RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Hledání jako pojmový postoj (Seeking as Notional Attitude). In Používanie, interpretácia a význam jazykových výrazov. Bratislava: Filozofický ústav SAV, 2004, p. 90-119. ISBN 80-967225-1-4. |
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Basic information | |
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Original name | Hledání jako pojmový postoj |
Name in Czech | Hledání jako pojmový postoj |
Name (in English) | Seeking as Notional Attitude |
Authors | RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Czech Republic, guarantor). |
Edition | Bratislava, Používanie, interpretácia a význam jazykových výrazov, p. 90-119, 30 pp. 2004. |
Publisher | Filozofický ústav SAV |
Other information | |
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Original language | Czech |
Type of outcome | Proceedings paper |
Field of Study | 60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion |
Country of publisher | Slovakia |
Confidentiality degree | is not subject to a state or trade secret |
RIV identification code | RIV/00216224:14210/04:00011574 |
Organization unit | Faculty of Arts |
ISBN | 80-967225-1-4 |
Keywords in English | notional attitudes; propositional attitudes; transparent intensional logic; intensional logic; seeking; looking for |
Tags | intensional logic, looking for, notional attitudes, propositional attitudes, seeking, transparent intensional logic |
Tags | Reviewed |
Changed by | Changed by: prof. PhDr. BcA. Jiří Raclavský, Ph.D., učo 7593. Changed: 25/6/2009 12:58. |
Abstract |
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Pojmové postoje, které jsou charakterizovány jako empirické relace mezi agens (individuem) a (většinou) intenzí, jejíž pojem je nepostradatelný, tj. nesmí být substituován ne-synonymním pojmem jiné intenze. Jinými postoji, které jsou pojmové pojmovými postoji jsou matematické/logické postoje vůči hyperintenzím, které ovšem nejsou konstrukcemi propozic (opět nejsou povoleny substituce výrazů vyjadřujících neekvivalentní pojmy). Pomocí Transparentní intenzionální logiky prozkoumávám, analyzuji a klasifikuji pojmové postoje hledání. |
Abstract (in English) |
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Abstract (Seeking as Notional Attitude): As Quine already recognized, there are attitudes that cannot be read in "relational sense" (extensionally), but exclusively in "notional sense" ("John seeks unicorn"). Montague proposed first "intensional" solution for the case of "seeking". We use and extend generalization of his account as being done by logicians using Tichý's Transparent Intensional Logic. (Empirical) notional attitude is characterized as empirical asymmetric relation between an agent (individual) and an intension (its concept cannot be substituted by the concept of another intension). We distinguish four basic kinds of "search-attitudes": "seeking" of the holder of an individual office, i.e., individual-in-intension (for example who is the murderer of somebody if any), "seeking" of the location of the holder of an office (for example the site of Troy if any), "looking for" the holder of an office (like the author of Waverley), "looking for" the location of the holder of an office (searching where is the murderer of somebody); the cases of relations towards intensions other than individual offices or location-offices are analyzed too. |
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