2024
Hierarchical Modeling of Cyber Assets in Kill Chain Attack Graphs
SADLEK, Lukáš; Martin HUSÁK a Pavel ČELEDAZákladní údaje
Originální název
Hierarchical Modeling of Cyber Assets in Kill Chain Attack Graphs
Autoři
Vydání
New York, NY, 2024 20th International Conference on Network and Service Management (CNSM), od s. 1-5, 5 s. 2024
Nakladatel
IFIP Open Digital Library, IEEE Xplore
Další údaje
Jazyk
angličtina
Typ výsledku
Stať ve sborníku
Obor
10200 1.2 Computer and information sciences
Utajení
není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství
Forma vydání
elektronická verze "online"
Označené pro přenos do RIV
Ano
Kód RIV
RIV/00216224:14610/24:00137295
Organizační jednotka
Ústav výpočetní techniky
ISBN
978-3-903176-66-9
ISSN
UT WoS
EID Scopus
Klíčová slova anglicky
attack graph;kill chain;cyber threat scenario;MITRE ATT&CK;MITRE D3FEND
Příznaky
Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno
Změněno: 4. 4. 2025 13:11, Mgr. Eva Špillingová
Anotace
V originále
Cyber threat modeling is a proactive method for identifying possible cyber attacks on network infrastructure that has a wide range of applications in security assessment, risk analysis, and threat exposure management. Popular modeling methods are kill chains and attack graphs. Kill chains divide attacks into phases, and attack graphs depict attack paths. A difficult issue is how to hierarchically model categories of cyber assets that should be used in threat models due to the variety of cyber systems in the current networks. This task should be addressed to provide automation of realistic threat modeling and interoperability with public knowledge bases, such as MITRE ATT&CK. In this paper, we propose a hierarchical modeling methodology for representing cyber assets in kill chain attack graphs. We illustrate its practical application on MITRE D3FEND’s Digital Artifact Ontology. Moreover, we define how cyber assets with related attack techniques should be transformed into logical facts and attack rules. We implemented proof-of-concept software modules that can process data obtained from network and host-based monitoring together with attack rules to generate attack graphs. We evaluated the approach with data from a cyber exercise captured in a network of a digital twin organization. The results show that the approach is applicable in real-world networks and can reveal ground-truth attacks.