Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of
Computer

D 2023

Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer

MACÁK, Martin, Radek OŠLEJŠEK a Barbora BÜHNOVÁ

Základní údaje

Originální název

Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer

Autoři

MACÁK, Martin (703 Slovensko, garant, domácí), Radek OŠLEJŠEK (203 Česká republika, domácí) a Barbora BÜHNOVÁ (203 Česká republika, domácí)

Vydání

Neuveden, 2023 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom), od s. 1935-1940, 6 s. 2023

Nakladatel

IEEE

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Stať ve sborníku

Obor

10201 Computer sciences, information science, bioinformatics

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Forma vydání

elektronická verze "online"

Odkazy

URL

Organizační jednotka

Fakulta informatiky

ISBN

979-8-3503-8200-6

DOI

http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263

Klíčová slova anglicky

insider attack;process visualization;cybersecurity;traitor;organization

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 29. 6. 2024 19:29, doc. Ing. RNDr. Barbora Bühnová, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

Insider attacks in organizations are currently one of the most crucial cybersecurity challenges. Traitors are one of the most dangerous types of insider attackers. They are difficult to detect because they know the organization, processes, defense mechanisms, and employees. Besides abusing their rights and accesses, they can use their co-workers’ rights and accesses. They can hide their activities to perform attacks inconspicuously. The current masquerader detection techniques usually rely on the fact that the masquerader is an outsider, making them unable to detect attacks from the traitor. To detect these insider attackers, which we call masquerading traitors, we propose the human-as-solution approach and engage the employees in deciding whether the usage of their rights and accesses is suspicious and, therefore, might be performed by a masquerading traitor.

Návaznosti

MUNI/G/1142/2022, interní kód MU

Název: Forensic Support for Building Trust in Smart Software Ecosystems

Investor: Masarykova univerzita, Forensic Support for Building Trust in Smart Software Ecosystems, INTERDISCIPLINARY - Mezioborové výzkumné projekty

Citovat

MACÁK, Martin, Radek OŠLEJŠEK a Barbora BÜHNOVÁ. Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer. Online. In 2023 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom). Neuveden: IEEE, 2023, s. 1935-1940. ISBN 979-8-3503-8200-6. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263.

@inproceedings{2410863,
   author = {Macák, Martin and Ošlejšek, Radek and Bühnová, Barbora},
   address = {Neuveden},
   booktitle = {2023 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)},
   doi = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263},
   keywords = {insider attack;process visualization;cybersecurity;traitor;organization},
   howpublished = {elektronická verze "online"},
   language = {eng},
   location = {Neuveden},
   isbn = {979-8-3503-8200-6},
   pages = {1935-1940},
   publisher = {IEEE},
   title = {Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer},
   url = {https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10538928},
   year = {2023}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2410863
AU  - Macák, Martin - Ošlejšek, Radek - Bühnová, Barbora
PY  - 2023
TI  - Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer
PB  - IEEE
CY  - Neuveden
SN  - 9798350382006
KW  - insider attack;process visualization;cybersecurity;traitor;organization
UR  - https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10538928
N2  - Insider attacks in organizations are currently one of the most crucial cybersecurity challenges. Traitors are one of the most dangerous types of insider attackers. They are difficult to detect because they know the organization, processes, defense mechanisms, and employees. Besides abusing their rights and accesses, they can use their co-workers’ rights and accesses. They can hide their activities to perform attacks inconspicuously. The current masquerader detection techniques usually rely on the fact that the masquerader is an outsider, making them unable to detect attacks from the traitor. To detect these insider attackers, which we call masquerading traitors, we propose the human-as-solution approach and engage the employees in deciding whether the usage of their rights and accesses is suspicious and, therefore, might be performed by a masquerading traitor.
ER  -

MACÁK, Martin, Radek OŠLEJŠEK a Barbora BÜHNOVÁ. Detecting Masquerading Traitors from Process Visualization of Computer. Online. In \textit{2023 IEEE 22nd International Conference on Trust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (TrustCom)}. Neuveden: IEEE, 2023, s.~1935-1940. ISBN~979-8-3503-8200-6. Dostupné z: https://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TrustCom60117.2023.00263.

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