The usual goals of offensive Side Channel Analysis are mostly two-fold. One is to assess and quantify the presence of side channel leakage, the other is to assume leakage and target the secret key. Both approaches often requires very precise knowledge of the implementation details, this knowledge is usually easy to guess for many cryptographic algorithms, like AES or RSA. However, the space of possible equivalent implementations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is much larger, making such an attack difficult to mount without the knowledge of actual implementation. Furthermore, existing work on attacks assumes the attacker has all of this knowledge, and does not solve the problem of obtaining it, given a black-box implementation.
The goal of this work is to develop an open-source toolkit for side-channel analysis of black-box implementations of Elliptic Curve Cryptography, from power or EM traces. The toolkit will support acquisition and preprocessing of traces, and simulation of ECC computations.
This toolkit will use side-channel analysis methods to extract details about an unknown implementation, such as the curve model, coordinates, addition formulas and scalar multiplication algorithm.
This toolkit will be evaluated on
1) custom implementations on development boards, serving as the ground truth for the methods developed, and on
2) real production JavaCards, which are a popular platform of programmable cryptographic smartcard.

Literature:
Mangard S., Oswald E., Popp T.: Power Analysis Attacks: Revealing the Secrets of Smart Cards, ISBN 978-0-387-38162-6
Rankl W., Effing W.: Smart Card Handbook, ISBN 0-470-85668-8