Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of
entitlement and self-selection effects

J 2024

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína a Rostislav STANĚK

Základní údaje

Originální název

Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects

Autoři

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína a Rostislav STANĚK

Vydání

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, NEW YORK, ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, 0176-2680

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 2.000 v roce 2022

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526

UT WoS

001220212100001

Klíčová slova anglicky

Entitlement effect; Self-selection; Contest; Experiment

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 1. 7. 2024 13:11, Mgr. Alžběta Karolyiová

Anotace

V originále

Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.

Návaznosti

GA21-25331S, projekt VaV

Název: Konflikty jako nedorozumění: tři experimentální studie

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Konflikty jako nedorozumění: tři experimentální studie

Citovat

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína a Rostislav STANĚK. Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects. EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, roč. 82, March, s. 1-10. ISSN 0176-2680. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526.

@article{2390659,
   author = {Čellárová, Katarína and Staněk, Rostislav},
   article_location = {NEW YORK},
   article_number = {March},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526},
   keywords = {Entitlement effect; Self-selection; Contest; Experiment},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0176-2680},
   journal = {EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY},
   title = {Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects},
   volume = {82},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2390659
AU  - Čellárová, Katarína - Staněk, Rostislav
PY  - 2024
TI  - Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects
JF  - EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
VL  - 82
IS  - March
SP  - 1-10
EP  - 1-10
PB  - ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC
SN  - 01762680
KW  - Entitlement effect
KW  - Self-selection
KW  - Contest
KW  - Experiment
N2  - Leaders who decide the allocation of resources are often chosen through contests. Due to imperfect monitoring, they often decide to allocate resources to themselves at the expense of others. This paper investigates how being selected in a contest affects such allocation through two channels: entitlement and self-selection effects. In our experiment, two players compete for the right to allocate resources between themself and a third, uninvolved player. We identify the entitlement effects by comparing the choices of participants who participated in the contest with those who were chosen randomly. Self-selection effect is identified by comparing the choices of winners and losers between treatments via a difference-in-difference approach. We find a significant effect of entitlement; people participating in the contest transfer fewer resources to the third player compared to those who did not participate. Further, we find no evidence that the people with specific distributional preferences self-select into the leaders’ role. Our findings suggest that the primary reason leaders allocate resources to themselves is their involvement in the contest rather than being a result of self-selection.
ER  -

ČELLÁROVÁ, Katarína a Rostislav STANĚK. Contest and resource allocation: An experimental analysis of entitlement and self-selection effects. \textit{EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY}. NEW YORK: ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC, 2024, roč.~82, March, s.~1-10. ISSN~0176-2680. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102526.

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