Since 2015 China has announced its military modernization, which includes the substantial reform of cyberspace. Except for its significant adversary, America, the Asian Pacific region is the first target in cyberspace due to the geographical adjacency and relative vulnerability to non-conventional attacks. The attackers have been launching advanced and persistent malicious operations in Asian countries with interests in China in political or economic fields. Their goals highly overlapped with Chinese national interests, and thus it is assumed that there is sponsorship from state actors behind the APT operations. The state-driven cyberattacks have more influence on the target countries, resulting in profound policies and infrastructure changes. This study aimed to unveil the best practice of counter measurements in Asian Pacific countries based on the suggestions of defensive government networks proposed by Bryce Boland; We compare the strategies of the selected countries, Japan, Taiwan, and ASEAN, to find out the closest model to the well-functional cybersecurity framework. The baseline standards indicate that the government's agile and rapidly reacting procedures, protective coverage of commercial networks, and few occurrences of human mistakes build the most reliable networks against APT attacks. The result showed that Japan's strategy framework is the best fit because of its central management of cyber affairs and substantial international cooperation. At the same time, Taiwan and ASEAN have encountered obstacles of implementation cybersecurity policies, which resulted in inefficient engagement in cybersecurity networks. By modeling the efficient approaches in the APEC region against the neighboring state-driven APT attacks, we take the country with best practices as a reference for future strategies against APT operations.