Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment
signaling for cooperative assortment

J 2026

Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment

LANG, Martin; Alexandra RUŽIČKOVÁ; Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ; Eva KUNDTOVÁ KLOCOVÁ; Radim CHVAJA et al.

Základní údaje

Originální název

Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment

Autoři

LANG, Martin ; Alexandra RUŽIČKOVÁ ; Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ; Eva KUNDTOVÁ KLOCOVÁ a Radim CHVAJA

Vydání

iScience, CELL PRESS, 2026

Další údaje

Jazyk

angličtina

Typ výsledku

Článek v odborném periodiku

Obor

60304 Religious studies

Stát vydavatele

Spojené státy

Odkazy

URL

Označené pro přenos do RIV

Organizační jednotka

Filozofická fakulta

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.114549

Klíčová slova anglicky

commitment; costly signaling; intuition; deliberation

Příznaky

Mezinárodní význam, Recenzováno

Změněno: 20. 1. 2026 11:18, doc. Mgr. Martin Lang, Ph.D.

Anotace

V originále

While costly signals of commitment were proposed to facilitate cooperative assortment in humans, little is known about cognitive processes facilitating the reliability of such commitment signals. Across three studies (total N = 2,223), we test whether this reliability is supported by intuitive processes or by deliberative cost-benefit evaluations. Participants played a public goods game in which they could send variously costly signals of commitment, and the signaling decision was made either under time pressure or delay. Under pressure, signals separated cooperators from selfish players only when signal cost was high. However, these intuitive, high-cost signals did not consistently predict subsequent cooperation. By contrast, when participants had time to deliberate under time delay, cooperators selectively chose the low-cost signal more often than selfish players and contributed more to the common pool. These findings suggest that reliable commitment signaling depends less on intuitive attraction to costly displays and more on deliberative cost-benefit evaluation where cooperators optimize signal cost.

Návaznosti

GA23-05655S, projekt VaV

Název: Psychologie signalizace: Výzkum komputací umožňujících kooperativní komunikaci

Investor: Grantová agentura ČR, Psychologie signalizace: Výzkum komputací umožňujících kooperativní komunikaci

Přiložené soubory

PIIS258900422502810X.pdf

Citovat

LANG, Martin; Alexandra RUŽIČKOVÁ; Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ; Eva KUNDTOVÁ KLOCOVÁ a Radim CHVAJA. Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment. Online. iScience. CELL PRESS, 2026, roč. 29, č. 2, s. 114549-114558. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.114549.

@article{2548578,
   author = {Lang, Martin and Ružičková, Alexandra and Čellárová, Katarína and Kundtová Klocová, Eva and Chvaja, Radim},
   article_number = {2},
   doi = {https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.114549},
   keywords = {commitment; costly signaling; intuition; deliberation},
   language = {eng},
   journal = {iScience},
   title = {Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment},
   url = {https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(25)02810-X},
   volume = {29},
   year = {2026}
}

TY  - JOUR
ID  - 2548578
AU  - Lang, Martin - Ružičková, Alexandra - Čellárová, Katarína - Kundtová Klocová, Eva - Chvaja, Radim
PY  - 2026
TI  - Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment
JF  - iScience
VL  - 29
IS  - 2
SP  - 114549
EP  - 114549
PB  - CELL PRESS
KW  - commitment
KW  - costly signaling
KW  - intuition
KW  - deliberation
UR  - https://www.cell.com/iscience/fulltext/S2589-0042(25)02810-X
N2  - While costly signals of commitment were proposed to facilitate cooperative assortment in humans, little is known about cognitive processes facilitating the reliability of such commitment signals. Across three studies (total N = 2,223), we test whether this reliability is supported by intuitive processes or by deliberative cost-benefit evaluations. Participants played a public goods game in which they could send variously costly signals of commitment, and the signaling decision was made either under time pressure or delay. Under pressure, signals separated cooperators from selfish players only when signal cost was high. However, these intuitive, high-cost signals did not consistently predict subsequent cooperation. By contrast, when participants had time to deliberate under time delay, cooperators selectively chose the low-cost signal more often than selfish players and contributed more to the common pool. These findings suggest that reliable commitment signaling depends less on intuitive attraction to costly displays and more on deliberative cost-benefit evaluation where cooperators optimize signal cost.
ER  -

LANG, Martin; Alexandra RUŽIČKOVÁ; Katarína ČELLÁROVÁ; Eva KUNDTOVÁ KLOCOVÁ a Radim CHVAJA. Intuitive and deliberative processes underlying commitment signaling for cooperative assortment. Online. \textit{iScience}. CELL PRESS, 2026, roč.~29, č.~2, s.~114549-114558. Dostupné z: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.isci.2025.114549.

Přehled o publikaci