RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří. Against Kolář's Criticism of Tichý's Bare Individuals (Against Kolář's Critique of Tichý's Bare Individuals). Pro-Fil. Brno: KF FF MU, 2007, vol. 8, No 2, p. 1-11. ISSN 1212-9097.
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Basic information
Original name Against Kolář's Criticism of Tichý's Bare Individuals
Name in Czech Proti Kolářově kritice Tichého holých individuí
Authors RACLAVSKÝ, Jiří (203 Czech Republic, guarantor, belonging to the institution).
Edition Pro-Fil, Brno, KF FF MU, 2007, 1212-9097.
Other information
Original language English
Type of outcome Article in a journal
Field of Study 60300 6.3 Philosophy, Ethics and Religion
Country of publisher Czech Republic
Confidentiality degree is not subject to a state or trade secret
WWW http://profil.muni.cz/02_2007/raclavsky_against_kolars_criticism.pdf
RIV identification code RIV/00216224:14210/07:00020456
Organization unit Faculty of Arts
Keywords in English bare individuals; bare particulars; properties; intensional logic; transparent intensional logic
Tags bare individuals, bare particulars, intensional logic, properties, transparent intensional logic
Tags Reviewed
Changed by Changed by: Ing. Mgr. Zdeňka Jastrzembská, Ph.D., učo 11408. Changed: 10/4/2011 15:35.
Abstract
In the present paper it is defended Tichý's conception of bare individuals against criticism raised by Petr Kolář. Kolář's attempt was in fact misguided because in most of his definitions he construed bare individuals as individuals lacking (certain kind of) properties. However, from Tichý's repeated formulations it is clear enough that bare individuals are individuals such that for any contingent property the individual instantiates, it is possible to lack it. Thus in fact, Kolář criticized conception(s) which was completely not Tichý's own. We discuss also other reasons why Kolář's criticism is wrong.
Abstract (in Czech)
V této stati je obhajována Tichého koncepce holých individuí proti kritice Petra Koláře. Kolářovo úsili je však zcela pochybené, neboť dle jakékoli jeho definice holá individua jsou individui postrádajícími (určitý druh) vlastností. Jenže podle žádné dosud navržené koncepce nejsou holá holá individua individui nahými, tedy bez vlastností. Ba co víc, z Tichého opakovaných formulací je sdodastek zřejmé, že holá individua jsou taková individua, že, pro jakoukoli vlastnost, pokud individuum instanciuje vlastnost, která je kontingentní, pak je možné (existuje možný svět takový), že ji postrádá. Obecný kvantifikátor tedy není v konsekventu příslušné implikace, jak si Kolář myslel. Takže fakticky Kolář kritizoval koncepci, která naprosto nebyla koncepcí Tichého.
Links
GP401/07/P280, research and development projectName: Singulární termíny - filosofie a logika
Investor: Czech Science Foundation, Singular Terms - Philosophy and Logic
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