Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the
rationalization and existential insecurity theories

k 2024

Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories

LANG, Martin

Basic information

Original name

Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories

Authors

LANG, Martin

Edition

Explaining Atheism: Atheismu Explained? The capstone conference of the Explaining Atheism programme, 26-28 June 2024, Oxford, UK, 2024

Other information

Language

English

Type of outcome

Presentations at conferences

Field of Study

60304 Religious studies

Country of publisher

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Confidentiality degree

is not subject to a state or trade secret

References:

URL

Organization unit

Faculty of Arts

Keywords in English

Abstract

In the original language

This registered report tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing insecurity. We will use an experimental framework where 880 secular participants from the USA and Poland will play a modified version of the Nash demand game, which simulates cooperative dilemmas indexing cooperative insecurity. To simulate institutions regulating cooperative dilemmas, participants will be offered a choice to play the game in a group without norms or with prosocial norms with extra entry requirements and a possibility of punishing non-normative behavior. Using a 2x2 between-subjects design, participants will be randomly assigned to either a secure or insecure condition, manipulated by the parameters of the Nash demand game. Next, participants will be randomly assigned either to a secular condition (choosing between a normative group and a group with no norms) or a religious condition (choosing between a normative group with religious framing and a group without norms). After the random assignment, participants will choose whether to play the demand game in a normative or non-normative group and make their game choice (withdrawing money from a common pool). We will test the two competing theories by analyzing whether insecurity increases the probability of choosing a religious normative group. The talk will discuss the results of this project and broader implications for the two theories.

Links

QUB_2022, interní kód MU

Name: Existential security, secular institutions, and group norms: Explaining the rise of non-theism

Investor: Ostatní - foreign, Existential security, secular institutions, and group norms: Explaining the rise of non-theism

Cite

LANG, Martin. Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories. In Explaining Atheism: Atheismu Explained? The capstone conference of the Explaining Atheism programme, 26-28 June 2024, Oxford, UK. 2024.

@proceedings{2430660,
   author = {Lang, Martin},
   booktitle = {Explaining Atheism: Atheismu Explained? The capstone conference of the Explaining Atheism programme, 26-28 June 2024, Oxford, UK},
   keywords = {register report; secularization; existential insecurity; rationalization; economic game},
   language = {eng},
   title = {Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories},
   url = {https://www.explainingatheism.org/the-atheism-explained-conference-2024},
   year = {2024}
}

TY  - CONF
ID  - 2430660
AU  - Lang, Martin
PY  - 2024
TI  - Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories
KW  - register report
KW  - secularization
KW  - existential insecurity
KW  - rationalization
KW  - economic game
UR  - https://www.explainingatheism.org/the-atheism-explained-conference-2024
N2  - This registered report tests two competing explanations of the secularization process related to rationalizing worldviews and decreasing insecurity. We will use an experimental framework where 880 secular participants from the USA and Poland will play a modified version of the Nash demand game, which simulates cooperative dilemmas indexing cooperative insecurity. To simulate institutions regulating cooperative dilemmas, participants will be offered a choice to play the game in a group without norms or with prosocial norms with extra entry requirements and a possibility of punishing non-normative behavior. Using a 2x2 between-subjects design, participants will be randomly assigned to either a secure or insecure condition, manipulated by the parameters of the Nash demand game. Next, participants will be randomly assigned either to a secular condition (choosing between a normative group and a group with no norms) or a religious condition (choosing between a normative group with religious framing and a group without norms). After the random assignment, participants will choose whether to play the demand game in a normative or non-normative group and make their game choice (withdrawing money from a common pool). We will test the two competing theories by analyzing whether insecurity increases the probability of choosing a religious normative group. The talk will discuss the results of this project and broader implications for the two theories.
ER  -

LANG, Martin. Mechanisms of secularization : Testing between the rationalization and existential insecurity theories. In \textit{Explaining Atheism: Atheismu Explained? The capstone conference of the Explaining Atheism programme, 26-28 June 2024, Oxford, UK}. 2024.

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