ŠIPULOVÁ, Katarína a David KOSAŘ. Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place. Hague Journal on the Rule of Law. 2024. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y.
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Základní údaje
Originální název Purging the Judiciary After a Transition: Between a Rock and a Hard Place
Autoři ŠIPULOVÁ, Katarína a David KOSAŘ.
Vydání Hague Journal on the Rule of Law, 2024.
Další údaje
Originální jazyk angličtina
Typ výsledku Článek v odborném periodiku
Utajení není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
WWW Fulltext
Organizační jednotka Právnická fakulta
Doi http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40803-024-00201-y
Klíčová slova anglicky lustration, judges, courts, judicial purges, transition, Czech Republic
Příznaky Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změnil Změnila: Mgr. et Mgr. Katarína Šipulová, Ph.D., MSt, učo 182643. Změněno: 10. 6. 2024 15:42.
Anotace
udges play a key role in the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms. Yet, less attention has been paid so far to the question of how to address their collaboration with non-democratic regimes. In theory, judges can be subjected to virtually all transitional justice mechanisms ranging from criminal prosecution and lustration to truth-seeking, or even amnesties. However, we show in a case study of Czechia that these mechanisms are not well equipped to address the complicity of judges in past crimes for three reasons: (1) judges usually play different roles in past crimes from political elites, (2) the principles of the separation of powers and judicial independence preclude the easy replacement of judges, and (3) pragmatic exigencies, such as the shortage of lawyers who are not tainted by cooperation with the previous regime, further complicate the renewal of the bench. Nevertheless, we argue that the lack of recognition of the role judges have played in non-democratic regimes is dangerous, as it may negatively affect public confidence in the judiciary and taint its legitimacy. Examples from Hungary, Poland and Romania, moreover, show that populist leaders are tempted to abuse the transitional justice rhetoric use the failure to deal with the past of judges as a justification for their court-curbing practices. Post-transition purges are therefore stuck between a rock (interfering in judicial independence and practical exigencies) and a hard place (mental dependence of the judiciary on the previous regime, low public trust in courts). When the democratic opposition defeats the populist leader, such as in Poland in 2023, it unfortunately faces the same dilemma. Thus, the Czech way of dealing with the past within the judiciary in transition from communism to democracy (transition 1.0) provides important insights also for today’s undoing of populist judicial reforms and transition from authoritarian populism to democracy (transition 2.0).
Návaznosti
101002660, interní kód MUNázev: Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay (Akronym: INFINITY)
Investor: Evropská unie, Informal Judicial Institutions: Invisible Determinants of Democratic Decay, ERC (Excellent Science)
VytisknoutZobrazeno: 14. 7. 2024 01:46