The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global
public good

J 2025

The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good

ABRAHAM, Diya Elizabeth; Katarína GLEJTKOVÁ a Ondřej KRČÁL

Základní údaje

Originální název

The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good

Autoři

ABRAHAM, Diya Elizabeth; Katarína GLEJTKOVÁ a Ondřej KRČÁL

Vydání

ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS, AMSTERDAM, ELSEVIER, 2025, 0921-8009

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

50200 5.2 Economics and Business

Stát vydavatele

Nizozemské království

Utajení

není předmětem státního či obchodního tajemství

Odkazy

URL

Impakt faktor

Impact factor: 6.300 v roce 2024

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Ano

Kód RIV

RIV/00216224:14560/25:00140333

Organizační jednotka

Ekonomicko-správní fakulta

Klíčová slova anglicky

Minimum contribution level; Dictator game; Public goods game; Climate change

Štítky

rivok

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 24. 2. 2026 15:31, Eliška Poláčková

Anotace

V originále

We study how different types of individuals respond to being forced to make a minimum contribution to a global public good. Participants in our experiment decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards offsetting CO2 emissions. We elicit their contributions when they are free to spend any amount of their endowment on carbon offsets and when they are forced to spend a certain minimum amount on it. We find that those who contribute more than the minimum before it is imposed contribute less overall once the minimum comes into effect. This is true for both a low and a high level of the minimum and appears to be driven in part by pessimistic beliefs about the contributions of others. We show that the lower minimum also reduces overall contributions relative to a situation with no minimum. We do not find evidence that having the level of the minimum determined through a majority vote rather than an exogenous procedure has any material impact on these results.

Návaznosti

GA20-23131S, projekt VaV

Název: Transformace českých podniků: socialistické podniky v tržní ekonomice

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Transformace českých podniků: socialistické podniky v tržní ekonomice

LX22NPO5101, projekt VaV

Název: Národní institut pro výzkum socioekonomických dopadů nemocí a systémových rizik (Akronym: SYRI)

Investor: Ministerstvo školství, mládeže a tělovýchovy ČR, Národní institut pro výzkum socioekonomických dopadů nemocí a systémových rizik, 5.1 EXCELES

Přiložené soubory

Abraham__Glejtkova__Krcal_2025.pdf

Citovat

ABRAHAM, Diya Elizabeth; Katarína GLEJTKOVÁ a Ondřej KRČÁL. The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good. ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER, 2025, roč. 227, January, s. 1-20. ISSN 0921-8009. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346.

@article{2446038,
   author = {Abraham, Diya Elizabeth and Glejtková, Katarína and Krčál, Ondřej},
   article_location = {AMSTERDAM},
   article_number = {January},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346},
   keywords = {Minimum contribution level; Dictator game; Public goods game; Climate change},
   language = {eng},
   issn = {0921-8009},
   journal = {ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS},
   title = {The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good},
   url = {https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X},
   volume = {227},
   year = {2025}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2446038
AU  - Abraham, Diya Elizabeth - Glejtková, Katarína - Krčál, Ondřej
PY  - 2025
TI  - The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good
JF  - ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS
VL  - 227
IS  - January
SP  - 1-20
EP  - 1-20
PB  - ELSEVIER
SN  - 09218009
KW  - Minimum contribution level
KW  - Dictator game
KW  - Public goods game
KW  - Climate change
UR  - https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S092180092400243X
N2  - We study how different types of individuals respond to being forced to make a minimum contribution to a global public good. Participants in our experiment decide how much of their endowment to contribute towards offsetting CO2 emissions. We elicit their contributions when they are free to spend any amount of their endowment on carbon offsets and when they are forced to spend a certain minimum amount on it. We find that those who contribute more than the minimum before it is imposed contribute less overall once the minimum comes into effect. This is true for both a low and a high level of the minimum and appears to be driven in part by pessimistic beliefs about the contributions of others. We show that the lower minimum also reduces overall contributions relative to a situation with no minimum. We do not find evidence that having the level of the minimum determined through a majority vote rather than an exogenous procedure has any material impact on these results.
ER  -

ABRAHAM, Diya Elizabeth; Katarína GLEJTKOVÁ a Ondřej KRČÁL. The hidden costs of imposing minimum contributions to a global public good. \textit{ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS}. AMSTERDAM: ELSEVIER, 2025, roč.~227, January, s.~1-20. ISSN~0921-8009. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2024.108346.

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