Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest
bias and inequality

J 2024

Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher S. COTTON; Enrico LONGO a Tommaso REGGIANI

Základní údaje

Originální název

Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality

Autoři

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher S. COTTON; Enrico LONGO a Tommaso REGGIANI

Vydání

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS, NETHERLANDS, ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2024, 0047-2727

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50202 Applied Economics, Econometrics

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 3.400

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/24:00139485

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

Multiple public goods; Donor heterogeneity; Crowdfunding; Lab experiment

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 13. 1. 2025 11:07, Tommaso Reggiani, PhD

Anotace

V originále

We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.

Návaznosti

GA20-06785S, projekt VaV

Název: Experimentální analýza problematiky přispívání na vícenásobné veřejné statky

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Experimental analysis of multiple public goods funding dilemmas

Přiložené soubory

CCLR_2024_jpube.pdf

Citovat

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher S. COTTON; Enrico LONGO a Tommaso REGGIANI. Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS. NETHERLANDS: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2024, roč. 238, October, s. 1-21. ISSN 0047-2727. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172.

@article{2419278,
   author = {Corazzini, Luca and Cotton, Christopher S. and Longo, Enrico and Reggiani, Tommaso},
   article_location = {NETHERLANDS},
   article_number = {October},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172},
   keywords = {Multiple public goods; Donor heterogeneity; Crowdfunding; Lab experiment},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0047-2727},
   journal = {JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS},
   title = {Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality},
   url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087},
   volume = {238},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2419278
AU  - Corazzini, Luca - Cotton, Christopher S. - Longo, Enrico - Reggiani, Tommaso
PY  - 2024
TI  - Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality
JF  - JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS
VL  - 238
IS  - October
SP  - 1-21
EP  - 1-21
PB  - ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA
SN  - 00472727
KW  - Multiple public goods
KW  - Donor heterogeneity
KW  - Crowdfunding
KW  - Lab experiment
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0047272724001087
N2  - We extend a collective action problem to study policy and project selection by heterogeneous groups who prefer to work together on a joint initiative but may disagree on which initiative is best. Our framework, adapted from a model of multiple threshold public goods, presents groups with several mutually exclusive projects, any of which require sufficient support from the group to succeed. Individuals strictly prefer to contribute where and how much they believe others expect of them to ensure joint project success. Groups tend to coordinate on the public good preferred by the wealthiest member, demonstrating a wealthy-interest bias even without corruption, politics, and information asymmetries. At the same time, groups divide costs in highly progressive ways, with the wealthy voluntarily funding a disproportionate share, helping offset the inherent inequality from endowment and selection differences. We discuss applications for policy selection, charitable giving, and taxes.
ER  -

CORAZZINI, Luca; Christopher S. COTTON; Enrico LONGO a Tommaso REGGIANI. Coordinated selection of collective action: Wealthy-interest bias and inequality. \textit{JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS}. NETHERLANDS: ELSEVIER SCIENCE SA, 2024, roč.~238, October, s.~1-21. ISSN~0047-2727. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2024.105172.

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