utility; performance of functions
Štítky rivok
Příznaky Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změnil Změnila: Mgr. Petra Georgala, učo 32967. Změněno: 26. 3. 2024 08:36.
Anotace
While a slew of recent scholarship has examined the phenomenon of executive overstay, there is little talk about the more complex and equally vexing phenomena of judicial overstay. This article begins to examine the many layers and complexities of judicial overstay by exploring whether the political branches ever seek to prolong abusively the time in office of loyal judges, and if so, by what mechanisms. Illustrating this is not merely a theoretical practice, we label such a phenomenon court-hoarding, and consider it a subset of the broader category of judicial overstay. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we argue that while court-hoarding is a somewhat risky and less-known governance tactic that is likely to occur only when certain conditions are fulfilled, the potential benefits of court-hoarding for power consolidation and institutional monopoly power are profound. Second, we contribute to the emerging literature on judicial tenure. More specifically, we add conceptual utility to thinking about judicial tenure— and its abuse—by describing a three-layer model of court-hoarding, consisting of a core, a mid-layer, and a periphery, which correspond to three broad categor of influencing judicial tenure across time and space.
Návaznosti
101002660, interní kód MUNázev: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Akronym: INFINITY)
Investor: Evropská unie, Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay, ERC (Excellent Science)
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 19. 7. 2024 22:18